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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with how and when proprietary relief ought to be available 
in certain commercial situations. The task of the thesis is to contribute to the ongoing 
debate whether and on what basis proprietary relief ought to be available beyond 
settled traditional categories.
Traditional proprietary rules and methodologies are no longer capable of providing a 
logical basis for determining when proprietary relief is appropriate in the receipt and 
collection of money in commercial transactions. Such rules were developed in earlier 
commercial times when commercial transacting was slower and less sophisticated 
than today. In recent times, money, that quintessential commercial commodity, has 
undergone metamorphosis from a tangible physical object to an essentially 
ephemeral electronic impulse. Indeed, in the light of these developments, it is argued 
that the traditional proprietary base requirement encapsulated in common law 
following and equitable tracing is becoming increasingly impractical to meet. 
Therefore, it is suggested that we should abandon the restrictions associated with the 
proprietary base requirement. This was presaged by the ‘swollen assets theory’ 
which operated in some jurisdictions in the United States during the Great 
Depression. Moreover, the weakness and limitations of manipulating traditional 
proprietary relationships such as the trust, fiduciary obligations or subrogation, in an 
ad hoc way in order to achieve a desired result, are highlighted. Instead, it is 
necessary to return to and develop a modem explanation of equitable proprietary 
intervention.
As courts have become more willing to intervene in commercial relationships, equity 
has been an important instmment in commercial intervention, particularly where 
proprietary relief is involved. Equity continues to base its intervention on the 
identification and remedy of unconscionable conduct of various forms. However, in 
recent times the intervention of equity’s provision of proprietary relief in commercial 
relationships has been explained on the basis that a party did not assume the risks 
associated with the commercial transaction (particularly the status of an unsecured 
creditor) because of the insolvent’s unconscionable conduct. Contrary to the 
contentions of common law lawyers (particularly some modem restitution lawyers), 
equity can and does operate on a principled basis.
The concept of non-assumption of risk is the starting point for the development of a 
theory of when a court exercising equitable jurisdiction ought to intervene in
commercial relationships. The concept of non-assumption of risk is not only used in 
the thesis to explain a variety of traditional equitable relationships and remedies, but 
also as a basis for a theory of objective non-assumption of risk which would apply in 
situations where proprietary relief has not been readily available in the past. Under 
the theory of objective non-assumption of risk, the unconscionable conduct of the 
insolvent which has led to a creditor’s unsecured status is remedied. As a proprietary 
base would no longer be a pre-condition to equitable relief, it is argued that a general 
equitable lien would be an appropriate form of remedy where non-assumption of risk 
had been proved. Whether the general equitable lien would extend to assets subject 
to a floating charge or encumbered assets is still to be resolved, although there are 
sound policy reasons both for and against the imposition of a lien in such 
circumstances. It is likely that, notwithstanding the establishment of objective non­
assumption of risk, an insolvent’s administrators would still have certain defences 
open to them and some of the kinds of defences which may be available are 
discussed and evaluated. The theory of objective non-assumption of risk is a natural 
progression and outcome of the continuing breakdown of the divide between 
personal and proprietary relief.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL MATTERS
I In tr o d u c tio n
One of the most difficult issues facing the commercial and insolvency 
lawyers o f the late 20th century is ascertaining and defining the circumstances in 
which a proprietary remedy will be available to aggrieved unsecured creditors in 
insolvency situations.1 23There needs to be a comprehensive and systematic review of 
this issue, otherwise the area will continue to be both contentious and uncertain. It 
has been recognised that the law is still in a formative stage. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that there have been some recent interesting and helpful responses to the 
challenges of proprietary relief in commercial and insolvency situations. This thesis 
is another contribution to the ongoing debate and an attempt to provide a systematic 
approach to the issue of proprietary relief and remedies in commercial transactions.
The problem addressed in this thesis is difficult from both practical and 
theoretical perspectives. A has money which B claims as his own. There would be no 
significant difficulty where A is solvent. B may bring a personal, action or a claim in 
personam to reclaim an amount equivalent to the amount in dispute. However, if  A is 
insolvent, then B is faced with a terrible dilemma - whether or not B has a 
proprietary interest in the money or an alternative security for the money. If B does 
have a proprietary interest in the money, in the monetary value or an alternative
See for example Millett J’s comments in ‘Reviews and Notices’ (1995) 111 The Law Quarterly 
Review 517, 518.
2 Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (In Receivership) [1995] 1 AC 74, 104 (Lord Mustill).
3 See for example Jeffrey Davis, ‘Equitable Liens and Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy: Judicial 
Values and the Limits of Bankruptcy Distribution Policy’ (1989) 41 Florida Law Review 1; Emily L 
Sherwin, ‘Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy’ [1989] University oflllinios Law Review 297; David M 
Paciocco, ‘The Remedial Constructive Trust: A Principled Basis for Priority over Creditors’ (1989) 
68 The Canadian Bar Review 315; WMC Gummow, ‘Unjust Enrichment, Restitution and Proprietary 
Remedies’ in PD Finn (ed), Essays on Restitution (1990) 47; John Glover, ‘Equity, Restitution and 
the Proprietary Recovery of Value’ (1991) 14 The University of New South Wales Law Journal 247; 
Peter BH Birks, ‘Restitution and Resulting Trusts’, in Stephen Goldstein (ed), Equity and 
Contemporary Legal Developments (1992) 335; Paul Finn, ‘Constructive Trusts - A New Era, Equity 
Commerce and Remedy’ (Paper presented at the 1993 New Zealand Law Conference, Wellington 
New Zealand, 2-5 March 1993) vol 1, 203; Charles Mitchell, The Law of Subrogation (1994); Peter 
Birks ‘Establishing a Proprietary Base’ [1994] Restitution Law Review 83; Peter Birks, ‘Proprietary 
Restitution: an Intelligible Approach’ (1995) 9 Trust Law International 43; A Oakley, ‘Proprietary 
Claims and their Priority in Insolvency’ (1995) 54 The Cambridge Law Journal 377; William 
Swadling, ‘A New Role for Resulting Trusts?’ (1996) 16 Legal Studies 110; Sarah Worthington, 
Proprietary Interests in Commercial Transactions (1996); Peter Birks, ‘Trusts Raised to Reverse 
Unjust Enrichment: The Westdeutsche Case’ [1996] Restitution Law Review 3; Robert Chambers, 
Resulting Trusts (1997); Malcolm Cope, Proprietary Claims and Remedies (1997); AJ Oakley, 
Constructive Trusts (3rd ed, 1997); David M Wright, The Remedial Constructive Trust (1998).
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security (such as a mortgage over A’s land), then B is effectively a secured creditor 
and stands ahead of all other unsecured creditors subject to a few statutory 
exceptions.4 However, if B does not have a proprietary interest in the money or does 
not have an alternative security, then B will stand pari passu with all the other 
unsecured creditors. This thesis focuses on developing a systematic approach to 
determining when an otherwise unsecured creditor ought to be afforded an effective 
proprietary and priority status.
It will be argued that traditional methods of creating proprietary interests and 
evaluating the existence of proprietary interests are helpful but are no longer 
adequate in the modem commercial world. New ways of dealing with the creation 
and evaluation of proprietary relief need to be developed. However, such a 
developmental process should proceed on a historical and contextual understanding 
of why the law has operated in the way that it has. In the forefront of such an 
understanding will be the law of equity and the principles which underlie its 
operation. The reason is both apparently simple and profound. The various 
mechanisms (most notably the trust and the lien) which have been used to prioritise 
the interests of otherwise unsecured creditors have been the creations of equity. It 
will be argued throughout that such mechanisms should not operate separately from 
the fundamental equitable principles from which they arose. Thus, as the title of the 
thesis indicates, the resolution of the problem of when otherwise unsecured creditors 
should acquire a proprietary interest and consequential relief, is equity’s domain. 
Unless this is recognised, the law will continue to be contentious and uncertain.
In order to develop a systematic approach to the problem of proprietary and 
priority relief in commercial insolvencies, it is necessary to sketch the context in 
which the commercial insolvencies arise and define the various phenomena which 
operate within and respond to the commercial context.
II T he Nature of the  Com m ercial Transactions: Transfer  and
Receipt
The first contextual component in the thesis is the basic nature of the 
commercial transactions which frame the discussion. There are two modes of dealing 
with money where proprietary claims and interests are involved, namely transfers 
and receipts. Transfer situations occur where A transfers money to B. The reasons for
For example, Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 109 (1).
4
3
the transfer vary depending on the relationship and the commercial transaction. 
Receipt cases occur where B acts for and on behalf of A. A third party, C, transfers 
money to B for and on behalf of A. The receipt can be simply a straight receipt by B. 
On the other hand, the receipt of funds from C may be funds received from the sale 
of A’s asset. B has acted as an agent for and on behalf of A in the sale transaction. 
The kinds of situations in which proprietary interests are claimed or where 
proprietary relief are sought in commercial situations can be divided into four major 
categories. First, there are the situations where the moneys are transferred for a use in 
a particular situation only and that particular situation does not eventuate. Prior to the 
event occurring, the recipient of the money becomes insolvent. The question is 
whether those moneys should form part of the assets of the insolvent.5
Secondly, there are those cases (which can be seen as a variation of the first 
mentioned) in which a large transaction (sometimes an ongoing one) is built on 
certain fundamental assumptions, which prove to be either entirely or in part 
erroneous.6 Prior to the wrongly held assumption or error being discovered, funds are 
transferred to the recipient. Subsequently, the recipient becomes insolvent and the 
wrongly held assumption or error is discovered. The question is whether these 
moneys should form part of the assets of the insolvent.
Thirdly, situations arise where money is neither transferred for a specific 
purpose nor as part of an ongoing commercial transaction. Rather, the actual 
circumstances surrounding the transfer of the money call into question whether the 
moneys should form part of the assets of the insolvent. For example, do the 
circumstances surrounding the transfer indicate that the actions of the transferor were 
truly voluntary? Or did the transferor fully understand the commercial circumstances 
in which the transfer took place? 7
Fourthly, there are those situations where there is no transfer of moneys. 
Rather, party B receives money for and on behalf of another party, A. Generally B is 
acting as an agent of A. However, after the receipt, but before accounting to A, B
5 For example, Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] AC 567.
6 For example, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] 2 
AC 669.
7
For example, Westpac Banking Corporation v Savin [1985] 2 NZLR 41.
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becomes insolvent. The question is whether those funds should effectively form part
o
of the assets of A for distribution amongst B’s creditors.
This thesis is an attempt to develop a modem, rational and coherent basis for 
determining when an aggrieved creditor is entitled to argue that he has a proprietary 
or prioritised interest ahead of other unsecured creditors. In so doing, these different 
kinds of situations are not analysed separately. Rather, the object of the thesis is to 
show how equity does and can respond to them in a coherent way.
Ill The Meaning and Function of Money
The second contextual component is money. This thesis is actually concerned 
with proprietary interests and relief in relation to money rather than a wide array of 
property (although in Chapter 2 the operation of equitable proprietary relief and 
interests is considered generally). It is submitted that the changing nature of money 
in our modem economy has been a principal reason why the issue of proprietary 
relief has become important in recent times. Therefore, an examination of monetary 
dealings is appropriate and timely.
Having limited the thesis to dealings with money, it is necessary to 
understand in both a practical and legal sense the way that money operates. The 
starting point for such a discussion of dealings with money is the nature of money 
itself. It may seem an unusual starting point. But, it is surprising to realise that many 
of the cases which will be considered throughout this thesis9 do not examine the 
fundamental nature of money as a prelude to any decision concerning disputes about 
it. One commentator has noted:
The troublesome question, What is money? has so constantly engaged 
the minds of economists that a lawyer might hesitate to join in the 
attempt to solve it. Yet the true answer must, if possible, be 
determined. For 'money answereth all things.'10
In Halsbury's Laws o f England it is stated that:
Walker v Corboy (1990) 19 NSWLR 382.
9
For example, Theiss Watkins White v Equiticorp Australia Ltd [1991] 1 Qd R 82 and Barclays Bank 
Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] AC 567.
10 FA Mann, The Legal Aspect of Money (5th ed, 1992) 1 citing Ecclesiastes 10:19.
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The primary function of money is to serve as a medium of exchange, 
and as such it is accepted without question in final discharge of debts 
or payment for goods or services. Money also serves as a common 
standard of value by reference to which the comparative values of 
different commodities are ascertained, as a unit of account in which 
debts and liabilities are expressed, and as a store of value or 
purchasing power.11
In relation to dealings with money, it has been noted that:
The law has not been prodigal in its thinking about money. Its utility 
as a medium of exchange, its lack of ‘earmark,’ and its regular 
metamorphoses in the ordinary operations of the banking system all 
contribute to the acute and often unanalysed difficulties which can 
arise when a trust is sought to be imposed on a particular sum said to
1 ^
be received, held, or controlled by a person for another's benefit.
The analysis presented in this thesis endorses the view that there are many 
‘unanalysed difficulties’ in relation to our handling of money in its modem form. It 
is submitted the failure to understand money and how it operates has led, in part, to 
the uncertainty and confusion in cases where proprietary relief has been sought.
Historically, money has taken many guises and has undergone a number of 
changes in its form. What is important in the context of this thesis is that the physical 
nature of money has changed. We are now faced with the reality that, in many 
transactions, money does not take a physical form at all. The rules which have been 
developed by the courts do not adequately take into account this fact. The evolution 
of money as we know it today was a complex process. A brief historical analysis is 
appropriate because the forms which money has taken in the past have influenced the 
legal rules.
A History o f Money
In ancient times, money was not a separate system of coinage or paper.
13 nRather, commodities were used as money. Indeed, the Latin word for money,
11 T Michael Ashe, ‘Money’ in Lord Hailsham of Marleybone (ed), Halsburv's Laws o f England (4th 
ed, 1973) vol32, [101].
Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (1977) [209],
13 For a full account of the trading in ancient times, see P Einzig, Primitive Money (2nd ed, 1966).
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pecunia, is derived etymologically from the Latin word for cattle, pecus, 14 It has 
been noted that money lacked ‘earmark’ . 15 Earmarks were used and continue to be 
used as a means of identifying and separating domestic animals as fungible items. 16 
Commodities had ‘intrinsic utility and use-value.’ Moreover, they were fungible in 
nature - that is a thing of the same or another class could be delivered in lieu of 
them. 18
The disadvantage was that commodities were perishable, bulky and difficult 
to move. A significant change was the transition from commodity bartering to the 
development of coinage as a common form of exchange. Metallic pieces were more 
durable and not depreciable. 19 The reliability of the coinage as a medium of 
exchange was due to both the formal authoritative endorsement of the coinage as a 
legal tender and the fact that the coinage itself retained an inherent intrinsic value 
based on market valuation. In the Middle Ages, the State conferred a nominal value 
on coin rather than certifying the value of the coin, as had been the case in earlier 
periods. It has been pointed out that the shift to nominal value did not of itself give 
rise to the development of paper money. Nevertheless, nominalism weakened any 
suggestion that money was a commodity in the same way as cattle. In losing its 
intrinsic value, it became only a matter of time before paper could be endorsed as 
having substantive value by the State. The development of paper money arose in 
response to the growing sophistication of medieval mercantile fairs and also as a
14 Benjamin Geva, ‘From Commodity to Currency in Ancient History - On Commerce, Tyranny and 
the Modem Law of Money’ [1987] 25 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 115, 125.
15 PD Finn, above n 12.
16 JM Sinclair (General Consultant), Collins English Dictionary, Australian Edition, (3rd ed, 1991), 
489.
17
Geva, above n 14, 121.
18 See the definition of ‘fungible’ in JA Simpson and ESC Weiner, The Oxford English Dictionary 
(2nd ed, 1989) vol VI, 269; United States Uniform Commercial Code, Section 1-201 (17) in Pike and 
Fischer Inc (eds), Uniform Commercial Code Reporting Service (1965-) 1201]; American Law
Institute, Restatement of the Law of Restitution (1937)§ 66 (4).
19 Geva, above n 14, 129.
20 Ibid 142-143. As to the State theory of money see Mann, above n 10, 14-22; Arthur Nussbaum, 
Money in the Law National and International (1950) 5-10.
21 Ibid 142-143; Nussbaum, above n 20, 17-19.
22 Geva, above n 14, 144.
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precaution against thieves/4 However, it was not until after the creation of the Bank 
of England in 1694 and the issue of bank notes by that institution,25 that paper money 
became a widespread phenomenon and an essential form of cash.26 Bank notes were, 
and are, far removed from the commodities of ancient times. As Lord Mansfield
27stated in Miller v Race'.
Now they are not goods, not securities, nor documents for debts, nor 
are so esteemed: but are treated as money, as cash, in the ordinary 
course and transaction of business, by the general consent of 
mankind; which gives them the credit and currency of money, to all 
intents and purposes. They are as much money, as guineas
themselves; or any other current coin, that is used in common
28payments, as money or cash.
Nevertheless, bank notes and coins retain a physical form and can be handled, 
preserved and destroyed like all physical objects. Henderson has labelled this system 
as a cash based system because these ‘instruments of payment are treated as 
valuables.’29 Coinage and notes ‘store and convey value.’30 In addition, the paper 
still functions as money in cases which are not regarded as legal tender. Treasury 
bills, bills of exchange and cheques would fall for consideration under this category. 
Henderson has described this paper based system as one which uses ‘physical objects 
as evidence of a claim to value.’
In the past, our legal system has adapted to the new forms of money and 
monetary transactions. It has been commented:
See John Chown, A History o f  Money: From AD 800 (1994) Chapter 14.
24 MJL Rajanayagam, The Law Relating to Negotiable Instruments in Australia (1980) [1.5].
25 James Milne Holden, The History o f  Negotiable Instruments in English Law (1955) 87-94.
26 For a general overview of paper money see Nussbaum, above n 20, 72-93.
27 (1758) 1 Burr 452; 97 ER 398.
9 0
Ibid 457; 401.
29 Paul B Henderson Jr, ‘Modem Money’, in Elinor Harris Solomon (ed), Electronic Funds Transfers 
and Payments: The Public Policy Issues (1987) 19.
30 Ibid.
Ibid.
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Lord Mansfield and his colleagues in the late eighteenth century were 
faced with radically new problems for which they devised radically 
new solutions.
The radically new problems all stemmed from the industrial 
revolution and the vastly increased number of commercial 
transactions which it spawned. When goods were shipped, they had to 
be paid for. The idea that the payments could be made in metallic 
currency, chronically in short supply, was ludicrous. The primitive 
banking system could not cope with the situation: the bank check 
which - a hundred years later - became the universal payment device 
was unknown. In effect the merchants and the bankers invented their
32own paper currency.
Whilst the law merchant was the source of the law on commercial paper and was 
integrated into the common law, 33 Lord Mansfield decided two major cases which 
ensured that negotiable instruments were accepted as substitutes for metallic 
currency.34 In so doing, Lord Mansfield (and his colleagues) not only assumed that 
the new way of dealing with payments was beneficial to commerce but he was also 
forced to adapt the legal rules to commercial realities. Today courts face the same 
dilemma - adapting legal rules to take into account new commercial and 
technological practices.
B Paperless Money
At present, we are seeing the evolution and expansion of paperless money. 
Technology may have intruded to the extent that in the future there will be no need 
for coinage or notes at all. At this point, it is necessary to distinguish paperless 
money from transactions which give rise to a paperless asset. For example, consider 
a savings account with a bank. Whilst the initial deposit and subsequent withdrawal 
is generally in the form of cash or paper manifestations of money (such as the 
banker's draft or the cheque), the debt itself which is recorded in the passbook is
Grant Gilmore, ‘Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments’ (1979) 13 Creighton Law 
Review 441, 446-447.
33 William H Lawrence, Commercial Paper and Check Collection (1990) §1.3.
34 Miller v Race (1758) 1 Burr 452; 97 ER 398 and Peacock v Rhodes (1781) 2 Dougl. 633; 99 ER 
402 which are discussed in Robert L Jordan and William D Warren, Commercial Paper (1983) 8-10.
35 Gilmore, above n 32, 448-450.
36 Steven Levy, ‘The End of Money?’ Newsweek, 7 November, 1995, 84; Henderson, above n 29, 19.
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itself paperless. From an economic perspective, the bank account is a paperless asset
37which functions as money.
However, from a legal perspective, the bank account is a legal chose in 
action. It is a right to bring an action to recover the debt.38 If the customer brings an 
action for the recovery of the debt, he may receive cash from the bank in satisfaction 
of the debt. However, a debtor, such as the bank, may decide not to pay a creditor 
with cash. The debtor may have the facility to transfer funds electronically to the 
customer. Such a transaction is paperless and cashless. But, it is still intricately 
concerned with money and its receipt and transfer. In multiple transactions, the new 
electronic money can be constantly on the move. It can be in continual process of 
creation and destruction, for time periods so short that the “ phantom money’ can 
escape detection altogether. ’39
C Transactional Ephemerality
As a consequence, there are two characteristics of the electronic based system 
which distinguish it from the earlier systems. First, the money (or value traded) is 
formless prior to, during and after the transfer process. There are no physical objects 
to convey value (other than the computer system) and it is not necessary (for the 
technology to work) for physical documents to evidence that claim for value.
Secondly, the process of transfer and storage of the data recording the transfer 
is electronically based. Whilst the transaction may also be recorded on paper, the 
paper representation is a copy of the primary transactional record which is 
electronically based. These two factors contribute to what will be referred to in the 
thesis as the transactional ephemerality of money. The ‘value’ credited to an 
individual in this system is neither discernible via a physical transaction nor 
necessarily long-lasting in the light of the speed of electronic transactions.40
37 Mann, above n 10, 5.
38 See Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed, 1990) 241; John S James, Stroud's 
Judicial Dictionary (5th ed, 1986) vol 1,428-430.
39 Elinor Harris Solomon, ‘Money, Now and Future’ in Elinor Harris Solomon (ed), Electronic 
Funds Transfers and Payments: The Public Policy Issues (1987) 13.
40 See Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth o f Australia [1993-1994] 179 CLR 155, 
192-202 (Dawson and Toohey JJ); Chin Yen Lee, ‘Legal Implications of Technology in Banking’ 
(1988) 16 Australian Business Law Review 114, 117-118.
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The phenomenon of transactional ephemerality is already part of everyday 
commercial dealings. Credit (or charge) cards, automatic teller machines (ATMS) 
and electronic funds transfer at point of sale (EFTPOS) sit in juxtaposition with cash 
based consumer transactions.41 Linked to the development of electronic based 
banking and financial services between the consumer and the service provider, 
transfer systems between banks have also been created, notably in the Australian 
context, the Bank Interchange and Transfer System (BITS) . 42
In the light of the dramatic transformation of money from a barter based 
commodity to an electronically based one, it is imperative to ask why such changes 
have been possible or necessary. Some practical answers can be found in history. For 
example, from the seventeenth century onwards, merchants needed to develop new 
forms of negotiable instruments such as the bill of exchange and cheques in order to 
facilitate trade throughout distant parts of the world.43 Other answers can be found in 
scientific and technological developments which have provided the opportunity to 
streamline the transfer and receipt of money.44 Business has embraced electronic 
based systems for efficiency and competitiveness. These sorts of factors explain why 
money and transactions with money change form. However, they do not explain why 
items so disparate as commodities, coins, paper and electronic impulses have been 
used as money.
D Fungibility
The answer lies in both a matter of fact and an issue of law. As a matter of 
fact, money is fungible whether as a coin or an electronic impulse. It is a thing (or 
now simply a value) which can be substituted for itself. One bag of wheat of a 
certain kind or quantity can be substituted for another bag of wheat of a similar kind 
or quality. One ten dollar note is as good as another in the discharge of a debt. An
For a discussion of such forms of electronic transfers see GA Weaver and CR Craigie, The Law 
Relating to Banker and Customer in Australia (2nd ed, 1990) [3.490]-[3.570]; Patrick Frazer, Plastic 
and Electronic Money: New Payment Systems and Implications (1985); Patrick RA Kirkman, 
Electronic Funds Transfer Systems: The Revolution in Cashless Banking and Payments Methods 
(1987); Mark Sneddon, ‘Cyberbanking and Payment Products: Legal and Regulatory Issues’ in 
Banking Law and Practice, 14^ Annual Conference (1997) 167.
42 Weaver, and Craigie, above n 41, [3.360].
43 WR Cornish and G de N Clark, Law and Society in England 1750-1950 (1989) 198-199. See 
generally, Holden, above n 25.
44 See for example Levy, above n 36, 84.
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electronic impulse which transfers $100 is as good as another electronic impulse 
which transfers $100. This notion of fungibility of money is very important because 
it underlies our concept of debt.4'^  When customer A deposits money in Bank B, B is 
a debtor to A.46 However, B is not expected by A to repay precisely the same notes 
and coinage deposited with B. The debt is satisfied if B repays A with an equivalent 
amount. The fungibility of money is an important source of its utility.
However, from a legal perspective, proprietary claims for money can be 
extremely difficult. There are generally no characteristics or earmarks which identify 
it so as to entitle a creditor to claim that he retains proprietary interest in certain 
money.
E Negotiability
As a matter of law, money is negotiable. Money is legally transferable in title 
by physical transfer from one party to another.47 In Miller v Race,48 a Bank of 
England note had been stolen and then passed into circulation. The plaintiff had 
obtained the note ‘for full and valuable consideration, and in the usual course... of... 
business.’49 The plaintiff successfully sued for payment on the note. Lord Mansfield 
commented:
It has been quaintly said, ‘that the reason why money can not be 
followed is, because it has no ear-mark:’ but that is not true. The true 
reason is, upon account of currency of it, it can not be recovered after 
it has passed into currency. So, in case of money stolen, the true 
owner can not recover it, after it has been paid away fairly and 
honestly upon a valuable and bona fide consideration: but before 
money has passed into currency, action may be brought for the money 
itself.50
45 For a legal definition of debt see James, above n 38, vol 2; 636-640; Black, above n 38, 403; LB 
Curzon, Dictionary o f Law (4 th ed, 1993) 106; Elizabeth A Martin (ed), A Dictionary o f Law (3rd ed, 
1994) 113; CRB Dunlop, Creditor-Debtor Law in Canada (1981) 15-20.
46 Pott v Clegg (1847) 16 M & W 321, 328; 153 ER 1212, 1215 (Pollock CB); Foley v Hill (1848) 2 
HLC 28, 36-37; 9 ER 1002, 1005-1006 (Lord Lyndhurst LC).
47 Moss v Hancock [ 1899] 2 QB 111, 115-116 (Darling J).
48 Miller v Race (1758) 1 Burr 452; 97 ER 398.
49 Ibid 453; 398.
50 Ibid 457-458; 401. See also Peacock v Rhodes (1781) 2 Doug 633; 99 ER 402.
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Some one hundred and fifty years later, Lord Haldane made a similar comment in 
Sinclair v Brougham, 51 The negotiability of money underlies the operation of most 
business transactions and gives money its peculiar but essential legal utility.' 
Therefore, as will be noted below,54 even in ancient times money has been treated 
differently than other fungible items.
Factors which have been seen as generally re-inforcing the commercial norms 
in relation to the negotiability of money have been the capacity of a party to use 
funds for his own purposes5' and payment of interest on the use of the funds.56
F Denial o f Fungibility and Negotiability
Despite the fact that money is a negotiable commodity, it can retain 
characteristics in keeping with its chattel origins. Our legal system has recognised 
that it is possible for money to be treated primarily as a chattel. In Moss v Hancock58 
a special minted gold coin was stolen and the Court held that the owner was entitled 
to an order for restitution of it. It was held that the coin had not been in currency at 
the time (despite the fact that the coin had been made currency of the realm by Royal 
Proclamation) . 59
The outcome of the case was indicative of an important process which, 
continues to be relevant today -  namely, the need to deny the fungibility and 
negotiability of money before it can be accorded the status of a specific chattel for 
the purposes of proprietary relief.
51 [1914] AC 398, 418.
5~ Ibid; Phanor J Eder, ‘Legal Theories of Money’ (1934-1935) 20 Cornell Law Quarterly 53, 55-56.
53 See MJL Rajanayagam, The Law Relating to Negotiable Instruments in Australia (1980) [1.2]-
[1.4].
54 Chapter 2, 67-68.
55 American Law Institute, The Restatement of the Law o f Trusts 2nd (1959) §12. See for example, 
Bank o f Nova Scotia v Societe General (Canada) (1988) 58 Alta LR (2d) 193.
56 Ibid.
57 Mann, above n 10, 8.
C O
[1899] 2 QB 111.
59 Ibid, 117 (Darling J); 119-120 (Channell J).
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The facts of Moss v Hancock were relatively straightforward. The coin was 
specially minted and had characteristics which made it possible to distinguish it. 
However, it has also been possible to reify money without any particular 
distinguishing characteristics into a specific chattel by the process of segregation.60 
The effect of such segregation has been to create a specific asset which could be 
subject to tortious actions of detinue or conversion61 and the subject matter of a 
trust. “ Therefore, in the light of the money as a specific asset, it is possible for a 
party to claim a proprietary interest in the money by virtue of its identifiability and 
non-negotiability. However, this assumes that the money is a physical asset capable 
of segregation.
G The Law and the Changing Nature of Money
The issue, in the light of the modem paperless money, is whether proprietary 
interests or proprietary relief can be claimed in what is essentially an incorporeal 
asset, (particularly when transactional ephemerality is bom in mind). After all, in 
Moss v Hancock, it was the physical characteristic of the coin which preserved its 
chattel status. In paperless and incorporeal transactions, it would not appear to be 
possible to preserve its chattel status due to its non-physicality.
In the context of this transformation, steps have been taken to define the 
rights and liabilities of parties to transactions in a wide variety of electronic 
transactions which involve the transfer and receipt of money.63 However, the general 
law remains an important source of the characterisation of monetary transactions and 
claims for proprietary interests in electronic money.64
Chapter 3, 102-106. For example Carreras Rothmans Ltd v Freeman Matthews Treasure Ltd 
[1985] Ch 207; Cohen v Cohen (1929) 42 CLR 91.
61 J G Fleming, The Law of Torts (9th h ed, 1998) 60-61 and fn 28.
62“ Worthington, above n 3, 61-66.
63 For a discussion of the law in relation to electronic transfer of funds in the banking context see 
generally Anu Arora, Electronic Banking and the Law (2nd ed, 1993) Chapters 8 and 9; Chris Reed, 
Electronic Finance Law (1991); WS Weerasooria, Banking Law and the Financial System in 
Australia (4th ed, 1996) Chapters 8, 17, 18, 24 and 25; Henry Batel and Gavin Arbuckle, Electronic 
Banking in Canada and the United States (1987).
64 See for example, Weaver, and Craigie, above n 41, Chapter 14; Arora above n 63.
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Just as Lord Mansfield and his contemporaries were called upon to respond 
and provide practical and workable legal rules to take into account the changed 
nature of money and commercial transactions, so too, legislatures and the judiciary 
are being challenged to redefine legal norms where proprietary interests are claimed. 
So far, it appears that the response has been either a denial that legal rules can 
accommodate money in its metamorphosed electronic form65 or a tenacious 
insistence on a proprietary base (with an apparent relaxation of rules as to how the 
specific proprietary base is ascertained) . 66 Both responses are artificial. One of the 
major functions of this thesis is to propose an alternative approach to proprietary 
claims in relation to money.
IV Commercial Transactions and Risk
The third contextual component of the thesis is that the transactions which 
will be under investigation are essentially commercial transactions rather than 
personal or domestic ones. This may appear a trite assertion. However, it is 
important to emphasise the commercial nature of the transactions in order to 
understand the values which inform commercial activity and legal responses to that 
activity.
Such words as commerce and commercial are defined by reference inter alia 
to ‘trade’, ‘buying and selling’67 and ‘matter of business looking toward financial 
profit. ’ Commerce is concerned with the buying and selling of goods and services 
or the making of profit in a capitalist economy.
The feature which is common to all commercial transactions is the taking or 
assumption of risk of potential loss due to the nature of the transaction or the 
environment in which the transaction takes place.69
65 See for example Millett J in relation to common law tracing in Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1990] 
1 Ch 265, 285-286.
66 See for example, Lipkin Gorman (A Firm) v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548.
67 Simpson and Weiner, above n 18, vol 3, 552
68 Ibid, 553.
69 For theoretical and historical perspectives on risk see Peter G Moore, The Business o f Risk (1983), 
particularly Chapters 1-3; Peter L Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story o f Risk (1996); 
Baruch Fischoff, et al, Acceptable Risk (1981).
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‘Risk’ is defined in The Oxford English Dictionary as:
To hazard, endanger, to expose to the chance of injury or loss
and
70To venture upon, take the chances of 
‘Risky’ has been defined as:
71Dangerous, hazardous, fraught with risk.
Sometimes, the evaluation of risk and its consequences is based on perceptions of
77risk rather than the reality of risk.
The kinds of risks to which a commercial party may be exposed are many and 
in some areas of the law, such risks are specifically dealt with as risks.73 He is 
exposed to the possibility that the other party will breach its undertaking to perform 
certain tasks, that the subject matter of the contract is stolen or destroyed, that the 
goods which he produces are not as popular as he expects and do not sell on the 
market and that a more efficient competitor on the market takes his market share. 
One important risk which a commercial party may assume is the possibility that the 
party with whom he is dealing may become insolvent in the future. If the party is 
unsecured, then he assumes the risk that upon insolvency he may not be paid fully 
for the amount owing to him. Generally, these kinds of risks are viewed as part of the 
hurly-burly of commercial life. In the context of this thesis the question is - to what 
extent should a commercial party be expected to bear the risks associated with that 
status without any legal intervention?
There appear to be two major legal responses for dealing with the risks 
generally associated with commercial transactions. Today, these responses sit side by
70 .Simpson and Weiner, above n 18, vol 13, 988.
71 Ibid. See also F Wharton, ‘Risk Management: Basic Concepts and General Principles’ in Jake 
Ansell and Frank Wharton (eds), Risk: Analysis, Assessment and Management (1992) 1, 4.
72 Wharton, above n 71, 5.
73 See in relation to the sale of goods GHL Fridman, Sale o f Goods in Canada (3rd ed, 1986), Chapter 
13; LS Sealy “ Risk’ in the Law of Sale’ [1972B] 31 The Cambridge Law Journal 225, 226-227; MG 
Bridge, The Sale o f Goods (1997) 111-131; Darren Fitzgerald, ‘The Risk Issue in Sale’ (1996) 9 
Journal o f Contract Law 206.
16
side, if somewhat uneasily. However, both responses have fashioned our legal 
system, and in particular, the way that commercial parties react to commercial risk.
A The Laissez-Faire Model o f Commerce, Risk and Law
First, there is the laissez faire model. Under this model, the individual who 
enters into the commercial world is required to ascertain his interests, take necessary 
action to protect those interests and control commercial risk. This basic model 
dealing with risk appears to have reached its zenith in 19th century England in the 
concept of caveat emptor.74
If the onus is on the individual person or enterprise to deal with the problem 
of commercial risk, then commercial players take the opportunity to ascertain the 
possible commercial risks and offset or, at the very least, minimise the risk which is 
perceived to exist. There are many responses to dealing with the minimisation of risk 
in commercial situations75 including commercial research before entering into the 
transaction, taking out insurance in respect to the perceived risk, requiring and 
taking security from the other party and obtaining the guarantee of the potential loss 
from third parties. In order to ensure that such self-protective mechanisms are 
efficient, it has been necessary to develop a highly effective legal environment to 
legitimise risk minimisation devices.
During the legally creative period of the 19th century, commercial parties 
demanded greater legal certainty, a greater array of risk minimisation devices and a 
more efficient judicial administration. In response to such demands, there were 
dramatic changes in both substantial and adjectival law. In response to the industrial 
revolution and a market based economy, the concept of contract was redefined in 
terms of the will theory of the individual. Not only could individuals freely negotiate 
the value of the contractual bargain, but they were required to protect their own
74 PS Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979) 464.
75
See for example, Edmund AC Crouch and Richard Wilson, Risk/Benefit Analysis (1982); Lester B 
Lave, Risk Assessment and Management (1987).
76
For a helpful cojoining of economic concerns and legal responses see Charles O Hardy, Readings 
in Risk and Risk-Bearing (1924) 7-12.
77 Ibid Chapters XIII, XIV and XV.
78
Ibid Chapter XVI.
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interests. Courts would intervene to set aside a transaction only in such exceptional
79situations as fraud or actual undue influence. The emphasis on the intention of the
O A
parties and the sanctity of contract led to the growth of legal formalism.
There was a great interest in the systematisation of the substantive law by 
virtue of legislative codification. Parliament began to standardise, in legislative form, 
the ways that commercial operators dealt with one another and the legal relationship, 
rights and obligations assumed by the parties. The three tools which were utilised to 
protect interests and to manage the commercial risk were schemes which regulated
how commercial relationships operated, schemes of registration of ownership or
82security interests and statutory rules concerning the passing of title in contracts for
83the sale of goods and the imposition of security interests. Statutory codification was
84interpreted as positivist in nature so that legislation was seen as authoritative and 
clearly intentional commands. These trends enhanced the means by which a 
creditor could obtain a secured status and minimise loss in the event of insolvency of 
the debtor.
Risk minimisation devices were developed and consolidated. Commercial 
parties used the limited liability company and the veil of incorporation to protect the
79 Examples of cases where transactions were set aside see Earl o f Aylesford v Morris (1873) 8 Ch 
App 484 and Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145.
80
Atiyah, above n 74, 389.
81 For example, sale of goods - Sale o f Goods Act 1893 (UK); bills of sale - Bills o f Sale Act 1878 UK 
partnership - Partnership Act 1890 UK; pawnbroking - Pawnbrokers Act 1872 (UK).
82" For example Real Property Act 1858 (SA). See P Moerlin Fox, ‘The Story Behind the Torrens 
System’ (1950) 23 The Australian Law Journal 489; DJ Whalan, ‘The Origins of the Torrens System 
and its Introduction into New Zealand’ in GW Hinde (ed), The New Zealand Torrens System 
Centennial Essays (1971) 1; MA Neave, CJ Rossiter and MA Stone, Sackville and Neave: Property 
Law Cases and Materials (5th ed, 1994) [7.31 ]-[7.33]; Adrian J Bradbrook, Susan V MacCallum and 
Anthony P Moore, Australian Real Property Law (2nd ed, 1997) [4.01 ]-[4.08].
83 Sale o f Goods Act 1979 (UK) ss 16-25 and ss 41-45. See also PS Atiyah and John Adams, The Sale 
o f Goods (9th ed, 1995) Chapters 17, 18 and 23; Fridman, above n 73, Chapters 4, 5 and 14; KCT 
Sutton, Sales and Consumer Law in Australia and New Zealand, (4th ed) Part III and Chapter 21; 
Atiyah, above n 74, 102, 255.
84 Atiyah, above n 74, 102, 255; The Governor and the Company o f the Bank o f England v Vaughan 
Brothers [1891] AC 107, 120 (Lord Halsbury).
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assets from creditors.86 Whilst insurance was not an invention of the 19th century,87 
there was a consolidation and expansion of insurance practices.88
Security devices expanded in scope. There was a re-appropriation and 
utilisation of security devices in the 18th and 19th Centuries which had been current 
during Roman times. The kinds of consensual security devices (as distinct from 
imposed security devices) which had Roman roots were the hypotheca or charge and 
the pledge. New or modified forms of security developed such as hire purchase and 
bills of sale.90 These devices were used to elevate the otherwise unsecured creditor to 
a secured status.
Commercial operators, governments and lawyers became increasingly 
concerned that the risk minimisation devices were certain and easily enforceable. 
The successful operation of 19th century individualism depended upon a clear, 
certain and predictable legal system. If the individual commercial participant was 
responsible for protecting his interests, then the commercial operator was entitled to 
rely on the certainty and validity of the transaction. If the individual could not access 
risk management techniques which were supported by a well organised and 
predictable legal system, then the underlying notion of individual responsibility 
broke down in practical terms. And, if the individual could not take foolproof 
methods to protect his interests as part of the risk management strategy, then, the 
underlying concept of self-reliant individualism would begin to break down. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that politicians, men of commerce and lawyers began 
to take a critical interest in the functioning of the legal system. This resulted in the 
practical re-organisation of the court system and procedural rules of law culminating 
in the Judicature Act 1873 (UK).
In addition to administrative re-organisation, there were judicial 
pronouncements extolling the virtues of certainty of the law and the limited function 
of the courts. The responsible judicial creativity which Lord Mansfield personified,
86 For an excellent short account of the origins and development of the limited liability company see 
Cornish and Clark, above n 43, 246-262; Paul L Davies, Gower’s Principles of Modern Company 
Law, (6th ed, 1997) Chapters 1-3 and particularly 40-48.
87 AA Tarr, Kwai-Lian Liew and W Holligan, Australian Insurance Law (2nd ed, 1991) 1-4.
00
Cornish and Clark, above n 43, 512-515.
89 WW Buckland, Equity in Roman Law (1911) 63-71.
90 Cornish and Clark, above n 43, 237-246.
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was stifled in the 19th century. The practice of following precedents (evolved from 
an 18th century doctrine of stare decisis) hardened into a set of rules.91 Generally 
speaking, the courts had abandoned the idea that the courts could and did make the 
law.
Consistent with the restrictive attitude towards judicial intervention in 
contractual relationships and the strict hierarchy and limitations imposed by the law 
of precedent, equitable jurisdiction was considerably curtailed. Nevertheless, 
equitable jurisdiction was creatively used in some ways. The issue of equitable 
jurisdiction will be further considered later in this chapter.
1 Weaknesses of the Laissez-Faire Model
The strength of the laissez-faire model as a response to commercial risk was 
(and is) that it does allow the commercial parties a considerable amount of freedom 
to negotiate the kinds of risk minimisation methods which can be used. However, it 
can be an inflexible and insensitive tool because it is presupposed that individuals 
control and pre-empt events.
First, it assumes that economic conditions are completely predictable and that 
parties to commercial relationships should anticipate all contingencies. Whilst 
commercial parties should anticipate, as much as possible, economic downturns, 
sudden loss of supply of goods or services, sudden falls in the value of currency or 
force majeure, there will always be situations which are beyond a contracting party’s 
contemplation.93
Jim Evans, ‘Change in the Doctrine of Precedent during the Nineteenth Century’ in Laurence 
Goldstein (ed), Precedent in Law (1987) 35, 64-72. See also The London Street Tramways Co Ltd v 
The London County Council [1898] AC 375, 380 (Earl of Halsbury LC); Beamish v Beamish (1861) 9 
HL Cas 273; 11 ER 735.
92 Atiyah, above n 74, 392-393, 671-680.
93 See for example, Prager v Blatspeil, Stamp and Heacock Ltd [1924] 1 KB 566 and SP Co v F Co 
Reichsgericht, Third Civil Senate, 21 September, 1920, 100 ERG (Z) 129 extracted in Arthur Taylor 
von Mehren, The Civil Law System (1957) 733-737.
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Secondly, literally and inflexibly applied, the laissez-faire model would not 
provide remedial relief for innocent and unintended errors such as factual and legal 
mistakes94 or ultra vires transactions.95
Thirdly, the model assumes that parties have the time, resources and 
inclination to laboriously set out all their rights and liabilities in contracts and to take 
steps to minimise risk.
The pace of economic activity and the immense technological changes in 
business transactions in the 20th century have meant that there will be occasions 
where there is no supporting documentation or the supporting documentation is 
inadequate, because it is impossible to address all the potential problems which may 
arise. It may be economically inefficient to spend the time and money in the light of 
the relatively small size of the transaction. Alternatively (but not inconsistently), the 
situation may be so urgent that the parties do not have time to conclude a contract or 
obtain securities.96 In ground-breaking research, Macaulay97 published the results of 
interviews with business people and lawyers which showed that in fact, there was 
often little legal planning. The focus was on commercial matters rather than legal
98niceties. In a later article he demonstrated that in the ‘battle of the forms’ 
boilerplate terms were sometimes incomprehensible and inconsistent. In one case, a 
manufacturer had failed to set up a valid and binding contract with customers up to 
7 5% of the time.99
Fourthly, where there is written documentation, it cannot be assumed that the 
contract is the product of the fully informed intention and will of the parties. 
Sometimes a party is placed under an inordinate pressure to enter a commercial
94 David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353; Rover 
International Ltd v Cannon Film Sales Ltd [1989] 1 WLR 912; Barclays Bank Ltd v WJ Simms Son 
and Cooke (Southern) Ltd [1980] 1 QB 677.
95' For example, Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [1992] 2 AC 1.
96 See for example Prager v Blatspeil, Stamp and Heacock Ltd [1924] 1 KB 566; China Pacific SA v 
Food Corporation o f India (‘The Winson’) [1982] AC 939.
97 Stewart Macaulay, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study’ (1963) 28 
American Sociological Review 55. Note also Stewart Macaulay, ‘An Empirical View o f Contract’ 
[1985] Wisconsin Law Review 465.
QQ
Ibid 59.
99
Ibid 60.
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transaction. On other occasions, there is the problem of bargaining power. In this 
context, there is a continuing debate over the impact of standard forms on contract 
law. 100 Slawson101 has demonstrated that mutual intention and assent cannot be 
considered the basis of standard contracts. Consumers are presented with a standard 
form contract, as a ‘fait accompli’ and are expected to sign the contract without any 
or little negotiation.
Of course, it is arguable that in all the situations described here, the parties 
have assumed the risk of the absence of or inadequate legal documentation. This is 
an important argument against legislative and judicial intervention. However, this 
point of view can run very thin. In these situations, the laissez-faire model of 
commercial risk assumption is under strain because it cannot be assumed that the 
parties have, or would have, accepted the transaction as it transpired.
2 The Laissez-Faire Model and Receipt and Transfers
In the specific context of the kinds of transfers and receipts described, the 
laissez-faire approach to commercial transactions would severely curtail judicial 
intervention. It could be contended that the availability of a wide array of risk 
minimisation and security devices (in the framework of a legislative system dealing 
with bankruptcy) are sufficient measures to minimise and deflect risk. Therefore, the 
onus is on unsecured creditors to elevate their status to that of secured creditors or 
take other forms of risk minimisation. However, there may be a number of obstacles 
to effective risk minimisation or deflection including the nature of the transaction, 
the pace of economic activity and the bargaining power of the parties. The laissez- 
faire approach is inadequate to deal with those situations where it is for one party to 
take action to protect their interests in the event of the insolvency of the other. A 
more sophisticated and sensitive approach is needed.
See for example, Edward J Jacobs, ‘The Battle of the Forms: Standard Term Contracts in 
Comparative Perspective’ (1985) 34 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 297 and Ewan 
McKendrick, ‘The Battle of the Forms and the Law of Restitution’ (1988) Oxford Journal o f Legal 
Studies 197.
101 W David Slawson, ‘The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contract Law by 
Standard Forms’ (1984) 46 University o f Pittsburgh Law Review 21, 24-28.
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B The Interventionist Model Response to Commercial Transactions and
Risk
In the light of the general weaknesses of the laissez-faire model, it is not 
surprising that there have been considerable reactions against it. The alternative 
model accepts and, indeed, supports the active intervention of both the legislature 
and judiciary for the purposes of re-appraising the commercial assumption of risk. 
This approach has ancient legal antecedents in the civil law and common law 
traditions. Despite the differences between the two systems, it is clear that they 
have one common and essential thread which is entirely absent from the laissez-faire 
model. Notwithstanding the arms-length nature of the transaction, on some occasions 
the commercial interests or needs of one party will be accorded more weight than the 
other party’s. In order to achieve this, the legislature and/or the judiciary impose 
certain minimum legal standards of how parties should operate and conduct their 
commercial affairs. All commercial transactions operate against the backdrop of 
those minimum standards. It is only upon conformity to these minimum standards 
that it can be said that both parties have assumed the commercial risks inherent in the 
transaction. The civil law tradition will not be discussed here, suffice to say that its 
approach to commercial transactions reaches back to Roman and medieval times and 
is encapsulated in the phrase - duty to act in good faith or bona fides. The duty to 
act in good faith is alive and well in Europe104 and even in the United States. 105
Mary Ann Glendon, Michael Wallace Gordon and Christopher Osakwe, Comparative Legal 
Traditions (1994) 41. For an interesting discussion of some o f the similarities between the two 
traditions see RH Helmholz, ‘Continental Law and Common Law: Historical Strangers or 
Companions?’ [1990] Duke Law Journal 1207.
103 Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (1962) 163-164, 171; FH Lawson, A Common 
Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law (1953) 124-125; Peter Stein, ‘Equitable Principles in Roman Law’ in 
Peter Stein (ed), The Character and Influence of the Roman Civil Law { 1988) 19, 25-26; DH Van Zyl, 
History and Principles o f Roman Private Law (1983) Chapter 24; Rudolph Sohm, The Institutes: A 
Textbook o f the History and System of Roman Private Law (3rd ed, 1907), 102-103; OF Robinson, TD 
Fergus and WM Gordon, European Legal History (2nd ed, 1994) [6.6.8]-[6.6.9]; JF O’Connor, Good 
Faith in English Law (1990) 81-84.
104
See generally O’Connor, above n 103, 85-98.
105 HK Lücke, ‘Good Faith and Contractual Performance’ in PD Finn (ed), Essays on Contract 
(1987) 155, 155-156. See also Kirke La Shelle Co v Paul Armstrong Co 263 NY 79; 188 NE 163 
(Court o f Appeals New York, 1933); Steven J Burton, ‘Breach of Contract and the Common Law 
Duty to Perform in Good Faith’ (1980) 94 Harvard Law Review 369, 404. American Law Institute, 
Restatement o f the Law, Contracts, 2nd (1981) vol 2 § 205 and Robert S Summers, ‘General Duty of 
Good Faith - Its Recognition and Conceptualisation’ (1982) 67 Cornell Law Review 810, 814.
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In comparison to the civil law, the common law tradition (with which this 
thesis is concerned) has, arguably, provided a piecemeal, fragmented and incoherent 
judicial response to commercial risk. Part of the reason for this situation has been 
that 19th century politicians, lawyers and commercial operators were far from 
sanguine about legislative or judicial intervention in commercial transactions. 
However, notwithstanding this aversion to intervention, there have been some 
important and lasting judicial responses to the issue of risk assumption in 
commercial transactions. One prominent example was the method of implying terms 
in contracts. The courts rationalised the implication of terms in contracts on the basis 
of the inferred or presumed intention of the parties.106 But, the implication of terms 
did reflect an adjustment away from laissez-faire individualism. The concept of
107implied terms remains part of the legislative landscape today.
In order to construct a theory of how courts and insolvency administrators 
ought to respond to the commercial transactions described, it is necessary to 
highlight certain tools which have been utilised to explain and justify judicial 
intervention in commercial relationships. Three tools are important in this thesis.
1 Duty of Disclosure
It is apparent that English common law did absorb notions of good faith from
108the civil law traditions where insurance contracts were under scrutiny. Lord 
Mansfield held that good faith was:
The governing principle...applicable to all contracts and dealings.
Good faith forbids either party by concealing what he privately 
knows, to draw the other into a bargain, from his ignorance of that 
fact, and his believing the contrary.109
Lord Mansfield’s statement was made in the context of the law governing insurance 
contracts. An insurance contract was (and remains) a contract of uberrima fides. The 
insured was required to disclose accurately all the material facts which were
106 The Moorcock 14 PD 64, 68 (Bowen LJ).
107 For an informative discussion of implied terms see AG Guest, ‘Implied Terms’ in AG Guest (ed), 
Chitty on Contracts (27th ed, 1994), 901.
108 Lücke, above n 105, 156-157.
109 Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905, 1909-1910; 97 ER 1162, 1164.
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necessary for the insurer to review before entering into the insurance contract. Lord 
Mansfield stated:
Insurance is a contract upon speculation.
The special facts, upon which the contingent chance is to be 
computed, lie most commonly in the knowledge of the insured only: 
the underwriter trusts to his representation, and proceeds upon 
confidence that he does not keep back any circumstance in his 
knowledge, to mislead the under-writer into a belief that the 
circumstance does not exist, and to induce him to estimate the risque 
as if it did not exist. The keeping back such a circumstance is a fraud 
and therefore the policy is void. Although the suppression should 
happen through mistake, without any fraudulent intention; yet still the 
under-writer is deceived, and the policy is void; because the risque 
run is really different from the risque understood and intended to be 
run, at the time of the agreement.110
In the 19th century, Lord Mansfield’s endorsement of the duty of good faith was 
eclipsed by the perceived need to develop essentially predictable or even scientific 
legal method.111 Notwithstanding the 19th century assault on the concept of good 
faith, the duty of disclosure remained an important aspect of insurance contract law. 
Its incorporation into insurance contracts was not totally antithetical to laissez-faire 
individualism in the sense that it enforced the view that the four comers of the 
contract regulated the relationship of the parties. However, it went against the 
concept of caveat emptor because it was recognised and accepted that an insurer or 
underwriter was nor expected to know completely about the property or transaction 
which it insured. Whilst the duty of disclosure is mutual, it will rarely be required 
from the insurer or the underwriter. The duty transferred the onus to disclose any 
irregularities on the insured and created a duty of disclosure in what was otherwise a 
straightforward arm’s-length commercial transaction.113
111 Lücke, above n 105, 157-158.
112 Tarr, Liew and Holligan, above n 87, 70 and fn 2.
113 For a comprehensive discussion of the duty of disclosure in insurance contracts see Semin Park, 
The Duty o f Disclosure in Insurance Contract Law (1996). Shorter accounts can be found in Anthony 
Duggan, Michael Bryan and Frances Hanks, Contractual Non-Disclosure (1994) 71-83; ER Hardy 
Ivamy, General Principles o f Insurance Law (6th ed, 1993), Chapters 12 and 13; Robert Merkin (ed), 
Colinvaux’s Law o f Insurance (6th ed, 1990) [5.01 ]-[5.10]. From a legislative perspective see of the 
Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) Part II; Marine Insurance Act 1906 (UK) s 18.
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It will be contended that a duty of disclosure is no longer confined to 
insurance cases. A duty to disclose may apply to situations where a commercial party 
could not be expected to know or understand the nature and extent of the risk 
involved, particular the potential insolvency of the other party.
2 Quasi-Contract
Courts have had to intervene in situations where a party had refused to refund 
money to another where the money had been paid or services were rendered or goods 
supplied in a situation which was not regulated by a contract. There was no contract 
or the contract was ineffective. In the 18th and 19th centuries such intervention by 
courts was known as quasi-contract114 and the respective actions were for money had 
and received, quantum meruit (recovery for services rendered) and quantum valebat 
(price for goods supplied).115 The action for money had and received became 
extremely important prior to the 18th century. Two events ensured that this would be 
the case. In the seminal decision in Slade’s case,116 it was held that a promise to pay 
a debt could be implied from the facts of a case. The contract or promise was simply 
a fiction. The other fact was that the growth of the writ of indebitatus assumpsit 
superseded debt and account in the 16th century, so that quasi-contractual claims 
were enforced under that writ rather than the writs of debt or account. Lord 
Mansfield said:
If the defendant be under an obligation, from the ties of natural
justice, to refund; the law implies a debt, and gives this action,
founded in the equity of the plaintiffs case, as it were upon a contract
118(‘quasi ex contractu’, as the Roman law expresses it).
114 Lord Goff of Chieveley and Gareth Jones, The Law o f Restitution (4th ed, 1993) 3-5
115 Ibid 3-4.
116 (1602) 4 Co Rep 92a; 76 ER 1072. For a discussion of the case see JH Baker, ‘New Light on 
Slade’s Case’ (1971) 29 The Cambridge Law Journal, 51 and 213; David Ibbetson ‘Sixteenth 
Century Contract Law: Slade’s Case in Context’ (1984) 4 Oxford Journal o f Legal Studies 295.
117 Goff and Jones, above n 114, 3-5, 6-9.
118 Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr 1005, 1008; 97 ER 676, 678. Other cases where similar 
sentiments were expressed were White v Copeland (1894) 15 LR (NSW) 281, 288 (Darley CJ); R v 
Brown (1912) 14 CLR 17, 25 (Griffiths CJ); Campbell v Kitchen & Sons Ltd and Brisbane Soap 
Company (1910) 12 CLR 515, 531 (Barton J); Sargood Brothers v The Commonwealth (1910) 11 
CLR 258, 303 (Isaacs J).
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In the 19th century, some judges attempted to rationalise and legitimise the existence 
of quasi-contractual actions on the basis of an implied contract theory.119 But the law 
of quasi-contract was derided by others. Despite these mixed responses, the law of 
quasi-contract and its descendant (known as the law of restitution which incorporates 
the law of quasi-contract), is an example where courts have intervened to adjust 
legal relations. Important substantive situations where courts intervened were 
payment under mistake and payment under compulsion. The law of restitution 
is discussed further below.
3 Equity
Equitable jurisdiction has been a central and substantial tool of judicial 
intervention in commercial relationships. The traditional use of equity in its 
proprietary mode will be considered in Chapter 2. The conventional basis upon 
which equity has intervened has been on the notion of ‘conscience’,124 a principle 
which has ecclesiastical origins and which did not rest well with the harsher laissez- 
faire individualism of the 19th century. Despite the fact that there were concerns 
expressed about the intervention of equity in commercial transactions, equity still 
prescribed certain minimal standards of conduct in some commercial situations.
Equity intervened to prevent equitable fraud, which is wider in scope than
126actual fraud. In the seminal case, Earl o f Chesterfield v Janssen, Lord Hardwicke
119 Freeman v Jeffries (1869) LR 4 Ex 189; Re Rhodes (1890) 44 Ch D 94, 105 (Cotton LJ); Sinclair 
v Brougham [1914] AC 398, 415 (Viscount Haldane LJ), 452 (Sumner LJ).
120 Baylis v Bishop of London [1913] 1 Ch 127, 140 (Hamilton LJ); Holt v Markham [1923] 1 KB 
504, 513 (Scrutton LJ).
121 Goff and Jones, above n 114, 3-5.
122 See for example Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd v William H Price Ltd [1934] AC 
455; Kerrison v Glyn, Mills, Currie & Co (1911) LJKB 465 (HL); Lamer v London County Council 
[1949] 2 KB 683.
123 See for example in relation to the compulsory discharge of another’s liability Moule v Garrett 
(1872) LR 7 Ex 101; Johnson v Royal Mail Steam Packet Co (1867) LR 3 CP 38; and duress or 
improper pressure Smith v William Charlick Ltd (1924) 34 CLR 38.
124 Patrick Parkinson, ‘The Conscience of Equity’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The Principles of Equity, 
(1996)28, [201]-[202].
125 New Zealand & Australian Land Co v Watson (1881) 7 QBD 374, 382 (Bramwell LJ). For a 
discussion of equity in the 19th century see Atiyah, above n 74, 388-393.
126 (1751) 2 Yes Sen 125; 28 ER 82.
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said that the Court of Chancery had jurisdiction to provide relief against all forms of 
fraud. They are still relevant today. He said:
1...fraud, which is dolus malus, may be actual, arising from facts and 
circumstances of imposition; which is the plainest case.
2. It may be apparent from the intrinsic nature and subject of the 
bargain itself; such as no man in his senses and not under delusion 
would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would 
accept on the other; which are unequitable and unconscientious 
bargains...
A 3d kind of fraud is, which may be presumed from the circumstances 
and condition of the parties contracting; and this goes farther than the 
rule of law; which is, that it must be proved, not presumed; but it is 
wisely established in this court to prevent taking surreptitious 
advantage of the weakness or necessity of another: which knowingly 
to do is equally against the conscience as to take advantage of his 
ignorance: a person is equally unable to judge for himself in one as 
the other.
A 4th kind of fraud may be collected or inferred in the consideration 
of this court from the nature and circumstances of the transaction, as 
being an imposition and deceit on the other persons not parties to the
1 27fraudulent agreement.
Lord Hardwicke envisaged the investigation of the circumstances leading up to a 
contract and the very nature of the contract itself. These notions of fraud were 
substantively articulated in equitable doctrines which set aside commercial 
transactions on the basis of undue influence, relief against forfeiture or 
estoppel.130
Equity also began to develop other doctrines during the 18th century and 
early 19th century to deal with the new demand of an industrialising England. It was 
at this time that the concept of the fiduciary obligation, derived from the trust, was
127 Ibid 155-156; 100.
1 28
Earl o f Aylesford v Morris (1873) LR 3 Ch App; Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145.
129 Hill v Barclay (1810) 16 Ves Jun 402; 33 ER 1037; (1811) 18 Ves 56; 34 ER 238; Sanders v Pope 
(1806) 12 Ves Jun; 33 ER 108.
130 Loffus v Maw (1862) 3 Giff 592; 66 ER 544; Burrowes v Lock (1805) 10 Ves 470; 32 ER 927; 
Hammersley v De Biel (1845) 12 Cl & Fin 45; 8 ER 1312; PD Finn, ‘Equitable Estoppel’ in PD Finn 
(ed), Essays in Equity (1985) 59, 62-65.
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given independent expression.131 The doctrines of marshalling,132 contribution, 133 
subrogation134 and equitable assignments133 were developed and utilised with 
considerable effect in order to sustain the viability and integrity of commercial 
transactions. Equitable tracing developed in part as a response to the complexity of 
commercial transactions involving money.136 These are considered in Chapter 2. The
137equitable action for breach of confidence also originated during the 19th century.
Equity has also remained a significant supplement not only to the 
inadequacies and deficiencies of the common law, but also to legislation. Equity was 
engrafted on what were complex and sophisticated legislative property and security 
registration systems. These systems were an attempt to create certainty both for 
owners, security holders and potential creditors. In some security systems such as the 
Torrens system, equity was employed as a necessary adjunct to the codified 
system in order for the scheme to work.139
LS Sealy, ‘Fiduciary Relationships’ [1962] The Cambridge Law Journal 69; LS Sealy, ‘Some 
Principles of Fiduciary Obligation’ [1963] The Cambridge Law Journal 119; Finn, above n 12, [2].
132 See Webb v Smith (1885) 30 Ch D 192. For a discussion of the historical antecedents of the 
doctrine of marshalling see Sir William Holdsworth, A History o f English Law (2nd ed, 1937) vol 6, 
656-657.
133 See Dering v Earl o f Winchelsea (1787) 1 Cox 318; 29 ER 1184. For a discussion of the origins 
of the doctrine of contribution see Albion Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance Office (1969) 
121 CLR 342.
134 See Randal v Cockran (1748) 1 Ves Sen 98; 27 ER 916. For an discussion of the historical 
antecedents see RP Meagher, WMC Gummow and JRF Lehane, Equity Doctrines and Remedies (3rd 
ed, 1992) [901],
135 Holroyd v Marshall (1862) 10 HLC 191; 11 ER 999; Tailby v Official Receiver (1888) 13 App 
Cas 523; Milroy v Lord (1862) 4 De GF & J 264; 45 ER 1185.
136 Re Hallett’s Estate; Knatchbull v Hallett (1880) 13 Ch D 696.
137 Morison v Moat (1851) 9 Hare 24; 68 ER 492.
138 In relation to the Torrens system see Barry v Heider (1914) 19 CLR 197; Peter Butt, Land Law 
(3rded, 1996) [2021 ]-[2022]; Peter Butt and Frank Ticehurst, Woodman and Nettle: The Torrens 
System in New South Wales (1985) [74F], particularly [74F.20] and [74F.100].
139 For a discussion of the relationship of the present Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK) and equity see LS 
Sealy ‘The Contract of Sale of Goods’ in AG Guest (ed), Benjamin's Sale o f Goods (4Ih ed, 1992) 3, 
[ l-008]-[ 1-1010]. Note also DW Greig and JLR Davis, The Law o f Contract (1987) 881.
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4 Equity in the 20th Century - Identification of Risk Assumption
The history of the equitable jurisdiction in the 19th century shows that there 
was an uneasy and often irreconcilable truce between laissez-faire individualism on 
the one hand and a secular commercial morality on the other. Twentieth century 
judges and legislatures inherited the ambiguities and incongruities associated with 
this uneasy truce. Equitable intervention is still viewed by some with scepticism. For 
example, Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale 
Islington London Borough Council:140
My Lords, wise judges have often warned against the wholesale 
importation into commercial law of equitable principles inconsistent 
with the certainty and speed which are essential requirements for the 
orderly conduct of business affairs...If the bank’s arguments are 
correct, a businessman who has entered into transactions relating to or 
dependent upon property rights could find that assets which 
apparently belong to one person in fact belong to another; that there 
are ‘off balance sheet’ liabilities of which he cannot be aware; that 
these property rights and liabilities arise from circumstances unknown 
not only to himself but also to anyone else who has been involved in 
the transactions. A new area of unmanageable risk will be introduced 
into commercial dealings.141
Nonetheless, in the latter half of the 20th century, there has been a greater 
willingness on both courts and legislatures to intervene in commercial relationships - 
to an extent that 19th century lawyers would have abhorred.
Legislative intervention has been expansive and wide ranging in common law 
jurisdictions in order to ensure that commercial parties conform to certain minimum 
standards of conduct. Therefore, in Australia for example, legislation protects 
consumers,142 regulates the provision of credit to consumers,143 re-opens certain
140 [1996] AC 669.
141 Ibid 704-705. See also Henry v Hammond [1913] 2 KB 515, 521 (Channell J); Scandinavian 
Trading Tanker Co AB v Flota Petrola Ecuatoriana [1983] 2 AC 694, 703-704 (Lord Diplock citing 
Lord Goff in the Court of Appeal decision below); Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd 
(1989) 16 NSWLR, 582, 585-586 (Kirby P).
142 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) Part V.
143 For example, Consumer Credit Act 1994 (NSW); Consumer Credit Act 1994 (Qld). For a 
comprehensive review of the consumer credit legislation see Paul Sugden, ‘Credit’ in RB Vermeesch 
and Justice KE Lindgren, Business Law o f Australia (9th ed, 1998) 1004.
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kinds of contracts which are considered to be ‘unjust’,144 and prohibits commercial 
conduct which is considered to be unconscionable.145
Courts have also taken a more interventionist approach to commercial 
transactions. Equity remains a major innovative tool of judicial intervention. As Earl 
o f Chesterfield v Janssen showed,146 equity has redefined the notion of conscience 
from ecclesiastical conscience to a secular conscience which identifies various kinds 
of unconscionable conduct.147 The concept of unconscionable conduct continues to 
develop in response to modem conditions.
In particular, it will be contended that equity’s secular concept of conscience 
has broadened sufficiently to deal with the kinds of situations which form the first 
contextual component of the thesis. The concept of unconscionable conduct is further 
considered in Chapter 5. These are commercial transactions where a party is 
presumed to have assumed the risks associated with his unsecured status in the event 
of the insolvency of the other party. As money is the subject of the commercial 
transaction, it is equally assumed that as money is negotiable, title to the money 
passes to the recipient and/or collector of that money. This thesis addresses those 
situations where the nature of the transaction and the relationship of the parties is 
such that it cannot be presumed that there was an assumption of that risk.
V Bankruptcy and Insolvency
The fourth contextual component is the law of bankruptcy and insolvency. 
There are three aspects of bankruptcy and insolvency regimes which deserve 
introduction at this stage.
First, most generally, it is not surprising that bankruptcy was subject to a
148wideranging overhaul in the 19th century. Earlier bankruptcy regimes created
144 For example, Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW).
145 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) Part IVA.
146 (1751) 2 Ves Sen 125; 28 ER 82.
147 See generally Parkinson, above n 124.
148 For a comprehensive discussion of this process see V Markham Lester, Victorian Insolvency, 
Bankruptcy, Imprisonment for Debt, and Company Winding-up in Nineteenth-Century England, 
(1995). Note also Cornish and Clark, above n 43, 226-237.
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unnecessary uncertainty, fraud and abuse.149 The bankruptcy and insolvency regimes 
which operate in the 20th century are the products of this reform process.
Secondly, despite the 19th century reform process, certain fundamental 
principles had already been well established by 1800.150 The principle of rateable 
distribution between unsecured creditors had been settled. The principle stems in part 
from the Roman law of bonorum venditio, 151 In the Middle Ages, the law of 
bonorum venditio was adopted by the Italian City States which were leaders in 
commerce, the development of commercial law and the concept of modem
153bankruptcy itself.
In early English law, there was no formal law of bankruptcy.154 However, in 
the reign of Henry VIII, the Parliament enacted ‘An Act Against Such Persons As 
Do Make Bankrupt’155 which established the principle that the money realised from 
the assets of the bankrupt were to be rateably distributed amongst creditors.156 In 
Smith v Mills,157 the Court stated:
but the law, as hath been said before, hath appointed certain 
commissioners of indifferency and credit, to make the distribution of 
his goods to every one of his creditors, rate and rate alike, a portion,
158according to the quantity of their debts, as the statute speaketh.
149 Lester, above n 148, 25-26.
150 Ibid 37.
151 HF Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study o f Roman Law (2nd ed, 1952) 225.
152 Wyndham Antis Bewes, The Romance o f the Law Merchant: Being an Introduction to the Study 
o f International and Commercial Law with some Account o f the Commerce and Fairs o f the Middle 
Ages (1923) 57-58. Note also Holdsworth, above n 132, vol 8, 229-230.
153 Ibid 61-62.
154 Lester, above n 148, 13-14; Dennis Rose, Lewis: Australian Bankruptcy Law (10th ed, 1994) 7-8.
155 34 & 35 HenVIII c 4.
156 Rose, above n 154, 11; Lester, above n 148, 14.
157 (1584) 2 Co Rep 25a; 76 ER 441.
1 SR
Ibid 26a; 473-474.
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From then onward, the principle sustained remarkable currency and it appears that it 
was not challenged directly thereafter, despite the passage of numerous statutes.159 
No doubt the principle of rateable distribution would not have conflicted with 19th 
century utilitarianism because it was a straightforward, easily understood, 
disarmingly simple to apply and apparently fair. As Atiyah’s discussion has 
indicated, the principle of rateable distribution of assets was not only unchallenged, 
but the commercial community sought to have the principle applied more 
vigorously.160 In the 20th century, the rateable distribution principles remains 
entrenched in legislation.161
The principle of rateable distribution is relevant because it is a compelling 
reason for legislative and judicial non-intervention in commercial relationships 
where one party has become insolvent. Non-intervention preserves the certainty and 
fairness of the rateable distribution principle. The argument is that to do otherwise 
would artificially deplete the assets of the bankrupt. This argument is addressed in 
Chapter 4.
However, when considering the principle of rateable distribution, 
qualifications are necessary. The operation of rateable distribution of assets has been 
undercut by prioritisation of certain unsecured creditors under legislation. Certain 
claims by unsecured creditors are given automatic priority over other unsecured 
creditors. The concept of the secured creditor dramatically limits the operation of 
rateable distribution because the security effectively removes the asset from 
distribution amongst unsecured creditors until the secured creditor has been fully 
paid out. Commercial persons have turned to other means, such as the limited 
liability company (and even arranged the assets of the company so as to take them 
preferentially on winding up), to prevent personal bankruptcy and the operation of 
the principle.164
159 For a discussion of the complex array of statutes see Rose above, n 154, 10-16.
160 Atiyah, above n 74, 519.
161 Ibid; For a discussion of the history of Australian bankruptcy law see Rose, above n 154, 17-18.
16~ Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 109(1).
163 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 90.
164 Cornish and Clark, above n 43, 236; Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22. For a modem 
application of the doctrine see Lee v Lee's Air Farming Ltd [1961] AC 12 and Hamilton v Whitehouse 
(1988) 82 ALR 626. For a discussion of the modem scope and limitations of the doctrine see HAJ
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Thirdly, there have been occasions where equity has been used to alleviate 
the harsh results of an untrammelled operation of rateable distribution. The problem 
is that the principle does not distinguish between different kinds of creditors (other 
than on the basis of whether the creditor is secured or unsecured). Therefore, the 
circumstances which surround the transfer, the collection of money by a debtor or 
the retention of money by a debtor is never investigated. Thus, equity has been used 
as a supplement to bankruptcy and insolvency regimes where the application of the 
rateable distribution principle is involved. The application of equitable principles has 
arisen in two separate and complementary contexts.
The first situation is the interpolation of the principle into bankruptcy law 
that a trustee in bankruptcy is an officer of the court who should not abuse his or her 
powers. Therefore, in the 19th century authority of Ex parte James; Re Condon,165 it 
was made clear that equitable principles were applicable to the process of bankruptcy 
administration. James LJ stated:
I am of opinion that a trustee in bankruptcy is an officer of the Court.
He has inquisitorial powers given him by the Court, and the Court 
regards him as its officer, and he is to hold money in his hands upon 
trust for its equitable distribution among the creditors. The Court, 
then, finding that he has in his hands money which in equity belongs 
to some one else, ought to set an example to the world by paying it to 
the person really entitled to it. In my opinion the Court of Bankruptcy 
ought to be as honest as other people.166
167The basic principles are that there must be an enrichment of the estate, the 
claimant must not be in a position to submit an ordinary proof of debt and it would 
be contrary to ‘fair dealing’ for the trustee to retain the moneys for the purpose of pro 
rata distribution to creditors169 or it would be unfair for the trustee to rely upon his
Ford, RP Austin and IM Ramsay, Ford’s Principles o f Corporations Law (8th ed, 1997) [4.140]- 
[4.420],
165 (1874) LR 9 Ch App 609.
166 Ibid 614.
167 Re Clark (A Bankrupt); Ex parte The Trustee v Texaco Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 559, 563-4; Re Ayoub; 
Ex parte Silvia (1983) 67 FLR 144, 148 (Morling J); Re Sabri; Ex parte Brien v Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1996-1997] 21 Fam LR 213, 232 (Chisolm J).
168 Ibid.
169 Re Tyler; Ex parte The Official Receiver [1907] 1 KB 865, 872 (Farrell LJ).
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strict legal rights. In some cases, judges have indicated that they would exercise 
equitable jurisdiction in order to ensure that the administrator acts in such a way as to 
ensure that there has been honest dealing. However, whilst there has been some 
discussion of what sort of conduct would not amount to fair dealing, 172 it appears that 
the kinds of situations involved are not fully delineated. The principle enunciated in 
Ex parte James is consistent with the underlying assumption in bankruptcy law that 
the trustee in bankruptcy acquires no better title than the bankrupt. 173
The other method by which courts have been able to moderate the application 
of the principle of rateable distribution is by determining that the debtor held the 
money in trust for the creditor. This principle does not operate in relation to express 
trusts based on intention only. Rather, it is equally effective in relation to the diverse 
range of trusts which operate in our legal system. 174 However, the trust property must 
be identified. It is not surprising that litigants and courts alike have focussed on 
the existence of a trust. It is a well accepted principle of the administration of 
bankruptcy and insolvency regimes that money which is held in trust does not form 
part of the assets of the debtor. Therefore, the beneficial interest in the asset is 
patriated in, or repatriated into the hands of the creditor as beneficiary. In many 
cases, there is no question that a trust operates and the property which is subject to 
the trust is clearly identifiable. Far more difficult are those cases where a creditor 
alleges that there is a trust operating in its favour, but there is no clearly expressed 
trust regulating the relationship between the parties and/or the property which is 
alleged to be subject of the trust is not clearly identifiable or traceable. In order to
170
170 Re Clark (A Bankrupt); Ex parte The Trustee v Texaco Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 559, 563-4; Re Ayoub; 
Ex parte Silvia (1983) 67 FLR 144, 148 (Morling J); Re Sabri; Ex parte Brien v Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1996-1997) 21 Fam LR 213, 232 (Chisolm J).
171 Re Craig & Sons: Ex parte Hinchcliffe [1916] 2 KB 497; Re Regent Finance & Guarantee Corp 
[1930] WN (Eng) 84; Re Henderson; Ex parte Tonkin (1934) 7 ABC 273; Re Docker; Ex parte 
Official Receiver (1938) 10 ABC 97; Re Sabri; Ex parte Brien v Australia & New Zealand Group Ltd 
(1996-1997) 21 Fam LR, 213. For a full list of cases where the principle has been referred to and/or 
applied see PP McQuade and MGR Gronow, McDonald, Henry and Meek: Australian Bankruptcy 
Law and Practice (5th ed, 1996) vol 1, [116.1.310],
172 Re Tyler; Ex parte The Official Receiver [1907] 1 KB 865, 872-873 (Farwell LJ).
173 McQuade and Gronow, vol 1 above n 171, [116.1.320].
174 RP Meagher and WMC Gummow, Jacobs ’ Law o f Trusts in Australia (6th ed, 1997) Chapter 3.
175 McQuade and Gronow, above n 171 vol 1, [116.2 .10].
176 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 116 (2) (a).
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find and justify a trust, courts have embraced a broadened notion of an intention to 
create an express trust and in so doing, courts (and commentators) have relied on the 
specificity and identifiability of the property which is allegedly subject to a trust. In 
recent years courts of various common law jurisdictions have turned to the 
consideration of constructive trust in commercial transactions,177 but this process has 
been sporadic, incompletely formulated and, in some cases, the guidelines which 
have been enunciated have been unnecessarily restrictive.178
This thesis will explore both doctrinally and practically the appropriate test 
and appropriate legal mechanism which should be applied when determining whether 
the funds form part of the assets of the bankrupt debtor. It will be argued that closer 
examination of the principle of unconscionability in equity is required.
Hereafter, for ease of discussion the words ‘insolvent’ and ‘insolvency’ will 
be used in preference to ‘bankrupt’ and ‘bankruptcy’ to encompass the failure of an 
individual, partnership or corporation to meet their debts as and when they fall due 
(except where specific bankruptcy legislation is discussed).179 So too, reference will 
be made to insolvency administrators rather than trustees in bankruptcy, receivers 
and liquidators for ease of expression. The discussion of insolvency issues will 
particularly focus on the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
VI Equity and Restitution
The fifth and final contextual area is the relationship of equity and restitution 
in the context of commercial transactions and bankruptcy.
The law of restitution has revived in recent years in Australia and England 
as a response to commercial situations which require judicial intervention but which
For example Gerard McCormack, ‘The Remedial Constructive Trust and Commercial 
Transactions’ (1996) 17 The Company Lawyer 3; DWM Waters, ‘The Nature of the Remedial 
Constructive Trust’ in Peter Birks (ed), The Frontiers o f Liability (1994) vol 2, 165; Paul Finn, 
‘Constructive Trusts - A New Era, Equity Commerce and Remedy’ (Paper presented at the 1993 New  
Zealand Law Conference, Wellington New Zealand, 2-5 March 1993) vol 1, 203, 224.
178
For example Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] 
AC 669, 711-716 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
179 Corporations Law (Cth) s 95 A; Sandell v Porter (1966) 115 CLR 666. Note also Bankruptcy Act 
1966 (Cth) s 122 (4) (c) and Hymix Concrete Ltd v Garrity (1977) 13 ALR 231.
180
Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1987) 162 CLR 221; Lipkin Gorman (A Firm) v Karpnale Ltd 
[1991] 2 AC 548.
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do not fall neatly into the categorisation of contract and tort law. A major component 
of any definition of the law of restitution has been the area of common law quasi- 
contract. The modem law of restitution is based on the concept of unjust 
enrichment rather than the earlier fiction of implied contract. " Goff and Jones have 
stated in relation to the principle of ‘Unjust enrichment’ that:
Most mature systems of law have found it necessary to provide, 
outside the fields of contract and civil wrongs, for the restoration of 
benefits on grounds of unjust enrichment. There are many civil 
circumstances in which a defendant may find himself in possession of 
a benefit which, in justice, he should restore to the plaintiff. Obvious 
examples are where the plaintiff has himself conferred the benefit on 
the defendant through mistake or compulsion. To allow the defendant 
to retain such a benefit would result in his being unjustly enriched at 
the plaintiffs expense, and this, subject to certain defined limits, the 
law will not allow. ‘Unjust enrichment’ is, simply, the name which is 
commonly given to the principle of justice which the law recognises
1 89and gives effect to in a wide variety of claims of this kind.
Such an endorsement of unjust enrichment as the coherent and consistent concept 
underlying the law of restitution has been forcefully criticised and a generalised right 
to restitution rejected by some commentators. Nevertheless, the breadth of the 
concept of unjust enrichment has resulted in two phenomena. First, advocates of the 
law of restitution have expanded the notion of unjust enrichment well beyond quasi­
contract. They have subsumed and rationalised areas which are the traditional 
domain of equity. Such rationalisations are interesting academic exercises but 
remain unsatisfactory because these doctrines are the creation of the conscience of 
equity rather than the relatively modem notion of unjust enrichment.
Secondly, in recent times, restitution commentators have sought to endow the 
concept of unjust enrichment with proprietary features which the original law of 
quasi-contract did not possess. The problem for the modem restitution commentators
181
Goff and Jones, above n 114, 3-5.
1 CO
Ibid 5-11.
1 89
Ibid 12-13.
184 Steve Hedley, ‘Unjust Enrichment as the basis of Restitution - an overworked concept’ (1985) 5 
Legal Studies 56.
185 See for example, Goff and Jones, above n 114, Chapters 33, 10 and 11; Keith Mason and JW 
Carter, Restitution Law in Australia (1995) Chapter 17.
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is that a successful claimant obtains a personal remedy only. Where the party who 
has been unjustly enriched is insolvent, restitution lawyers have found their elaborate 
and cohesive scheme severely wanting. And, they have had to consider the prospect
of invoking the jurisdiction of equity. The schemes presented by restitution lawyers
186have been generally unsatisfying in this regard.
One possible reason for the apparent friction between equity lawyers and 
restitution lawyers may rest in the fact that both equity and quasi-contract were tools 
of judicial intervention in commercial transactions. Judicial intervention was unco­
ordinated, due to the laissez-faire attitude of 19th century courts and the 
administration of the ‘courts’ system up to the passing of the Judicature Act in 1873. 
Thus, there has been overlapping jurisdictions in relation to some kinds of matters. 
But, equity was (and is) the primary tool for judicial intervention and equitable 
principles govern the award of equitable proprietary relief.
Therefore, a focus of this thesis will be where a so-called restitutionary 
claimant requires a proprietary remedy because of the insolvency of the defendant. It 
is submitted that the answer to the question whether an unsecured creditor is entitled 
to a proprietary remedy is inevitably linked to how equity has and should define 
unconscionable conduct with reference to commercial risk and the conduct of 
commercial parties.
VII Plan of the Thesis
The thesis is divided into two parts. Part One comprises Chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
Part Two comprises Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
In Part One, there is a consideration of the use and abuse of proprietary 
interests and relief in our legal system in the context of insolvency. Chapter 2 is 
concerned with the comparison between personal and proprietary interests and 
remedies and the various situations where equity has traditionally recognised 
proprietary interests. It is contended that equitable intervention can be explained not 
only on the basis of unconscionability, but also on the basis of risk assumption. 
These concepts are not mutually exclusive. The concept of unconscionable conduct 
has subsumed the commercial notion of risk. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the problem 
of trying to extend equity’s proprietary reach. Chapter 3 deals with the relatively
186 See the discussion in Chapter 3, 122-129; Chapter 5, 199-201.
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recent extension of proprietary interests and adaptations considered in Chapter 2 and 
the doctrinal problems which these extensions present. However, some extensions 
are explicable on the basis of risk assumption as well. Turning from the attempts to 
extend equitable proprietary mechanisms, it is contended in Chapter 4 that the 
traditional requirement for a proprietary base for the operation of equity’s rules is no 
longer tenable in the modem age - particularly where money is concerned.
Part Two deals with development and enhancement of the principle of 
unconscionability in recent times; and the importance of risk assumption as an 
integral part of the equity’s characterisation of unconscionable conduct. Chapter 5 
directly confronts the meaning and applicability of unconscionable conduct. It is 
contended that we are moving towards a theory of objective non-assumption of risk. 
Chapter 6 details the practical application of the theory of objective non-assumption 
of risk. Chapter 7 considers what is the appropriate remedy where there has been an 
objective non-assumption of risk; and any possible defences.
A conclusion:
(i) summarises the arguments and findings of the thesis; and
(ii) considers the potential impact of the thesis findings on the way equity may 
operate in the future, particularly in relation to insolvency administration.
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PART ONE
EQUITABLE PROPRIETARY GATEWAYS AND THE 
PROPRIETARY BASE THEORY
Chapter 2
EQUITABLE PROPRIETARY INTERESTS: TRADITIONAL 
APPROACHES
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I Introduction
This chapter analyses how equity’s proprietary devices have traditionally 
operated in insolvency contexts. In order to do so, it will be necessary to consider the 
equitable mechanisms and the underlying rationale for them. The early concept of 
‘conscience’ has informed the development of equitable proprietary devices. 
However, this concept of conscience has a modem secular focus - risk assumption in 
commercial transactions.
II Personal and Proprietary Interests
A starting point for a consideration of equity’s traditional proprietary impact 
in insolvency contexts is a consideration of the well known divide between personal 
interests or claims in personam and proprietary interests or claims in rem. Personal
claims exist against a specific person such as a claim for debt or breach of contract. 1 2
2A claim in rem is a right or claim which operates against the world at large. 
Generally, a claim in rem will function in the context of proprietary interests and 
relief. However, this is not always the case. Sykes and Walker have pointed out that 
claims in rem may operate without the need for property at all:
Such a right is frequently proprietary in the sense of being available in 
relation to a piece of tangible property, but the phrase is also used to 
cover rights in tort which are not proprietary. A right not to be 
assaulted or a right not to be maliciously prosecuted is a right in rem 
but is not proprietary. Conversely, neither security nor ownership 
rights over ‘property’ are necessarily available against all the world. 
Whether they are depends on the nature of the res. A mortgagee of 
land gets rights available against all the world because of the nature of 
the res. However, modem commercial and legal development has 
uncovered an increasing number of interests which can be made the 
subject of ownership. A mere debt is now regarded as a res, a thing 
which one can own, dispose of and make the subject matter of a 
security. But a debt is a mere right in personam; the person entitled to 
it can, therefore, in making it available as the subject matter of a
1 Edward I Sykes and Sally Walker, The Law o f Securities (5th ed, 1993) 4.
2 Ibid 4, 8.
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security, give to the security holder nothing but a mere right in
3personam.
However, a substantial portion of in rem claims will be directed at some forms of 
property (although increasingly such claims are becoming detached from tangible 
property) .3 4 Such proprietary rights or rights in re5 are of two kinds. First there are 
proprietary rights based on the ownership of a res. A person has the ownership of a 
res where that person
has a collection or aggregation of rights in re, such as the rights of 
possession and of enjoyment and the right of transfer or disposal of 
the res.6 78
Secondly, there are security rights in re where a secured creditor may obtain 
ownership of property (such as under an equitable mortgage), a mere charge over the 
property or something in between these two extremes. For the purposes of the 
subsequent discussion, the concept of security is defined:
...as an interest, not being an interest arising from a trust, in property 
which is either owned by another person or in which another person 
has incomplete or inchoate rights capable of maturing into full 
ownership, by virtue of which interest certain rights are exercisable in 
relation to that property in order to obtain payment or performance of 
an obligation by that other person either consensually provided for or 
provided for by implication of law or validly directed by some third
g
party to be paid or performed.
Such interests in re are highly effective in insolvency contexts. If it can be 
established that the insolvent does not own certain property, then that property will 
not form part of the asset base of the insolvent. It will not be property owned or 
vested in the insolvent or the insolvency administrator.9 Therefore, it is not
3 Ibid 8.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid 7.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid 12.
9
Note generally Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 116 (1).
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surprising that elaborate title retention schemes have surfaced. 10 On the other hand, 
secured creditors are accorded special treatment under insolvency regimes. They may 
realise their securities outside of the insolvency regime and they stand ahead of 
unsecured creditors. 11 Equity developed two different mechanisms which, broadly 
speaking, fall within the concept of proprietary interests. There are proprietary 
interests in which a party acquires an equitable interest in the underlying property 
such as the equitable interests which beneficiaries acquire in trust property. 12 
Alternatively, there are security interests, such as the lien or the floating charge or 
lien, under which a party acquires a security interest over, but not in, another 
person’s property.
Various equitable proprietary devices which have operated effectively in 
insolvency contexts will be considered. What needs to be emphasised here is that this 
chapter is primarily concerned with proprietary interests and security devices which 
stand outside traditional commercial transactions by which parties consensually 
agree to shift the burden of risk. Therefore, equitable mortgages and floating and 
fixed charges14 will not be discussed. Such consensual devices create a situation 
where a creditor has a priority interest by virtue of the fact that he is a secured 
creditor.
I ll  Assumption of Risk
The second important feature to re-iterate is that equity has transcended its 
original family and domestic origins. 15 Equity is such an important jurisdiction with 
respect to commercial transactions that it has absorbed significant general concepts 
which flow through the commercial process. Increasingly, as a means of explaining
See for example, Sarah Worthington, Proprietary Interests in Commercial Transactions (1996) 
Chapter 2.
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 90.
12 See below,50-55; cf discretionary trusts: Gartside v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1968] AC 
553; IJ Hardingham and R Baxt, Discretionary Trusts (2nd ed, 1984) [605]-[609].
13 For a discussion of the equitable mortgage see Sykes and Walker, above n 1, 307-319.
14 Ibid 193-199.
15 For a discussion of the origins of equity and the trust in England see William Holdsworth, A 
History of English Law (2nd ed, 1937) vol 1, 395-423 and vol 4, 407-480.
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existing equitable mechanisms and defining unconscionable conduct, modem courts 
have referred to the need to determine whether a party assumes the risks which 
commercial transactions present. Thus, risk, an inherent factor in commercial 
transactions, is becoming an important determinant of equitable intervention. An 
early United States case, Re Kountze Bros' 6 established that equity operated 
increasingly as a means by which courts examined the assumption of risk. In that 
case, a private bank was adjudicated bankrupt. A series of appellants argued that 
funds had been forwarded to the private bank as agent and tmstee for them. The 
problem was that funds had been mixed and the issue was how equity’s tracing rules 
should be applied. The Circuit Court of Appeal stated:
The usual formula is to say that, where a fund is composed partly of 
the defrauded claimant’s money and partly of the fiduciary’s own 
money, the fiduciary is presumed to intend to draw out the money he 
can legally use rather than that of the claimant... Equity marshals the 
withdrawals against the fiduciary’s own funds so long as it can 
because that result is deemed fairer. There is good reason for this 
because the fiduciary’s creditors have accepted the risk of his 
solvency, while his cestuis have accepted only the risk of his 
honesty.17
A similar approach was taken in Australian Securities Commission v Melbourne
18Asset Management Nominees Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) where 
Northrop J stated in relation to fiduciary obligations of fund recipients for prescribed 
schemes:
If MAM and Nominees had administered the scheme properly, the 
funds would not have become intermingled with the general funds of 
MAM. The investors were relying on the honesty and integrity of 
MAM and Nominees to administer the scheme properly so that such 
intermingling did not occur and that MAM would not use the 
investors’ funds for its own purposes. The unsecured creditors, on the 
other hand, stood in the same position as any normal unsecured 
creditor in dealing with MAM; they accepted the risk that, as with any 
other unsecured creditor, MAM may become insolvent and that they 
may not receive what was owing to them. The investors did not accept
16 79 F 98 (2nd Cir, 1935). This case was cited in Stephenson Nominees Pty Ltd v Official Receiver; 
Ex parte Roberts (1987) 16 FCR 536, 556 (Gummow J).
17 Ibid 101-102.
1 R
(1994) 49 FCR 334.
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such a risk and should not have been exposed to such a risk, given the 
fiduciary obligation of MAM to use their funds for a specified 
purpose only. For these reasons... the investors should be given 
priority over the unsecured creditors. 19
In a Privy Council case, Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan Lord Nichols, 
who delivered judgment, pointed out that beneficiaries do not take on the risk of loss 
or insolvency when a trustee has acted in an unauthorised way:
All investment involves risk. Imprudence is not dishonesty, although 
imprudence may be carried recklessly to lengths which call into 
question the honesty of the person making the decision. This is 
especially so if the transaction serves another purpose in which that 
person has an interest of his own.
This type of risk is to be sharply distinguished from the case where a 
trustee, with or without the benefit of advice, is aware that a particular 
investment or application of trust property is outside his powers, but 
nevertheless he decides to proceed in the belief or hope that his will 
be beneficial to the beneficiaries or, at least, not prejudicial to them.
He takes a risk that a clearly unauthorised transaction will not cause 
loss. A risk of this nature is for the account of those who take it. If the
risk materialises and causes loss, those who knowingly took the risk
21will be accountable accordingly.
If there is loss arising from the unauthorised use and employment of the trust funds,
the unauthorised trustee (whether acting wrongfully or ignorantly), must bear the
22loss and personally re-imburse the trust assets.
The views expressed in these cases have won some academic endorsement in 
the United States,23 England,24 Canada,25 Australia26 New Zealand27 and Ireland28 in
19 Ibid 359.
20 [1995] 2 AC 398.
21 Ibid 389-390.
22 RP Meagher and WMC Gummow, Jacobs ’ Law of Trusts in Australia (6th ed, 1997)[2205]-[2206]; 
HAJ Ford and WA Lee, Principles of the Law of Trusts (3rd ed, 1996) [17110]-17120].
~3 George E Palmer, The Law of Restitution (1978) vol 1, [2.14], 185-186.
24 For example, Jill E Martin, Hanbury & Martin: Modern Equity (14th ed, 1993), 642 - but note the 
omission in Jill E Martin Hanbury & Martin: Modern Equity (15th ed, 1997) 657; Lord Goff of 
Chieveley and Gareth Jones, The Law of Restitution (4th ed, 1993) 94-95; Gareth Jones, ‘Tracing 
Claims in the Modem World’ [1988-1989] King’s Counsel 15.
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the sense that some commentators have considered that assumption of risk is an 
increasingly helpful criterion for determining when equity should intervene in 
commercial relationships.
A crucial aspect of defining risk taking in commercial relationships has been
29the issue of disclosure which was introduced in the discussion of uberrima fides. 
The traditional reluctance to impose duties of disclosure has given way to a greater 
acceptance of the need for courts and legislatures to impose disclosure obligations on 
commercial parties. Finn has stated in this regard:
A rigid insistence upon the caveat emptor rule is now acknowledged 
to be capable of producing ‘singularly unappetising’ results in some 
instances. As a consequence there is an emerging trend to insist upon 
disclosure to prevent undue advantage taking in dealings and this in 
recognition of the view that there is a widening ‘array of contexts 
where one party’s superior knowledge of essential facts renders a
32transaction without disclosure inherently unfair.’
In the general law, in order to ensure that commercial transactions proceed 
smoothly and that parties understand the risks they are taking, elaborate procedures
See generally David M Paciocco, ‘The Remedial Constructive Trust: A Principled Basis for 
Priorities over Creditors (1989) 68 The Canadian Bar Review 315 noting difficulties at 324-325.
26 John Glover, ‘Equity, Restitution and the Proprietary Recovery of Value’ (1991) 14 The University 
of New South Wales Law Journal, 247, 276-277; John Glover, Commercial Equity: Fiduciary 
Relationships (1995) [6.61 ]-[6.66]; Paul Finn, ‘Constructive Trusts - A New Era, Equity Commerce 
and Remedy’ (Paper presented at the 1993 New Zealand Law Conference, Wellington New Zealand, 
2-5 March 1993) vol 1, 203; David M Wright, The Remedial Constructive Trust {1998) [4.20]-[4.25].
27 SR Scott, The Remedial Constructive Trust in Commercial Transactions [1993] Lloyd’s Maritime 
and Commercial Law Quarterly 330, 341.
28 Paul R Coughlan, ‘Equitable Liens for the Recovery of Book Deposits’ (1987) 9 Dublin University 
Law Journal 65, 104-106.
29 Chapter 1, 24-26.
30 Tina Cockbum and Leanne Wiseman, ‘Introduction: Disclosure Obligations of Business: 
Contemporary Issues’ in Tina Cockbum and Leanne Wiseman (eds), Disclosure Obligations in 
Business Relationships (1996) 1, 3-7.
31 Ibid 7-14.
3" Paul Finn, ‘Contract and the Fiduciary Principle’ (1989) 12 The University of New South Wales 
Law Journal 76, 78.
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have been set up in relation to investment schemes and consumer transactions. The 
complex law concerning corporate prospectuses33 and consumer protection34 are 
conspicuous examples.
In determining whether equitable proprietary intervention is warranted, courts 
have increasingly considered whether the party knew all the relevant information in 
relation to the transaction. In Barclays Bank pic v O ’Brien, 35 the House of Lords 
considered the nature and extent of the doctrine of undue influence in the context of 
wives providing security for the liabilities of husbands.36 The House of Lords held, 
inter alia, that third party lenders such as Barclays Bank, could not simply rely on 
written documentation in order to obtain reliable security for funds which had been 
lent or would be lent in the future. The third party lender would be fixed with 
constructive notice of any undue influence exerted by the husband over the wife.37 
In short, what the third party lenders were obliged to ensure was that the wife 
understood the commercial risk she was taking when acting as guarantor. Therefore, 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated:
But in my judgment the creditor, in order to avoid being fixed with 
constructive notice, can reasonably be expected to take steps to bring 
home to the wife the risk she is running by standing as surety and to 
advise her to take independent advice. As to past transactions, it will 
depend on the facts of each case whether the steps taken by the 
creditor satisfy this test. However for the future in my judgment a 
creditor will have satisfied these requirements if it insists that the wife 
attend a private meeting (in the absence of the husband) with a 
representative of the creditor at which she is told of the extent of her 
liability as surety, warned of the risk she is running and urged to take 
independent legal advice. If these steps are taken in my judgment the
33 Corporations Law (Cth) Part 7.12; Simon Fisher, ’Disclosure Obligations Specific to Corporations’ 
in Tina Cockbum and Leanne Wiseman (eds), Disclosure Obligations in Business Relationships
(1996) 212.
34 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) Part V; Sharon Christensen, ’The Effect of the Trade Practices Act 
on Non-disclosure’ in Tina Cockbum and Leanne Wiseman (eds), Disclosure Obligations in Business 
Relationships (1996) 92.
35 [1994] 1 AC 180.
36
For a discussion o f the complex contextual issues see Belinda Fehlberg, Sexually Transmitted Debt
(1997) .
37 See also the judgment of Kirby J in Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 155 ALR 614, 
[70]-[83].
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creditor will have taken such reasonable steps as are necessary to 
preclude a subsequent claim that it had constructive notice of the
38wife’s rights.
The judgment showed that, at least in some cases, undue influence is not primarily 
focussed on the voluntariness of a party, but on whether the party has assumed the 
risk of the transaction fully informed about the possible affect of the transaction on 
her personal interests. Once the third party lender had redressed the potential 
vitiating factor of non-disclosure, it could enforce the transaction on the basis that it 
was a conventional commercial transaction where it could be safely assumed that the 
other party understood and assumed commercial risk. In this case, the wife did not 
seek proprietary relief but rescission. Rescission was appropriate because it restored 
her to the situation prior to the execution of the guarantee. Such an effective personal 
remedy (which had a proprietary effect of nullifying the mortgage over the house) 
would not have been available if there had been disclosure.
In the recent case, Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd39 a majority of the 
High Court upheld the decision of Dixon J in Yerkey v Jones40 and declined to follow 
the O ’Brien approach.41 However, they effectively determined that risk assumption 
was at the heart of cases where a wife, as a volunteer, guaranteed her husband’s 
debts. They held that a bank’s enforcement of such a guarantee would constitute 
unconscionable conduct, if the bank had not explained the transaction to the wife or 
was not aware of the wife having obtained appropriate independent advice. Thus, it 
would be unconscionable to enforce a guarantee against a wife who did not 
understand the risks associated with the guarantee.42
The associated, but still different, doctrine43 of unconscionable dealings can 
also be explained on the basis that there has been a lack of informed risk assumption.
38 Barclays Bank pic v O ’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, 196-197.
39 Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 155 ALR 614.
40 (1939) 63 CLR 649.
41 (1998) 155 ALR 614, [39] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
4" Ibid [31]-[33], [41], For a further discussion of the case see Chapter 5, 194-195.
43 See IJ Hardingham, ‘Unconscionable Dealing’ in PD Finn (ed), Essays in Equity (1985) 1 and the 
recent decision of the High Court of Australia, Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 155 
ALR 614, [26]-[30],
49
The doctrine is triggered by the unscrupulous taking advantage of another person’s 
special disabilities which may include for example, poverty,44 poor health,45 lack of 
education or language difficulties46 or lack of business expertise.47 Again, evidence 
of full disclosure of the financial risk and suggestions to take independent advice will 
redress the obvious informational and personal imbalance, and transform the 
unconscionability of the transaction into a standard risk assumption venture.
It will be argued that a variety of equitable proprietary mechanisms and 
equitable doctrines may be explained on the basis that the aggrieved party had not 
assumed the risk of the transaction. For ease of discussion, these mechanisms and 
doctrines will be referred to as ‘equitable proprietary gateways.’
IV The Trust, Fiduciary Obligations and Tracing
A The Trust
Commentators have pointed out that it is immensely difficult, if not 
impossible, to provide a satisfactory definition of the trust. Some have suggested 
that this is due to the fact that there is a family of trust concepts rather than a single 
dominating idea.49 However, what cannot be denied is that the family of trust 
concepts are concerned with the relationship between various parties and property of 
one kind or another. Generally, a trust arises where there is a division between legal 
title and equitable title.50 However, it must be acknowledged that some trusts, such
44 Vital Finance Corporation Pty Ltd v Taylor (1991) ASC T|56-099, ^[57,051 (Smart J).
45 Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362.
46 Commercial Bank of Australia vAmadio (1983) 151 CLR 447.
Morlend Finance Corp (Vic) Pty Ltd v Luke (1991) ASC ^56-095, ^56, 995 (Smith J); Vital 
Finance Corporation Pty Ltd v Taylor (1991) ASC ^56-099, [^57,051 (Smart J).
48 JD Heydon and PL Loughlan, Cases and Materials on Equity and Trusts (5th ed, 1997) [22.3.1]; 
Meagher and Gummow, above n 22, [101]; DWM Waters, Law of Trusts in Canada, (2nd ed, 1984), 
4-5; Jill E Martin, Hanbury & Martin: Modern Equity (15th ed, 1997) 45.
49 Heydon and Loughlan, above n 48, [22.3.1].
50 Meagher and Gummow, above n 22, [105] and [107]; Martin, above n 48, 45-46; Hardoon v 
Belilios [1901] AC 118, 123 (Lord Lindley).
50
51 52as charitable trusts or non charitable purpose trusts, do not vest equitable 
proprietary interests in clearly defined beneficiaries. In the latter case, this can result 
in invalidity. Also, the discretionary trust does not vest beneficiaries with an 
equitable interest.' Nonetheless, the kinds of trusts which will be discussed 
throughout this thesis will generally conform to the standard criterion that there is a 
split between legal and equitable ownership.
Equity, via the development of the trust, arose essentially in the context of 
family and domestic disputes about land and property. Whilst it is true that 
Aristotle’s concept of epieikeiä54 is generally credited with directly influencing 
Roman law aequitas55 (and thereafter Roman law influenced English equity) , 56 such 
influence did not take place in a vacuum. Generally Roman aequitas and English 
equity were employed to resolve property disputes. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
records show that when a plaintiff petitioned the Chancellor for redress for a 
perceived wrong, the perceived wrong was often the fact that one member of a
58family retained land which did not belong to him.
51 Meagher and Gummow above n 22, [1005]; Ford and Lee, above n 22, [ 19000]-[ 19010].
52
Meagher and Gummow, above n 22, Chapter 11; Ford and Lee, above n 22, [5230]-[5310]; Morice 
v Bishop of Durham (1804) 9 Ves 399; 32 ER 656; Re Denley’s Trust Deed [1969] 1 Ch 372; Leahy v 
Attorney-General (NSW) AC 457; Bacon v Pianta [1966] 114 CLR 634.
53 Gartside v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1968] AC 553; R & I Bank of Western Australia Ltd v 
Anchorage Investments Pty Ltd (1992) 10 WAR 59.
54 See JAK Thomson (trans), The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics (1976) Book V 
Chapter 10, 198-200.
55 JM Kelly, A Short History on Western Legal Theory (1992) 52; James Mackintosh, Roman Law in 
Modern Practice (1934) 34 Charles Phineas Sherman, Roman Law in the Modern World (1917) vol 1, 
§65.
56 See Spencer W Symore (ed), A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence, (5th ed, 1941) §2; Sherman, 
above n 55, §379; cf FW Maitland, Equity: A Course o f Lectures (1936) 32 and OW Holmes, ‘Early 
English Equity’ (1885) 1 The Law Quarterly Review 62.
57 For a discussion of a device in Roman law similar to a trust to address property disputes see David 
Johnston, The Roman Law ofTrusts (1988) and Sherman, above n 55, vol 1, § 151.
58 For a full discussion of these issues and how the use subsequently developed see Holdsworth, 
above n 15, vol 4, 407-480. For a discussion of the period see RP Meagher, WMC Gummow and JRF 
Lehane, Equity Doctrines and Remedies (3rd ed, 1992) [103]- [110].
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The importance of such petitions was not simply that they were made in a 
context in which petitioners appealed to ‘what right and reason demand’59 or ‘the 
fulfilment of justice to the parties. ’60 Rather, the Chancellor was called upon to 
recognise interests in property which were not legal interests, but which were 
sufficiently defined and meaningful to warrant protection. From these early origins, 
equity developed proprietary interests as distinct from legal ownership in property. 
The concept of the trust was a brilliant compromise. On the one hand, equity did not 
interfere with the legitimacy of the common law concept of ownership. Equity acted 
as a gloss on the common law in the sense that the legal ownership was subject to a 
legitimate interest of another.
Thus, ecclesiastical notions of natural law and fairness may have survived in 
equitable jurisprudence.61 However, what ultimately gave the trust its historically 
enduring quality was the development of the proprietary interest which was a central 
feature of the trust. As Scott and Fratcher have stated:
The trust would never have attained the position it has assumed in 
English law, however, if the chancellor had contented himself with 
enforcing the personal duties imposed upon the trustee. He did much 
more than this. He created a system of equitable ownership. At first, it 
is true, he did not profess to do this. He spoke as though he were 
merely compelling the trustee to act in accordance with the dictates of 
conscience. But before the end of the fifteenth century he had held 
that the interest of the beneficiary would be protected against 
purchasers with notice of his interest, against the heir of the trustee, 
and against gratuitous transferees. It is true that he refused to subject 
to the trust a purchaser for value and without notice of the 
beneficiary’s interest. He did not give as complete protection to 
equitable ownership as the law gave to legal ownership. Before the 
end of the fifteenth century he treated the beneficiary’s interest as a 
form of ownership, and not merely as a claim against the trustee, not
only as between the beneficiary and the outer world, but as between
62the beneficiary and his successors in interest.
59 William Paley Baildon (ed), ‘Select Cases in Chancery’ (1896) 10 Seldon Society Case Number 63.
60 Ibid Case Number 95.
61 See The Honourable Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Place of Equity and Equitable Doctrines in the 
Contemporary Common Law World: An Australian Perspective’ in Donovan WM Waters (ed), 
Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts 1993 (1993) 1,5.
62 Austin Wakeman Scott and William Franklin Fratcher, The Law of Trusts (4th ed, 1987) vol I, § 1, 
5-6.
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The history of the trust (originally known as the use) has been described from the 
perspective of taxation and primogeniture. However, the use of equitable interests 
and the trust to circumvent the rigours of bankruptcy law was equally important. 
Holdsworth has demonstrated that during the 17th century, a party could successfully 
plead that property, in which he had an equitable interest, could not be considered 
part of the assets of a bankrupt.64 Property which had been settled by a relative for 
the benefit of the wife and children of the bankrupt, was not part of the assets of the 
bankrupt.65 The court held that the settlement was not a trust created by the 
husband.66 Therefore, during this era, it appears that trusts were used to try to protect 
assets from creditors, although Holdsworth’s account is not specific on this point.
Since that time, the fact that the trust vests an equitable interest has meant 
that the trust has been a highly effective device against the insolvency of the 
trustee. Another way of expressing the effect of the trust is to say that a trustee in 
bankruptcy acquires no better title than the bankrupt. This apparently simple but 
effective principle of equity and bankruptcy law has been enshrined in bankruptcy 
legislation of various jurisdictions. In Australia, s 116 (2) (a) Bankruptcy Act 1966 
(Cth) states that certain property is not divisible amongst creditors of the bankrupt 
including:
property held by the bankrupt in trust for another person;09
63 Ibid § 1. l-§ 1.6; HAJ Ford and IJ Hardingham, Trusts: Commentary and Materials (1990) 2-3.
64 Holdsworth, above n 15, vol 8, 241-242.
65 Vandenanker v Desbrough (1689) 2 Vem 96; 23 ER 671.
67 Scott v Surman (1743) Willes 400, 403; 125 ER 1235, 1237; John F Archbold, The Law and 
Practice in Bankruptcy as Founded on the Recent Statutes (5th ed, 1834) 192. In relation to executors 
as trustees see Winch v Keeley (1787) 1 TR 619; 99 ER 1284; Carpenter v Marnell (1802) 3 Bos & 
Pul 40; 127 ER 23; Gardner v Rowe (1828) 5 Russ 258; 38 ER 1024; Morgan v Swansea Authority 
(1878) 9 Ch D 582, 585 (Jessel MR); The Governors o f St Thomas’ Hospital v Richardson [1910] 1 
KB 271, 276-277 (Cozens-Hardy MR).
68 Re Gunsbourg [1920] 2 KB 426; Pearce v Bastable’s Trustee in Bankruptcy [1901] 2 Ch 122; 
Shoolbred v Roberts [1900] 2 QB 497; Re Mapleback (1876) 4 Ch D 150. For a discussion of this 
principle see PP McQuade and MGR Gronow, McDonald, Henry and Meek: Australian Bankruptcy 
Law and Practice (5th ed, 1996) [116.1.320].
69 For helpful discussions see WA Lee, ‘Trusts and Bankruptcy’ (1973) 47 The Australian Law 
Journal 365; RP Meagher, ‘Insolvency of Trustees’ (1979) The Australian Law Journal 648.
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70 71 72In the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States “ the position is similar in 
relation to bankruptcy. In relation to insolvent corporations it has been noted that in 
Australia, the Corporations Law (Cth) does not expressly exclude trust assets from 
the assets which are distributable amongst the insolvent’s creditors. However, s 556 
Corporations Law effectively excludes trust assets from those being used to 
discharge the liabilities of the corporation.74
The exclusion of the assets of a trust from the distributable property of the 
insolvent has been explained in terms of commercial risk. In Space Investments Ltd v 
Canadian Imperial Bank o f Commerce Trusts Co (Bahamas) Ltd the Privy Council 
considered the position of a trustee bank which had become insolvent. The bank, in 
its capacity as trustee, had properly deposited the trust funds in its own enterprise 
and the beneficiaries were not entitled to a proprietary interest in the bank’s assets. 
Nevertheless, Lord Templeman (who delivered the judgment for the Privy Council) 
made some salient remarks about the operation of trusts in insolvency contexts:
This priority is conferred because the customers and other unsecured 
creditors voluntarily accept the risk that the trustee bank might 
become insolvent and unable to discharge its obligations in full. On 
the other hand, the settlor of the trust and the beneficiaries interested 
under the trust, never accept any risks involved in the possible 
insolvency of the trustee bank.76
And, when comparing the standard of care required from a company director on the 
one hand and a trustee on the other hand, Finn J stated:
70 Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) s 283 (3) (a); Christopher Berry, Edward Bailey and Stephen Schaw- 
Miller, Personal Insolvency -  Law and Practice (2nd ed, 1993) [28.1].
71 Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act RSC 1985 c B-3 s 67 (1) (a); The Honourable Mr Justice LW 
Houlden and CH Morawetz QC, The 1996 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (1995) F§ 5.
72 Scott and Fratcher, above n 62, vol II, § 221,1; Daniel R. Cowans, Bankruptcy Law and Practice 
(2nd ed, 1978) vol 1, § 348; Robert D Albergotti, Understanding Bankruptcy Law in the US: A 
Handbook of Law and Practice (1992) 52.
73 Meagher and Gummow, above n 22, [2114].
75 [1986] 1 WLR 1072.
76 Ibid 1074. See also SJ Stoljar, The Law of Quasi-Contract (2nd ed, 1989) 142-143.
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I would add that underlying the distinction today is, probably, not 
merely an historical assumption about the separate purposes of 
companies and of trusts, but also a generalisation about the different 
risks that persons who invest their assets in companies on the one 
hand and in trusts on the other are considered likely to have 
assumed. . . 77
In the light of the powerful protection which a trust affords beneficiaries, it is 
not surprising that provisions excluding the trust property from the assets of the 
insolvent have been the subject of interpretation. Two major problems have arisen. 
First, there has been the question whether trust property over which an insolvent 
trustee has a lien or charge to recoup moneys expended by him for and on behalf of 
the trust, is protected. It has been established that such entitlements from the trust 
property were property of the insolvent and were not afforded the protection of the 
legislative exclusion. Thus, when the trustee becomes insolvent the indemnity 
which is secured by a right of charge vests in the insolvency administrator.
Secondly, there has been the problem of what does such legislation mean by 
the word ‘trust.’ This will be considered below.
B Express or Declared Trusts
The kind of trust which was under consideration in Space Investments Ltd v 
Canadian Imperial Bank o f Commerce Trusts Co (Bahamas) Ltct0 was an express 
trust. An express trust has been described as one in which
...the creator has used language which expresses an intention to create 
a trust. The author of the trust has meant to create a trust, and has used 
language which explicitly expresses that intention, either orally or in 
writing. The fact that a trust was intended may even be deduced from
77 Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominees (1995) 133 ALR 1,13.
78
See for example Vacuum Oil Co Pty Ltd v Wiltshire (1945) 72 CLR 319.
79 Octavo Investments Pty Ltd v Knight (1979)144 CLR 360; Re Matheson; Ex parte Worrell v 
Matheson (1994) 121 ALR 605; 49 FCR 454; Re McLernon; Ex parte SWF Hoists and Industrial 
Equipment Pty Ltd v Prebble (1995) 130 ALR 609; 58 FCR 391; McQuade and Gronow, above n 68, 
[116.2.057],
80
[1986] 1 WLR 1072.
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the conduct of the parties concerned but, if there is any uncertainty as 
to intention, there will be no trust.81
The standard (but not sole) legal context in which the necessary intention82 to create 
an express trust arises is where there is a settlement of a trust deed or a testamentary
83trust created in writing.
However, this concept of the trust has not been the only kind of trust or 
relationship which has been protected by the operation of such important provisions 
as si 16 (2) (a) Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).84
C The Resulting Trust
Historically speaking, the trust was the result of a settlor’s or a testator’s 
intention. However, even in medieval times, trusts were implied or imposed by the 
Chancellor. According to Scott and Fratcher, the resulting trust began to emerge in 
the late 15th century when Chancellors were faced with the problem that proprietary 
relief was required in cases where a use had not been declared or did not deal with 
the whole beneficial interest. Holdsworth suggests that the resulting trust emerged 
later in the 17th century.86
The resulting trust has been explained on the basis that it is grounded on an
87absence of intention to create a trust or because the law intervenes on the basis of
88what the parties were presumed to have intended. There has been academic debate
81
Meagher and Gummow, above n 22 [307]. See also Ford and Lee, above n 22, [2010]- [2060].
82
~ Knight v Knight (1840) 3 Beav 148; 49 ER 48.
83
For example Hayes v National Heart Foundation, NSW Division, [1976] 1 NSWLR 29; Dean v 
Cole (1921) 30 CLR 1.
84
Ford and Lee, above n 22 [14100].
85
Scott and Fratcher, above n 62, vol V § 404, 4-5.
86
Holdsworth, above n 15, vol 6, 644.
87
Scott and Fratcher, above n 62, vol V § 404.1, 6.
88 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669, 708 
(Lord Browne-Wilkinson); Meagher and Gummow, above n 22, [1201].
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as to which test is the appropriate one. At the end of the day, the debate can 
become quite an arid one. Ultimately what is important is that the two approaches are 
not necessarily inconsistent. Resulting trusts arise by operation of law (whatever the 
ultimate rationale) and have operated in two situations as Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
has explained:90
(A) where A makes a voluntary payment to B or pays (wholly or in 
part) for the purchase of property which is vested either in B alone or 
in the joint names of A and B, there is a presumption that A did not 
intend to make a gift to B: the money or property is held on trust for 
A (if he is the sole provider of the money) or in the case of a joint 
purchase by A and B in shares proportionate to their contributions. It 
is important to stress that this is only a presumption, which 
presumption is easily rebutted either by the counter-presumption of 
advancement or by direct evidence of A’s intention to make an 
outright transfer...(B) Where A transfers property to B on express 
trusts, but the trusts declared do not exhaust the whole beneficial 
interest.91
The two kinds of resulting trust were also explained and distinguished by Megarry J 
in the earlier case, Re Vandervell’s Trusts (No 2) “ when he said:
The distinction between the two categories of resulting trusts is 
important because they operate in different ways. Putting it shortly, in 
the first category, subject to any provision in the instrument, the 
matter is one of intention, with the rebuttable presumption of a 
resulting trust applying if the intention is not manifest. For the second 
category, there is no mention of any expression of intention in any 
instrument, or of any presumption of a resulting trust: the resulting 
trust takes effect by operation of law, and appears to be automatic.
What a man fails effectually to dispose of remains automatically 
vested in him, and no question of any mere presumption can arise.
The two categories are thus of presumed resulting trusts and
89
89 Waters, above n 48, 18-20; Robert Chambers, Resulting Trusts (1997) 32-34. For a discussion of 
problems of definition see Wright, above n 26, [6.20].
90 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669.
91 Ibid 708.
92 [1974] 1 Ch 269.
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automatic resulting trusts. The first question must therefore be into
93which category any given case falls
Each of the presumed resulting trusts94 and automatic resulting trusts95 have a well 
documented legal pedigree and statutory formalities do not affect the creation or 
operation.96 Automatic resulting trusts arise where, inter alia, an express trust fails,97 
where there is a failure to set out the trust or dispose of the whole of the beneficial 
interest where property is conveyed on trust but the specific purpose of the trust 
fails100 and where property conveyed on trust exceeds what is required. 101 Presumed 
resulting trusts arise where there has been a voluntary transfer of some forms of 
property (although the law is not devoid of difficulties) or a purchase money 
situation, where one party purchases property in the name of another. 104 The
93 Ibid 289.
94 Dyer v Dyer (1788) 2 Cox 92; 30 ER 42; Ingram v Ingram [1941] VLR 95; Jones v Parkinson 
[1952] NZLR 89; Bateman Television Ltd (in liq) v Bateman and Thomas [1971] NZLR 453; Napier 
v Public Trustee (WA) (1980) 32 ALR 153; Calverley v Green (1984) 155 CLR 242; Nelson v Nelson 
(1995) 184 CLR 538.
95 Re Gillingham Bus Disaster Fund v Official Solicitor [1959] Ch 62; Re West Sussex 
Constabulary’s Widows Children & Benevolent (1930) Fund Trusts [1971] Ch 1; Watson v Holland 
(Inspector of Taxes) [1985] 1 All ER 290.
96 See for example, Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s 23C (2); Properly Law Act 1958 (Vic) s 53(2); 
Law o f Property Act 1925 (UK) s 53 (2).
97 Ford and Lee, above n 22, [21030]; Meagher and Gummow above, n 22, [1205].
98 Meagher and Gummow, above n 22, [1203].
99 Ford and Lee above n 22, [21010]; Meagher and Gummow, above n 22, [1204].
100 Meagher and Gummow, above n 22, [1206]; GE Dal Pont and DRC Chalmers, Equity and Trusts 
in Australia and New Zealand (1996), 416.
101 Re Trusts o f the Abbott Fund; Smith v Abbott [1900] 2 Ch 326; Re British Red Cross Balkan Fund 
[1914] 2 Ch 419; Re Gillingham Bus Disaster Fund v Official Solicitor [1959] Ch 62; Meagher and 
Gummow, above n 22, [1207]; Dal Pont and Chalmers, above n 99, 416.
102 Ford and Lee, above n 22, [21080]-[21100],
103 Meagher and Gummow, above n 22, [1220]-[1221].
104 Ford and Lee above n 22, [21110]-[21120]; Meagher and Gummow, above n 22, [1210]-[ 1211]; 
Napier v Public Trustee (WA) (1980) 32 ALR 153; Jones v Parkinson [1952] NZLR 89; Heneker v 
Heneker [1954] SASR 181. In relation to personal property see Russell v Scott (1936) 55 CLR 440; 
Bateman TV Ltd (in liq) v Bateman and Thomas [1971] NZLR 453.
58
presumed resulting trust may be rebutted by evidence that the contributor of the 
purchase price intended to benefit the party in whose name the property or interest is 
registered105 or by the presumption of advancement.106 Whilst the continued 
existence of the presumption of advancement has been questioned,107 it is still an 
operative principle.108
Whilst much has been written on the resulting trust, its impact in bankruptcy 
and insolvency situations has often gone unnoticed.109 Yet a party which is entitled 
to claim an interest under a resulting trust
is like a beneficiary under an express trust in many respects.110
A beneficiary under a resulting trust will be able to claim that he has a proprietary 
interest which is effective against any claims of a trustee in bankruptcy. For example, 
in Re 389179 Ontario Ltd; Re Peat Marwick Ltd,ul 389178 Ontario Ltd supplied 
funds for the purchase of assets of Barrie’s Ltd as vendor. However, the assets which 
were purchased were taken in the name of another separate company, 389179 
Ontario Ltd. A receiving order was made against 389179 Ontario Ltd and it was 
argued on behalf of 389178 Ontario Ltd that the assets were not part of the former 
company’s asset base. This argument succeeded, notwithstanding the fact that both 
companies had common directors and shareholders. The funds used to purchase 
the property had been borrowed from a third party and the purchase transaction 
between the companies had been used to artificially inflate the value of the property
105 Ford and Lee, above n 22, [21130] and [21150]; Meagher and Gummow, above n 22, [1213].
106 Charles Marshall Pty Ltd v Grimsley (1956) 95 CLR 353; Nelson v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538. 
For a comprehensive discussion of the presumption of advancement see Ford and Lee, above n 22, 
[21160]-[21170] and Meagher and Gummow, above n 22, [1212].
107 See Calverley v Green (1984) 155 CLR 242, 265 (Murphy J); Dullow v Dullow (1985) 2 NSWLR 
531, 535-536 (Hope JA).
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Nelson v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538, 602 (McHugh J).
109 cf Robert Chambers, The Resulting Trust (1997).
110 Ford and Lee, above n 22, [21180].
111 (1980) 34 CBR (NS) 46.
112 Ibid 47.
113 Ibid 47-49.
59
in order to support the mortgages. The facts disclosed that the presumption 
operated, prima facie, and there was no evidence to suggest that the presumption was 
rebuttable115 or that the funds did represent a loan between the companies.116 Thus, 
the presumed resulting trust was used with considerable effectiveness, (together with 
the separate legal identity doctrine), to prove that the insolvent company did not 
have the beneficial or equitable interests in the disputed assets. Therefore, whilst 
the resulting trust did not specifically arise in response to insolvency contexts, it is a 
powerful proprietary device.
Although the concept of risk assumption has not been posited as a rationale 
for the resulting trust, it is arguable that it is a better explanation than the absence of 
intention or presumed intention. The circumstances warrant the intervention of 
equity on the basis that it cannot be presumed that the supplier of a purchase fund or 
a settlor assumed the risk of the recipient’s insolvency. Certainly, such an 
explanation provides a modem underpinning of the resulting trust which increasingly 
appears as an early precursor of the remedial constructive trust.119
D Fiduciary Obligations, the Institutional Constructive Trust and Equitable
Tracing
fiduciary obligations, which provide an even wider proprietary gateway,
arise where there is a relationship of trust and confidence. It has been suggested that
the earliest fiduciaries were trustees, administrators and bailees and that other
121kinds of fiduciaries appeared much later in the 18th century. However, the
Ibid 49.
Ibid 52-55.
Ibid.
117 Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22; Lee v Lee’s Air Farming Ltd [1961] AC 12; 
Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd [1925] AC 619.
118
See also Howard Graff v Deloitte & Touche, as Trustee in Bankruptcy for the Estate of Trevor 
Richard Bitz [1992] 2 WWR 162; Re Heffner and Price Waterhouse Ltd (1987) 32 DLR (4th) 760.
119
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identification of fiduciary obligations appears to have been a much later 
phenomenon. Sealy has argued that the first identifiable formulation of fiduciary
1 99obligations occurred in the 18th century.
During the 19th century the word ‘trust’ was used to describe relationships
i
which a modem lawyer would consider as being essentially fiduciary. Sealy has 
identified that the word ‘trust’ was used to describe not only cases where a party held 
property for and on behalf of another, but also where a party held no property but 
was simply in a position of trust and confidence.124 What is essential in the fiduciary 
relationship is that one party has reposed trust and confidence in another.125 
Therefore, although a substantive trust relationship does not exist, one party stands in 
a position of trust in relation to the other although the expansion of fiduciary 
obligations in some jurisdictions and judicial discussion of the expansion strongly 
suggests that the trust analogy is no longer adequate. A major difference between 
the trust and fiduciary obligations is that whereas a trustee is invariably entrusted 
with property, fiduciary obligations may arise where the fiduciary does not hold 
property for and on behalf of the beneficiary. Therefore, whilst a trust relationship 
is invariably fiduciary, fiduciary obligations do not necessarily entail the existence of
129trusts.
However, where property is vested in the fiduciary and/or later proprietary 
interests arise, a fiduciary is generally called a tmstee. Where the holding of property
122 LS Sealy, ‘Fiduciary Relationships’ [1962] The Cambridge Law Journal 69, 69-70.
123 Ibid; Cholmondeley and Darner v St John Clinton (1821) 4 Bli 1; 4 ER 721.
124 Sealy, above n 122, 71-72.
125 John Glover, Commercial Equity: Fiduciary Relationships (1995) [1.12] and Patrick Parkinson, 
’Fiduciary Obligations’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The Principles of Equity (1996) 325, [1009]- 
[ 1011]. '
126 See for example Frame v Smith [1987] 2 SCR 790; (1987) 42 DLR (4th) 81; Hodgkinson v Simms 
[1994] 3 SCR 377; (1995) 117 DLR (4th) 161.
127 Meagher and Gummow, above n 22, [202]-[208], 5; see also Ford and Lee, above n 22, [1000].
128 Meagher and Gummow, above n 22, [208]; Parkinson, above n 125, [1011]; Reading v The King 
[1949] 2 KB 232, 236 (Asquitb LJ).
129 Meagher and Gummow, above n 22, [202].
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for another is involved, trust law and fiduciary obligations noticeably converge. 130 
But, the ways in which the subsequent trust relationship arises will be different. 
Traditionally, there are essentially three situations where the fiduciary may be a 
trustee.
First, the fiduciary may receive property from the beneficiary as part of the 
relationship between the parties. The mere receipt of property does not necessarily 
give rise to a trust. There must be an intention that the legal title of the property vests 
with the fiduciary. There are many relationships where fiduciaries are entrusted with 
property to carry on a transaction or for the purpose of safekeeping131 such as 
bailees, 132 brokers, 133 and agents, 134 but a trust does not automatically arise. The 
notion of vesting title in property in a bailor who has received physical possession is 
totally antithetical to the concept of bailment. Agents or brokers do not hold the 
proceeds of sale of assets entrusted to them for the purposes of sale as trustees136 
unless the contracts between the parties provide so. The different standards are 
explicable on the basis of the varying and divergent functions of fiduciaries. 
Moreover, in the case of agents and brokers in particular, commercial transacting 
would become unmanageable if funds transferred to them or received from the sale 
of assets were automatically subject to a trust. Here, money operates as a negotiable 
commodity. However, equity is becoming more flexible in the relief that it does 
grant. The decision in Attorney- General (Hong Kong) v Reid may be effectively
130 PD Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (1977) [184].
131 Glover, above n 125, [3.69]; Scott and Fratcher, above n 62, vol VA, § 530.
132 Kingsmill v Lyne (1910) 13 CLR 292; Everingham v Everingham (1911) 12 SR (NSW) 5.
133 King v Hutton (1900) 83 LT 68; Re Goode; Ex parte Mount (1974) 4 ALR 579; Option 
Investments (Aust) Pty Ltd v Martin (1980) 5 ACLR 124; Daly v Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd (1986) 
160 CLR 371; Glover above n 125, [3.62]-[3.68],
134 Walker v Corboy (1990) 19 NSWLR 382.
135 Davis v Heuber (1923) 31 CLR 583, 595 (Higgins J).
136 Walker v Corboy (1990) 19 NSWLR 382; Re Goode; Ex parte Mount (1974) 4 ALR 579; Glover, 
above n 125, [3.72]-[3.80].
137 See for example Stephens Travel Service International Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers 
Appointed) v Qantas Airways Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 331.
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used in the future to impose proprietary relief against agents or bailors who make 
unauthorised profits or gains out of the relationship even where assets have not been 
transferred to them. However, in other cases such as the relationship of solicitor to 
client, safekeeping has been elevated to a trust relationship. Therefore, in Re A 
Solicitor 39 the funds in a solicitor’s trust account for the benefit of a client did not 
vest in the trustee in bankruptcy. 140 The trust status which exists in relation to such 
property is so entrenched in principle that it has been enshrined in legislation. 141
Secondly, if a fiduciary makes an unauthorised profit or gain out of the 
fiduciary relationship, he will become a trustee of the profit or the property which 
has been acquired from the profit. Here, the trust has influenced fiduciary 
obligations. 142 This approach to gains made from the fiduciary relationship has been 
generally applied strictly. Even so-called honest or innocent profits or gains must 
be accounted for. 144 The enforcement of fiduciary obligations is subject to the 
personal remedy of account of profits. 145 However, from a proprietary perspective, 
fiduciaries are deemed to be constructive trustees of the gain which has been made 
from the use of trust property. 146 Fiduciaries have been held to have misused or 
misappropriated trust property or opportunity where one party renewed a lease for
139 (1952) 1 Ch 328.
140 See also Re Jones (Deceased): Ex parte Mayne (1953) 16 ABC 169; Re Stillman and Wilson 
(1950) 15 ABC 68; Re Estate o f  Lee (1937) 9 ABC 196.
141 In relation to solicitors note: Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 61; Trust Accounts Act 1973 
(Qld) s 7 (1); Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s 31 (1); Legal Practice Act 1996 (Vic) ss 173 and 
174; Legal Profession Act 1993 (Tas) s 101; Legal Practitioners Act 1893 (WA) s 34 (1); Legal 
Practitioners Act 1970 (ACT) s 91; Legal Practitioners Act 1974 (NT) s 57; Law Practitioners Act 
1982 (NZ) s 89 (1). For a comprehensive discussion of solicitors duty to account see GE Dal Pont, 
Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility in Australia and New Zealand (1996) Chapter 10.
142 Parkinson, above n 125, [1010].
141
Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942] 1 All ER 378; [1967] 2 AC 134n; Boardman v Phipps 
[1967] 2 AC 46.
144 Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46.
145 For a discussion of account of profits as a remedy see the decision of the High Court of Australia 
in Warman International Ltd v Dwyer (1995) 182 CLR 544, 556-562 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, 
Dawson and Gaudron JJ).
146 Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41, 107-110 (Mason
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his benefit to the exclusion of the other147 or where the fiduciary used money of the 
trust to purchase property in his name. A fiduciary may also obtain profits or gains 
other than by use of trust property. Such a situation would be where the fiduciary 
uses his position as a fiduciary 149 or information gleaned during the course of the 
fiduciary relationship to obtain a profit. 150
The constructive trust which arises in response to breach of fiduciary 
obligation is often referred to as an institutional constructive trust rather than a 
remedial constructive trust. 151 Generally, the former trust arises notwithstanding the 
intention of the parties, but in other respects is considered to be akin to the express 
trust in the sense it arises where there is identifiable property, the legal title to which 
is vested in one party and the equitable title vested in the another. 153 Such a 
constructive trust has also been utilised against third parties who have knowingly 
received trust property as the result of a breach of trust or fiduciary obligation. 154 The 
institutional constructive trust operates like an express trust in insolvency situations. 
Therefore, property which is subject to a constructive trust does not form part of the 
insolvent’s assets.
147 Keech v Sandford (1726) Sei Cas T King; 25 ER 223 and Chan v Zacharia (1984) 154 CLR 178.
148 Paul A Davies (Australia) Pty Ltd v Davies (No 2) (1983) 1 NSWLR 440.
149 Attorney-General (Hong Kong) v Reid [1994] 1 AC 324.
150 See Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46; DPC Estates v Grey and Consul Development Pty Ltd 
(1974) 1 NSWLR 443, 470-471 (Hutley JA); Justice BH McPherson, ‘Information as Property in 
Equity’ in Malcolm Cope (ed), Equity: Trends and Issues (1995) 234.
151 M Cope, Constructive Trusts (1992) 12-15; DWM Waters, The Constructive Trust: The Case for 
a New Approach in English Law (1964) 9-19; Wright, above n 26, [2.2].
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Thirdly, in addition to the constructive trust as outlined above, parties to 
whom fiduciary obligations are owed have the opportunity to access tracing rules.155 
McDonald has pointed out that whilst the institutional constructive trust and equity’s 
tracing rules are not inconsistent, they are different. She has stated:
Tracing, being purely proprietary, persists against even an innocent 
volunteer but ceases once the property has been lost or dissipated. A 
constructive trust, relying not so much on the notion of property as on 
the culpability of the defendant, persists as a personal liability even 
when the property can no longer be traced or identified. The 
constructive trust, involving liability to compensate for losses and to 
account for gains will also be the more attractive remedy where either 
the property has depreciated in value or the claim is also for incidental 
profits made by the third party for use of the property.156
The difference between the institutional constructive trust and equity’s tracing rules 
can be explained on the basis of their different historical origins.
The institutional constructive trust arose where the recipient of the property 
had notice of the breach of trust or fiduciary obligation. As early as the 16th century, 
the institutional constructive trust was being successfully imposed on errant trustees. 
Holdsworth has pointed out that the issue was whether there was sufficient notice of 
breach of trust where third parties were involved. The concept of constructive 
notice was being considered. Interestingly, the concept of notice still remains 
largely unresolved today in relation to some aspects of the institutional constructive 
trust and third party receipt of trust property.159
In contrast, the equitable rules of tracing have both more distant and more 
recent origins than the institutional constructive trust. Equitable tracing rules arose in
For helpful discussions concerning tracing see Meagher and Gummow, above n 22, Chapter 27; 
Ford and Lee, above n 22, [ 17190]-[ 17390]; Malcolm Cope, Proprietary Claims and Remedies 
(1997) Chapters 7-11.
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(Sir Robert Megarry VC).
157
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159
McDonald, above n 152, [2129]-[2132], [2137]; Michael Evans, Outline of Equity and Trusts, (3rd 
ed, 1996) [17.36]-[17.39], [17.41]-[ 17.46]; Meagher and Gummow, above n 22, [1335].
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response to the limitations which existed and still exist in common law following. 
Common law following rules were limited to conversion, detinue and money had and 
received. 160 Moreover, whilst property can be followed when it is no longer in the 
hands of the wrongdoer, it cannot be followed when it has been mixed with other 
property of a like nature so that it is no longer identifiable. 161 The common law is 
‘strictly materialistic.’ Thus, common law following is of limited assistance where 
money as a fungible is involved. Money may be both unidentifiable and non­
physical. 163
In comparison, equitable tracing permits not only tracing into the hands of 
third parties, but also tracing into a mixed fund. 164 The equitable tracing rules not 
only apply to money but to chattels, subject to the requirement that the chattels can 
be identified and separated from the mixed assets. 165 Equitable tracing rules appear 
to have more distant origins than common law following in the sense that it is likely 
that the development of equitable tracing was influenced by Roman law. Roman law 
developed the sophisticated rules confusio and commixtio to deal with the admixture 
of property. Confusio dealt with the mixture of liquids. When fluids were mixed, 
whether with or without the owners’ consent, such owners became joint owners of 
the mixture. 166 Commixtio was concerned with the mixture of grains and like 
materials. If there had been consent to the mixture of the solids, then the parties had 
joint ownership. When the parties had not consented to the admixture of their
160 Meagher and Gummow, above n 22, [2702].
161 Taylor v Plumer (1815) 3 M & S 62; 105 ER 721; cf the views of Salman Khurshid and Paul 
Matthews, ‘Tracing Confusion’ (1979) 95 The Law Quarterly Review 78; LD Smith, ‘Tracing in 
Taylor v Plumer, Equity in the Court of King’s Bench’ [1995] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial 
Law Quarterly 240.
162 Re Diplock [1948] Ch 465, 580 (Lord Greene MR).
163 See Chapter 1, 10-11.
164 Re Hallett’s Estate; Knatchbull v Hallett (1880) 13 Ch D 696; Brady v Stapleton (1952) 88 CLR 
322; Michael Christie, ‘Tracing’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The Principles of Equity (1996) 816, 
[2320H2333],
165 See for example Borden (UK) Ltd v Scottish Products Ltd [1981] Ch 25.
166 DH Van Zyl, History and Principles of Roman Law (1983) 158. For other discussions see RW 
Lee, The Elements of Roman Law (4th ed, 1956) 133-134 and Goff and Jones, above n 24, 76.
167 Ibid 159.
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separate assets, then individual ownership in relation to the assets continued to 
exist. When it was impossible to identify and separate the property (such as in the 
case of mixed grain), Roman law entitled the owner to a share of the mixture. This 
concept was extended to money. Where there had been a mixture of coins which 
belonged to different owners, the party who possessed the coinage obtained title to 
the coinage. However, the other earlier owners of the coinage were entitled to claim 
the value of their original coinage and were not required to identify the original 
coins. 169 Therefore, it appears that Roman law retained the negotiability of money170 
and at the same time ensured that the rightful owner was entitled to claim the value 
of his original coinage.
Re Hallett’s Estate; Knatchbull v Hallett established a position which is 
not dissimilar from the approach of Roman law. The case stands specifically for 
several important propositions. Where a trustee mixes trust money with his own and 
purchases a property with that new fund, that beneficiary cannot claim the property 
as his own. However, the beneficiary is entitled to a charge (or more properly 
speaking, an equitable lien) over the property for an amount equivalent to the trust 
funds expended on the purchase. Where trust moneys are paid into a mixed fund 
and withdrawals are made, it is presumed that the trustee withdraws his own funds 
first, if there was never any stage at which the trust fund was utilised. 174 However, 
the case also paved the way for a proprietary interest in the form of a charge over the 
whole of a mixed fund or its substitute. Thus, a beneficiary, like his Roman legal 
forbears, is effectively entitled to an amount from the larger mixed fund equivalent to 
the money which belonged to him. He is not required to identify the money which 
belonged to him or be able to segregate that money. Instead, the errant fiduciary has 
legal title to the fund, but the beneficiary has a security interest over the mixed fund
170 See Chapter 1, 12-13.
171 (1880) 13 Ch D 696.
172 For a discussion of the equitable lien see Chapter 7, 293-297.
173 (1880) 13 Ch D 696, 709 (Jessel MR).
174 Ibid 727-728 (Jessel MR).
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equivalent to the trust funds. Thus, simultaneously, the negotiability of money is 
retained and the beneficiary acquires a security interest with proprietary 
consequences. Equity adopted ‘a more metaphysical approach’. Therefore, equity 
substantially (although not entirely) treated money as a fungible item in a way 
similar to the Roman law and also in a manner which the common law had treated 
other fungible items. Equity's logical and plausible (but it is submitted uninspired) 
step has been long lasting.
Traditionally, equitable tracing has had two main limitations. Equitable 
tracing has been available only to parties owed fiduciary obligations in respect of the 
property entrusted to them. This approach has been questioned and will be further 
considered in Chapter 3.
Equitable tracing rules are helpful so long as the trust property can be 
identified in its original form, in a mixed fund or in a substituted form. Not only 
must the plaintiff identify the recipient of the funds, but also the destination of the 
moneys as well. Where, for example, a trustee simply mixes trust property with his 
own property, a beneficiary will be entitled to trace into such a fund.180 So long as 
the mixed fund is ascertainable, a beneficiary may be entitled to a charge over the 
mixed fund for an amount equivalent to the amount in dispute. However, where 
the funds have been completely or partially dissipated, the beneficiary faces 
difficulties.
Partial dissipation could occur where a trustee mixes his own funds with trust 
funds in a bank account. He withdraws an amount from the account which is greater
175
175 See Chapter 1, 12-13 for a discussion of this concept.
176 Re Diplock [1948] Ch 465, 520 (Lord Green MR).
177 Goff and Jones, above n 24, 76.
178
Sinclair v Brougham [1914] AC 398; Re Diplock [1948] Ch 465, 520-521, 532, 540 (Lord 
Greene).
179 McDonald, above n 152, [2126]. For an interesting example see Re Delta Smelting & Refining Co 
(1988) 72 CBR (NS) 295; 33 BCLR (2d) 383.
180
Re Hallett's Estate; Knatchbull v Hallett (1888) 13 Ch D 696.
181 For a helpful discussion of tracing into a mixed fund see Meagher and Gummow above n 22, 
[2709]-[2712]; Ford and Lee, above n 22, [ 17240]-[ 17280] and Christie, above n 164, [2320]-[2331],
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than his own money in the account. The beneficiary is only entitled to the amount 
equal to that remaining in the account even if at a later stage the trustee makes 
further deposits. This is known as the intermediate balance rule.
Complete dissipation of the trust moneys could occur when the trustee spends 
all the money on a holiday. Another example of an effective and complete 
dissipation of trust funds occurred in Re Diplock * 1 where executors paid charitable 
institutions substantial moneys pursuant to an invalid bequest. The Court of Appeal 
held that the moneys spent by charities altering and improving buildings and
185paying off unsecured debts could not be traced because ‘the money will have
186disappeared leaving no monetary trace behind.’ The decision has been criticised
187for failing to apply the tracing rules to their fullest extent and for applying an 
emasculated version of the restitutionary defence of change of position. The 
decision could be explained on the basis that if the tracing rules were allowed to 
operate, an innocent volunteer would be forced to sell the improved property in order 
to fulfil the charge which the next of kin sought to have imposed. For our purpose, 
however, the significance of the decision in Re Diplock is that an equitable 
proprietary interest may be dissipated although the assets into which the moneys 
have been paid remain in existence and are clearly identifiable. Therefore, despite 
equity's willingness to allow tracing into mixed funds, its tracing rules do not 
provide a basis for relief in all cases.
Whilst the rules may appear mechanical and unprincipled, the perfunctory 
application of them betrays the reality that there must exist a direct link to specific
182
,James Roscoe (Bolton) Ltd v Winder [1915] 1 Ch 62; Lofts v McDonald (1974) 3 ALR 404; Re 
Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (In Receivership) [1995] 1 AC 74; Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd 
(in liquidation) v Homan [1995] Ch 211.
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184_ . , .Ibid 547.
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187 Graham Moffat, Trust Law: Texts and Materials (2nd ed, 1994) 429.
188 Lord Goff of Chieveley and Gareth Jones, The Law of Restitution (3rd ed, 1986), 76. But now see 
Goff and Jones, above n 24, 90-92.
189 Dale A Oesterle, ‘Deficiencies of the Restitutionary Right to Trace Misappropriated Property in 
Equity and in UCC § 9-306’ [1983] 68 Cornell Law Review 172; Christie, above n 164, [2305]; cf
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moneys (even though they are mixed with other moneys) before equitable tracing 
rules will operate. Again, the thrust of tracing in equity is apparently similar to 
Roman law in the sense that commixtio and confusio applied to the mixed fungibles 
where there was an unbroken connection between the disputed assets and the mixed
190mass.
Despite the fact that the institutional constructive trust and equitable tracing 
each have different historical origins, they operate in a surprisingly synchronistic 
way. Where the property, which is the subject of the institutional constructive trust, 
has been dissipated and can no longer be traced, the beneficiary still has access to an 
in personam remedy against the constructive trustee. So too, where tracing is being 
utilised and the property is dissipated, the equitable tracing trail may come to an end, 
but the beneficiary is still entitled to an in personam remedy against the errant trustee 
or fiduciary. 191 Another aspect of the synchronicity is that the institutional 
constructive trust has been available as an alternative to a charge, particularly where 
specific restitution of an asset is required. 192 It also appears that a beneficiary under
193an institutional constructive trust can utilise equity’s tracing rules.
Notwithstanding the proprietary limitations of the institutional constructive 
trust and equitable tracing, they remain powerful proprietary gateways in insolvency 
contexts. Institutional constructive trusts operate like express trusts to ensure that 
funds or assets do not form part of the insolvent’s estate. So too, the institutional 
constructive trust or the equitable lien (which may result from the successful 
operation of the equitable tracing rules) may respectively, remove assets or secure 
assets, so that the unsecured creditor has a proprietary and priority interest. 194
Greg Reinhardt, ‘The Availability of Tracing to the Insolvency Administrator -  Is the Remedy 
Adequate?’ (1996) 4 Insolvency Law Journal 74, 84. In relation to tracing the proceeds of crime see 
Helen Norman, ‘Tracing the Proceeds of Crime: an Inequitable Solution?’ in Peter Birks (ed), 
Laundering and Tracing (1995) 95.
190 Goff and Jones, above n 24, 76.
191 Useful discussions are Dal Pont and Chalmers, above n, 100, 529-537; Ford and Lee, above n 22, 
[17110]-[17170]; Waters, above n 48, Chapter 25.
192 Christie, above n 164, [2308] and [2310].
191 Canadian Pacific Air Lines Ltd v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1988) 61 OR (2d) 233. 
194 For further discussions concerning the equitable lien see below, 73-75; Chapter 7, 293-297.
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The original underlying rationale for the institutional constructive trust and 
equitable tracing rules was the rectification of breach of trust and fiduciary 
obligations. Thus, it could be said that the institutional constructive trust and 
equitable tracing rectified what was essentially unconscionable conduct.
An interesting issue is whether fiduciary obligations, the institutional 
constructive trust and equitable tracing rules are explicable on the basis that the 
fiduciary did not assume the risks associated with the transaction. It cannot be simply 
stated that parties who transact with fiduciaries do not assume the commercial risk of 
the transaction (including the potential insolvency of the fiduciary). There are a 
number of decisions involving agents and brokers where the party to whom fiduciary 
duties were owed, were not entitled to proprietary relief because there was no reason 
to suggest that the unsecured creditors had not assumed the risk of the possible 
insolvency of the other party. 195 However, what can be said is that it has been held 
that where it is evident that a party reposed trust and confidence, to the extent that he 
or she did not assume the miscarriage of the commercial transaction and the 
concomitant insolvency of the other party, the recognition of fiduciary obligations 
may be appropriate.
In Australian Securities Commission v Melbourne Asset Management Pty Ltd 
(Receivers and Managers Appointed) , 196 Melbourne Asset Management (‘MAM’) 
and McKinley Wilson Nominees Pty Ltd (‘Nominees’) received moneys from the 
public which were to be on-lent on the security of first mortgages. The moneys were 
to be allocated to particular borrowers and first mortgages. Neither separate trust 
funds nor a common trust fund pursuant to a single trust deed were set up. Instead, 
the investment funds were mixed with the mortgage repayments and MAM’s own 
funds. MAM became insolvent. Northrop J held:
From all the evidence, there can be no doubt that a fiduciary 
relationship existed between MAM and each investor. This 
relationship arose from the nature of the dealings between MAM and 
each investor. Neither company claimed any beneficial interest in the
195
See for example Walker v Corboy (1990) 19 NSWLR 382; Re Goode; Ex parte Mount (1974) 4 
ALR 579.
196 (1994) 49 FCR334.
197 Ibid 337.
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moneys advanced by the investors. MAM received the moneys on the 
basis that it would deal with the moneys in accordance with the 
investment scheme. In fact, it did not do so, but that does not alter the 
fiduciary relationship that existed between MAM and the investors. 199
There were two interrelated reasons why the investors did not assume the risk of the 
insolvency of MAM and the recognition of a fiduciary relationship was warranted. 
First, the investors were entitled to rely on the honesty and integrity of the company 
to follow and administer the scheme. If this had been undertaken, then the 
investment funds would not have been mingled with MAM’s general assets. 
Secondly, the investment scheme prescribed that the moneys would be allocated to a 
particular borrower and secured by a particular security. Therefore, the investors 
sought a secured status, albeit as against a third party borrower rather than MAM 
itself.200 The fact that MAM failed to administer the scheme properly meant that the 
investors were unsecured creditors.
The decision in MAM also relates to a broader trend in fiduciary obligations. 
Where the fiduciary has acted wrongly in relation to assets transferred or received or 
has made an unauthorised profit or gain out of the relationship, then proprietary relief 
may be available. Certainly, Attorney General (Hong Kong) v Reid201 indicates that 
parties to whom fiduciary obligations are owed, are not taken to have assumed the 
risk of the subsequent insolvency in the light of the wrongdoing.
If trusts (and by association some fiduciary obligations) can be explained as 
situations where beneficiaries (who would otherwise be unsecured creditors) do not 
assume the risk of wrongdoing (and the insolvency of the fiduciary), then such 
traditional remedies as the institutional constructive trust and equitable tracing are 
indirectly informed by non-assumption of risk. It is a derivative or indirect factor. It 
is this reason (as well as the unconscionable conduct of a trustee or fiduciary) which 
sustains the proprietary intervention of equity. Otherwise, both the unconscionable 
conduct of the defendant and the beneficiary’s legitimate non-assumption of risk
199 Ibid 358.
200 See also Liggett v Kensington [1993] 1 NZLR 257, 270-271 (Cooke P).
201 [1994] 1 AC 324.
202 Ibid 331-332.
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would remain substantially unredressed. However, mere insolvency will not amount 
to wrongdoing or unconscionable conduct.
V Situations other than Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations
There are a series of disparate relationships and factual contexts where 
traditionally, equity has been willing to intervene in order to protect one or both of 
the interests of the parties even though the parties were in an essentially commercial 
relationship. These contexts have given rise to various proprietary mechanisms and 
doctrines which have a proprietary effect.
A The Equitable Lien
First, the equitable lien, as a form of equitable proprietary relief, is an
203effective security against insolvency. It will be recalled that in Re Hallett ’s Estate, 
Jessel MR used the equitable charge as an effective security device to enforce 
equity’s tracing rules. Strictly speaking, what Jessel MR was referring to was an 
equitable lien. Equitable charges arise by virtue of the intention of parties, whilst 
equitable liens arise by operation of law.204 Thus, the equitable lien is allied to the 
resulting trust and the institutional constructive trust. An equitable lien in relation to 
land has been described as follows:
a pure hypothecation; it involves no transfer of actual or potential 
ownership, it does not depend on possession and it rests only on 
equity, with the result that it is unenforceable against the bona fide 
purchaser for value without notice of the legal estate...it is of a 
proprietary character.205
206The lien differs from the trust in that the lien bestows security over property rather 
than vests a party with an equitable proprietary interest. The equitable lien, as a 
security device is also considered in Chapter 7.
203
204
205
206 
207
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Common uses of the equitable lien (outside the tracing context) arise where 
equity intervenes to protect what is perceived as the legitimate interests of specific 
commercial parties. Thus a vendor may claim a lien over land which has been 
conveyed prior to being paid by the purchaser. A purchaser may claim a lien over 
a vendor’s land for an amount equivalent to the deposit or purchase price (as the case 
may be), when the purchaser has lawfully repudiated the contract.209 A trustee has an 
equitable lien on trust property in respect of money properly expended in the due 
performance of trustee obligations. On the dissolution of partnership by 
retirement, death or bankruptcy of a partner, the remaining partners or their 
representatives have a lien on all assets belonging to the partnership for the purpose 
of satisfying all claims against the partnership. Thus, in Re Wilson; Ex parte 
Robertson it was held that the solvent partner’s lien over the partnership assets 
took priority over the claims of the insolvent partner’s official assignee in 
bankruptcy. A person who has spent money on property in the mistaken belief that 
he has an interest in that property or that he will acquire an interest in that 
property/ ' 4 is entitled to a lien over the property provided that it is shown that the 
owner of the land stood by with knowledge of the expenditure. Finally, an insurer
208 See for example Hearle v Botelers (1604) Cary 25; 21 ER 14; Chapman v Tanner (1684) 1 Vem 
267; 23 ER 461; Mackreth v Symmons (1808) 15 Ves Jun 329; 2 Ves Jun Supp 410; 33 ER 778; 34 
ER 1155; Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 Ch D 499; Kettlewell v Watson (1884) 26 Ch D 501; Re 
Birmingham, Savage v Stannard [1959] Ch 523. For a discussion of vendors’ liens see JHG Sunnucks 
‘Liens’ in Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone (ed), Halsbury’s Laws o f England, (4th ed, 1979) vol 28 
[555]-[559].
209 See for example Burgess v Wheate, Attorney-General v Wheate (1759) 1 Eden 177; 28 ER 652; 
Wythes v Lee (1855) 3 Drewry 396; 61 ER 954; Westmacott v Robins (1862) 4 De GF & J 390; 45 ER 
1234; Rose v Watson (1864) 10 HL Cas 672; Whitbread & Co Ltd v Watt [1902] 1 Ch 835 and 
Sunnucks, above n 208, [560]-[565].
210 Stott v Milne (1884) 25 Ch D 710; Octavo Investments Pty Ltd v Knight (1979) 144 CLR 360; Re 
Enhill Pty Ltd [1983] 1 VR 561; Mansard Developments Pty Ltd v Tilley Consultants Pty Ltd [1982] 
WAR 161.
211 West v Skip (1749) 1 Ves Sen 239; 27 ER 1006.
212 (1891) 1 BC (NSW) 61.
~13 Ramsden v Dyson (1866) LR 1 HL 129; Neesom v Clarkson (1845) 4 Hare 97; 67 ER 576; 
Middleton vMagnay (1864) 2 H & M 233; 71 ER 452; Wilmott v Barber ( 1880) 15 Ch D 96.
~14 Cadorange Pty Ltd (in liq) v Tanga Holdings Pty Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 26.
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has a lien over any compensation the insured receives after the insurer has paid out
215its liabilities under the insurance policy.
B Equitable Assignments
An equitable assignment of legal property or an equitable assignment of
equitable property is a powerful proprietary device in insolvency situations. Such an
assignment of property withdraws the equitable or beneficial interest from the
insolvent’s asset base. There are three situations which are relevant here. First, where
property assignable at law is not effectively assigned, equity may intervene where
the assignor has shown an irrevocable intention to assign. Equity will recognise
that the property has been validly transferred to another. Therefore, the property falls
outside the insolvent’s general assets which vest in the insolvency administrator and
which are available for distribution to creditors. However, in the case of
insolvency of the assignor, such an assignment would be, prima facie, void for lack 
218of consideration.
Secondly, where an assignment for value fails at law, equity will effect an 
assignment.219 In such a case, the legal owner has been considered to be a 
constructive trustee“ of a limited or qualified kind." Such an assignment would be
215 Lord Napier and Ettrick v Hunter [1993] AC 713.
216 Corin v Patton (1990) 169 CLR 540.
217
See for example Re Rose; Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Company Ltd v Rose [1949] Ch 
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218
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219
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221 Raynor v Preston (1881) 18 Ch D 1,6 (Cotton LJ).
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void if there was no consideration, the consideration was inadequate or there was 
an intent to defraud creditors (notwithstanding the existence of valuable 
consideration). However, the right to set aside such a transfer will be subject to the 
rights of an assignee who gave valuable consideration and who was unaware of the 
assignor’s fraudulent act.224
Thirdly, in the 19th century, courts exercising equitable jurisdiction 
recognised that equity would intervene to give effect to an agreement to assign future 
property or a mere expectancy. ' The principle in modem form is summarised by 
Meagher, Gummow and Lehane as follows:
Where:
(a) A for valuable consideration agrees to assign, or purports presently 
to assign, an expectancy, of future property, to B,
(b) the consideration has been paid, or executed, and
(c) A acquires property which falls within the description of that 
which he agreed, or purported presently, to assign,
then in equity that property vests in B as soon as it is acquired by A 
and can be identified, without any further assurance by A and without
any action by B. It is an example of equity regarding as done that
226which ought to be done.“
Therefore, if the vendor agrees to assign or assigns the future assets, once these 
assets (including book debts) come into his hands, the purchaser acquires a beneficial 
interest in the assets analogous to the status of a beneficiary under a tmst. Such an
222
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interest is not limited and operates where the assignor becomes insolvent and/or 
obtains a discharge before he acquires the property. However, presumably, where 
there was an intent to defraud creditors, the assignor would not be able to rely on the 
principle. In addition, it has been suggested that if the contractual liability is proved 
and then the insolvent is discharged, the assignment has no further effect. ~ It has 
also been suggested that equitable principles should apply to the sale of future goods 
where sale of goods legislation applies. However, there are several constraints on 
the operation of the doctrine. It is limited to a present assignment of future property. 
It applies only to future property which fits the description and then comes into 
existence. Consideration must be given before the doctrine will operate.
C Accessorial Devices
Equity has enabled and continues to enable parties to access the pre-existing 
securities or liens in favour of other parties in limited but important circumstances. 
The tools under which this has been achieved have been subrogationz3z and 
marshalling.233
1 Subrogation
It has been stated that:
Subrogation is a doctrine by which rights are transferred from one 
person to another by operation of law. Subrogation functions
Palette Shoes Pty Ltd v Krohn (1937) 58 CLR 1, 27; Akron Tyre Co Pty Ltd v Kittson (1951) 82 CLR 
477.
228 Re Lind, Industrial Finance Syndicate Ltd v Lind [1915] 2 Ch 345; Re Dent Ex parte Trustee 
[1923] 1 Ch 113, 120 (P O Lawrence J).
229 Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, above n 58, [656].
230 Ibid [670],
231 Ibid [652],
232 For a comprehensive discussion of subrogation see Charles Mitchell, The Law o f Subrogation 
(1994).
233 For a comprehensive review of the law of marshalling see Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, above 
n 58, Chapter 11 and Commonwealth Trading Bank o f Australia v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance 
Society Ltd [1970] Tas SR 120.
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procedurally to avoid inconvenient circularities in litigation. 
Unnecessary steps are circumvented by third persons being compelled 
to allow their names to be used in proceedings between others. In both 
substantive and procedural uses, it can be said that the applicant 
‘stands in the shoes’ of the person from whom subrogation is sought.
The purpose is to avoid undesirable outcomes and procedural 
inconvenience. Subrogation gives effect to a broad sense of 
unconscionability where it regulates outcomes. Liabilities for debts 
and the commission of wrongs are brought home to persons 
ultimately responsible. Double compensation is denied to the victims 
of wrongs.234
235The subrogation mechanism operates as a form of involuntary assignment. This 
may well mean that the subrogated party is simply entitled to bring an action for 
personal relief.“ However, it is possible that the party will be subrogated to assets 
or a security interest with dramatic results in an insolvency context. There are three 
vivid applications of subrogation doctrine in this regard.
First, the concept of subrogation has been effectively used where trusts, 
particularly trading trusts, have operated. Trading trusts may be undercapitalised 
trading entities and creditors of the trading trust may be unable to recover what is 
due to them from the assets of the trading trust. However, creditors of trustees have 
been subrogated to any right of indemnity which the trustee has against the trust 
assets so long as the trustee has acted properly and in accordance with the terms of
John Glover, ‘Subrogation’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The Principles o f Equity (1996) 549, 
[1501].
235 Ibid [1502]; Meagher and Gummow, above n 22, [904]; JP Dawson, ‘Restitution or Damages?’ 
(1959) 20 Ohio State Law Journal 175, 183.
236 See for example, Castellain v Preston (1883) 11 QBD 380.
237 For a description of trading trusts see HAJ Ford and IJ Hardingham, ‘Trading Trusts: Rights and 
Liabilities of Beneficiaries’ in PD Finn (ed), Equity and Commercial Relationships (1987) 48; 
Meagher and Gummow, above n 22, [319].
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the trust. Most authorities effectively establish that only trust creditors are entitled
239to be subrogated against the trust assets.
Secondly, where a lender makes an unsecured loan, the funds from which are 
used to pay out an unsecured creditor, the lender may be entitled to be subrogated to 
the security interest of the previous creditor. It has been suggested that there is a 
rebuttable presumption that the security remains effective for the benefit of the new 
creditor240 and the defendant bears the burden of rebutting the presumption.241 
However, it remains unclear whether subrogation is only available where the parties 
actually intended that the new creditor access the pre-existing security as security for 
the loan,242 where the lender or payer intended subrogation to the security243 or 
where the new lender is subrogated to the pre-existing security interest unless a 
contrary intention is shown. It appears from Lord Diplock’s statement in Orakpo v 
Manson Investments Ltd244 that the last interpretation is more likely to be the 
appropriate approach.
Thirdly, there is the concept of lien by subrogation.245 The concept of lien by 
subrogation applies where moneys are advanced at the request of trustees and where 
money is advanced to a prospective purchaser to pay the contract price. 246 The
238
238 Re Exhall Coal Company Ltd; Re Bleckley (1866) 35 Beav; 55 ER 970; Re Johnson; Shearman v 
Johnson (1880) 15 Ch D 548; Re Holden (1887) 20 QBD 43; Re Pain [1919] 1 Ch 38; Re Staff 
Benefits Pty Ltd and the Companies Act [1979] 1 NSWLR 207, 213 (Needham J); Octavo Investments 
Pty Ltd v Knight (1979) 144 CLR 360, 371 (Stephen, Mason, Aickin and Wilson JJ).
239 Official Assignee v Jarvis [1923] NZLR 1009; Re Byrne Australia Pty Ltd and the Companies Act 
[1981] 1 NSWLR 394; Re Suco Gold Pty Ltd (in liq) (1983) 33 SASR 99; cf Re Enhill Pty Ltd [1983] 
1 VR 561.
240 Ghana Commercial Bankv DT Chandiram [1960] AC 732.
241 Glover, above n 234, [1513] citing State Bank o f New South Wales v Geeport Developments Pty 
Ltd (1991) 5 BPR 11 -947, 11,950-4 (Cohen J).
242 Evandale Estates Pty Ltd v Keck [1963] VR 647, 652 (Hudson J).
243 See Boscawen v Bajwa [1996] 1 WLR 328. Note also Wright, above n 26, [3.53].
244 (1978) AC 95, 104-105; see also State Bank o f South Australia v Rothschild Australia Ltd (1990) 
8 ACLC 925, 940-943.
245 Sunnucks, above n 208, [570].
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lender is entitled to subrogation to the vendor’s lien (which would have existed if the 
vendor had remained unpaid) once the vendor has been paid.247
2 Marshalling
Marshalling entitles a party to access securities and interests. It operates where
in respect of two funds in the hands of one person, there is a double 
claimant (A) who can claim against both funds and a single claimant 
(B) who can claim against only one of the funds. The fund against 
which both A and B may claim is described henceforth as ‘the double 
fund’; the fund against which only A may claim is described as ‘the 
single fund’. If A chooses to satisfy her or his claim out of the double 
fund, B has a right to stand in A’s place in respect of the single fund, 
to the extent that the double fund would have satisfied B’s claim if A 
had not claimed upon it first. Thus, marshalling is closely allied to the 
doctrine of subrogation.248
It operates against the common debtor rather than against the double claimant. 
Whilst the double claimant is free to take action against any security in order to 
satisfy his or her claim, the single claimant should not be disadvantaged nor the 
common debtor advantaged. The law will not permit what would otherwise be an 
unjust outcome from the perspective of the single claimant.249 In order for the 
doctrine of marshalling to operate, there must be a common debtor, the alternative 
fund or security must be in existence and the double claimant must have free and
252equal recourse to the same type of rights against each fund or security. However,
248 Barbara McDonald, ‘Marshalling’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The Principles o f Equity (1996) 462, 
[1601],
249 Ibid [1602]; Chase Corp (Australia) Pty Ltd v North Sydney Brick & Tile Co Ltd (1994) 35 
NSWLR 1,19-21 (Cohen J).
250 Ex parte Kendall (1811) 17 Ves Jun 514; 2 Ves Jun Supp 496; 34 ER 199; 34 ER 1196;. 
McDonald, above n 248, [1605]; Meagher and Gummow, above n 22, [1108],
251 Commonwealth Trading Bank v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd [1970] Tas SR 120; 
McDonald, above n 248, [1606],
Webb v Smith (1885) 30 Ch D 192; Miles v Official Receiver in Bankruptcy (1963) 109 CLR 501; 
McDonald, above n 248, [ 1607]-[ 1608]; Meagher and Gummow, above n 22, [1111].
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the doctrine is essentially accessorial, it does not confer proprietary rights on the
253single claimant.
The doctrine of marshalling has been pleaded where the common debtor has 
become insolvent.254 A simple example illustrates its effectiveness. The common 
debtor borrows funds from A and provides two mortgages in favour of A over 
Properties X and Y respectively. The common debtor borrows funds from B and 
provides a mortgage over Property X in favour of B. The common debtor defaults 
under the loan made with A. A decides to exercise its power of sale against X. There 
are good reasons for A doing so. For example, whilst there has been a general 
downturn in demand for properties, Property X is located in one of the few areas 
where demand has remained high and A considers that it will be successful in selling 
the property in a relatively short time. A, as first mortgagee, sells the property but 
realises an amount sufficient to cover the common debtor’s liabilities to it. In the 
meantime, the common debtor has become insolvent. Without the doctrine of 
marshalling, B would be characterised as a unsecured creditor. The mortgage over 
Property X which secured the loan from B, is no longer effective in the sense that 
Property X is no longer owned by the common mortgagor. Property X was sold to a 
bona fide purchaser for value pursuant to a valid mortgage by a mortgagee exercising 
power of sale. The only alternative is to permit B to be subrogated to A’s remaining 
security, Property Y. In this way, B may not become a secured creditor again, but it 
has access to a pre-existing security and therefore stands ahead and apart from other 
unsecured creditors.
D Proprietary Effect of the Additional Mechanisms and Doctrines
An effective equitable assignment of future property assigns or vests the 
equitable interest of the property in the assignee. The assignor is effectively a trustee 
and si 16 (2) (a) Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) would operate subject to voidable 
preference provisions.255
253 Commonwealth Trading Bank v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd [1970] Tas SR 120, 
125-128 (Neasey J); Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, above n 58, [1105]; and Sarge Pty Ltd v 
Cazihaven Pty Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 658, 664-665 (Cohen J).
254
See for example Miles v Official Receiver in Bankruptcy (1963) 109 CLR 501. Sarge Pty Ltd v 
Cazihaven Homes Pty Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 658.
255 See Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 120 and 121.
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The security nature of the lien and the accessorial security effect of 
subrogation and marshalling is recognised under s 5 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 
(Cth) which states that a ‘secured creditor’
in relation to a debtor, means a person holding a mortgage, charge or 
lien on property of the debtor as a security for a debt due to him or her 
from the debtor.256
The definition is a wide one and includes any creditor
who is in a position, either at law or in equity, to obtain recoupment 
partly or wholly from the assets of the debtor in priority to unsecured
257creditors.
Secured creditors stand ahead and apart from unsecured creditors because they have
258a direct claim on the assets of the debtor. They are not subject to the ordinary rules 
governing insolvency and have a variety of options under which they can realise
259their interests under the security.
E The Historical and Doctrinal Bases
It would be foolhardy to attempt to explain the additional situations by 
reference to one single doctrinal basis. Indeed, the specific doctrinal basis for each of 
the areas of additional cases could be disputed. For example, the doctrinal and 
historical basis of subrogation remains somewhat unclear and the subject of 
continuous debate. However, it is submitted that there are some central common 
threads which should be raised at this stage.
256 Note also Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) s 248; Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act RSC 1985 c B-3 s 2; 
Re Commercial Textiles Ltd (1940) 21 CBR 387.
257 Dennis Rose, Lewis: Australian Bankruptcy Law, (10th ed, 1994), 108 and the various interests 
which Rose cites. In relation to corporations see HAJ Ford, RP Austin and IM, Ramsay, Ford’s 
Principles o f Corporations Law (8th ed, Butterworths, Sydney, 1997) [1.340].
258 T1 . - t ~ _Ibid 107.
259 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 90; Corporations Law s 554E.
260 Memphis and Little Rock Railroad v Dow (1887) 120 US 287, 302 (Harlan J); Yonge v Reynell 
(1852) 9 Hare 809, 818-819; 68 ER 744, 748-749 (Turner VC); Lord Napier and Ettrick v Hunter 
[1993] AC 713, 736-738 (Lord Templeman); Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd [1978] AC 95, 104 
(Lord Diplock); Goff and Jones, above n 24, 93 and 590; Mitchell, above n 232, 8-15.
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First, it must be appreciated that equity developed the various additional 
situations as a reaction to different requirements during various historical periods. 
However, it appears that both the equitable lien  ^ and marshalling^ and even a 
form of equitable assignment had began to emerge during equity’s formative 
period. Marshalling was a fully operative principle both in England and the United 
States during the 19th century.264 By the end of the 19th century subrogation was an
265accepted equitable doctrine in the commercial sphered
266Secondly, Roman law was a fertile precedent for equitable liens and 
apparently French law for subrogation, without any concern that these new 
equitable principles were used to intervene in commercial relationships. So, it did not 
matter that equity intervened in specific kinds of commercial relationships between 
vendors and purchaser, partners, or as transpired later during the 18th century, 
debtors or insurers. It was only later, in the 19th century that the concern that equity
'yf.o
should not intervene in commercial relationships became apparent. But, even so, 
these additional situations survived the ‘decline’ of equity.
Thirdly, the operation of the mechanisms and doctrines were limited to 
specific factual situations. For example, the equitable assignment of future property 
is inherently limited. The equitable lien was (and is) generally available in only 
limited circumstances (which have been recognised in some cases by centuries of
261
Holdsworth, above n 15, vol 8, 242-245; Chapman v Tanner (1684) 1 Vem 267; 23 ER 261.
“62 Bullock v Knight (1682) 2 Ch Cas 114; 22 ER 872; Holdsworth above n 15, vol 6, 256-257.
263 Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, above n 58, [111]-[ 115]. In relation to equitable assignments 
note Holdsworth, above n 15, vol 7, 535-536.
264 Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, above n 58, [115]; Holdsworth, above n 15, vol, 1, 465-466; 
Aldrich v Cooper (1803) 8 Ves Jun 382; 2 Ves Jun Supp 1181; 32 ER 402; 34 ER 1020; Ex parte 
Kendall (1811) 34 ER 199, 1196; Webb v Smith (1885) 30 Ch D 192; Lewis v United States 92 US 
618 (1875).
265 In relation to insurance see Castellain v Preston (1883) 11 QBD 380 Meagher and Gummow, 
above n 22, [931]-[945],
266 W W Buckland, Equity in Roman Law (1911) 63-84.
267 T1 . .  . _  _ _Ibid 47-55.
268 PS Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Contract (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979) 392-394.
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precedent). It has been pointed out that the situations where the doctrine of
271subrogation may be utilised may be open. However, some judges have opined that
272subrogation may be unsuited to new situations. The scope of the marshalling 
doctrine was (and is) inherently limited to disputes between double and single fund
273(or security) holders of a common debtor.
Fourthly, the equitable lien, equitable assignment of property with 
consideration and the accessorial doctrines of marshalling and subrogation were used 
to support contractual obligations rather than to set contracts aside. They supported 
the contractual intentions of the parties. For example, in the early case, Chapman v 
Tanner, 274 Chancery was willing to intervene and impose a vendor’s lien to ensure 
that obvious intentions of the parties were sustained and an equitable result 
prevailed. Without the operation of equity an assignee of future property could be 
faced with providing consideration for property to which the assignee was not 
entitled. So too, in relation to the application of the doctrine of marshalling, courts 
have supported the original contract between the common debtor and the single 
security holder by enabling the single security holder to marshall against the 
remaining security of the double security holder. Without such a mechanism, the 
result would be disastrous for the single security holder (who would be demoted to 
the status of an unsecured creditor) and an unexpected advantage for the common 
debtor because only one rather than two securities would be realised.
It is probable that the additional situations where equity intervened were so 
entrenched in 19th century thinking that courts would not have been able to remove 
such tools from equity’s armoury. And, it is most likely that in some cases (but not 
all cases) parties negotiated and entered into formal contracts and commercial 
relationships on the basis that these additional situations would be available if they 
were needed.
270
270 See generally Sunnucks, above n 208, [551 ]-[573].
271 Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, above n 58, [952],
272 Ibid [952]-[959]; cf Mitchell, above n 232, 8-15.
27"? For example, Ex parte Kendall (1811) 17 Ves Jun 514; 2 Ves Jun Supp 496; 34 ER 199; 34 ER 
1196.
274 (1684) 1 Vem 267, 268; 23 ER 461, 461.
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Fifthly, these various doctrines and mechanisms were justified on the basis 
that the circumstances of the case and the relationship of the parties rendered one 
party conscience bound to the other party. In the seminal Australian case 
concerned with equitable liens, Hewett v Court, Deane J pointed out, in the 
context of a purchaser’s lien, that:
the owner would be acting unconscientiously or unfairly if he were to 
dispose of the property (or, if it be appropriate, more than a particular 
portion thereof) to a stranger without the consent of the other party or 
without the actual or potential liability having been discharged.277
Therefore, he suggested that the lien in favour of a purchaser was imposed in order to 
ensure that the vendor acted in good conscience; or to put it another way, equity 
intervened to provide a purchaser with security against the failure of the vendor to 
honour his or her contractual undertakings.
A parallel approach can be identified in relation to the assignment of future 
property:
As the subject to be made over does not exist, the matter primarily 
rests in contract. Because value has been given on the one side, the 
conscience of the other party is bound when the subject comes into 
existence, that is, when, as is generally the case, the legal property 
vests in him. Because his conscience is bound in respect of a subject 
of property, equity fastens upon the property itself and makes him a
278trustee of the legal rights or ownership for the assignee.
The accessorial doctrines of marshalling and subrogation are concerned with
279 280the protection of the interests of creditors. Judges and commentators
See the discussion of Waters concerning vendors and purchasers and the language of trusts in 
Waters, above n 151, 74-75.
276 (1983) 149 CLR 639.
277 Ibid 668.
278
Palette Shoes Pty Ltd v Krohn (1937) 58 CLR 1, 27 (Dixon J).
279 Yonge v Reynall (1852) 9 Hare 809, 818-819; 68 ER 744, 748-749; Cochrane v Cochrane (1985) 
3 NSWLR 403, 405 (Kearney J); Lord Napier and Ettrick v Hunter [1993] AC 713, 738 (Lord 
Templeman).
280 Glover, above n 234, [1501]; Dal Pont and Chalmers, above n 100, 246.
85
acknowledge that subrogation exists in order to prevent unconscionable advantage 
taking and an unconscionable result. The major trend which characterises all 
subrogation cases is that liabilities, whether for debts or wrongs are brought home to 
the debtor and/or wrongdoer. But the doctrine of subrogation also operates against 
the conscience of victims of wrongs, who have received double compensation from 
the wrongdoer and the insurer." " The doctrine of marshalling also developed as a 
means of redressing what would otherwise be an unjust result. Thus, whilst the 
double secured creditor is entitled to exercise its contractual rights against the double 
security, equity will intervene and marshall securities in order to avert an unjust or 
unfair outcome.
The question in relation to the additional cases discussed is, why has equity 
intervened, or more accurately, why have courts of equity considered that there 
would be an unconscionable result if equity did not intervene? It is submitted that an 
answer which accurately reflects how these additional doctrines operate would 
highlight not only the unconscionable conduct, but also the assumption of risk. A 
party entitled to the lien, an effective assignment of future property (particularly 
supported by valuable consideration), subrogation or marshalling should not bear the 
ultimate risk of the insolvency and the status of unsecured creditor. Thus, despite the 
fact that such a party is intimately involved in a commercial transaction in which the 
assumption of risk is normative, the circumstances are such that the party did not 
assume the risk or ought not be expected to assume the risk of the transaction. This 
was alluded to by Murphy J in Hewett v Court when he held that an equitable lien 
was appropriate in a case where purchasers of a prefabricated home (who had paid a 
deposit on the home)
cannot be expected to inquire into the solvency of the person with
285whom they are dealing.
989 Lord Napier and Ettrick v Hunter [1993] AC 713, 738 (Lord Templeman).
283 Commonwealth Trading Bank v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd [1970] Tas SR 120, 
126 (Neasey J).
284 (1983) 149 CLR 639.
98S
Ibid 651.
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In other respects, for example, in respect of fire risk, they may have been expected to 
insure against loss. But their assumption of risk did not extend to the insolvency of 
the builder. What it is important here is that the concept of risk assumption may 
explain why courts exercising equitable jurisdiction intervene in some commercial 
transactions (which stand outside the traditional trust and fiduciary framework) and 
not in others.
It is arguable that the efficacy of equitable assignment of property for 
valuable consideration is explicable on the basis of non-assumption of risk for two 
reasons. First, the assignee did take action to protect his commercial interest by 
insisting on the assignment or agreement to assign future property via the operation 
of the equitable assignment. Secondly, if equity did not intervene, it would mean that 
notwithstanding the purported assignment, the assignor would obtain the 
consideration for the property and retain the property. This is an example of 
unconscionable retention of property which is discussed further.
Subrogation and marshalling are examples of a risk analysis at work and this 
is incontrovertibly shown where the debtor or wrongdoer is insolvent. A party 
entitled to subrogation or marshalling of assets has an accessorial security 
mechanism which may effectively circumvent the insolvency of the debtor. Where 
the marshalling of securities is concerned, the single security holder actively took 
steps to protect themselves against the insolvency of the common debtor. The 
doctrine of marshalling preserves the single creditor’s secured status to access the 
remaining security in the hands of the double secured creditor to the extent that they 
would have been protected under the original security. Otherwise, despite 
legitimate and appropriate attempts to protect its interests, the single security holder 
would be relegated to the status of an unsecured creditor.
The doctrine of subrogation is explicable on the basis that a party only 
assumes a limited kind of risk. For example, insurers take on the risk of injury and 
loss to the insured. But that risk taking is limited to the relationship of the insured 
and the insurer. As soon as the insurer has undertaken its responsibilities to the 
insured, paid compensation and legally (if not factually) negatived loss, the insurer 
has assumed the loss which the insured has suffered. Then, the insurer is entitled to 
repatriate the loss to the party who was the wrongdoer. Thus, the insurer stands in the
286 Chapter 5, 189-195.
287 McDonald, above n 248, [1604]; Meagher and Gummow above n 22, [1101 ]-[ 1103].
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shoes of the insured and may commence litigation against the wrongdoer for the loss. 
The double compensation situation in Lord Napier and Ettrick v Hunter merely 
highlighted a variation of this theme. The insurer took on the risk of loss and, when 
that loss occurred assumed that loss in the form of payments to the insureds. At that 
point, the insurer’s risk taking came to an end in the sense that it was entitled to 
repatriate the loss to the wrongdoers. But, before it could achieve this, the wrongdoer 
indemnified the insureds. Thus, as far as the wrongdoer was concerned, the 
wrongdoer had assumed the loss for which it was responsible - which incidentally is 
one of the functions of the doctrine of subrogation. As the wrongdoer had assumed 
the loss, the insurer was entitled to a lien over the damages settlement.
A risk analysis may also be applied to those situations where an unsecured 
creditor makes a loan which pays out a secured creditor on the basis that there is a 
direct connection between the pay-out and the pre-existing securities. Courts have 
distinguished cases where the lender advances the money to pay out the mortgage to 
the mortgagee (where subrogation will be available) and cases where funds are lent 
to the mortgagor who then pays out the mortgage (where the doctrine of subrogation 
is not available) . 290 It is presumed that the incoming lender has taken on the risk of 
lending subject to, and supported by, the ongoing operation of the mortgage for its 
benefit. It is arguable that the incoming lender has assumed risk on the basis that the 
pre-existing securities remain on foot and operate in the lender’s favour.
VI Conclusion
In this chapter, two major themes, which are central to modem equitable 
jurisprudence have been pursued. First, the strong proprietary and security tools 
available in equity have been highlighted. It has been shown that traditionally, equity 
has not only availed beneficiaries under trusts and fiduciary obligations of 
proprietary and priority interests, but equity has also intervened in commercial 
relationships and provided forms of relief tantamount to trust and security interests. 
These additional cases survived the restraints placed on equity as a jurisdiction
[1993] AC 713. Note in this regard Malcolm Luey, ‘Proprietary remedies in insurance 
subrogation’ (1995) 25 Victoria University o f Wellington 449, 450-457.
289 Glover, above n 234, [1501].
290 Cochrane v Cochrane (1985) 3 NSWLR 403, 405 (Kearney J); Paul v Speedway Ltd (in liq) 
[1976] 1 Ch 220.
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during the 19th century and continue to effectively operate in commercial contexts. 
Secondly, whilst the underlying philosophical and legal foundations for the operation 
of equity have rested on notions of conscience, the concept of conscience is an 
evaluation as to whether the circumstances indicate that a party assumed the risk of 
the commercial transaction, including its unsecured status, in the event of the other 
party’s insolvency. As demonstrated, courts have already concluded that 
beneficiaries under trusts and fiduciary obligations do not assume the risk of the 
insolvency of the trustee or the fiduciary. The additional doctrines and mechanisms 
are explicable as specific instances where equity jurisprudence has intervened on the 
basis that the relationship between such parties indicates that there has been a non­
assumption of risk.
In the light of equity’s powerful proprietary tools in insolvency contexts, it is 
not surprising that lawyers have sought to access these mechanisms for new 
situations. The problem has been (and continues to be) that accessorial techniques 
are grounded on two untenable assumptions. First, it is assumed that the extension 
and adaptation of equity’s proprietary devices is a simple task which does not have 
attendant doctrinal difficulties. As will be shown in Chapter 3, there are doctrinal 
difficulties. Not all of the extensions are appropriate or workable adaptations of 
equity’s traditional proprietary gateways. Secondly, it is assumed that the operation 
of proprietary mechanisms, in particular equitable tracing, requires a pre-existing and 
clear proprietary base. Or, to put it another way, it is appropriate to limit the 
operation of the trust, the equitable lien and equitable tracing to situations where 
there is a pre-existing and defined asset base. As will be shown in Chapter 4, the 
changing nature of money in the modem technological age means that an identifiable 
proprietary base requirement is not always helpful or practical.
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Chapter 3
EQUITABLE PROPRIETARY AND SECURITY INTERESTS: 
THE EXTENSION OF TRADITIONAL PROPRIETARY GATEWAYS
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I Introduction
In the last chapter, traditional means by which equity has intervened and 
accorded an aggrieved party proprietary and a fortiori priority interests were 
considered. Although the trust, fiduciary obligations, tracing and the various other 
doctrines and mechanisms discussed, did not originally arise overtly in response to 
risk assumption, their subsequent adoption and adaptation in the commercial 
environment can be explained on the basis of a party’s non-assumption of an 
unsecured status.
The function of this chapter is to show that some of the equitable mechanisms 
which were discussed in the last chapter have been used to extend proprietary 
interests which operate to protect an unsecured commercial party in the event of 
insolvency. However, such an appropriation of these equitable mechanisms to 
essentially commercial relationships has not been without some doctrinal difficulty. 
Along the road of refashioning these mechanisms, new questions and problems have 
arisen.
This chapter is divided into two distinct parts. The first part considers the 
adaptation of the express trust. The express trust is based on the concept of intention 
and so, the concept of intention will be a major focus of the discussion. The second 
part of the chapter focuses on traditional mechanisms which have been utilised to 
find or impose proprietary interests in commercial transactions where there is no 
evident intention to create a trust like security mechanism. The limitations inherent 
in each of these adapted mechanisms are discussed. It will be concluded that in the 
light of the various limitations, a new approach needs to be taken.
II Intention  and the  Express T rust
The important and standard requirement in relation to the express trust has 
been the necessity of certainty of intention to create it. 1 This requirement has been 
satisfied where a settlor or testator has unilaterally created a trust in writing. In
Knight v Knight (1840) 3 Beav 148; 49 ER 58; Renehan v Malone (1897) 1 NB Eq 506. For a 
discussion of this issue see DWM Waters, Law of Trusts in Canada (2nd ed, 1984) 107-117; RP 
Meagher and WMC Gummow, Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia (6th ed, 1997) [501 ]-[502]; HAJ 
Ford and WA Lee, Principles o f the Law of Trusts (3rd ed, 1996) [2000J-2060].
2
For a discussion of the trust as a security see Professor PD Finn’s comments recorded in The Hon. 
Mr Justice LJ Priestley, ‘The Romalpa Clause and the Quistclose Trust’ in PD Finn (ed), Equity and
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essentially commercial relationships, the express trust has been used as a means both 
of redefining standard commercial norms of risk assumption and creating a security 
device, namely via intention and ‘manifestation’ of intention. The notion of intention 
to create a trust has been expanded and redefined to accommodate the fact that 
commercial transactions are not the same as family trusts or testamentary trusts.
In commercial transactions, the mutualisation of intention to create an 
express trust has become apparent. A discussion of the issue will predominate in the 
first part of the chapter. However, it appears that a commercial party may be able to 
exercise unilateral intention and create a trust. After all, traditionally an express trust 
is created by the unilateral intention of a settlor or trustee. In Re Kayford Ltd (in 
liq) ,* 3 Megarry J countenanced the unilateral creation of a trust by a mail order 
company. The company received orders for goods, together with payments, from 
customers who were generally members of the public (as distinct from trade 
creditors). The company was having difficulty obtaining goods to fulfil orders and 
consequently faced the prospect of insolvency. The company paid the moneys 
received from the members of the public into a dormant and separate deposit account 
without seeking the concurrence of customers or advising them that it was doing so. 
The liquidators of the company took out a summons seeking a determination whether 
the funds were part of the company’s assets or whether the funds were held on trust 
for the customers. Megarry J held that the company’s deposit of the moneys in the 
account manifested an effective intention to create an express trust.4 Therefore, the 
case is an example of unilateral intention to create a trust in a commercial 
relationship. However, whilst from the perspective of trust law, a valid unilateral 
declaration of trust was possible, there were other problematical matters, such as 
voidable preference issues, which may make such an exercise difficult in the future.5
Commercial Relationships (1987) 217, 237 and Michael Bridge, ‘The Quistclose Trust in a World of
Secured Transactions’ (1992) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 333.
3 [1975] 1 W LR279.
4 Ibid 281-282.
5 For a discussion o f some of the problems associated with the case see Donovan WM Waters, ‘Trusts 
in the Setting of Business, Commerce and Bankruptcy’ (1983) 21 Alberta Law Review 395, 417; 
Priestley, above n 2, 234-236; RM Goode, Payment Obligations in Commercial and Financial 
Transactions (1983) 18 fn 64; Meagher and Gummow, above n 1, [215]; Sarah Worthington, 
Proprietary Interests in Commercial Transactions (1996) 59-61.
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A The Phenomenon of Mutual Intention to Create an Express Trust
A more likely scenario is that two parties in a commercial transaction will 
mutually agree to create a trust relationship over property. Unlike the simpler family 
trust or testamentary trust, the trust relationship is created by two persons rather than 
one person. Therefore, the intention to create a trust becomes part of the contractual 
relationship between the parties. Indeed, it can be said that the intention to create a 
contract and the intention to create a trust are conflated into a mutual intention to 
regulate the relationship according to the terms of the contract and to allocate the 
commercial risk in accordance with the operation of the express trust. The mutual 
creation of the trust effects a substantial change in the assumption of risk. Therefore, 
a party who would normally have no proprietary interest in money which it has 
transferred or in money which is collected on its behalf, may retain a proprietary 
interest via the use of the trust.
The concept of mutual intention is not limited to commercial relationships. 
There are a significant number of cases where the issue of mutual intention to create 
a trust has been crucial in determining whether a wife or a person in a de facto 
relationship have had a proprietary interest in the matrimonial home or property 
associated with the de facto relationship.6 7*The discussion here will concentrate on 
commercial transactions. Theoretically speaking, it is open to any commercial parties 
involved in the transfer and collection of money to create a trust. However, it is 
likely that certain kinds of transactions may incorporate or be tantamount to an
n
express trust, such as the transfer of money for safe keeping, the transfer of money 
for a specifically defined purpose (which limits the assumption of risk) and the 
collection of money from the sale of an asset.9 Instead of undertaking a encyclopedic 
description of such cases, it is more helpful to consider the major problems which
6 Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886; Pettit v Pettit [1970] AC 777; Hepworth v Hepworth (1963) 110 
CLR 309; Allen v Snyder [1977] 2 NSWLR 685; Grant v Edwards [1986] Ch 638; Green v Green 
(1989) 17 NSWLR 343.
7 Austin Wakeman Scott and William Franklin Fratcher, The Law o f Trusts (4th ed, 1987) vol 1, § 8.1 
but note those situations where a banker acts as a bailee rather than a trustee -  see §5.1 of the same 
work.
g
See the discussion of Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] AC 567 below, 115- 
117.
9
See the discussion of Stephens Travel Service Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v 
Qantas Airways Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 331 below, 99-101.
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may arise when attempting to show that an express trust regulates the commercial 
relationship.
B The Juxtaposition o f Debt and Trust
The initial question which was resolved in Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose 
Investments Ltd ( ‘Quistclose’) 10 was whether a trust relationship could operate 
simultaneously with the standard debtor-creditor relationship. This important 
threshold question was determined in favour of the co-existence of debtor and 
creditor relationships with the operation of the trust. Lord Wilberforce said that the 
contrary view was untenable:
It means that the law does not permit an arrangement to be made by 
which one person agrees to advance money to another, on terms that 
the money is to be used exclusively to pay debts of the latter, and if, 
and so far as not so used, rather than becoming a general asset of the 
latter available to his creditors at large, is to be returned to the 
lender...
I should be surprised if an argument of this kind - so conceptualist in 
character - had ever been accepted. In truth it has plainly been rejected 
by eminent judges who from 1819 onwards have permitted 
arrangements of this type to be enforced, and have approved them as 
being for the benefit of creditors and all concerned. There is surely no 
difficulty in recognising the co-existence in one transaction of legal 
and equitable rights and remedies...I can appreciate no reason why the 
flexible interplay of law and equity cannot let in these practical 
arrangements, and other variations if desired: it would be to the 
discredit of both systems if they could not.* 11
He confirmed that the trust could be used in a highly effective way to reverse 
commercial norms associated with the debtor-creditor relationship. Despite 
reservations expressed by others that such an express trust should be limited to
10 [1970] AC 567.
11 Ibid 581-582.
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money lent to discharge obligations, it has been the view that such express trusts 
may operate in a wide range of transactions. 13
Since the decision in Quistclose, parties have mutually agreed that the 
proceeds of sale of goods can be held on express trust for and on behalf of the owner 
of the goods. 14 This is a highly effective device, particularly where the agent has 
provided a floating charge to a third party and the owner has sought a security 
interest over the proceeds of sale only. In this way, in the event of insolvency, the 
owner has been assured that the sale proceeds would not form part of the assets of 
the insolvent agent.
There are two reasons why the trust has been utilised in this way. First, the 
standard commercial method of dealing with the sale proceeds has been quite 
different. Despite the fact that the selling party may be an agent of the owner of the 
goods, the fiduciary obligations of the agent do not extend to the obligation of 
holding the sale proceeds on trust for the owner. 15 After all, it has been established 
that there are different kinds of fiduciary obligations which have different rights and 
responsibilities attached to them. 16 Thus, Glover states:
Equity attaches considerable significance to the way in which an 
agent receives his principal’s money. Money paid by third parties to 
agents on behalf of principals is treated differently from money that 
the principal directly receives. There is no rule that equity will regard 
money as possessing the same character as the underlying property 
that it represents. Further...prices received for the consigned cargo or 
the equipment sold are not themselves entrusted. Proceeds received in 
either case are not given by the principal into the agent’s care, 
because they are not the principal’s to give at the relevant time. The 
money came from a third party. The point of the transaction for the 
principal was to use the agent to get the money from someone else.
12
12 Re Miles: Ex parte National Australia Bank Ltd v Official Receiver in Bankruptcy (1988) 20 FCR 
194, 199 (Pincus J).
13 Meagher and Gummow, above n 1, [216].
14 See the discussion of Stephens Travel Service International Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers 
Appointed) v Qantas Airways Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 331 below, 99-100.
15 See for example, Walker v Corboy (1990) 19 NSWLR 382; Hydro-Electric Power Commission of 
Ontario v Brown [1960] OR 91; (1960) 21 DLR (2d) 551; Re HB Haina & Associates Incorporated 
(1978) 28 CBR (NS) 113; (1978) 86 DLR (3d) 262.
16 For example, Kelly v Cooper [1993] AC 205.
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Nor is the money entrusted by the third party who pays it. It is simply 
the consideration in an ordinary commercial exchange: the price of 
grain or equipment purchased.17
The implementation of the mutual express trust is a response by commercial parties 
to the unenviable situation where, between the date of sale of the chattels and the 
date of accounting for the sale proceeds, the debtor-agent becomes insolvent. Thus, 
the mutual intention to create a trust operates to reverse the standard characterisation 
and transformation of what is essentially an initial bailment and principal and agent 
relationship into a secured debtor-creditor relationship. The trust operates as a 
device to retain or obtain proprietary interest in money.
Secondly, the technical means by which the creditor is able to retain a legal 
or equitable interest in the proceeds of sale is limited. It is impossible for the legal 
owner of the property to take security over that property. However, there is a hiatus 
in the proprietary interest trail when the asset is sold. The trust device is an ingenious 
means by which, simultaneously, the owner retains an interest in the goods and then 
the sale proceeds (whilst the money itself operates as a normal negotiable entity). 
Obviously, it may be open to the creditor-principal to seek alternative security to 
counterbalance the fact that he or she will not retain a proprietary interest in the 
chattels. However, there may be no such suitable property. The agent’s assets may 
already form security for other commercial commitments and the provision of 
additional security may interfere with other security arrangements. As the chattel was 
not the property of the debtor in the first place, it makes sense that a new security 
arrangement should relate to the proceeds from the sale of the chattel.
One example is Stephens Travel Service International Pty Ltd (Receivers and 
Managers Appointed) v Qantas Airways Ltd ( ‘Stephens’) } 9 In that case Qantas and 
Stephens Service International Pty Ltd (‘Stephens’) entered into a travel agency 
contract under which Stephens sold airline tickets and transportation orders owned 
by Qantas and agreed to collect and hold the proceeds in trust for Qantas. Stephens
John Glover, Commercial Equity: Fiduciary Relationships (1995) [3.73]. See also in this regard 
John Brunyate, Limitation o f Actions in Equity (1932) 85-87; Paul Finn, ‘Fiduciary Law and the 
Modem Commercial World’ in Ewan McKendrick (ed), Commercial Aspects o f Trusts and Fiduciary 
Obligations (1992) 7, 17-18.
18
For a discussion o f the nature of bailment and its applicability to money see NE Palmer, Bailment 
(2nd ed, 1991) 1-7, 13, 178-182.
19 (1988) 13 NSWLR 331.
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paid the funds it received for the airline tickets and transportation orders into an 
overdraft account with ANZ Bank Ltd (‘ANZ’). ANZ demanded payment for an 
overdraft facility and Stephens was unable to pay. Consequently, ANZ appointed 
receivers and managers to Stephens pursuant to a floating charge over Stephens' 
assets. The question was whether a trust had been created. Hope JA, who delivered 
the unanimous decision of the Court, held that the parties had mutually created a 
trust under the agreement and that such a trust could operate within the context of a 
debtor-creditor relationship to reverse commercial norms. The use of the trust in this 
context has become so effective that the incorporation of an express trust has become 
part of many standard arrangements between travel agents and airlines in a variety of 
jurisdictions.20
However, the expansion of the concept of intention to include mutual 
intention has not been without the need to re-adjust other equitable requirements, 
particularly where money, rather than specific assets, has been the subject of the 
dispute.
First, the wider reading of the concept of intention has necessitated the re­
interpretation of the criteria of certainty of subject matter. In Stephens, whilst there 
was clearly an intention to create a trust, there was the issue whether there was 
certainty of subject matter to which the trust attached. The problem was that the 
agreement did not contain a requirement that the agent retain the sale proceeds in a 
separate account. Moreover, the sale funds were in fact deposited in the trustee’s 
general overdrawn account. Hope JA held that the absence of an express separate 
account provision would not render a trust invalid. Indeed, he pointed out that there 
was evidence to suggest that payment of the funds into a separate account would 
have been commercially and practically difficult for Stephens. “ The fact that the
23funds had been mixed in a general account did not negate the existence of the trust. 
Rather, it led to an inquiry as to what was the effect of the breach of trust and the
20 See Air Traffic Conference v Downtown Travel Center Inc (1976) 14 AVI (CCH) 17,172; 
Forastieri v Eastern Airlines Inc (1983) 18 AVI (CCH) 17, 145; Air Canada v M  & L Travel Ltd 
[1993] 3 SCR 787.
21 (1988) 13 NSWLR 331,341-342.
22 Ibid.
23 See also Air Canada v M  & L Travel Ltd [1993] 3 SCR 787, 804 (Iacobucci J).
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mixing of the funds24 and the application of equity's tracing rules.25 However, the 
effect of such a judgment was to qualify the requirement for specific and clear 
subject matter of the trust. Where money or other fungible items are involved, this 
may be a necessary and logical response to the practicalities of commercial 
transaction and the changing nature and function of money. Certainly, it is strongly 
arguable that an entry on the agent’s balance sheet would have been sufficiently 
practical to indicate the existence of the subject matter of the trust. After all, it has 
been decided that the opening of a separate account is only an indication of intention
29to create a trust.
Secondly, the intrusion of an agreed express trust inevitably affects third 
parties. The effect of such an express trust is to withdraw assets from the property 
base of the insolvent party who is characterised as a trustee.30 Therefore, secured 
creditors, particularly floating chargees,31 are faced with the situation that when the 
charge crystallises, the property which is subject to the trust will not form part of the 
assets upon which the charge crystallises. This is precisely the problem which ANZ 
faced in Stephens. Thus, it is inconsequential whether or not the chargee has had 
notice of the existence of the trust because the trust operates quite separately from 
notice.
The existence of the trust will not be notified on any publicly accessible 
register. The security arrangement created by the mutually intended express trust 
remains one essentially known to the parties and (as in Stephens) commercial 
parties such as the ANZ in Stephens who are involved with the day to day
24 (1988) 13 NSWLR 331, 345-348.
25 Ibid 345-350.
26 See Hunter v Moss [1994] 1 WLR452.
27 Chapter 1, 14-15.
28 Ausintel Investments (Aust) v Lam (1990) 19 NSWLR 637, 648 (Meagher JA).
Re Nanwa Gold Mines [1955] 1 WLR 1080; Re HB Haina & Associates Incorporated (1978) CBR 
(NS) 113; (1978) 86 DLR (3d) 262.
30 Bankruptcy Act 1966 Cth) s 116 (2) (a).
31 William James Gough, Company Charges (2nd ed, 1996) 85-90.
32 (1988) 13 NSWLR 331.
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relationship between them. Thus, it could be argued that both unsecured and secured 
creditors (particularly floating chargees in the latter category) are faced with the 
unenviable task of trying to ascertain what are the assets of a debtor without the 
availability of accurate and verifiable information. This could be solved by the 
implementation of a register of trusts in relation to all property. So far, in relation to 
a major property register, this kind of scheme has not been favoured even in relation 
to Torrens Title land. However, such a registration scheme has been implemented 
in relation to the company charge.34
Nonetheless, it remains that commercial parties have open to them the 
possibility to negotiate arrangements which have security implications. The 
effectiveness of the security arrangement between the parties has not been 
undermined by concerns for other third parties. Court are averse to setting such 
arrangements aside simply on this basis35 (particularly where the third party has 
knowingly received the trust money). Prima facie, it is the responsibility of third 
party creditors to set, negotiate and implement their own effective security 
arrangements. Only in limited, albeit significant situations, will equity be called upon 
to review the order of priorities and intervene on behalf of unsecured creditors.37 And 
the fact that a trust is not notified on a public register is not one of them. At any rate, 
in converse situations, the asset base of the debtor is unaffected by the fact that the 
debtor is a beneficiary under a trust. The assets of a beneficiary under a trust form 
part of that beneficiary’s assets for distribution between creditors, except in cases of
33
For arguments that trusts ought to be registered see Robert Stein, ‘Torrens Title -  A Case for the 
Registration o f Trusts in New South Wales’ (1982) 9 The Sydney Law Review 605; Douglas J 
Whalan, ‘Partial Restoration of the Integrity of the Torrens System Register: Notation o f Trusts and 
Land Law Planning Control’ (1970) 4 New Zealand Universities Law Review 1.
34
In relation to company charges see Corporations Law (Cth) Part 3.5; HAJ Ford, RP Austin and IM 
Ramsay, Ford’s Principles o f Corporations Law (8th ed, 1997) [ 19.340]-[ 19.450].
35
For cases which show what are the kinds of factors which may determine the existence of an 
express trust, see for example, the judgment of Gummow J in Re Australian Elizabethan Theatre 
Trust (1991) 102 ALR 681 and the judgments of Tompkins J and the Court of Appeal in General 
Communications Ltd v Development Corporation o f New Zealand [1990] 3 NZLR 406.
36 See for example, Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] AC 567, 582 (Lord 
Wilberforce); Stephens Travel Service International Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v 
Qantas Airwarys Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 331.
37 For a discussion of this issue see Chapters 5 and 6 below.
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protective and discretionary trusts. It is only when the debtor is a trustee that the 
assets are treated as separate from the assets of the debtor for the purpose of 
insolvency administration.39
38
C Manifestation o f Intention
In the absence of clearly delineated written statements creating a trust or oral 
statements in which the intention to create a trust has been made, courts have 
resorted to other criteria in order to sustain the view that there has been an intention 
to create a trust. Courts have held that the parties have acted in a way which 
‘manifested’ an intention to create a trust. The concept of manifesting an intention to 
create an express trust is well established in trust law where the unilateral intention 
of a ‘settlor’ has been involved.40
So too, in other cases, the important question will be whether the party (or 
parties, as the case may be) manifested sufficient intention to create a legal 
relationship which was tantamount to a trust. Courts will infer an intention to create a 
trust,41 considering the nature of the transaction, the conduct of the parties and the 
circumstances of the case.42 But, there is no one single method indicating intention. 
Therefore, it is unnecessary for the words ‘trust’ or ‘trustee’ to be used.43 On the 
other hand, it has been well established that the use of the words ‘trust’ and ‘trustee’
38 Re Coram; Ex parte Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Inglis (1992) 36 FCR 250; Dwyer v Ross 
(1992) 34 FCR 463.
39 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 116 (2) (a).
40 Re Armstrong [1960] VR 202; Paul v Constance [1977] 1 WLR 527; Ford and Lee, above n 1 
[2010].
41 Bahr v Nicolay (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 604, 618-619 (Mason CJ and Dawson J); cf the apparently 
narrow approach in Re Schebsman: Ex parte Official Receiver v Cargo Superintendents (London) Ltd 
[1944] Ch 83, 104 (du Parq LJ).
42 Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNeice Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 107, 121 (Mason CJ 
and Wilson J), 147-149 (Deane J); Swain v The Law Society [1983] 1 AC 598, 621 (Lord Brightman); 
Walker v Corboy (1990) 19 NSWLR 382, 395-396 (Meagher JA); Winterton Constructions Pty Ltd v 
Hambros Australia Ltd (1991) 101 ALR 363, 370-371 (Gummow J).
43 Re Armstrong [1960] VR 202; Paul v Constance [1977] 1 WLR 527; Brisbane City Council and 
My er Shopping Centres Pty Ltd v Attorney-General for Queensland [1979] AC 411, 421; Scott and 
Fratcher, above n 7, vol I, § 24, 250.
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may not indicate an intention to create a trust.44 A direction to a party to hold that 
property for a third party may be sufficient to manifest an intention to create a trust.45
The flexible approach to certainty of intention reflects the inherent emphasis 
on the substance of the transactions over form.46 Essentially, equity looks to the 
intent, rather than to the form.47 Thus, it has been recognised that equity’s capacity to 
infer trusts where no words of trust are used, is an example of the application of this 
maxim of equity. Whilst it has been pointed out that the equitable maxim ‘is not a 
boundless power in equity’ and it ‘is applied only in cases where the intention of the 
party is clear’ ,49 it appears that the interpretation of intention has been wide. Indeed, 
it has been suggested that there have been a number of cases where the evidence 
upon which the manifestation of intention to create a trust was minimal.50 Sceptics 
such as the realist philosopher, Frank would devastatingly opine:
Someone has observed that whenever a lawyer says that something or 
other was the manifest intention of a man, ‘manifest’ means that the 
man never really had such an intention.51
Frank's statement highlights the fact that an obvious (yet powerful) criticism that the 
outward indications of intention may not manifest an intention to create a trust at all.
Into this complex and intuitive area of intention to create a trust, there is now 
the added dimension of mutual intention to create a trust in commercial relationships. 
Where the parties have mutually intended to create a trust in writing, then the
Commissioner o f Stamp Duties (Queensland) v Joliffe (1920) 28 CLR 178. For a discussion of 
some o f the complexities which arise in an analysis of intention see Scott and Fratcher, above n 7, vol 
IA, § 58-§58.1.
45
Scott and Fratcher, above n 7, vol I § 24.
46
Parkin v Thorold (1852) 16 Beav 59, 66; 51 ER 698, 701; Solomons v Halloran (1906) 7 SR 
(NSW) 32, 42. For a full discussion of the maxim see RP Meagher, WMC Gummow and JRF 
Lehane, Equity Doctrines and Remedies (3rd ed, 1992) [331 ]-[338].
47 Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, above n 46, [311].
49 GE Dal Pont and DRC Chalmers, Equity and Trusts: In Australia and New Zealand (1996) 11.
50 Patrick Parkinson, ‘Chaos in the Law of Trusts’ (1991) 13 The Sydney Law Review 227, 232-234.
51 Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (1930) 27.
101
Situation is a relatively clear one, subject to the difficulties pointed out earlier in this 
chapter. However, where there is no express intention, courts will consider the 
circumstances of cases, “ including whether there has been segregation of assets.
D Segregation of Assets
There are cases which establish that the segregation of assets, particularly, 
money, can be important means of manifesting an intention to create a trust (as well 
as providing an identifiable subject matter).53 Where money is involved, the 
segregation method reverses the standard commercial norms in relation to the 
passing of title.54 The recipient has only acquired a legal interest in the money by 
virtue of possession. The money has been stripped of its negotiability. The express 
requirement to segregate the money reifies the money into a separate and distinct 
fund. As a fund, the money becomes a distinct asset which is capable of 
identification and being the subject matter of a trust.55
1 Origins o f the Segregation Requirement
The segregation method may have originated in common law rather than in 
equity. Three examples indicate that this was probably the case. First, during the 
16th and 17th centuries there were common law cases which held that money could 
only be the subject of common law actions of detinue, trover or conversion if the 
money was described or identified by storage in a bag, (although some cases
52 Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNeice Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 107, 121 (Mason CJ 
and Wilson J), 147-149 (Deane J).
53 A few examples are Moseley v Cressey's Co (1865) LR 1 Eq 405; Henry v Hammond [1913] 2 KB 
515; Cohen v Cohen (1929) 42 CLR 91; Re Associated Securities Ltd and the Companies Act [1981]
1 NSWLR 742; Re Australian Elizabethan Theatre Trust (\99 \)  102 ALR 681; Re Multi Guarantee 
Co Ltd [1987] BCLC 257; Carreras Rothmans Ltd v Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd [1985] Ch 207; 
Steffanson v Jaasma and Jaasma [1976] 4 WWR 449; Farmers State Bank of Farmers State Bank of 
Forston v Sig Ellingson & Co 16 NW (2d) 319 (SC Minnesota, 1944); Cohen v Cohen 20 A (2d) 594 
(SC New Jersey, 1941). Note also American Law Institute, Restatement o f the Law of Trusts 2nd 
(1959) vol 1, §12 g.
54 For the standard norms see Chapter 1, 12-13.
55 Worthington, above n 5, 61-62.
56 See for example Rivers v Oodskirt Cro Eliz 568; 78 ER 812.
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appear to suggest that trover was available notwithstanding lack of such 
identification). So too, modem detinue permits recovery of goods but as such 
requires identification of goods (including money) wrongfully detained.59 The 
modem tort of conversion encompassing trover60 is available where there has been 
serious interference with the right of another to control a chattel.61 An action will lie 
if the chattel or money is specifically identified. Fleming observes in relation to 
conversion, ‘the action is proprietary in substance, only tortious in form.’63 The fact 
that the remedy is damages64 does not detract from the fact that the initial chattel 
over which there is dispute must be sufficiently identifiable.65
Secondly, the common law emphasis on segregation has occurred where the 
sale and passing of title in relation to fungibles, other than money, has been involved. 
The relevant legislation is the Sale o f Goods Act 1979 (UK)66 which replaced the
57 Banks v Whetson, Cro Eliz 457; 78 ER 711; Clark's Case Godbolt 210; 78 ER 128; Issack v Clarke 
(1688) 2 Bulstrode 306; 80 ER 1143; Draycott v Plot Cro Eliz 818; 78 ER 1045; Taylor v Plumer 
(1815) 3 M & S 562; 105 ER 721.
C O
Clark’s Case Godbolt 210; 78 ER 128; Hall v Dean Cro Eliz 841; 78 ER 1068.
59 For a helpful discussion of detinue see RP Balkin and JLR Davis, Law o f Torts (2nd ed,1996) 107- 
109.
60 John G Fleming, The Law o f Torts (9th ed, 1998), 60-66.
61 Ibid 60-61; Balkin and Davis, above n 59, 11-SI. As to the chattels see in relation to cars: Union 
Transport Finance Ltd v British Car Auctions Ltd [1978] 2 All ER 385; Motor Mercantile Co Ltd v 
Twitching [1977] AC 890; timber: Berry v Heard (1632) Cro Car 242; 79 ER 812; Pyne v Dor (1785) 
1 Term Rep 55; 99 ER 968; Blackett v Lowes (1814) 2 M & S 494; 105 ER 465.
62 Ibid 60-61. See also Brambles Security Service Ltd v By-Lo Pty Ltd (1992) Aust Torts Reports ^81 - 
161, ^61, 269-61, 270; Balkin and Davis, above n 59, 75.
63 Ibid 61.
64 Ibid 76-78.
65 Ibid 60-61. See also in relation to conversion Edward H Warren, ‘Qualifying as Plaintiff in Action 
for Conversion’ (1936) 49 Harvard Law Review 1084; William L Prosser ‘The Nature of Conversion’ 
(1957) 42 Cornell Law Quarterly 168.
66 Note equivalent legislation has been enacted in the Australian States such as Sale o f  Goods Act 
1923 (NSW); Goods Act 1958 (Vic); Sale o f Goods Act 1896 (Qld); Sale o f Goods Act 1895 (SA); 
Sale o f  Goods Act 1896 (Tas); Sale o f Goods Act 1895 (WA).
103
earlier Sale o f Goods Act 1893 (UK). Prior to the original codification, the common 
law required that where an executory contract for the sale of goods was entered into, 
it became an executed contract upon the specification or appropriation of the goods 
to that contract. Under the original codification, a contract for the sale of 
unascertained goods did not amount to a sale but simply to an agreement to sell, that 
is, an executory rather than an executed agreement.69
70The concept of unascertained goods refers to where there are generic goods, 
from which part is identified and title thereupon passes.71 It had been argued 
unsuccessfully that prior to the appropriation of a part from a larger bulk, the 
purchaser acquired an equitable interest in the bulk. Therefore, the position was 
changed under the UK legislation and there have been calls for reform in Australia 
as well.74
75 76Thirdly, the prevailing interpretation (but by no means the universal one) 
of what constitutes common law following, confirms that the segregation of
67
67 For a general discussion of the earlier legislation see LS Sealy, ‘The Contract of Sale of Goods’ in 
AG Guest (ed), Benjamin's Sale of Goods (4Ih ed, 1992) 3, [1-002],
68 Arthur Beilby Pearson-Gee and Hugh Fenwick Boyd, Benjamin's Treatise on the Law of Sale of 
Personal Property (4* ed, 1888) Chapter 5.
69 Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik [1906] AC 419; Mischeff v Springett [1942] 2 KB 331; Preston v 
Albuery [1964] 2 QB 796; Re Wait [1927] 1 Ch 606.
70 Re London Wine Co (Shippers Ltd) (unreported, 7th November 1975, Oliver J ) which is set out in 
RM Goode, Property Rights and Insolvency in Sales Transactions (1985) 95-130.
71 Re Wait [1927] 1 Ch 606.
72 Ibid; F Pollock, ‘Notes: Re Wait’ (1927) 43 The Law Quarterly Review 293; Meagher, Gummow 
and Lehane, above n 46, [666]-[684] Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (In Receivership) [1995] 1 AC 74.
73 Robert Bradgate and Fidelma White, ‘Sale of Goods Forming Part of a Bulk: Proposals for 
Reform’ [1994] Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 315; Lionel Smith, ‘Bailment with 
Authority to Mix-and Substitute’ [1995] 111 The Law Quarterly Review 10.
74 Gail Pearson, ‘The Transfer of Property in Unascertained Goods: Who Owns the Wine Bottles’ 
(1997) 71 The Australian Law Journal 134.
75 Re Diplock [1948] Ch 465; Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1991] Ch 547, 563; Michael Scott, ‘The 
Right to ‘Trace’ at Common Law’ (1965-1966) 7 The University o f Western Australia Law Review 
463,465.
76 See for example Lionel D Smith, The Law of Tracing (1997) 162-174.
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fungibles such as money was essential. Further, the need for the physicality of 
identity was recognised by Millett J at first instance in Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson? 1 
He held that common law following was not available against a party which had
78received electronically transferred funds.
There are two major scenarios in relation to the segregation of assets in the 
context of manifestation to create a trust. The first kind is where the parties in the 
commercial relationship expressly agree in some way that the recipient of the funds 
will retain the funds separate and segregated from his own assets. Although the 
parties have not used any language denoting a trust, the effect of such an agreement 
is to create a trust relationship. As the agreement to segregate reverses commercial 
norms, the party who has provided the funds (or in some cases the assets sold) 
retains an equitable interest in the funds or sale proceeds. Thus, it has protected itself 
against its otherwise unsecured status in the event of the insolvency of the other 
party.
Another method of agreed segregation, is where one party makes an 
unilateral statement (such as in an advertisement) in relation to the segregation of 
money upon receipt of the funds, and the other party enters into the transaction on 
the basis of that statement. In Re Nanwa Goldmines Ltd, the subscription form for 
an issue of capital in a company stated that in the event that the subscribed shares 
were not allotted, ‘application moneys will be refunded and meanwhile will be 
retained in a separate account.’ The allotment never took place and a receiver was 
appointed in relation to the company. Harman J said that the construction of the 
application form led to the conclusion that there was a representation that 
subscription moneys were kept separate. The funds were not part of the assets of the 
company but were returnable to the subscribers.
A third method of agreed segregation, is where one party entrusts assets to 
the other party on the clear understanding that that party will not only sell the assets
77 [1990] 1 Ch 265.
78
Ibid 285-286.
79 For a discussion of this issue in the context of Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose [1970] AC 567 see 
Worthington, above n 5, 55-56.
80
[1955] 1 WLR 1080; cf Re Hartney Co (1959) Ltd and Freed (1962) 4 CBR (NS) 71.
81
Ibid 1081-1082.
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but will account the actual proceeds of sale to the owner of the goods. Whilst there is 
no express intention to create a trust over the moneys in the same way as in 
Stephens, either the requirement of specific accountability of the money or the 
agreed segregation of the moneys into a specific fund, has been sufficient to create a 
trust. In Cohen v Cohen, the wife had entrusted the sale of goods and collection of 
moneys to her husband. The couple had separated and the wife wanted her former 
husband to account to her for the sale proceeds. The problem was that her actions 
were statute barred under the relevant Statute o f Limitations. The question was 
whether the husband held any of the sale proceeds on trust for his wife. The High 
Court held that as the wife had intended that the husband should account to her for 
the sale proceeds in relation to certain furniture, she had a proprietary interest in 
them. The husband did not simply owe a personal obligation to account for the 
money but was required to specifically account for it.84
The second method in relation to segregation is where one of the parties to 
the relationship simply segregates the money. There is no express agreement, but the 
circumstances leading up to the segregation of the money indicates that the 
segregation of the money into a fund, is the fulfilment of the negotiations. This was
85the effect of the segregation of the funds in Quistclose.
2 Problems Associated with the Segregation Model of Trust Creation
Whilst segregation of moneys directly received from the transferor of funds 
or from the sale of chattels is an ingenious means by which to reverse commercial 
norms of risk assumption, the process has not been interpreted in a clear or consistent 
way. The risk analysis has not been used to explain segregation and this has led to a 
number of misunderstandings why and how segregation works in the context of trust 
law. It is strongly arguable that an emphasis on risk assumption rather than simply 
intention to create a trust explains many of the apparent anomalies in the case law.
82 (1988) 13 NSWLR 331.
83 [1929] 42 CLR91.
84 Ibid 101-102.
[1970] AC 567.
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(a) What Kind o f  Trust Does the Segregation Phenomenon Create ?
The fact that the trust created by segregation of moneys is discussed under 
the heading of mutual intention to create a trust, indicates the author’s view that the 
device is an express trust. There are some authorities which would support this 
view. However, Lord Wilberforce stated in Quistclose:
That arrangements of this character for the payment of a person’s 
creditors by a third person, give rise to a relationship of a fiduciary 
character or trust, in favour, as a primary trust, of the creditors, and 
secondarily, if the primary trust fails, of the third person, has been 
recognised in a series of cases over some 150 years.87
Thus, some commentators have suggested that the trust operates initially as an 
express trust, which subsequently fails, and a secondary trust repatriates the 
beneficial interest to the lender. The secondary trust has been interpreted as an 
express trust and a resulting trust. There have even been suggestions that the 
remedial constructive trust is more appropriate because it would be unconscionable 
for the money to be used in a way which was outside the agreement of the parties.90
The difference between the interpretations is based on whether the trust arises 
via the unexpressed intentions and conduct of the parties or, whether the trust is 
imposed on the basis of criteria which operates separate from the express or apparent
86 Re Australian Elizabethan Theatre Trust (1991) 102 ALR 681, 693-694 (Gummow J); Priestley, 
above n 2, 237; and effectively the conclusion of PJ Millett, ‘The Quistclose Trust: Who Can Enforce 
It?’ (1985) 101 The Law Quarterly Review 269, 290.
R T
Ibid 580.
88 General Communications Ltd v Development Finance Corporation o f New Zealand Ltd [1990] 3 
NZLR 406, 419 (Tompkns J at first instance) and 432-3 (CA); Re Australian Elizabethan Theatre 
Trust {1991) 102 ALR 681, 691 (Gummow J).
89
Re Associated Securities Ltd and the Companies Act [1981] 1 NSWLR 742, 749 (Needham J); Re 
ETVR Ltd and Gilbert v Barber [1987] BCLC 646, 650-651 (Dillon LJ);; RM Goode, Principles o f 
Corporate Insolvency Law (1990) 55; CEF Rickett, ‘Different View on the Scope of the Quistclose 
Analysis: English and Antipodean Insights’ (1991) 107 The Law Quarterly Review 608, 618; Bridge, 
above n 2, 352; Dal Pont and Chalmers, above n 49, 416; Robert Chambers, Resulting Trusts (1997), 
Chapter 3.
90 IM Hardcastle, ‘Purpose Trusts’ how close to Quistclose?’ (1988) 85 The Law Society’s Gazette 
14; Dines Construction Ltd v Perry Dines Corporation (1989) 4 NZCLC ^[96-330, (Ellis J)- For a 
consideration of the relationship of the Quistclose trust and the constructive trust see David M 
Wright, The Remedial Constructive Trust ( 1998) [6.10].
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intention of the parties. Such characterisations arise from a different interpretation of 
the facts. If the trust is the product of the unexpressed intentions and conduct of the 
parties (which is an agreement to segregate assets or the factual allocation of assets) 
then the trust arises by virtue of that intention. If the trust does not arise from the 
intention of the parties, then it will be imposed by existing legal rules which 
establish the resulting trust or imposed by the court pursuant to a constructive trust. 
However, the various arguments in relation to whether the trust or trusts should be 
characterised as one kind of trust or another, is an arid one. This is because the courts 
have found that a trust has regulated the commercial relationship between the parties; 
and, therefore the standard commercial norms in relation to dealing with money have 
been overturned. As has been shown,91 various kinds of trusts have been used 
traditionally to protect a beneficiary from any risk of wrongdoing or insolvency of 
the trustee.
(b) Is an Agreement to Segregate Essential Before an Express Trust Arises?
Basically, the question is whether segregation will be effective to reverse 
commercial norms and create an express trust without the need for an actual 
agreement to segregate between the parties. This was one of the issues which was 
faced by the litigants in Quistclose. A company in a poor financial situation 
borrowed money from a related company for the purpose of paying shareholders a 
dividend. In this context, the shareholders were not only stakeholders in the 
company, but also creditors as well. The money was deposited in a separate account. 
Before the money was used for the purpose for which it had been lent, the company 
went into liquidation and the question was whether the lender (Quistclose 
Investments) or the company's principal creditor (Barclays Bank) were entitled to the 
moneys. At first instance, Plowman J held that, as the company was not required to 
keep the funds separate from its own, a trust did not arise in favour of the lender after 
the purpose failed.94 In comparison, the higher courts clearly took the view that the 
omission of an actual obligation to segregate moneys was not damaging to the
91 Chapter 2, 50-60.
92 [1970] AC 567.
93 Quistclose Investments Ltd v Rolls Razor Ltd (in liq) [1967] Ch 910.
94 Ibid 929- 931.
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lender’s case. The House of Lords,95 affirming the decision of the Court of Appeal,96 
held that a trust arose in favour of the creditors and if the primary trust failed, in 
favour of the third party lender. They apparently substituted other criterion, namely 
specific purpose, which evidenced the creation of an express trust without the need to 
address the lack of a strict requirement to segregate the assets. However, another 
possible reason why the segregation issue was not so important was because in fact
Q  O
(if not by way of obligation), the moneys were held in a separate account anyway.
Another reason why the obligation to segregate the moneys was not so 
important was that the requirement to segregate the funds could be implied from the 
events which led up to the commercial transaction itself. Particular care had been 
taken to ensure that the funds were separate from the assets of the borrower. 
Substantial negotiations which took place indicated that the lender was wary of 
handing over money to the borrower.99 It was clear that the lender was not willing to 
assume the risk of an unsecured status in the event of the insolvency of the borrower, 
except in the situation where the moneys which were lent were used to pay the 
dividends owing to the shareholders. 100
Nonetheless, there is judicial authority which suggests that the mere
segregation of money may not of itself create a trust. 101 Therefore, it is likely, as has
been demonstrated above, that in the absence of express agreement, a plaintiff will
have to demonstrate something more than the fact that the funds in dispute are
factually segregated. The concept of special purpose is considered as a potential
102additional factor, although as will be shown, this criterion is ultimately unhelpful.
95 [1970] AC 567.
96 Quistclose Investments Ltd v Rolls Razor Ltd (in liq) [1968] 1 Ch 540.
97 [1970] AC 580-581.
98 Ibid, 579.
"  [1968] 1 Ch 540, 550-552 (CA); [1970] AC 567, 579-580 (HL).
100 Ibid.
101 Re Nanwa Gold Mines Ltd [1955] 1 WLR 1080, 1084; Re HB Haina & Associates Incorporated 
(1978) 28 CBR (NS) 113; (1978) 86 DLR (3d) 262.
102 Below, 112-114.
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(c) Is the Security Device Which Arises in the Form of a Trust a Product of 
the Intention of Both of the Parties or the Single Intention of One of the 
Parties?
This is a question which is related to the issue immediately discussed, but in 
other respects quite separate from it. The question focuses on whether, in a 
consensual relationship, it is possible for one party to take action tantamount to 
creating a trust without the input of the other party. At first blush, it is arguable that 
the segregation phenomenon is generally the product of consensus. Therefore, the 
prospect of unilateral action which leads to the creation of a trust appears to be 
unlikely. After all, the segregation phenomenon is conflated into the express and 
mutual creation of a trust. Not only does the transferor or owner of the goods seek 
to limit their assumption of risk, but the recipient of the funds must agree (in effect) 
that his use of the money is limited by the operation of the trust. Nonetheless, it is 
likely that it will be the initial intention of the lender or transferor to limit risk (such 
as in a Quistclose situation) 104 which will fuel the desire for a security arrangement 
in the form of a trust. 105
(d) In Whom Does the Equitable Interest Reside?
One of the central requirements of the law of trusts is that there must be 
certainty of object. 106 Generally, trusts in favour of purposes rather than persons are 
invalid, 107 subject to exceptions including the tomb, 108 animal109 cases and charitable
103 See the comments of The Honourable Mr Justice Priestley on an interpretation of the Quistclose 
trust by Professor PD Finn in Priestley, above n 2, 237.
104 In relation to the emphasis on the lender or transferor’s intention see Millett, above n 86.
105 Worthington, above n 5, 53-55; 59-61.
106 Knight v Knight (1840) 3 Beav 148; 49 ER 58; Morice v Bishop of Durham (1804) 9 Ves 399; 32 
ER 656.
107 Morice v Bishop of Durham (1804) 9 Ves 399; 32 ER 656; Re Astor’s Settlement Trusts [1952] 
Ch 534; Re Recher’s Will Trusts [1972] Ch 526.
108 Musset v Bingle (1876) WN 170; Pirbright v Salwey [1896] WN 86; Re Hooper [1932] 1 Ch 38; 
Re Filshie (Deed), Raymond v Butcher [1939] NZLR 91; Re Budge (Deed); Ex parte Pascoe [1942] 
NZLR 350.
1OQ Pettingall v Pettingall (1842) 11 LJ Ch 176; Re Dean (1889) 41 Ch D 552.
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trusts. 110 It is strongly arguable that in the segregation cases, the beneficial interest 
will lie in the transferor of the funds (such as the lender in Quistclose) or the owner 
of the chattels which have been entrusted for sale. In this respect, an analysis based 
on a single express trust is preferable.
The alternative is the dual trust structure in which, for example, a secondary 
resulting trust repatriates the beneficial interest in the transferor of funds when it 
becomes clear that the ‘purpose’ of the trust fails or cannot be achieved. The evident 
problem in such a case is that it may be difficult to ascertain the precise purpose of 
the trust or whether the purpose of the trust is achievable. Indeed, some 
commentators have questioned whether the purpose of the primary trust in 
Quistclose was no longer capable of fulfilment. 111 Moreover, one commentator 
suggested that Quistclose stood for the proposition that courts would uphold 
purpose trusts. The primary trust in Quistclose was a non-charitable purpose trust 
followed by a secondary resulting trust in favour of the lender. 114 This was criticised 
at judicial level1 1' 5 and the commentator subsequently withdrew such an 
interpretation. 116
Another suggestion in relation to the beneficial interest has been that the 
beneficial interest floats above the transaction. In fact, it does not attach to any party 
until the actual transfer of money to the designated recipient. In Carreras Rothmans 
v Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd ( ‘Carreras’) u 1 Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd 
(‘Freeman’) was an advertising agency which had undertaken advertising services
110 Re Gott [1944] 1 Ch 193; New Zealand Society of Accountants v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
[1986] 1 NZLR 147.
11 * William Goodhart and Gareth Jones, ‘The Infiltration of Equitable Doctrine into English 
Commercial Law’ (1980) 43 Modem Law Review 489, 494, fn 28; Ford and Lee, above n 1, [1390] 
fn 2; Chalmers, above n 89, Chapter 3.
112 [1970] AC 567.
113 Note generally Rickett, above n 89.
114 Ibid 618.
115 Re Australian Elizabethan Theatre Trust (1991) 102 ALR 681, 692 (Gummow J).
116 Charles EF Rickett, ‘Trusts and Insolvency: The Nature and Place of the Quistclose Trust’ in 
Donovan WM Waters (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts 1993 (1993) 325, 332-333.
117 [1985] Ch 207.
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for Carreras Rothmans Ltd (‘Carreras’). Freeman utilised the services of the various 
third parties and received the invoices for the services rendered. Each month, 
Carreras paid Freeman an amount equivalent to the total amount owing in relation to 
the invoices received for the previous month. This system worked well until Freeman 
had financial difficulties. Therefore, Carreras and Freeman agreed that a special 
account would be set up into which Carreras would deposit the moneys to pay the 
third parties. Funds were deposited and Freeman drew cheques on the account to pay 
the creditors. Freeman went into voluntary liquidation and the liquidator froze 
payment on the cheques prior to clearance. Peter Gibson J held that the funds in the 
account did not form part of Freeman’s or Carreras’ assets. However, this mode of 
legal analysis was flawed. The circumstances which arose in Carreras were different 
from the loan made by a lender in Quistclose or a segregation arrangement made by 
an owner of chattels in respect of the proceeds of sale. In Carreras, Carreras 
deposited money in the account so that Freeman could withdraw the funds or issue 
cheques to pay debts which were essentially owed by Carreras. As Carreras owed 
money to the third parties, it is fairly clear that as against the third parties, Carreras 
did not wish to retain an interest in it. Whether or not the third parties became 
insolvent, did not affect Carreras’ ultimate liability. The third parties, rather than 
Carreras, were the unsecured creditors. The account was set up in order to ensure that 
the funds did not become part of the general assets of Freeman. Therefore, whilst 
Freeman was not entitled to use the moneys as part of the general assets, there was 
no reason why the court could not have held that the beneficial interest resided in the 
third parties. If Carreras paid them directly, it would have been appropriate for the 
court to have ordered that the beneficial interest be repatriated to Carreras on the 
basis that the third parties had received payment twice.119
(e) Is the Specific Purpose Which is Attached to the Funds Indicative of a 
Trust?
It has been suggested that a trust arises where funds are transferred for a
120specific purpose. This proposition probably arose from the judgment of Lord
1 1 R
Ibid 223-224.
119 For analogous cases see Chapter 6, 271-272.
120 See generally, Chambers, above n 89, Chapter 3.
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Wilberforce himself in Quistclose, where he quoted with apparent approval the
1 99judgment of Abbott CJ in Toovey v Milne “ who said:
I thought at the trial, and still think, that the fair inference from the 
facts proved was that his money was advanced for a special purpose, 
and that being so clothed with a specific trust, no property in it passed 
to the assignee of the bankrupt. Then the purpose having failed, there 
is an implied stipulation, that the money shall be repaid. That has 
been done in the present case; and I am of opinion that that repayment
191was lawful, and that the nonsuit was right.
Lord Wilberforce stated:
The basis for the decision was thus clearly stated, viz., that the money 
advanced for the specific purpose did not become part of the 
bankrupt’s estate. 124
125His Lordship cited a variety of supporting subsequent authorities. Notwithstanding 
such authority, the concept of special purpose should be used most carefully.
The concept of special purpose on its own will not assist a court to establish 
whether the parties intended to treat the moneys in a way distinct from standard 
commercial norms. For example, there are many unsecured loans which are 
expressed to be made for specific personal and business purposes. Yet, it could not 
be said that the money which represents the loan or the asset subsequently purchased 
or substituted, is subject to a trust. What is required is evidence of the express 
intentions of the parties or their conduct which shows that the money was not only 
transferred for a specific purpose, but that specific purpose represented the limited 
commercial risk which the transferor was willing to take. Toovey v Milne and 
Quistclose can be analysed on the basis of this limited assumption of risk. The facts 
of Toovey v Milne were simple. The moneys were lent for the specific purpose of
121
121 [1970] AC 567.
122 (1819) 3 B & A 683; 106 ER 514.
Ibid 684; 515; See also Edwards v Glyn (1859) 2 El & El 29; 121 ER 12; Re Rogers; Ex parte 
Holland & Hannen (1891) 8 Morrell’s Reports o f Cases under the Bankruptcy Acts 1883 & 1890, 
243; Re Drucker (No 1), Ex parte Basden [1902] 2 KB 237; Re Watson; Ex parte Schipper (1912) 
107 LT 783.
124 [1970] AC 567, 580.
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assisting the bankrupt to pay out his creditors. When this did not (and apparently
could not) eventuate, then the potential limited risk came to an end. Abbott CJ said
that the property or title to the money did not pass to the insolvent. Title would not
have passed unless the limited conditions in which the risk of unsecured creditor
status occurred. So too, in Quistclose the lender had made it clear that it would
assume the risk of insolvency only in the event that the money which was deposited
in the account was used to pay dividends to shareholders. Otherwise, the risk of the
borrower’s insolvency would not be assumed. Thus, the concept of specific purpose
is simply an additional factor which will define the extent of risk assumed and
conditions under which the risk will be assumed. It does not, of itself, determine
whether title to the money has passed and whether there has been an assumption of
126risk. It appears that this is the situation in the United States.
Where a specific chattel has been transferred for sale, the fact that the chattel 
has been transferred specifically for the purpose of sale, does not of itself create a 
trust. It appears that the situation will be treated as a bailment, whether or not there is 
a specific purpose attached to the use or sale of the chattels. Indeed, there may be no 
special purpose attached to the chattel which is held by the recipient as bailee. When 
the goods are sold, the funds become part of the assets of the recipient, unless there 
are evident special arrangements between the parties the title of the money will pass 
to the recipient agent seller. Therefore, even though the sale proceeds are to be used 
for a specified purpose, such as the purchase of another chattel, this should not on its 
own be insufficient to create a trust over the funds which favours the owner of the 
original chattel.
3 Review
The express trust has been used in commercial transactions as a highly 
effective proprietary gateway where the parties in a commercial transaction did not 
envisage or accept that the debtor would acquire title to the money or the creditor 
would assume the potential risk of the debtor’s insolvency. Here, it is arguable that 
the trust is not operating in a context where one reposes reliance and confidence in 
another party - except perhaps where money is transferred for safekeeping. The 
express trust is a kind of bare trust with limited trustee powers “ used as a security
126 Chapter 4, 173-174.
127 For a description of the bare trust see Meagher and Gummow, above n 1, [318].
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device pursuant to which a commercial party undertakes a risk protection exercise. 
Thus, the line between the express trust and security devices which commentators 
insist upon128 is not so discernible in these kinds of cases. 129
However, the express trust has its limitations. There must be an intention to 
create a trust or conduct which manifests an intention to create a trust. Some well 
advised creditors will insist that written express trusts govern the commercial 
transactions. However, in many cases, commercial parties will not have the time to 
seek and implement such a sophisticated security arrangement. Courts will be left 
with the unenviable task of deciding whether or not the conduct of the parties 
sufficiently manifests an intention to deal with the transferred funds or sale proceeds 
contrary to commercial norms. Such an exercise can lead to the distortion of the 
concept of intention and result in doctrinal confusion. Moreover, not all commercial 
situations where a trust is claimed to exist can be explained on the basis of an 
intention (however broadly defined) to create a trust. Indeed, it can be argued that a 
plaintiff did wish the insolvent to have title to money.
Therefore, other equitable proprietary gateways have been adapted and 
expanded to meet claims for proprietary relief.
Ill No Express Intention or Manifestation of Intention to
Create a Trust
A Introduction
A difficult issue to determine is on what basis courts should intervene in 
commercial relationships where the parties have not actually intended or manifested 
an intention to alter commercial norms.
The following discussion highlights various methods which have been 
employed and suggested to deal with this problem. The advantages and 
disadvantages of these adaptations are discussed subsequently. It will be quickly 
appreciated that despite the different approaches which have been used (with varying 
success), they all have two common threads. First, courts and commentators have
1"8 Edward I Sykes and Sally Walker, The Law o f Securities (5th ed, 1993) 12. 
129 Bridge, above n 2, 355.
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taken traditional approaches to equitable proprietary interests and relief and built 
upon them. Positively speaking, they have expanded the potential use of these 
traditional proprietary gateways. However, such an expansion has been made at a 
price. Thus, the use of equitable proprietary gateways in this way has led to a 
considerable amount of doctrinal uncertainty. Secondly, the discussion of these 
proprietary gateways will indicate that risk assumption has been generally 
overlooked as a criterion, which may determine whether equitable proprietary relief 
should be available.
B Fiduciary Obligations
The equitable concept of fiduciary obligations has provided a ready gateway 
to proprietary relief. This is very understandable because the categories of fiduciary 
obligations are not closed and may arise in a variety of situations outside the 
standard nominate categories. 130 Fiduciary obligations have been found to exist 
between a government and indigenous people, 131 bankers and customers, 132 doctors 
and patients133 and parents and children. 134 Moreover, there are many cases of which 
Re Diplock135 is notable, which stand for the proposition that in order to sustain a 
claim for proprietary relief, a fiduciary relationship must be established. 136 Thus,
See generally Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41; 
LAC Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14; Hodgkinson v 
Simms [1994] 3 SCR 377; (1995) 117 DLR (4th) 161; Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71, 107 
(Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
131 Guerin v The Queen [1984] SCR 335; (1984) 13 DLR (4th) 321; R. v Sparrow [1990] 1 SCR 
1075; (1990) 70 DLR (4th) 385; Te Runanga o Wharekauri Rekoho Inc v Attorney-General [1993] 2 
NZLR 301; Mabo v Queensland (No 2) 175 CLR 1, 200-205 (Toohey J). For a criticism of the use of 
fiduciary law in this context see Professor P D Finn, ‘The Forgotten Trust: The People and the State’ 
in Malcolm Cope (ed), Equity: Issues and Trends (1995) 131, 136-138.
132 Commonwealth Bank v Smith (1991) 102 ALR 453. Note also Finn, above n 17, 11-12.
133 Norberg v Wynrib [1992] 2 SCR 226; (1992) 92 DLR (4th) 449; Mclnerney v MacDonald [1992] 
2 SCR 138; (1992) 93 DLR (4th) 415 cf Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71.
134 KM v HM [1992] 3 SCR 6; (1992) 96 DLR (4th) 289; H v  R [1996] 1 NZLR 299.
135 [1948] Ch 456.
136 See for example Carter v Long & Bisby (1896) 26 SCR 430; Re Wayne Coal Co Ltd; Schultz’s 
Case (1920) 55 DLR 327; Allen v O ’Hearn & Co [1935] 3 DLR 584; affd [1937] AC 213; [1937] 1 
DLR 17; Szczepkowski v Eppler [1946] 3 DLR 641; Re The Bergethaler Waisemant; Re Fehr [1947] 
2 DLR 234; Re Hartney Co (1959) Ltd and Freed (1962) 4 CBR (NS) 71; Steffanson v Jaasma and 
Jaasma [1976] 4 WWR 449.
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commentators have tried to discern the essential qualities of this elusive, but
137powerful, equitable relationship - some more convincingly than others.
However, the problem has been that courts have been more interested in 
accessing the proprietary potential of fiduciary obligations without attending to the 
fact that the relationship between the parties did not warrant and could not warrant 
the imposition of a fiduciary obligation. This has been the case even where, 
arguably, the plaintiff did not assume the risk of the defendant’s insolvency.
In Sinclair v Brougham ( ‘Sinclair’) ,139 which has been overruled by the 
House of Lords in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London 
Borough Council ( ‘Westdeutsche’) , 140 a building society received deposits from 
members and non-members of the society. The deposit was ultra vires in relation to 
non-members. Lord Parker’s judgment in this case rested on the recognition of 
fiduciary obligations existing between depositors of moneys deposited ultra vires 
and the directors of the society. Therefore, he held that the remaining assets were 
distributable amongst the members and non-members rateably. 141 Lord Parker’s 
‘discovery’ of fiduciary obligations in the situation has been queried because it was 
not clear why the directors owed fiduciary obligations to such depositors. 142 In
See for example Finn, above n 17, 5; PD Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T G Youdan (ed), 
Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (1989) 1; Austin W Scott, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ (1949) 37 
California Law Review 539; Ernest J Weinrib, ‘The Fiduciary Obligation’ (1975) 25 University of 
Toronto Law Journal 1; JC Shepherd, ‘Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships’ 
(1981) 97 The Law Quarterly Review 51; Tamar Frankel, ‘Fiduciary Law’, (1983) 71 California Law 
Review 795; Tamar Frankel, ‘Fiduciary Relationship in the United States Today’ in DWM Waters 
(ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts 1993 (1993) 173; JR Maurice Gautreau, ‘Demistyfing the 
Fiduciary Mystique’ (1989) 68 The Canadian Bar Review 1; John Glover, above n 17, Chapters 1-3; 
John Glover, ‘Wittgenstein and the Existence of Fiduciary Relationships: Notes Towards a New 
Methodology’ (1995) 18 The University of New South Wales Law Journal 443; Patrick Parkinson, 
‘Fiduciary Obligations’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The Principles of Equity, (1996) 325.
138 See Malcolm Cope, Proprietary Claims and Remedies (1997) 99.
139 [1914] AC 398.
140 [1996] AC 669, 709-711 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
141 [1914] AC 398, 445-448.
142 See for example Lord Goff of Chieveley and Gareth Jones, The Law of Restitution (4 ed, 1993) 
84; Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, above n 46, [505]; cf Legatt LJ in Westdeutsche Landesbank 
Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1994] 1 WLR 938, 953.
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comparison, Lord Haldane143 and Lord Dunedin144 held that the circumstances had 
not created such a fiduciary relationship.
The trend to utilise fiduciary obligations as a means of justifying proprietary 
relief is also illustrated in Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-British Bank (London) 
Ltd ( ‘Chase ) .145 The plaintiff bank paid over $2 million to another bank in New 
York for account to the defendant bank which carried on business in London. The 
defendant went into liquidation and the question was whether the plaintiff could 
recover $2 million from the defendant. Goulding J held that the plaintiff could do so 
where money was paid under factual mistake. He held that the plaintiff retained an 
equitable proprietary interest in that money and the defendant was subject to a 
fiduciary duty in respect of the money.146 In finding that a mistaken payment created 
a fiduciary relationship between the two banks, Goulding J had given the mistaken 
payer an opportunity to utilise the traditional tracing rules and recoup the moneys. At 
the time of the case, the remedial constructive trust was not judicially recognised and 
utilised in English courts in comparison to their American counterparts.147 Thus, 
Goulding J felt compelled to characterise a relationship between two large corporate 
banks as fiduciary - notwithstanding the fact that there was clearly no duty of loyalty 
or special relationship of trust and confidence between them. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that in Westdeutsche Lord Browne-Wilkinson reinterpreted the case as 
an example of the potential operation of the remedial constructive trust.149
The existence of fiduciary obligations may also be used to access the rules in 
Barnes v Addy. In such a case, not only is the concept of fiduciary obligations 
distorted, but the concept of notice is expanded to include notions of constructive
143 [1914] AC 398,421-424.
144 Ibid 436-438.
145
[1981] Ch 105. See also English v Dedham Vale Properties Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 382.
146 Ibid 120; Note also Goodbody v Bank of Montreal (1974) 47 DLR (3d) 335.
147 CiRe Berry 147 F 208 (2nd Cir, 1906).
148 [1996] AC 669.
149 Ibid 714-715.
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notice. Here fiduciary obligations are used as a means of re-allocating risk to a third 
party who has sufficient knowledge of the insolvent’s unconscionable conduct. 150
The attractiveness of a fiduciary characterisation has dimmed in recent years. 
There are two reasons. First, judges151 and commentators152 have drawn attention to 
this misuse of the fiduciary obligations. In Breen v Williams, the High Court of 
Australia held that whilst a medical practitioner did owe certain equitable obligations 
to a patient, such a patient could not rely on fiduciary obligations between doctor 
and patient to access medical records. 154 The patient did not have a proprietary 
interest in the records and was unable to rely on fiduciary law in order to assert a 
proprietary interest in them. Gaudron and McHugh JJ also warned against the 
insensitive overuse of fiduciary obligations:
many of the Canadian cases pay insufficient, if any, regard to the fact 
that the imposition of fiduciary duties often gives rise to proprietary 
remedies that affect the distribution of assets in bankruptcies and
, • 155insolvencies.
See for example, Westpac Banking Corporation v Savin [1985] 2 NZLR 41; Lankshear v ANZ 
Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd [1993] 1 NZLR 481.
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This has resulted in the Court adopting a proscriptive approach rather than the wider 
prescriptive approach which is dominant in Canada, 156 particularly where the concept 
of fiduciary obligations is used to access property rights.
Secondly, in the light of the doctrinal difficulties, the imposition of the 
remedial constructive trust has support at various levels in a number of jurisdictions. 
In the United States it can be said that the remedial constructive trust was embraced 
earlier than in other common law jurisdictions. The imposition of the constructive 
trust was not always predicated on the existence of a pre-existing fiduciary 
obligation. Rather, it arose and still arises in response to certain kinds of events such 
as theft, 157 misrepresentation158 and mistake. 159 The general scenario appears to be 
that the party is able to factually trace the funds. Thereafter, a constructive trust is 
imposed upon the funds. 160 In contradistinction, the situation in Chase 61 was quite 
different. The fiduciary obligation was imposed in order to enable the payer to access 
tracing and the proprietary remedy of the institutional constructive trust. The former 
situation represents an extension of the constructive trust beyond its institutionalised 
bounds. The latter situation was simply a creation of a fictional pattern which 
reflected and superficially conformed to traditional norms. In recent times, the 
Canadian courts have rejected the necessity of a pre-existing fiduciary obligation in 
favour of the remedial constructive trust. This trend has become apparent in
156 Note Frame v Smith [1987] 2 SCR 790; (1987) 42 DLR (4th) 81. For a helpful discussion o f the 
differences between the proscriptive and the prescriptive approaches see Patrick Parkinson, 
‘Fiduciary Law and Access to Medical Records: Breen v Williams' [1995] 17 The Sydney Law Review 
432, 440-443.
157 Peters v Carr 654 SW (2d) 317 (Mo App, 1983). In relation to embezzling agents see Mickelson v 
Barnet 460 NE (2d) 566 (Mass SC, 1984). See generally 89 CJS Trusts § 146.
158 Scheidelman v Castle 496 NYS (2d) 111 (SC, 1985).In relation to fraud and misrepresentation see 
Scott and Fratcher above n 7, vol V § 468-47land 89 CJS Trusts § 145-146.
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Lamkin v Hill 419 A (2d) 1077 (SC New Hampshire, 1980) 1; Re Mahan & Rowsey Inc 817 F 
(2d) 682 (10th Cir, 1987). In relation to mistake see Scott and Fratcher above n 7, vol V §465-467, 
§472-473 and 89 CJS Trusts § 143.
160 See Meagher and Gummow, above n 1, [1310].
161 Chase Manhattan BankNA v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd [1981] Ch 105.
162 See generally Pettkus v Becker [1980] 2 SCR 834; (1980) 117 DLR (3d) 257. Note also Simpson- 
Sears Ltd v Fraser (1974) 54 DLR (3d) 225; BC Teachers’ Credit Union v Betterly (1975) 61 DLR 
(3d) 755. For a good general discussion see Peter D Maddaugh and John D McCamus, The Law of 
Restitution (1990) 140-141. In relation to fraud see Re Blackhawk Downs Inc and Arnold (1972) 38 
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Australia as well. In England, there is authority which suggests that the 
constructive trust was available to remedy fraud without the necessity for a pre­
existing fiduciary obligation. 164 Moreover, it is clear that the analysis provided by 
Goulding J in Chase has been rejected by the House of Lords, 165 and the remedial 
constructive trust could become a carefully utilised device. 166 This is discussed 
below. 167
Therefore, the use of fiduciary obligations as a means of justifying a 
proprietary result is no longer acceptable. It is a fiction because in some cases there 
is no relationship of trust or confidence. Courts are able to sidestep (or limit) 
discussion of the fundamental issue of why proprietary relief should be countenanced 
in a debtor-creditor relationship.
The traditional veneer has another unwelcome effect. Because the cases 
which utilise the fiduciary obligation in this fashion, do not in fact fall within general 
doctrine or academic theory of fiduciary obligations they are treated as odd or 
unusual. Thus, they are relegated to a discussion of atypical or singular 
applications of fiduciary obligations. Yet, these cases are neither unusual nor 
singular. In truth, they represent a growing trend in which courts exercising equitable 
jurisdiction have been and are willing to intervene in commercial relationships in 
certain circumstances and on certain conditions. By explaining the cases as examples 
of unusual fiduciary obligations, the courts have not only utilised an inappropriate 
proprietary gateway, but they have unnecessarily concealed what is happening in our 
legal system.
163
163 Muschinski v Dodds (1986) 160 CLR 583. Note also Australian Postal Corporation v Lutak 
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C Resulting Trusts
Another traditional proprietary gateway is the resulting trust. The situations 
where a resulting trust arises has been discussed elsewhere. 169 It will be recalled that 
one of the interpretations of the resulting trust is that it is based on an absence of 
intention to vest the beneficial interest in the recipient of the property. This definition 
has formed the foundation of an attempt to expand and utilise the resulting trust as 
the dominant proprietary device which would regulate commercial transactions in 
insolvency situations. The nucleus of this idea was formulated by Birks and was
171later refined by Chambers.
The utilisation of the resulting trust has been more discernible in England
J 7 0
than in other jurisdictions such as Australia. " No doubt also, Birks and Chambers 
have been influenced by Viscount Haldane LC in Sinclair. Although, Viscount 
Haldane’s reasons for finding that a proprietary interest existed is far from clear, 174 
he held that a resulting trust vested the equitable interest in the depositors. 175 
Chambers has stated:
The role of intention in resulting trusts is a negative one. The primary 
question is always whether the provider intended to benefit the 
recipient and not whether he or she intended to create a trust. The 
latter question is relevant, of course, to whether the provider has 
succeeded in creating an express trust, but its relevance to the 
resulting trust is only as an indication of a lack of intention to benefit 
the recipient. Although a resulting trust may be identical to an 
express trust which the provider intended, but failed, to create, this is
169 Chapter 2, 56-60.
170 Peter BH Birks, ‘Restitution and Resulting Trusts’ in Stephen Goldstein (ed), Equity and 
Contemporary Legal Developments (1992) 335.
171 Chambers, above n 89. Note also in this context Helen Norman, ‘Tracing the Proceeds of Crime: 
an Inequitable Solution?’ in Peter Birks (ed), Laundering and Tracing (1995) 95, 102 and 
Worthington, above n 5, Chapter 7.
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” Pettit v Pettit [1970] AC 777; Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886; Waters, above n 1, 357-361.
173 [1914] AC 398.
1 74
Re Diplock [1948] Ch 465, 540-541; Chambers, above n 89, 156-157; Goff and Jones, above n 
142,83-84.
175 Sinclair v Brougham [1914] AC 398,421.
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fortuitous because the facts which gave rise to a resulting trust and 
define its content (the unjust enrichment of the recipient) are different 
from those which create and define an express trust (the intentional
176actions of the settlor).
In so arguing, Chambers has made a number of assumptions about the nature of 
intention, traditional resulting trusts, the nexus between the resulting trust and the 
law of restitution and the nature of commercial relationships.
First, Chambers relied on a notion of intention which is difficult to define. It 
may be a difficult task to confirm that there has been an absence of intention where 
the factors which may give rise to intention are broad and varied. It is also 
conceptually unsatisfying to develop a trust regime in which trusts arise by virtue of 
intention to retain an equitable interest and by virtue of an absence of intention to 
transfer title to money.
Secondly, even if the concept of absence of intention was accepted as the 
qualifying factor, it was by no means clear that the traditional resulting trust was 
always based on the absence of intention. There have been other interpretations of 
the conceptual raison d ’etre of the resulting trust such as what is the presumed 
intention of a party or the common intention of the parties. Moreover, there are 
many cases which Chambers located as examples of a resulting trust operating 
sometimes in a disguised fashion, which can be explained satisfactorily on the basis 
of other equitable principles such as undue influence (or duress) , 179 or mutual 
intention to create an express trust. 180
Thirdly, a strict application of the absence of intention test does not provide 
the proprietary tool for which Chambers hoped. Chambers has argued that a wide 
range of situations where there has been vitiated intention (such as where there is a
176 Chambers, above n 89, 222.
177 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669, 708 
(Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
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CLR 242, 251 (Gibbs CJ); Waters, above n 1, 357-361; cf Chambers, above n 89, 36.
179 See the cases discussed in Chambers, above n 89, 139-142.
180 See generally Part II of this Chapter.
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mistake) or qualified intention (or intention conditioned on the happening of 
events which do not occur) " can be explained on the basis of an absence of 
intention to benefit the other party. Yet, this is far from an accurate understanding of 
the situation. When a party transfers money to another on the basis of a mistake 
which is discovered later, that party generally intends to transfer title to the 
transferees. It has been this point in relation to intention that Chambers’ thesis has 
unravelled.
Fourthly, Chambers co-joined the operation of the resulting trust and the law 
of restitution (or more properly subtractive enrichment). He argued that the resulting 
trust and the law of restitution historically followed a similar trend, namely,183
the recognition of unjust enrichment as the generic event to which the
common law obligation and the resulting trust each respond.184
In a seminal article on the resulting trust, Swadling argued convincingly that the 
resulting trust had little historical relationship with the law of restitution He pointed 
out that the absence of intention was not the critical factor which underlined or ought 
to underline equitable intervention where the law of restitution is concerned.185
Swadling’s concerns were reviewed in Westdeutsche,186 The plaintiff bank 
and the defendant local authority entered into a ten year interest rate swap.187 Under 
the swap, interest payments were payable on a half yearly basis and the plaintiff 
agreed to pay the local authority a lump sum of £2.5 million as the first fixed rate 
payment. The local authority made a series of payments. It was held in earlier 
decisions that it was beyond the power of local authorities to enter into interest rate
181
181 Chambers, above n 89, 125-132.
182
" Ibid Chapter 6.
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Ibid 223.
184 Ibid.
185 William Swadling, ‘A New Role for Resulting Trusts?’ (1996) 16 Legal Studies 110. Note also 
Andrew Burrows, ‘Swaps and the Friction between Common Law and Equity’ [1995] Restitution 
Law Review 15.
186 [1996] 2 AC 669.
187 For a discussion of interest rate swaps see Nasser Saber, Interest Rate Swaps: Valuation, Trading 
and Processing (1994); Clive Grumball, Managing Interest Rate Risk (1987) Chapter 3.
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swap arrangements. Such an agreement was ultra vires their powers. The plaintiff 
bank, having recovered an amount which represented the initial payment less the 
amounts paid by the local authority, sought to recover compound interest on that 
sum. The trial judge held that the bank was entitled to do so189 and the Court of 
Appeal dismissed the appeal of the local authority. 190 Dillon LJ held that a resulting 
trust operated191 and the appropriate award was compound interest. 192
The House of Lords reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal. It held that 
the plaintiff had only a personal action based on total failure of consideration and it 
was not appropriate for the bank to obtain compound interest. 193 Some of Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson’s objections to the operation of the resulting trust were based on 
broader notions of how trusts work. These are considered below. 194 However, he 
endorsed Swadling’s contention that a presumption of a resulting trust was rebuttable 
by any inconsistent intention. 195 Lord Goff (who dissented in relation to other 
matters) accepted Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s view that the imposition of the resulting 
trust was inconsistent with traditional trust principles. 196 Moreover, Lord Goff 
opined that in such ultra vires cases, there was a clear intention at the time the 
transaction took place, that the title to the money should pass to the recipient. 197 It
1 QÄcan be added that the general nature of money as a negotiable commodity 
necessitated the conclusion that title to the money passed to the recipient.
188
188 See for example, Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [1992] 2 AC 1.
189 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council (1993) 91 LGR 323.
190 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1994] 1 WLR 938.
191 Ibid 947; cf the judgement of Legatt LJ at 952-953 based on fiduciary obligations.
192 Ibid 948-951 (Dillon J); 953-955 (Legatt LJ).
193 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669, 717 
(Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
194 Below, 129-131.
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Fifthly, just as Chambers embraced the concept of the absence of intention as 
the underlying and infusing equitable intervention, Chambers has rejected serious 
consideration of the other explanations for the intervention of equity. He dismissed 
(too swiftly in the author’s opinion) the notion of the assumption risk as the central 
factor which should be considered when considering the intervention of equity in 
commercial transactions.1"  He also rejected considerations of whether at the time of 
the transaction, there was evidence of the recipient’s imminent insolvency.200
Finally, Chambers’ theory was used to explain such situations as where there 
was a mistaken payment,201 ultra vires transactions202 or failure of consideration.203 
However, he faced difficulties applying the resulting trust to situations which he 
identified as wrongs, most notably the wrongful conduct of the trustee such as in the 
making of an unauthorised profit.204 He argued that these situations do not attract the 
resulting trust. Rather, the wrong was the primary event and the response is the 
institutional constructive trust. In this respect, Chambers’ topography reflected 
Birks' work in the area.206 The consequence of the approach was that Chambers has 
created a bifurcated system of trusts based on whether the circumstances were unjust 
enrichment by subtraction or wrongdoing.
The problem with Chambers’ approach was that he failed to appreciate that 
the concept of ‘wrongdoing’ or unconscionable conduct has always been broad and 
has broadened in recent decades to encompass the wrongful retention of money 
outside breaches of fiduciary obligations. Therefore, the concept of
199 Chambers, above n 89, 235.
200 Ibid 236.
201 Ibid 125-132.
202 Ibid 123-125.
203 Ibid 154-163.
204 Ibid 230.
205 Ibid.
206 See for example Birks, above n 170. 
207 See Chapter 5, 189-193.
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unconscionable conduct encompasses the traditional area of common law counts for 
money had and received208 and the kinds of cases which has Chambers discussed.
D Subrogation
Connected with the view that the way to solve proprietary problems is to 
utilise pre-existing legal mechanisms, has been the suggestion that there is scope for 
the development of a broadened notion of subrogation. This suggestion has arisen in 
the context of the possible proprietary mechanisms which are open to plaintiffs 
bringing an action based on restitution. This is another example of an attempt to 
appropriate an equitable mechanism with proprietary effect to the armoury of 
restitution. 209
210Mitchell has advanced the most comprehensive thesis in this regard. He 
has argued that there are two forms of subrogation. There is simple subrogation. 
This kind of subrogation operates to transfer subsisting rights of action from one 
party to another such as in insurance cases. The second form of subrogation is 
‘reviving’ subrogation. In this situation, a third party makes a payment to the security 
holder which discharges the security. However, the security ‘revives’ in response to 
unjust enrichment in such situations as legal compulsion, in which the party which
213was primarily liable has obtained a benefit at the expense of a third party.
In Banque Financiere de la Cite v Parc (Battersea) Ltd (Banque 
Financiere) 2 14 the House of Lords endorsed the operation of subrogation as a 
restitutionary remedy. What essentially occurred was that the plaintiff lender paid 
out, in part, the obligations the defendant owed to a first chargee. The plaintiff did 
not contemplate that the defendant would provide security. However, the plaintiff did
908
Muschinski v Dodds (1986) 160 CLR 583, 619-620 (Deane J).
209 See Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law o f Restitution (1985) 93-98; Andrew Burrows, The 
Law o f Restitution (1993) 76-93.
210 Charles Mitchell, The Law o f Subrogation (1994).
211 Ibid 5.
212 Ibid Chapter 6.
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obtain a letter by the corporate group’s general manager that the groups would not 
demand repayment of loans made to the borrowing company until the plaintiff was 
paid out. Another company in the group, Omnicorp Overseas Ltd (‘OOL’) was a 
second chargee. The group collapsed. The question was whether, as against OOL, 
the plaintiff had an effective proprietary interest. The House of Lords held that 
subrogation was a remedial response to unjust enrichment. It was clear that there was 
no common intention between OOL and the defendant that OOL would access the 
pre-existing security. But, this did not preclude subrogation being used as a 
restitutionary remedy.“ OOL would be unjustly enriched if it were permitted to take 
priority over the plaintiff. The plaintiff had made the repayment on the mistaken
217belief that is would take priority over all other members of the corporate group. 
Lord Hoffman said:
subrogation is not a right or cause of action but an equitable remedy 
against a party who would otherwise be unjustly enriched. It is a 
means by which the court regulates the legal relationships between a 
plaintiff and a defendant or defendants in order to prevent unjust 
enrichment. When judges say that the charge is ‘kept alive’ for the 
benefit of the plaintiff, what they mean is that his legal relations with 
a defendant who would otherwise be unjustly enriched are regulated 
as i f  the benefit of the charge had been assigned to him. It does not by 
any means follow that the plaintiff must for all purposes be treated as 
an actual assignee of the benefit of the charge and, in particular, that
he would be so treated in relation to someone who would not be
218unjustly enriched.
In effect, an in personam action gave rise to an in personam remedy which had a 
proprietary effect.219
However, the potential utilisation of subrogation is limited. It must not be 
forgotten that the traditional view is that a party only acquires rights to which the 
paid out party is entitled. If there is no pre-existing security, then it is difficult to
215 Ibid 483 (Lord Hoffman with whom Lord Steyn, Lord Griffiths and Lord Clyde agreed).
216 Ibid 483-485 (Lord Hoffman).
“17 Ibid 486 (Lord Hoffman).
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argue that the doctrine of subrogation will operate. In Banque Financiere, the pre­
existing charge was an important factor in utilising subrogation. Thus, if there had 
been no charge, but simply a letter, the plaintiff would not have acquired personal 
relief against OOL with proprietary consequences. Here, it appears odd that the pre­
existence of a security was crucial in determining whether the plaintiff was entitled 
to proprietary relief.
Moreover, subrogation operates in those commercial situations where a party 
pays out the debts or liabilities of another. In any form, whether the traditional 
approach or Mitchell’s expanded version, it will not assist in bilateral commercial 
situations. Therefore, there is the possibility that a proprietary topography could 
develop based on resulting trusts for bilateral commercial relationships and on 
subrogation based for trilateral relationships. The ultimate issue will be - whether it 
is necessary to utilise these separate equitable devices to deal with these different 
situations? It is arguable that to do so would create unnecessary confusion.
E The Constructive Trust - An Approach Based on a Tainted Conscience
The final adaptation of the equitable devices considered in the previous
chapter is the constructive trust based on a tainted conscience. The institutional
221 222constructive trust developed as a response to the breach of fiduciary obligations,
knowing receipt of trust property " or knowing assistance in the breach of fiduciary 
duty.224 In each of these cases, the tainted conscience of the wrongdoer has been an 
instrumental factor giving rise to the imposition of the constructive trust.
220
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In Westdeutsche, Lord Browne-Wilkinson set out what he considered to be 
the basis upon which equity operated:
(i) Equity operates on the conscience of the owner of the legal 
interest...
(ii) Since the equitable jurisdiction to enforce trusts depends upon the 
conscience of the holder of the legal interest being affected, he cannot 
be a trustee of the property if and so long as he is ignorant of the facts 
alleged to affect his conscience, ie until he is aware that he intended to 
hold the property for the benefit of others in the case of an express or 
implied trust, or, in the case of a constructive trust, of the factors 
which are alleged to affect his conscience.226
He held that a constructive trust may arise when the conscience of the recipient is 
tainted at the time of the receipt or soon after the receipt. However, in Westdeutsche 
a constructive trust had not arisen. At the time of the receipt of the funds which were 
the subject of the swap agreement, the council was not aware that the swap was ultra 
vires its powers. Moreover, he overruled Sinclair and explained Chase on the 
basis that whilst the bank did not know of the mistaken payment at the time of 
receipt, it became aware of the mistake two days afterwards.229 Thereafter, Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson described the future remedial constructive trust in the following 
terms:
225
Although the resulting trust is an unsuitable basis for developing 
proprietary restitutionary remedies, the remedial constructive trust, if 
introduced into English law, may provide a more satisfactory road 
forward. The court by way of remedy might impose a constructive 
trust on a defendant who knowingly retains property of which the 
plaintiff has been unjustly deprived. Since the remedy can be tailored 
to the circumstances of the particular case, innocent third parties 
would not be prejudiced and restitutionary defences, such as change
230of position, are capable of being given effect.
225
226
227
228
229
230
[1996] AC 669.
Ibid 705.
Ibid 710.
Ibid 715.
Ibid.
Ibid 716; see also Cope, above n 138,94-95.
130
In addition, Lord Browne-Wilkinson emphasised the need for specifically
231identifiable property. This issue is considered in Chapter 4.
Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s approach to the problem he faced in Westdeutsche 
is understandable in the light of equitable jurisprudence, even if ultimately, it is 
flawed and impractical. He drew on a tradition of equity which does constrain parties 
who have knowledge of factors which should affect their conscience. The tradition
233is a strong one and sustains such principles as breach of fiduciary obligations, the 
rules in Barnes v Addy, unconscionable dealings and undue influence. 
However, his interpretation of the concept of unconscionable conduct was unduly 
narrow and did not accord with the way in which equity has developed. Suffice to 
say at this stage, that the concept of unconscionable conduct (or unjust enrichment 
which has been developed in other jurisdictions) has taken into account not only 
whether there was a tainted conscience at the commencement of the transaction and 
receipt of funds, but also whether there are intervening circumstances which lead to 
the conclusion that it is improper for the recipient to retain them. Understandably,
231 Ibid 705.
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restitution lawyers who seek to link the law restitution to proprietary relief have 
criticised the judgement of Lord Browne-Wilkinson as well.
Another practical criticism of the judgment is the temporal limitation on the 
effectiveness of the knowledge requirement. The reason for this approach is to ensure 
that there is stability in commercial dealings and that a plaintiff does not acquire a 
proprietary interest months, and sometimes years, after the happening of the event. A 
more appropriate manner of dealing with the situation would be to permit actions 
untrammelled by considerations of time. However, an action would be subject to an
239equitable defence of laches.
The judgment of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche represented an 
unpolished response to the issue of proprietary interests in commercial non-fiduciary 
relationships. The emphasis on the conscience of the defendant solely at the time of 
receipt did not encompass the broadened concept of unconscionable conduct which 
is alive in equity jurisprudence today. Equally, it did not identify and apply an 
underlying modem criterion for equitable intervention - whether the plaintiff 
assumed the risk of being an unsecured creditor.
IV Conclusion - Limitations of the Adaptation of Existing
Mechanisms
The previous discussion has highlighted the problems which have arisen in 
relation to the adaptation, or proposed adaptation, of traditional proprietary gateways 
to accommodate new situations which arise in commercial relationships. In each of 
the situations, the difficulties which have arisen have included the stretching of 
criteria (arguably beyond recognition) in the case of intention to create an express 
trust, distortion of traditional doctrines, such as in the case of fiduciary obligations 
and the advocacy of the use of a proprietary mechanism beyond its original 
application, such as in the case of the resulting trust.
238
Peter Birks, ‘Equity in the Modem Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’ (1996) 26 The University o f  
Western Australia Law Review 1, 92-96; Peter Birks, ‘Trusts Raised to Reverse Unjust Enrichment: 
The Westdeutsche Case’ [1996] Restitution Law Review 3; Chambers, above n 89, 157-163; 
Worthington, above n 5, Addendum, vii-xxiv.
“39 Lindsay Petroleum Co v Hurd (1874) LR 5 PC 221; Orr v Ford (1989) 167 CLR 316. For a 
discussion o f the modem law of laches see Michael Spence, ‘Equitable Defences’ in Patrick 
Parkinson (ed), The Principles o f Equity (1996) 939, [2918]-[2926].
132
However, the most severe criticism must be reserved for the bases for 
equitable intervention in Part III. Each demonstrates a limited understanding of the 
fundamental nature of equity and when equity will intervene in commercial 
relationships. The implementation and advocacy of these gateways has been at the 
expense of an appreciation of what the concept of unconscionability means. In the 
case of the extended application of fiduciary obligations, subrogation and resulting 
trusts, the fundamental concept of unconscionability has been essentially ignored. In 
the Westdeutsche case, the concept of unconscionable conduct was narrowly 
construed. Without an appreciation of the concept of unconscionability, the 
development of equitable proprietary intervention will remain unsatisfactory.
There has been insufficient acknowledgment that equity is being asked to 
intervene in what are essentially commercial transactions. If the notion of lack of risk 
assumption can be used to explain equitable intervention in undue influence cases, 
fiduciary obligations, express trusts and subrogation, it is possible that the risk 
assumption can determine and justify equitable intervention in other commercial 
situations.
Before discussing assumption of risk further, it is necessary to consider the 
second factor which has muddied the proverbial waters. When undertaking the 
adaptation and extension of equitable proprietary gateways, courts and commentators 
have insisted on a pre-existing proprietary base. In the following chapter, the effect 
of the specific asset requirement and the breakdown of the requirement will be 
examined. It will be argued that the specific asset requirement is no longer a helpful 
or constructive measure of equitable intervention.
133
Chapter 4
FROM THE PROPRIETARY BASE REQUIREMENT TO THE 
SWOLLEN ASSETS THEORY
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I Introduction
The discussion in the preceding chapters has shown that equity has developed 
a number of proprietary mechanisms some of which have been adapted for the 
primary purpose of utilising their proprietary and security function.
Apparently, common to the operation of these mechanisms has been the pre­
existence of specific property or a proprietary base. The argument is that without the 
existence of the proprietary base, there is no proprietary interest in or over property. 
This proposition is very attractive - if only superficially so. After all, how can one 
have a proprietary interest in property which is neither specific nor ascertainable? It 
just does not stand up to logic. Therefore, the pre-existence of a proprietary base 
which encapsulates specific assets is absolutely necessary as a pre-condition for 
proprietary relief.
The problem with this approach is that there has been a considerable over­
emphasis on the practical need for a proprietary base at the expense of determining 
the underlying rationale for equitable intervention. Instead, it has been shown that 
assumption of risk is becoming the primary criterion for equitable intervention in 
commercial situations. Co-existent with the ascendancy of the assumption of risk, the 
need for a proprietary base is undergoing considerable re-adjustment. Thus, there is a 
slow, but evident, move away ffom the requirement of a proprietary base to an 
evaluation of whether a party could be expected to assume the risk of being an 
unsecured creditor.
II Proprietary Base Theory
The basic proposition of proprietary base theory is that a plaintiff must be 
able to point to the asset in dispute in a segregated, substituted or intermixed form. 
Birks states in relation to restitution:
The only satisfactory basis for raising a restitutionary proprietary right 
in the assets in which, by substitutions and intermixtures, the original 
enrichment now survives is as follows: the circumstances of the 
original receipt by the defendant must be such that, either at law or in 
equity, the plaintiff retained or obtained the property in the matter 
received by the defendant, and then continued to retain it until the 
moment at which the substitution or intermixture took place...where 
the defendant receives an enrichment which, apart from the 
substitutions and intermixtures, would have continued to belong to the 
plaintiff, the law can raise a new restitutionary right in rem in the
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different assets in which the original receipt is represented at the time 
of the claim...The phrase ‘proprietary base’ is used to capture this 
idea: if he wishes to assert a right in rem in the surviving enrichment, 
the plaintiff must show that at the beginning of the story he had a 
proprietary right in the subject-matter, and that nothing other than 
substitutions or intermixtures happened to deprive him of that right in
lrem.
2This view has had considerable support. The proprietary base theory has merit 
because it requires the plaintiff to prove continued existence of the asset (in whatever 
form) which is subject of the dispute. Therefore, arguably, it creates a degree of 
legal certainty.
However, in creating such certainty, the proprietary base theory (particularly 
in extreme versions) has emphasised that the finding of the proprietary base (via 
common following and tracing rules in particular) is simply a mechanical process to 
find the ‘thing’. Smith has stated that
even though legal rules are inevitably involved, the exercise of tracing 
is nonetheless just that: an exercise or process which is preliminary to 
the making of the claim. An analogy may be drawn with a plaintiff 
who wishes to prove a claim in breach of contract. Such a plaintiff 
must show that there was a contract. This is done by proving certain 
facts, such that the application to those facts of the rules of contract 
formation leads to the conclusion that a contract was formed. Proving 
that a contract was formed is not a right, nor a remedy; it does not 
establish liability. It is just something which one is at liberty to do.
But some causes of action, such as the one for breach of contract, 
depend on the successful exercise of that liberty.1 23
Such an argument is unconvincing. Even the most mechanical legal process is 
motivated by and contains inherent values. In the case of equitable tracing, the values
1 Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law o f Restitution (1985) 378-379.
2
See for example RM Goode, ‘The Right to Trace and Its Impact in Commercial Transactions’ 
(1976) 92 The Law Quarterly Review, 359 and 528; RM Goode, ‘Property and Unjust Enrichment’ in 
Andrew Burrows (ed), Essays on the Law o f Restitution (1991) 215; Robert Chambers, Resulting 
Trusts (1997) 146-147, 234; Lionel D. Smith, The Law o f Tracing (1997) 300; Malcolm Cope, 
Proprietary Claims and Remedies (1997) Chapter 2. Note also the reasoning and outcome in Mac- 
Jordan Construction Ltd v Brookmount Erostin Ltd (In Receivership) [1992] BCLC 350.
3 Smith, above n 2, 11; see also Boscawen v Bajwa [1996] 1 WLR 328, 334 (Millett LJ).
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are open and transparent - the protection of parties who repose trust and confidence 
and do not assume the risk of the fiduciary’s wrongdoing.4 It is submitted that the 
reason why the characterisation of equitable tracing as a process is attractive to 
Smith is that he is able to disengage tracing from its essentially equitable origins and 
portray it as a neutral and non-equitable exercise. He argues, inter alia, that the pre­
existence of fiduciary relationship is not necessary to utilise tracing.5 Smith redefines 
tracing as essentially a common law process with proprietary consequences which is 
available to redress unjust enrichment (restitutionary claims) and wrongdoing.6 Thus, 
Smith re-attaches the equitable tracing process to claims and causes of action which 
essentially conform to Birks' topology of restitution.7 Whilst this is a convenient 
outcome for restitution lawyers, it is an inaccurate picture of equitable tracing as a 
response to fiduciary wrongdoing. This is symptomatic of the attempts of restitution 
lawyers to appropriate equity’s proprietary mechanisms as remedies for personal 
actions.8
Ill Mechanical Process under Transition 
A Introduction
Increasingly, the capacity to meet the proprietary base requirement is 
becoming more difficult. Therefore, a trust application of the proprietary base 
requirement has been relaxed in the light of the fungible nature and negotiable 
function of money. For example, equity has loosened its interpretation of the well 
known requirement that in trust law there must be certainty of subject matter.9 The 
criterion is satisfied where a declaration of trust is made in respect of a portion of
4
For example, Australian Securities Commission v Melbourne Asset Management Nominees Pty Ltd 
(1994) 49 FCR334.
5 Smith, above n 2, 120-130.
6 Ibid 291-299.
7 Birks, above n 1, 106-107.
g
See generally, Chapter 3.
9 Knight v Knight (1840) 3 Beav 148; 49 ER 58.
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shares which are fungible10 or where there is an express written intention to create a 
trust without any requirement to segregate funds in a separate bank account. 11
An analysis of recent decisions on common law following and equitable 
tracing best illustrates the erosion of proprietary base theory.
B Following and Tracing
The requirement for the identifiability of a res (an inherently common law 
requirement) began to break down when the bases for both the common law and 
equitable tracing rules were developed. 13 This process continues. 14
1 Common Law Following
Common law following requires that the precise asset (or fund) or substituted 
asset (or fund) be ascertained. 15 However, the fund cannot be followed if the fund 
has been mixed so that it is not precisely identifiable. 16 It also appears that there is a
Hunter v Moss [1994] 1 WLR 452; cf Herdegan v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1988) 84 
ALR 271, 279 (Gummow J); David Hayton, ‘Uncertainty of Subject-Matter of Trust’ (1994) 110 The 
Law Quarterly Review 335.
Stephens Travel Service International Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Qantas 
Airways Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 333; Air Canada v M & L  Travel Ltd [1993] 3 SCR 787; Air Traffic 
Conference v Downtown Center Inc (1976) 14 AVI (CCH) 17, 172; Forastieri v Eastern Airlines Inc 
(1983) 81 AVI (CCH) 17, 145.
12 Chapter 3, 102-106
13 Chapter 2, 65-68.
14 Gareth Jones, ‘Tracing Claims in the Modem World’ [1988-89] King’s Counsel 15; John Glover, 
‘Bankruptcy and Constructive Trusts’ (1991) 19 Australian Business Law Review 98; John Glover, 
‘Equity, Restitution and the Proprietary Recovery of Value’ (1991) 14 The University o f New South 
Wales Law Journal 247, 265-280; Penelope S Zohrab, ‘Trust Claimants: The End of the Rainbow for 
Tracing Orders’ (1993) New Zealand Law Journal 294; April G Mountfort, ‘Tracing: An 
Examination of the Applicability of Tracing Principles Today’ (1996) 70 The Australian Law Journal 
54; Christa Band, ‘The Development of Tracing Rules in Commercial Cases’ [1997] Lloyd’s 
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 65; Cope, above n 2, 19-23; Peter Oliver, ‘The extent of 
equitable tracing’ (1995) 9 Trust Law International 78.
15 Chapter 2, 65.
16 Taylor v Plumer (1815) 3 M & S 562; 105 ER 721; Re Diplock [1948] Ch 465, 518-519; Puma 
Australia Pty Ltd v Sportsman’s Australia Ltd [1994] 2 Qd R 159, 162 (McPherson ACJ) Agip 
(Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1990] 1 Ch 265; Trustee of the Property o f FC Jones & Sons (A Firm) v Jones
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requirement of the materiality of the property for common law tracing rules to
1 7  1 0
operate. Following, as it is applied today, is the subject of criticism.
2 Lipkin Gorman (A Firm)v Karpnale Ltd19
Clear substitution can be used to follow money in and out of a bank account 
where it is impossible to expect the segregation of the money into a fund or an 
ascertainable asset. The record of a bank account which evidences the chose in action 
in favour of the depositor is regarded as a complete substitution for the money 
deposited.20
This process was creatively used in Lipkin Gorman (A Firm) v Karpnale Ltd.
A partner in a firm of solicitors had drawn out funds from the firm’s trust account.
The partner was an authorised signatory, but he had withdrawn the funds for his
personal addiction to gambling. He spent the money at a club. It appears that the
21partner did not have the resources to warrant an action against him for the money. 
Therefore, the firm of solicitors brought an action against the club.
The House of Lords found that the gaming contract was void and therefore, 
the club had not provided valuable consideration for the money gambled. The 
problem was that the Privy Council had earlier held that a partner who withdraws 
money from the firm’s account obtains sole title to the money to the exclusion of the
[1997] Ch 159; NH Andrews and J Beatson, ‘Common Law Tracing: Springboard or Swan-song?’
[ 1997] 113 The Law Quarterly Review 21.
17 Re Diplock [1948] 465, 518-519; Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1990] 1 Ch 265, 285-286 (Millett 
LJ).
18
See for example Smith, above n 2, 70-77; Salman Khurshid and Paul Matthews, ‘Tracing 
Confusion’ (1979) 95 The Law Quarterly Review 78.
19
[1991] 2 AC 548. For helpful discussions of this case see Peter Birks, ‘The English Recognition of 
Unjust Enrichment’ [1991] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 473; Brian F 
Fitzgerald, ‘Tracing at Law, the Exchange Product Theory and Ignorance as an Unjust Factor in the 
Law o f Unjust Enrichment’ [1994] 13 University o f Tasmania Review 116.
20
Re Diplock [1948] Ch 466, 519; Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1990] 1 Ch 265, 285 (Millett J); 
Trustee o f the Property o f FC Jones & Sons (A Firm)v Jones [ 1997] Ch 159.
21 [1991] 2 AC 548, 569 (Lord Goff).
22 Union Bank o f Australia Ltd v McClintock & Co [1922] 1 AC 240; Commercial Banking Co o f 
Sydney Ltd v Mann [1961] AC 1.
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firm. The House of Lords decided not to overrule these cases. It held that that the 
common law debtor tracing trail had not come to an end. The solicitors were clients 
of the bank. The subject matter of the relationship was a chose in action which 
belonged to the solicitors at law. Therefore, the solicitors were able to trace the chose 
in action or its product.24
The decision is a product of legal compromise, which did not apparently 
resolve the friction between the negotiability of money and the fraud of the solicitor. 
The House of Lords effectively upheld the negotiability of money. Prima facie, the 
solicitor had acquired legal title to the money on the basis of his apparent authority. 
However, the fraudulent circumstances permitted the firm to re-assert its interest in 
the money at a later date - even though by that stage the money had become mixed 
into the assets of the club. Lord Goff attempted to rationalise the development of a 
retrospective common law following theory on the basis that it was available against 
wrongdoers but not innocent recipients. However, the fact was that the club was 
unaware that the money used to subsidise the gambling habit had been fraudulently 
obtained by the solicitor. It was not guilty of ‘wrongdoing’, except that the contract 
was technically illegal.
The judgment of Lord Goff has been subject to criticism because of the 
novelty of the common law tracing rules it applied. It also remains unclear why the 
firm could not have brought an action based on breach of fiduciary obligations (owed 
by the partner of the firm), equitably tracing the money into the hands of the club and 
claiming the money (or more precisely its value or equivalent) on the basis of the 
failure of consideration/ However, the nature of the judgment highlighted the 
breakdown of the mechanical following process by stretching the concept of 
substitution.
23
Lipkin Gorman (A Firm) v Karpnale [1991] 2 AC 548, 573 (Lord Goff).
24 Ibid 573-574.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 See for example, Burrows, above n 2, 67-68; Birks, above n 19, 473-497.
28 See the comments of Gummow J in Re Australian Elizabethan Theatre Trust (1991) 102 ALR 681, 
699.
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2 Equitable Tracing
It is not surprising that equity’s major case in relation to mixing of assets was
y 29Re Hallett’s Estate; Knatchbull v Hallett where a claim was made against bankers 
of a deceased fiduciary. In this case, equity permitted tracing of moneys into a mixed 
fund, a bank account. It is possible to trace into mixed funds which have arisen by 
virtue of the admixture of the funds belonging to two separate trusts and the 
admixture of the funds personally belonging to the fiduciary and the trust.
Sometimes, courts have rewritten the application of equitable tracing rules to 
achieve what they considered an appropriate result. The conventional view is that an 
errant trustee who withdraws money from the mixed fund, withdraws his own money 
first. This approach works well unless the value of the amount in the mixed pool 
falls below the plaintiffs claim or the fund is dissipated altogether. In Re Oatway; 
Hertslet v Oatway ( ‘Oatway ) a trustee paid deposited trust funds in his personal 
account and withdrew funds to purchase shares. He dissipated the remaining amount 
in the account. In order to provide the aggrieved plaintiff with proprietary relief, the 
court treated the shares as property obtained with the trust funds (and thus trust 
property).
A strict application of equity’s tracing rules can have the unmerited effect of 
requiring a plaintiff to prove the existence of the equitable property, albeit in a 
substituted and/or mixed form. This means that the effective application of equity’s 
tracing rules is determined by how the errant trustee dealt with the property rather 
than the relationship of the parties. Therefore, it is not surprising that Birks has
29 (1880) 13 Ch D 696; See Chapter 2, 68-69.
30 Devaynes v Noble; Clayton’s case (1816) 1 Mer 572; 35 ER 781; HAJ Ford and WA Lee, 
Principles of the Law of Trusts (3rd ed, 1996) [17250]; [17270]; RP Meagher and WMC Gummow, 
Jacob’s Law of Trusts in Australia (6th ed, 1997) [2711 ]-[2712],
31 Brady v Stapleton (1952) 88 CLR 322; Scott v Scott (1963) 109 CLR 649; Ford and Lee, above n 
30, [17240]; [17245]; Meagher and Gummow, above n 30, [2709]-[2710].
32 Devaynes v Noble; Clayton ’s case (1816) 1 Mer 572; 35 ER 781.
33 [1903] 2 Ch 356.
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posited the concept of negative asset which is in the form of specific surviving 
enrichment. 34 He states:
And there is at least one example of a negative asset: a debt 
discharged. That is, if you pay me money and I use it to discharge my 
overdraft or my mortgage, my enrichment survives in my release from 
these burdens. As the asset may be of various different kinds so also it 
may represent the original enrichment in varying extents, depending 
on what mixtures and substitutions have happened.35
However, recent case law indicates that some courts exercising equitable jurisdiction 
are more concerned with the relationship of the parties and the activity of the 
defendant, rather than the need for a proprietary base (albeit a negative one in the 
form of a surviving enrichment). And, this is understandable in the light of the fact 
that equity has always looked to the substance of matters rather than the form. 
Indeed, the argument for relief based on negative assets indicates that, 
notwithstanding proprietary base theory, following and tracing rules are beginning to 
break down.36
(a) Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid37
A prime example can be found in relation to equity's changed attitude toward 
fiduciaries and bribes. In Lister & Co v Stubbs the Court of Appeal held that the 
employer had no proprietary interest in bribes received by an employee because the 
funds in question had never belonged to the employer. Thus, the fact that the 
fiduciary may acquire property directly from the breach of the fiduciary duties, did 
not give rise to a proprietary remedy. This attitude was consistent with the equitable
34 Birks, above n 1, (1985), 84, 372-375, 397-399; cf Thompson v Clydesdale Bank Ltd [1893] AC 
283, 291-292 (Lord Shand); Smith, above n 2, 150-152; Lionel D Smith, ‘Tracing into the Payment 
of a Debt’ (1995) 54 The Cambridge Law Journal 290, 296-300; Cope, above n 2, 153.
35 Birks, above n 1, 84.
36 For a helpful discussion of the various permutations of the tracing rules in reaction to the inherent 
problems see Cope, above n 2, Chapter 10.
37 [1994] 1 AC 324.
7 0
(1890) 45 ChD 1.
39 Ibid 15 (Lord Lindley).
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tracing rules which require that the property in dispute must be traceable and have a 
direct nexus to the proprietary interest of the beneficiaries.
In Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid the Privy Council ruled on an 
appeal from the Court of Appeal in New Zealand in relation to another bribery case. 
The respondent, whilst a Crown servant in Hong Kong, had accepted bribes in 
breach of a fiduciary relationship with which he had purchased properties in New 
Zealand. The issue was whether the appellant was entitled to the property. The Privy 
Council decided in favour of the appellant and overruled Lister v Stubbs. Lord 
Templeman (who delivered the advice of the Privy Council) said:
it is said that if the false fiduciary holds property representing the 
bribe in trust for the person injured, and if the false fiduciary is or 
becomes insolvent, the unsecured creditors of the false fiduciary will 
be deprived of their right to share in the proceeds of that property. But 
the unsecured creditors cannot be in a better position than their 
debtor. The authorities show that property acquired by a trustee 
innocently but in breach of trust and the property from time to time 
representing the same belong in equity to the cestui que trust and not 
to the trustee personally whether he is solvent or insolvent. Property 
acquired by a trustee as a result of the criminal breach of trust and the 
property from time to time representing the same must also belong in 
equity to his cestui que trust and not to the trustee whether he is 
solvent or insolvent.40
If a trustee mistakenly invests money which he ought to pay over to 
his cestui que trust and then becomes bankrupt, the moneys together 
with any profit which has accrued from the investment are withdrawn 
from the unsecured creditors as soon as the mistake is discovered. A 
fortiori if a trustee commits a crime by accepting a bribe which he 
ought to pay over to his cestui que trust, the bribe and any profit made 
therefrom should be withdrawn from the unsecured creditors as soon 
as the crime is discovered.41
Thus, the Privy Council held that the properties were held on constructive trust, even 
though such assets had never belonged to the beneficiary. However, the case did 
pose some pertinent questions. It is unclear what would have been the result if there 
had been evidence that the bribe moneys had not been used to purchase the
40 Ibid 331.
41 Ibid 336.
143
properties in New Zealand and/or there was an insufficient nexus between the bribes 
and the assets of the respondent. The Privy Council was not called upon to decide 
whether the appellant would have had a vested interest in the assets of the 
respondent, if the evidence had shown that the bribes had been dissipated, rather than 
astutely invested.
Some commentators have generally welcomed the development in Reid42 
Beatson43 has quite properly characterised the case as ‘a version of the 'swollen 
assets’ theory. ” 44 Cope has expressed a similar view45 However, Birks has 
questioned the breakdown of the distinction between property and obligation. The 
result would be the loss of certainty and property interests based on judicial 
discretion.46 The question which Birks cannot answer satisfactorily is why should a 
wrongdoing fiduciary benefit from his wrongdoing and swell his assets? Academic 
distinctions based on a proprietary based theory do not ensure that fiduciaries take 
their obligations seriously.
(b) Lord Napier and Ettrick v Hunter47
There has also been tentative developments in Lord Napier and Ettrick v 
Hunter ( ‘Napier’) towards awarding proprietary remedies to commercial parties to 
whom no fiduciary obligations are owed. The insured had been paid out under the 
insurance policy and had also received compensation from the wrongdoing third 
party. The House of Lords held that the stop loss insurers were entitled, under the 
doctrine of subrogation, to a lien over settlement moneys received from the
Donovan Waters, ‘Proprietary Relief: Two Privy Council Decisions - A Canadian Perspective’ 
[1995] 25 Canadian Business Law Journal 90, 92; Thomas Allen, ‘Bribes and Constructive Trusts: 
A-G o f Hong Kong v Reid' (1995) 58 The Modern Law Review 87.
43
J Beatson, ‘Proprietary Claims in the Law of Restitution’ (1995) 25 The Canadian Business Law 
Journal 66.
44 Ibid 84.
45 Cope, above n 2, 97.
46 P Birks, ‘Property in the Profits of Wrongdoing’ (1994) 24 The University o f Western Australia 
Law Review 8, 15-16.
47[ 1993] AC 713.
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wrongdoer.48 Victims of wrongdoing are not entitled to double compensation 49 The 
result of the case is that the law of subrogation was given some proprietary teeth.50
The decision has been criticised for granting the insurers a proprietary base 
where the fund never belonged to the insurers.51 However, such criticism fails to 
recognise that a number of processes were at work. The House of Lords was ensuring 
that the underlying philosophy of the law of subrogation, the prevention of 
unconscionable conduct “ was fulfilled, notwithstanding the insolvency. Moreover, 
the House of Lords was ensuring that a party should not swell his assets to the 
detriment of another, although this was not how it was described. There was no 
evidence to suggest that the stop loss insurers had not taken on the risk of the 
insolvency of the insured. However, it was equally the case that the stop loss 
insurers had not taken on the risk that they would not be able to utilise subrogation 
so as to receive an equivalent of the amount paid out.53 Having decided that the stop 
loss insurers could access proprietary rights on the basis of the law of subrogation, 
the insurers were required to trace the funds into the hands of the insured. The lien 
was over the settlement moneys. 54 The innovation in Napier showed that insurers 
were able to access equity’s limited tracing rules in the context of a commercial 
contract - a contract of insurance where they had not held the proprietary interest in 
the fund which was subject to dispute.
48 Ibid 737-739 (Lord Templeman); 742-745 (Lord Goff), 750-752 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
49 .
RP Meagher, WMC Gummow and JRF Lehane, Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (3 ed., 1992),
[951]; Lord Goff o f Chieveley and Gareth Jones, The Law of Restitution (4th ed, 1993), 589-591; 
Chapter 31; John Glover, ‘Subrogation’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The Principles o f Equity 549, 
(1996) [1501].
50 See also Banque Financiere de la Cite v Parc (Battersea) Ltd [1998] 2 WLR 475.
51 Charles Mitchell, The Law of Subrogation (1994) 82-84; Charles Mitchell, ‘Subrogation and 
insurance law: proprietary claims and excess clauses’ [1993] Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law 
Quarterly 192.
52 See for example, Lord Napier and Ettrick v Hunter [1993] AC 713, 738 (Lord Templeman); 
Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd [1978] AC 95. In relation to unjust enrichment see Banque 
Financiere de la Cite v Parc (Battersea) Ltd [1998] 2 WLR 475.
53 Note also Chapter 2, 87-88.
54 See for example Lord Napier and Ettrick v Hunter [1993] AC 713, 738 (Lord Templeman); 752 
(Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
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(c) Space Investments Ltd v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co 
(Bahamas) Ltd55
In Space Investments Ltd v Canadian Imperial Bank o f Commerce Trust Co 
(Bahamas) Ltd ( ‘Space ), it was held that a bank which was the trustee of various 
settlements (which was permitted to invest in any bank including itself), had properly 
invested the money with itself. However, Lord Templeman also considered the 
situation where, contrary to the terms of the settlement, the trustee bank deposited 
the funds with itself and mixed the funds with its own assets to the extent that there 
was no identifiable mixed pool - except perhaps the entire assets of the bank as a 
pool of assets. Conformity to equity’s tracing rules would be impossible. In a helpful 
statement Lord Templeman said:
A bank in fact uses all deposit moneys for the general purposes of the 
bank. Whether a bank trustee lawfully receives deposits or wrongly 
treats trust money as on deposit from trusts, all the moneys are in fact 
dealt with and expended by the bank for the general purposes of the 
bank. In these circumstances it is impossible for the beneficiaries 
interested in trust money misappropriated from their trust to trace 
their money to any particular asset belonging to the trustee bank. But 
equity allows the beneficiaries, or a new trustee appointed in place of 
an insolvent bank trustee to protect the interests of the beneficiaries, 
to trace the trust money to all the assets of the bank and to recover the 
trust money by the exercise of an equitable charge over all the assets 
of the bank. Where an insolvent bank goes into liquidation that 
equitable charge secures for the beneficiaries and the trust priority 
over the claims of the customers in respect of their deposits and over 
the claims of all other unsecured creditors....
It is therefore equitable that where the trustee bank has unlawfully 
misappropriated trust money by treating the trust money as though it 
belonged to the bank beneficially, merely acknowledging and 
recording the amount in a trust deposit account with the bank, then the 
claims of the beneficiaries should be paid in full out of the assets of 
the trustee bank in priority to the claims of the customers and other 
unsecured creditors of the bank. ‘If a man mixes trust funds with his 
own, the whole will be treated as the trust property... that is, that the 
trusts property comes first...’ per Sir George Jessel MR in In re 
Hallett's Estate (1880) 13 Ch D 696, 719, adopting and explaining 
earlier pronouncements to the same effect. Where a bank trustee is 
insolvent, trust money wrongfully treated as being on deposit with the
55 [1986] 1 WLR 1072.
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bank must be repaid in full so far as may be out of assets of the bank 
in priority to any payment of customers’ deposits and other unsecured 
debts.56
In the event that tracing rules were inapplicable, beneficiaries would be entitled to far 
more than simply a judgment debt. They would be entitled to priority over all the 
bank’s other unsecured creditors.
The suggested operation of equity in Space fulfils the centrality of trust and 
confidence in fiduciary relationships. Priority was not simply linked to a specific 
property or a mixed fund. Whilst the Court envisaged that a bona fide bank trustee 
will segregate trust assets from its own, segregation was (and is) not a precursor to an 
action to recover the money because beneficiaries do not assume the risk of a 
trustee’s insolvency.57 Thus, the priority extended over the defendant’s assets 
including non-monetary assets. This is a most provocative point. The Court 
disguised the inherent radicalism of its approach by attempting to bring the judgment
CO
within the principles of Re Hallett’s Estate. However, in that case, it would not 
have been open to the client to trace the moneys into the assets of the solicitor 
generally because equitable tracing is asset specific. When the Court of Appeal in Re 
Hallett's Estate referred to the mixing of money, it had an eye to the mixing of funds 
in a specific bank account. In Space, Lord Templeman interpreted the words ‘mixes 
trust funds with his own’ as not pertaining simply to the specific larger fund into 
which a plaintiffs moneys may be mixed, but the admixture of the moneys to the 
assets of the defendant as a whole. Such a construction has the potential to radically 
change equitable tracing because it is sufficient if the plaintiff can establish that the 
defendant received the money.
This trend has been evident in the United States. It has also been pointed out 
that the Restatement o f the Law Second, Restitution 9 may permit proprietary relief 
which is not connected to specific and ascertainable assets.60 This may occur where
56 Ibid 1074.
57 Ibid.
SR
(1880) 13 Ch D 696.
59 American Law Institute, Restatement o f the Law Second, Restitution, Tentative Draft No 2 (1984) § 
33.
60 Jones, above n 14, 17-18.
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the wrongdoing has been conducted in such a way that the victim is prevented from 
identifying specific proceeds. Although this is quite limited, it does show a loosening 
of the proprietary base requirement.
Space has been subject to considerable criticism on the basis that it does not 
accord with equitable tracing and does not protect the interests of unsecured 
creditors. Indeed, Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (In Receivership) ( ‘Goldcorp’), 
Boscawen v Bajwa and Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd (in liq) v Homan 
( ‘Bishopsgate ’) 4 indicate the approach in Space is not favoured at the present time. 
In Goldcorp,65 Lord Mustill said that the obiter dicta in Space concerned a mixed 
rather than a non-existent fund. Therefore, the obiter was not applicable to the facts 
of the case. In Bishopsgate, it was confirmed that equitable tracing cannot be
pursued through an overdrawn account and the obiter in Space was limited as
68envisaged by Lord Mustill in Goldcorp.
In Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough 
Council ( ‘Westdeutsche) 69 Lord Browne-Wilkinson took a strict proprietary base 
approach. Envisaging that the appropriate proprietary remedy is likely to be the 
remedial constructive trust, he specified that the trust res should be identifiable. In 
this respect, the case is similar to the reasoning in Napier and the outcome in 
Attorney-General v Reid. However, it fails to take into account the fluidity of the
RM Goode, ‘Ownership and Obligation in Commercial Transactions’, (1987) 103 The Law 
Quarterly Review, 433, 446-447; Smith, above n 2, 231, 312-315.
62 [1995] 1 AC 74.
63 [1996] 1 WLR328.
64 [1995] Ch 211.
65 [1995] 1 AC 74.
66 Ibid 103-105.
67 [1995] Ch 211.
68 Ibid 218-220 (Dillon LJ); 221-222 (Leggatt LJ).
69 [1996] AC 669.
70 Ibid 705.
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concept of certainty of subject matter in trust law, particularly where fungibles are 
concerned.71
The reticence to adopt the line of thinking enunciated by Lord Templeman in 
Space is due to three reasons. First, there has not been sufficient appreciation that in 
the light of the changing nature of money, it is no longer feasible to strictly apply 
common law following and equitable tracing. Secondly, it is assumed that the 
alternative to the application of the equitable tracing is an anarchic system in which 
all claims to proprietary relief are met without any recourse to principle. As will be 
shown, this is far from the truth. Thirdly, it is assumed that common law following 
and equitable tracing are valueless mechanical rules. Yet, a radical aspect of Space 
was that Lord Templeman freed equitable tracing from illogical practical restraints. 
However, he did not divest the obiter dicta from the equitable values which led to 
their inception.
This would seem to indicate that an important step towards a principled and 
inherently coherent system of proprietary relief was made via the obiter dicta in 
Space and swollen assets theory.
IV Swollen Assets Theory
During the Great Depression which commenced in 1929, some courts in the 
United States moved seriously towards liberalising equity’s tracing requirements and 
opening up the situations were parties could access proprietary remedies. The period 
was characterised by unprecedented and sudden economic dislocation, insolvency 
and unemployment. The trend away from the rigid application of equity’s tracing 
rules started to become apparent well before the Depression. However, it was the 
advent of the Depression which gave rise to the urgent need for the re-evaluation.
71 Hunter v Moss [1994] 1 WLR452.
72 See generally J K Galbraith, A Journey Through Economic Time: A First Hand View (1994) 
Chapters 7 and 8.
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A Versions o f the Swollen Assets Theory
Three separate kinds of swollen assets theory have been identified. The first 
kind is the ‘weak version’ in which the claimant is required to show the defendant’s 
receipt of the fund in dispute. Having established the fact of receipt, the burden of 
proof is shifted on the defendant to show that he does not retain the original asset or 
the traceable proceeds.74 Therefore, if the defendant no longer retains the asset in its 
original, substituted or mixed form, the defendant is not required to disgorge the 
asset in whatever form, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant has acted 
unconscionably. The so-called ‘weakened version’ of the swollen assets theory does 
not address the central issue of the relationship and obligations of the parties. It is 
still primarily concerned with the mechanics of ascertaining assets or funds. 
Therefore, it is simply a variation of equitable tracing.
The second version of the swollen assets theory is the ‘augmentation version’ 
where the plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant received the asset in 
dispute and that the asset augmented and continues to augment the defendant’s asset 
base at the time of the insolvency. Augmentation is discussed below. Suffice to 
say, that the augmentation version is also linked to the limitations of the tracing rules 
generally. Whilst the plaintiff is supposedly not required to undertake technical 
tracing exercise, he is unable to prove augmentation without such an exercise. 
Otherwise, the defendant is not required to disgorge the asset despite the defendant’s 
unconscionable conduct. Moreover, once the asset is dissipated, there is no longer 
any augmentation of the defendant’s estate and proprietary relief is not possible.
The third and only true version of the swollen assets theory simply requires 
the plaintiff to prove that the defendant received the assets or funds in dispute. The 
nature of the relationship of the parties and the conduct of the defendant will
73 Smith, above n 2, 270-274, 310-320. Note also the discussion in Kingsley A Taft, ‘A Defense of a 
Limited Use of the Swollen Assets Theory Where Money Has Wrongfully Been Mingled With Other 
Money’ (1939) 39 Columbia Law Review 172.
74 Smith, above n 2, 270; For a possible manifestation of this kind of swollen assets theory in English 
law see Oliver, above n 14, 78, 81-83.
75 Smith, above n 2, 271.
76 Below, 154-159.
77 Note the description of Smith, above n 2, 271, 311-315.
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determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to proprietary relief. The remaining 
discussion is principally related to this form of the swollen assets theory.
78 79There have been its proponents such as Taft, Hirsch and sympathisers 
such as Oesterle who have argued that a defendant should not be entitled to retain 
assets unjustly even if the original assets can no longer be identified. The application 
of the identifiability requirement has the effect of augmenting the defendant's asset 
base; or, to put it another way, the full quantum of the assets available to the 
defendant for distribution amongst the creditors is enhanced.
B Early Authorities
A case which has been identified as leading to the development of swollen 
assets theory was Peak v Ellicott which was decided in 1883. The plaintiff 
borrowed money from the defendant bank and then executed a note acknowledging 
the indebtedness. The bank had sold the note for valuable consideration to a third 
party which held the note. The plaintiff paid the bank the amount which was due on 
the note and requested that the bank pay that amount to the third party. The bank 
became insolvent and the question was whether the plaintiff had a proprietary 
interest for an amount equivalent to the amount in dispute. The Court held that the 
bank received the money as agent of the plaintiff, that a fiduciary relationship arose 
between the parties and that the bank received and held the money as a trust fund and 
not as part of the assets of the bank. The case located two features which were to 
become synonymous with the swollen assets theory. One feature was that the 
circumstances of a common law relationship which would otherwise accord personal 
rights and liabilities, could give rise to a proprietary interest in the assets of an 
insolvent entity. The other feature indicated that the technicalities of the tracing rules
78
Taft, above n 73, 175-176.
79 Sylvan H Hirsch, ‘Tracing Trust Funds - Modem Doctrines’ (1936-1937) 11 Temple Law 
Quarterly 11-12.
80 Dale A Oesterle, ‘Deficiencies of the Restitutionary Right to Trace Misappropriated Property in 
Equity and in UCC § 9-306’ (1982-1983) 68 Cornell Law Review 172, 189 fn 33.
81 George Gleason Bogert and George Taylor Bogert, Handbook of the Law of Trusts (4th ed, 1963), 
585 fn 34.
82" 1 P 499 (SC Kansas, 1883); See also Bogert and Bogert, above n 81, 585 fn 34.
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were not belaboured. It was assumed that the assets could be traced because the bank 
had received them.
83In Evangelical Synod o f North America v Schoeneich Burgess J considered 
the situation where a trustee deposited money with a firm without the required 
consent of the beneficiaries and the firm became insolvent. The Court had no 
hesitation holding that the trustee had acted in breach of his duties and that the 
beneficiaries were entitled to take action to recover the money. Certainly, keeping in 
mind the obiter dicta of Lord Templeman in Space, it could be said that the 
beneficiary did not take on the risk of the trustee’s wrongdoing. The problem was 
that in fact it was going to be very difficult to trace the moneys. If the money could 
not be identified in a segregated, mixed or substituted form, the beneficiary’s action 
would fail. Burgess J acknowledged the substantial authority which required
identifiability. However, His Honour referred to some authorities which did not
86require identifiability and said:
But the modem doctrine, and especially the adjudications by the 
appellate courts of this state, go further, and hold that when a tmstee 
or bailee wrongfully mixes tmst money with his own, so that it cannot 
be distinguished what particular part is tmst money and what part is 
private money, equity will follow the money, by taking out of the 
insolvent estate the amount due the cestui que tmst, although it cannot 
be identified, or separated from other funds with which it was
87mixed.
This was a remarkable extension of the equity tracing mles. It permitted the courts to 
abandon the difficult and time consuming process of identifying money or its 
substitute.
The decision also represented a farsighted approach to the problem of 
remedy. Burgess J held that if the funds in question had been received but could no
Q 1
45 SW 647 (SC Missouri, 1898).
84 [1986] 1 WLR 1072.
O C
45 SW 647 (SC of Missouri, 1898), 648-649.
86 Ibid 649-650; Bryan v Coconut Grove Bank & Trust Co 132 So 481 (SC Florida, 1931).
0 7
Ibid 649.
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longer be identified, then the remedy would have to take this into account. He 
stated, citing Stollar v Coates, 88 that
...the general assets of the insolvent bank having received the benefit 
of the unlawful conversion of a trust fund, the bank was chargeable 
with the amount of the converted fund, as a preferred demand; that, 
while it may be possible to follow a fund into its diverted use, it is 
always possible to make a charge upon the estate or assets to the 
increase or benefit of which it had been appropriated, and, the general 
assets of the bank having received the benefit of the unlawful 
conversion, there is nothing inequitable in charging them with the
89amount of the converted fund, as a preferred demand.
The acceptance of swollen assets theory was neither widespread nor 
sustained. Historically, standard equity tracing principles were followed without 
question by many judges even in times of an extraordinary economic Downturn.90 
Indeed, the Bogerts have pointed out that many of the cases establishing the swollen 
assets theory were subsequently expressly overruled on this basis.91 An examination 
of the case law which Hirsch suggests stands for the modem swollen assets 
approach indicates that some of the cases may be interpreted as supporting in effect 
the orthodox rules and/or indeed positively identifying with them.93 The tracing 
exercise is limited to the mixed fund of cash assets rather than the whole of the assets 
of the debtor/bank.
Moreover, in the hands of some judges, the pure swollen assets theory was 
turned on its head. Courts did not deny that it was important that a party to whom the 
fiduciary obligation was owed, should have the ability to recover the assets which 
had been wrongly diverted from the trust. But, some courts required that there should 
be a discernible augmentation of the assets of the defendant.94 Thus, neither the
oo
88 Mo 514 (SC Missouri, 1885).
89
Evangelical Synod o f North America v Schoeneich 45 SW 647 (SC Missouri, 1898), 650.
90 Hirsch, above n 79, 18.
91 Bogert and Bogert, above n 81, 585 fn 34.
92 Hirsch, above n 79, 20 fn 37.
93 See for example First National Bank o f Danville v Commercial Bank & Trust Co 175 SE 775 (SC 
Virginia, 1934); American Express Co v Cochrane 137 So 696 (SC Florida, 1931).
94 Kershaw v Jenkins 71 F (2d) 647 (10th Cir, 1934), 649.
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payment of debts95 nor the shifting of credit in a bank, would serve as a basis for 
proof of augmentation.96 Augmentation became synonymous with identifiability and 
substitutability.
C Reaction to the Swollen Assets Theory
Three main arguments have arisen in an attempt to discredit the theory and 
each of these will be considered in turn.
071 No Factual Augmentation of Assets
It is argued that the swollen assets theory does not represent a factual 
augmentation of assets. If there is no factual augmentation of assets, how can it be 
said that there has been a swelling of the assets in the hands of the defendant? 
George G Bogert and George T Bogert maintain that:
The fallacy of the ‘swollen assets’ theory lies in its failure to 
recognise that a trust requires specific property as its subject-matter, 
and that the very essence of the beneficiary's right to trace is his 
ability to identify the trust res or its exact substitute. As a creditor a 
beneficiary is entitled to no preference over any other creditor. It is 
only as a property owner that he is entitled to take particular 
personalty or realty. The matteT is illuminated by the court in Slater v 
Oriental Mills'....
98They quoted from Slater v Oriental Mills, including the following:
‘But right here comes the argument that it is equitably his own 
because the debtor has taken the claimant’s money and mingled it 
with his estate, whereby it is swelled just so much. But, as applicable
95 Note the earlier case City o f Lincoln v Morrison 90 NW 905 (SC Nebraska, 1902).
96
Edisto National Bank of Orangeburg SC v Bryant 72 F (2d) 917 (4th Cir, 1934).
97 Burnes National Bank of St Joseph, Mo v Spurway 28 F (2d) 40 (District Court Iowa, 1928); 
National Bank of the Republic v Porter 258 P 544 (SC Idaho, 1927); Re Citizen’s State Bank of 
Gooding 255 P 300 (SC Idaho, 1927); City of Lincoln v Morrison 90 NW 905 (SC Nebraska, 1902); 
Kershaw v Jenkins 71 F (2d) 647 (10th Cir, 1934); Edisto National Bank of Orangeburg SC et al v 
Bryant 72 F (2d) 917 (4th Cir, 1934); Harmer v Rendleman 64 F (2d) 422 (4th Cir, 1933); cf Orr v St 
Louis Union Trust Company 236 SW 642 (SC Missouri, 1922); Nelson v McClean’s Estate 161 SW 
(2d) 676 (Kansas City Court of Appeals, 1942).
98 27 A 433 (SC Rhode Island, 1893), 443.
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in all cases, the argument is not sound. Where the property or its 
substantial equivalent remains, we concede its force; but, where it is 
dissipated and gone, the appropriation of some other property in its 
stead simply takes from creditors that which clearly belongs to 
them...Though the particular money cannot be identified the amount 
is swelled just as much, and the amount added belongs to the cestui
99que trust....
Then they continued:
A further fallacy in the swollen assets doctrine is its assumption that 
the use of the trust funds to pay the trustee's personal debts has 
swollen the estate which he leaves. As a matter of fact such use has 
the effect of paying one debt at the same time creating another of 
exactly the same size, so that the estate is neither swollen or 
diminished. Thus if T is trustee of the A trust, has in his hands $1,000 
of trust money, and owes personally $500 to X and $1,000 to Y, and 
the only property T owns personally is a bond worth $500, it is 
apparent that T is insolvent. He owes $1500 and owns $500. The trust 
property does not count in the private affairs of T, either as an asset or 
liability, as long as T is carrying out his trust. Now if T uses the 
$ 1000 of trust money to pay his creditor, Y, and dies, it cannot be said 
that the use of the trust money has ‘swollen’ the estate left by T. The 
estate still has assets of $500 and liabilities of $1500. Instead of 
owing Y $1000, his estate owes the trust $1,000 on account of the 
misappropriated funds.100
These authors have described the infusion of trust funds into the assets of a trustee as 
neither increasing nor diminishing the asset base of the trustee because the trustee 
still owes what he has received. There has been no factual augmentation of the 
assets. However, the example they use to demolish the swollen assets theory is 
unconvincing, particularly in the insolvency context. If T is insolvent, the question 
is whether the payment to Y was a fraudulent disposition or a voidable preference101 
and/or whether Y took the money with notice that the funds were trust funds
100 Bogert and Bogert, above n 81, 586-587. See the dissenting judgment of Taylor and Cassody JJ in 
Frances v Evans 33 NW 93 (1887); Slater v Oriental Mills 27 A 443 (SC Rhode Island, 1893) Austin 
Wakeman Scott and William Franklin Fratcher, The Law o f Trusts (4th ed, 1987) vol V, §521.2.
101 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 121 and 122. In relation to the law governing fraudulent 
dispositions and voidable preferences see Dennis Rose, Lewis: Australian Bankruptcy Law, (10th ed, 
1994), Chapters 20 and 21; PP McQuade and MGR Gronow, McDonald, Henry and Meek, 
Australian Bankruptcy Law and Practice (5th ed, 1996) [121.0]-[ 122.8.05].
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(including whether the funds were still identifiable in Y's hands). If the answer to this 
question is no and Y is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, then the trust 
would compete with the other unsecured creditors for the funds which remained in 
the hands of T or his administrator. To say that the assets of T had not been swollen 
is simply not true. If, as suggested, the trust funds were not part of either the assets or 
liabilities of T, then T had liabilities of $1500. His estate would now have personal 
liabilities of $500.
Another and possibly better example of the swollen assets theory at work, is 
where there are multiple unsecured creditors. A is an insolvent which operated as a 
stockbroker. Each day thousands of electronic transactions passes between A and his 
creditors. A owes $1,000,000 to 100 creditors. A has received $100,000 from Z 
pursuant to a mistaken overpayment. The money is not ascertainable because the 
funds have immediately disappeared into the ‘black hole’ of the overdrawn 
account. “ A has assets of $200,000. The question is whether Z can obtain a 
proprietary remedy equivalent to $100,000.
If Z is treated as an unsecured creditor then (assuming there are no secured 
creditors and leaving aside statutory preferential creditors) Z would be treated 
equally and rateably with the other unsecured creditors. Z would be entitled to 
$20,000. Another creditor, P who is owed $200,000, would be entitled to $40,000 
and so on. But, if it can be said that Z is an unsecured creditor who cannot be treated 
the same way as other unsecured creditors because Z did not take on the risk of the 
debtor’s insolvency, then A is not entitled to retain the assets or use them to partially 
pay off outstanding debts. To treat Z as simply an unsecured creditor would be to 
swell the assets of the debtor. Thus, if Z has not taken on the risk of the insolvency, 
A has at its disposal an additional $ 100,000 which it would not have had otherwise. 
A is able to pay a greater amount of the outstanding debt than he would otherwise 
have been able. The other creditors obtain a larger amount than they would have 
otherwise received. If A has assets of only $100,000, then P would only receive 
$20,000 - one half of the amount under the previous scheme. What the swollen assets 
theory identifies is that where a debtor's accounts are swelled by funds to which the 
debtor is not entitled due to the breach of fiduciary duty and/or the unusual nature of 
the transfer or the receipt of the funds, the debtor and his other creditors receive an
102 Re Diplock [1948] 1 Ch 465, 521; Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd (in Liquidation) v 
Homan [1995] Ch211.
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unwarranted benefit. In this case, P receives $40,000 rather than $20,000 whilst Z 
receives only $20,000 instead of $100,000.103
Another example, is where A spends the money received from Z on a 
holiday, and dissipates the whole amount. The asset base of A remains swollen to the 
detriment of Z because if A wanted to enjoy the holiday, A would have otherwise 
had to spend his own money. One possible suggestion is to describe it as the creation 
of a negative asset which is in the form of a specific surviving enrichment.104 The 
problem is whether the expenditure saved can be interpreted as a specific saving 
enrichment. A's asset base has been ‘swelled’ at the expense of Z because A has been 
able to utilise the fund and dissipate it.
Scott was another staunch advocate of the present approach to equitable 
tracing.105 In the seminal work on the law of trusts subsequently co-authored with 
Fratcher,106 Scott set out to demolish the swollen assets theory107 and re-affirm that 
the actual tracing of property in accordance with the orthodox approach remains 
preferable.
In relation to the augmentation debate, they (like the Bogerts) dismissed the 
argument that there should be recovery where that wrongdoer's estate has been 
originally augmented and the ‘wrongdoer’ has dissipated the asset. They stated:
the wrongdoer’s estate is no larger than it would have been if he had 
not taken the claimant's property. The general creditors, therefore, are 
not seeking to obtain a larger amount from the wrongdoer's estate than 
they would have received if no wrong had been committed. They are 
not seeking to profit through the wrong. On the contrary the claimant 
is seeking to diminish the amounts that the creditors are to receive. He 
is certainly not entitled to priority over the other creditors.108
103 Oesterle, above n 80, 189-190 fn 33.
104 Birks, above n 1, 84.
105 Austin W Scott, ‘The Right to Follow Money Wrongfully with Other Money’ (1913-1914) 27 
Harvard Law Review 125.
106 Scott and Fratcher, above n 100.
107 Ibid vol V, § 521.
108
Ibid vol V, §521,653.
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Under the swollen assets theory, so long as it could be shown that the assets of the 
recipient have been ultimately augmented due to the wrongdoing, it does not matter 
that the assets have been subsequently dissipated. While they admitted that this 
appeared to be fair, they pointed to ‘difficulties that are almost insuperable’ 109 which 
would face courts. Where the money has been dissipated, courts have to decide 
whether or not the ‘wrongdoer’ would have spent his own money for the same 
purpose. Where courts have decided that this was the case - then it has been 
suggested that the ‘victim’ would have priority. However, they argued that under the 
pure swollen assets theory, the victim would not fare so well if the wrongdoer 
retained the victim’s assets but the estate appeared no larger than if the wrong had 
not been committed. 110 Such a situation would arise when the defendant paid his 
debts with the money he received and therefore his current assets were not 
augmented. On the basis of this assessment, they decided that orthodox tracing was 
better than swollen assets theory because the victim could trace into a mixed fund 
regardless of whether the wrongdoer’s assets were ultimately augmented at the time 
of the insolvency.
They stressed that courts will have to decide whether the ‘wrongdoer’
actually benefited from the dissipation to his own advantage. This ‘insuperable
difficulty’ was not insuperable at all if a basic presumption in equitable tracing itself
was applied. In Oatway A the court assumed, in relation to the application of
equitable tracing, that the trustee/fiduciary will dissipate his own money before
112spending money belonging to another to whom a fiduciary obligation was owed. 
Oatway in fact turned the argument on its head, because it suggested that courts will 
assume that a party will spend his own money first so that the moneys in dispute 
would remain. However, Oatway does not and cannot determine whether a party 
would have actually spent money if he was aware that it was not his own.
At any rate, care should be taken to separate two very different issues - a 
basis for a cause of action and a defence. The first issue is whether the fiduciary has 
benefited from the receipt of the moneys. The answer must be that the fiduciary has 
benefited from receipt of the assets. There has been an initial augmentation of the
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid vol VA, §521,654.
111 [1903] 2 Ch 356.
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assets. In cases which apply to the third version of the swollen assets theory, the 
personal reason why the trustee/fiduciary dissipated trust assets (or mixed them so 
that the assets became completely untraceable), was irrelevant. What was important 
was that the defendant had received funds to which the court did not consider the 
defendant was prima facie entitled. At that point, the courts were concerned with the 
circumstances of the receipt, rather than whether there was a permanent 
augmentation of the defendant’s assets. On the other hand, the issue of whether or 
not the defendant then spent the money as his own and/or whether the defendant 
would have spent the money in the first place is a matter for subsequent 
consideration. Rather than discussing this issue as part of the concept of swollen 
assets theory, it is better to view the matter from the angle of a defence. Does the 
defendant have a defence that he dissipated the assets in the genuine belief that they 
belonged to him? The defence of change of position may be the answer to Scott’s
113and Fratcher’s dilemma.
Swollen assets theory begins where the equitable tracing rules finish. Viewed 
from the perspective of a proprietary approach of equitable tracing, there is no 
augmentation of A’s assets because the property which originally augmented those 
assets no longer exists. Non-existent property cannot augment an existing asset base. 
Whilst it is possible to trace money into a mixed fund, 114 it is not possible to argue 
that after dissipation of one fund another replaces it. 115 This is the case even where 
what is at stake are the interests of beneficiaries who have not taken on the risk of the 
trustee’s insolvency. The existence of swollen assets theory represents an 
acknowledgment by some courts that equitable tracing, though helpful, may not go 
far enough, where the entitlement of a party to recover funds solely depends on the 
traceability of money and the augmentation of assets.
113 Lipkin Gorman (A Firm) v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548, 577-583 (Lord Goff); David Securities 
Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank o f Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353, 384-386 (Mason CJ, Deane, 
Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). For a discussion of change of position see Chapter 7, 351-353.
114 Re Hallett’s Estate; Knatchbull v Hallett (1880) 13 Ch D 696; Ford and Lee, above n 30, 
[17240]-[ 17270]; Meagher and Gummow, above n 30, [2709]-[2712].
115 James Roscoe (Bolton) Ltd v Winder [1915] 1 Ch 62.
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2 The Swollen Assets Theory Undermines the Rateable Distribution 
Principle
Another argument is that swollen assets theory cuts across one of the 
sacrosanct tenets of insolvency law - the principle of rateable distribution.116 Scott 
and Fratcher label the desire to give a creditor priority outside traditional security 
mechanisms ‘a peculiar psychological phenomenon’ which can be indulged by
117writers and judges - to the detriment of general creditors who ‘pay the bill’.
118The rateable distribution principle has been discussed in Chapter 1. 
However, the untrammelled operation of the principle of rateable distribution is 
curtailed. If the principle operated in such a way to determine the rights and 
liabilities of all creditors, then there would be some merit in the argument that the 
equality principle was so paramount in determinations of insolvency that there 
should be no judicial interference to undercut it. However, a cursory examination of 
the law indicates that rateable distribution is only one of a number of factors which 
are taken into account when the assets of an insolvent are distributed.119
Nevertheless, the underlying assumption is that either the plaintiff to whom 
fiduciary obligations are owed should access tracing rules or the plaintiff should
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 108. For a discussion o f this provision see McQuade and Gronow, 
above n 101, [108.0]-[ 108.0.15], In relation to the United Kingdom see Insolvency Act (1986) (UK) 
ss 328(2) (3); Christopher Berry, Edward Bailey, Stephen Schaw-Miller and Philip Reed, Personal 
Insolvency-Law and Practice (1993), 337-344; Ian F Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency (2nd ed, 1996) 
295.
In relation to Canada see Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act 1950 RSC 1985 c B-3 ss 136 and 141; and L 
W Houden and C H Morawetz, The 1996 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (1996) 323-341; 
In the Bankruptcy o f Gingras Auto Ltee; Les Produits de Caoutchouc Marquis Inc v Trottier [1962] 
SCR 676; 34 DLR (2d) 751.
For a discussion o f the situation in relation to unsecured creditors in the United States o f America see 
the Bankruptcy Code which is Title 11 of the United States Code (11 USC); Lawrence P King, 
‘Bankruptcy and Other Insolvency Remedies’ in Alan B Morrison (ed), Fundamentals o f American 
Law (1996) 463-464; Douglas G Baird and Thomas H Jackson, Cases, Problems and Materials on 
Bankruptcy (1985) 547-573; James W Bowers, ‘Bankruptcy’ in Alain A Levasseur and John S Baker 
(eds), An Introduction to the Law of the United States (1992) Chapter XXXIII.
117
Scott and Fratcher, above n 100, vol V § 521, 656. See also Goode above, n 61, 447.
1 1 o
Chapter 1,32-33.
119 Ibid. Note also in relation to the United States, Baird and Jackson, above n 216, 547-550.
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minimise risks by taking security. The problem is that it may not be practical for a 
party to take security. Swadling “ has argued that a mistaken payer should not be 
treated any differently than another unsecured creditor, a victim of a defendant's 
negligent driving. This view does not take into account that unsecured creditors 
constitute a wide band of persons and circumstances subject to various legal regimes 
and remedies. After all, the example of the victim of negligent driving is probably 
not a good one because the victim would be presumably compensated directly via 
third party insurance anyway. Nor does it take into account the fact that whilst some 
parties, such as a victim of a driver’s negligence, are creditors based on loss only to 
themselves, other creditors, such as the mistaken payer, is a creditor because there is 
a correlation between their commercial loss and the defendant’s commercial gain. 
The net effect of Swadling’s attitude is that even if funds are transferred in the course 
of extraordinary events, an unsecured creditor ought not be elevated to the status of a 
secured creditor. Instead of facing the problem of differentiating between unsecured 
creditors, he dismisses their claims completely. Here, Swadling's attitude is really 
behind the times, even in the light of the House of Lords in the Westdeutsche 
decision, where the House of Lords did enunciate a test for ascertaining priority 
status in non-fiduciary relationships. The House of Lords recognised that the 
circumstances surrounding the creation of debt and the status of an unsecured 
creditor were qualitatively different and may require the imposition of a constructive 
trust. The problem was that the criteria, presently applied to determine proprietary 
status, was unnecessarily narrow. 124
3 The Swollen Assets Theory Creates Uncertainty
The third argument is that the swollen assets theory creates uncertainty. In an 
article on the swollen assets theory, Cowan, Edmunds and Lowry have argued that 
equitable tracing is now outmoded and needs to be overhauled to take into account
120
See generally David S Cowan, Rod Edmunds and John Lowry, ‘Equitable Tracing and the 
Swollen Assets Theory’ (1995) 1 Contemporary Issues in Law 1. Note also some of the reactions 
against the remedial constructive trust in the United States in Scott and Fratcher, above n 100, 1996 
Supplement, § 481.2.
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the modem commercial needs. They examined the swollen assets theory as an 
alternative to the equitable tracing rules and they decided that its scope was too wide. 
They argued that its operation was neither limited to fiduciary relationships nor to 
the identification of specific assets. The result was the potential destruction of the 
line between personal and proprietary remedies. This sentiment is shared by other 
commentators. However, Cowan, Edmunds and Lowry rejected the swollen assets 
theory without asking one fundamental question - under what circumstances did the 
courts in the United States grant proprietary relief under the swollen assets theory? 
These authors did not undertake an examination of the American case law. If these 
authors had done so, then their final appraisal of the swollen assets theory may have 
been different - although it is conceded that the theory did challenge the artificial 
divide between personal and proprietary relief.
D Extending Proprietary Relief for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Beyond
Traceable Proceeds
The swollen assets theory has presaged two possible areas of proprietary 
expansion.
1 Extensions of Remedial Relief in Commercial Relationships Regulated by 
Fiduciary Obligations
There were those situations where the theory was used as a modem extension
of equitable tracing. The sorts of cases which arose involved the misappropriation of
128assets by a fiduciary because the fiduciary used the money to pay his own debts,
129the running of his own business and sometimes because the asset had been in fact
130acquired by a third party which was aware of the breach. The sorts of parties
125
125 See generally Cowan, Edmunds and Lowry, above n 120.
126 Ibid 20.
127 Burrows, n 2, 44-45; Goode, above n 61.
128 See for example the early cases of McLeod v Evans 28 NW 173 (SC Wisconsin, 1886); Myers v 
Board o f Education o f City o f Clay Center 32 P 658 (SC Kansas, 1893).
129 Nelson v McLean’s Estate 161 SW (2d) 676 (Kansas Court of Appeals, 1942); Horigan Realty 
Company v Flynn 253 SW 403 (Kansas Court of Appeals, 1923).
1 70 Evangelical v Synod o f North America v Schoeneich 45 SW 647 (SC Missouri, 1898).
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which fell under the category were trustees and treasurers of corporations who
132acted without authority. However, the funds were untraceable.
If a trustee misappropriates the trust assets for his own use or diverts them to 
a third party who is aware of the trust status of the funds, why should equitable 
tracing limit the beneficiary’s remedies? The beneficiary has not assumed the risk of 
the wrongdoing of the insolvency of the trustee or the third party. In order to justify 
the obvious limitations of equity’s tracing rules, one author has suggested that 
beneficiaries and bailors do take on the risk of insolvency and therefore this is not a 
sufficient rationale for the expansion of the beneficiary’s and bailor’s proprietary 
reach beyond traceable assets. With respect, such a suggestion fails to take into 
account that a beneficiary under a trust may have no input into the appointment of 
that trustee. Therefore, it could not be said that the beneficiary has assumed the risk 
of the insolvency of the trustee. Moreover, equity has determined that proprietary 
intervention is required to protect the interests of beneficiaries due to the trust and 
confidence reposed in the trustee. The entire relationship is antithetical to the 
practical taking of risk. The argument in relation to bailors can be dispensed with 
quickly. The essential nature of bailment is that the bailor retains the legal and 
equitable proprietary interest in the assets. 134 It is for that reason that the goods stand 
outside the insolvent bailee’s estate.
Therefore, a practical result of equitable tracing may be the dilution of the 
beneficiary’s interest in the general assets of the fiduciary. The swollen assets theory 
permits the beneficiary to claim his proprietary interest against the whole of the 
assets of the fiduciary135 and it represents an extension to equitable tracing. If the 
swollen assets theory is re-appraised as the logical and coherent culmination of the 
equitable tracing rules rather than the destroyer of them, the inner logic of the
131
131 McLeod v Evans 28 NW 173 (SC Wisconsin, 1886); Evangelical v Synod o f North America v 
Schoeneich 45 SW 647 (SC Missouri, 1898) and the authorities cited therein at 650.
132
Davenport Plow Co v Lamp 45 NW 1049 (SC Iowa, 1890); Independent District v Boyer v King 
45 NW 908 (SC Iowa, 1890); Myers v Board o f Education o f City o f Clay Center 32 P 658 (SC 
Kansas, 1893).
133 Smith, above n 2, 313-314.
1 ^ Davis v Heuber (1923) 31 CLR 583, 595 (Higgins J).
135 cf American Express Co v Cochrane 137 So 696 (SC Florida, 1931) for a situation where the 
preferred claim was limited to cash assets.
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swollen assets theory becomes apparent. Swollen assets theory extends equity to 
secure the rights and interests of beneficiaries which the present equitable tracing do 
not protect. A failure to protect those interests results in the absurd result that an 
insolvent trustee may benefit from the misappropriation of trust funds where he has 
sufficiently muddied the tracing waters. As the Supreme Court of Missouri stated in 
Orr v St Louis Union Trust Co:136
It would indeed be strange doctrine that a trustee can accept money or 
other property in trust, and, by commingling such property with his 
own in hopeless confusion, defeat the very object and purpose of the 
trust. Such a rule would violate one of the cardinal principles of the
137law, that no man may take advantage of his own wrong.
2 Intervention in Commercial Relationships which are not Regulated by 
Fiduciary Obligations
The swollen assets theory was applied to situations where the relationship of 
the parties was not fiduciary (in the sense that they were not characterised as
138automatically fiduciary). Oesterle pointed that:
The high-water mark of tracing came in the early 1930’s when 
depositors in numerous bank failures found their accounts empty and 
were unable to trace their funds into any identifiable fund or property 
of the insolvent bank. The depositors were left to squabble among 
each other and with the bank’s other creditors for a share of the 
remaining assets. Courts in a few states, moved by the plight of some 
of the victims recognised a ‘swollen asset’ or ‘augmentation’ theory 
of tracing that gave those select depositors priority over other kinds of 
creditors...Under the new theory, if the plaintiff could prove some 
equitable wrong by the bank against him, he was excused from 
specifically tracing his lost funds into products of exchanges or into 
commingled funds. The mere fact that the bank wrongfully dealt with
136 236 SW 642 (SC Missouri, 1922). See also Nelson v McClean ’s Estate 161 SW (2d) 676 (Kansas 
City Court of Appeals, 1942) which cited and followed this case. Note also First Trust Co o f Lincoln 
v Exchange Bank 254 NW 569 (SC Nebraska, 1934).
137 Ibid 649.
138
Oesterle, above n 80.
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the plaintiffs assets entitled him to an equitable lien on the bank’s 
entire estate for the full amount of the loss.139
Scott and Fratcher argued that it would be incorrect to base priority on the character 
of the wrong because it:
would seem to be unjust to the general creditors, and no court has 
gone so far as to base priority merely upon the character of the wrong
A 140done.
At this point, Scott and Fratcher have shown that the swollen assets theory never 
operated solely on the basis of the defendant’s wrong without recourse to the issue of 
whether the defendant’s assets had been augmented initially. To this extent, Scott’s 
evaluation was correct. But the effect of such an assertion has been to underestimate 
the context in which a defendant received money which courts did examine closely.
This attitude towards the award of proprietary relief is no longer tenable. As 
shown in Chapter 3,141 it leads to the unsatisfactory use and abuse of the law of 
fiduciary obligations.
Moreover, linked to the fiduciary' pre-requisite issue, there has been an 
unnecessary bifurcation of rules in common law and equity. This problem has been 
ably raised by Smith142 who has shown that the development of common law 
following (which does not have a fiduciary pre-requisite) was unnecessarily limited 
by early case law.143 There can be no doubt that the existence of two regimes has led 
to the unnecessary complexity. Where Smith’s argument and underlying theme of 
this thesis diverge is the remaining importance of equity as the primary determinant 
of proprietary relief and the role of the swollen assets theory. Smith contends that 
common law following (which for Smith is essentially a mechanical process) would 
operate in much the same way as the present rule of equitable tracing without the
139 Ibid 189 fn 33.
140 Scott and Fratcher, above n 100, vol V, § 521.
141 Chapter 3, 122-125.
142 Smith, above n 2, 120-130.
143 Ibid 162-174; Lionel D Smith, ‘Tracing in Taylor v Plumer. Equity in the Court of King's Bench’ 
[1995] Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 240.
165
need for equity’s fiduciary pre-requisite. However, there would be no need for the 
adoption of the swollen assets theory. Therefore, the common law could make a 
proprietary response to unjust enrichment without the need to consider equitable 
principles. Instead, this thesis asserts that proprietary relief ought to be linked to 
equitable principles and that those principles can regulate the application of the 
swollen assets theory.
The retention of the fiduciary pre-requisite would mean that there would be 
situations where the insolvent non-fiduciary could act with impunity and the plaintiff 
would not be entitled to any proprietary relief. As equity has re-emerged in the late 
20th century, the limitations which were placed on the operation of equitable tracing 
are no longer sensible. There will be situations which are not governed by fiduciary 
obligations where equitable proprietary relief is merited because our modem notion 
of unconscionable conduct demands it.
Finally, Oesterle’s presentation of the remedy available for an aggrieved 
depositor was correct, in so far that it represented the swollen assets theory at its 
broadest and most effective. However, the description also suggested that the theory 
(unrestrained by the fiduciary pre-requisite) was applied generously in favour of 
commercial depositors. An examination of the case law indicates that this was not so.
Whilst some commercial parties were accorded proprietary rights analogous 
to a beneficiary’s interest in a trust, some courts held that the plaintiff was only 
entitled to trace as a beneficiary if it were possible to identify the assets144 and/or the 
bank’s assets were currently augmented.145 Therefore, the comprehensive swollen 
assets theory was not available in all cases. However, there were four situations in 
which courts apparently intervened and provided relief to a customer who would 
have otherwise been left to pursue personal remedies.146 These situations could not 
be interpreted as opening up an unmanageable or uncertain collection of exceptions
144 Woco Pep Co v Montgomery 149 So 692 (SC Alabama, 1933); Tri-Lake Const. Co v Northam 184 
NE 792 (Appellate Court Indiana, 1933); School District No 62 v Schramm 20 P (2d) 241 (SC 
Oregon, 1933).
145 Burnes National Bank of St Joseph Mo v Spurway 28 F (2d) 40 (District Court Iowa, 1928); 
National Bank of the Republic v Porter 258 P 544 (SC Idaho, 1927); Kansas State Bank v First State 
Bank of Marrion 64 P 634 (SC Kansas, 1901); Kershaw v Jenkins 71 F (2d) 647 (10th Cir, 1934); 
Edisto National Bank of Orangeburg SC v Bryant 72 F (2d) 917 (4th Cir, 1934). A modem example is 
Chase Manhattan NA v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd [1981] Ch 105.
146 For a discussion of some of these situations see Hirsch, above n 79, 12-13.
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to the principle of rateable distribution. Hirsch has referred to these kinds of 
situations as those in which the defendant was characterised by the courts as being a 
trustee ex maleficio. 147 A trustee ex maleficio is:
A person who, being guilty of wrongful or fraudulent conduct, is held 
by equity to the duty and liability of a trustee, in relation to the 
subject-matter, to prevent him from profiting by his own 
wrongdoing. 148
Courts utilised swollen assets theory to ensure that a wrongdoer did not profit from 
wrongdoing.
(a) Accepting Deposits When Insolvent.
Prior to the Depression, courts took a dim view of banks which accepted 
deposits in the knowledge that the bank was hopelessly insolvent. Courts had held 
that the relationship of debtor and creditor did not arise but instead, such an act 
constituted a fraud and the customer was entitled to a preferential claim. 149 This 
position did not change during the Depression. There were a number of cases in 
which the courts accorded a plaintiff a proprietary remedy or discussed the 
possibility of a plaintiff being accorded such a remedy. 150 These cases arose in the 
context of the transfer of money, 151 deposits152 and the collection of cheques. 155 
There were three main requirements.
148 Henry Campbell Black, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed, 1990) 1514.
149 See for example Richardson v New Orleans Coffee Co Ltd Co 102 F 780 (5th Cir, 1900).
150 Scharnberg v Citizens National Bank of Spencer, Iowa 33 F (2d) 673 (8th Cir, 1929); Great 
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v Citizens National Bank 2 Fed Supp 29 (District Court Pennsylvania, 
1932); Florida Bank and Trust Co v Yaffey 136 So 399 (SC Florida, 1931); Cameron v Carnegie 
Trust Co 140 A 768 (SC Pennsylvania, 1928); Lipchutz v Philadelphia Saving Fund Society 164 A 74 
(SC Pennsylvania, 1933); Tri-Lake Co v Northam 134 NE 792 (Appellate Court Indiana, 1933).
151 Scharnberg v Citizens National Bank of Spencer, Iowa 33 F (2d) 673 (8th Cir, 1929).
152 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co v Citizens’ National Bank 2 F Supp 29 (District Court 
Pennsylvania, 1932).
153 Cameron v Carnegie Trust Co 140 A 768 (SC Pennsylvania, 1928); Lipschutz v Philadelphia 
Savings Fund Society 164 A74 (SC Pennsylvania, 1933).
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First, the defendant had to be insolvent. For some courts this meant that the 
defendant must be in the situation that there was no possibility that it could save 
itself from the desperate financial predicament. 154 The Court stated in Quin v 
Earle:]55
But fraud must be proved, and is not to be presumed, and the burden 
of proof is on the complainant. The mere fact that the bank was in an 
embarrassed condition, by reason of the large indebtedness to it from 
its president, is not sufficient of itself to establish fraud in this case. A 
trader, whether a corporation or an individual, may be struggling in 
the straits of financial embarrassment, but with an honest hope of 
weathering the financial storm and of being eventually solvent. 
Property received by such an individual or concern in the ordinary 
course of business during the period of such embarrassment becomes 
honestly theirs, and the fact that their expectations were unrealised, 
and their hopes not well founded, would not fasten upon them a fraud 
that would vitiate their business transactions. 156
Such a requirement neither undermined the rule that generally customers have a 
personal remedy against the bank, nor undercut rateable distribution. The financial 
institution took funds in circumstances where it was impossible for it to repay an 
equivalent amount to the depositor.
Hirsch suggested that a less strict approach was applied as well. He pointed
out that some courts have held that a plaintiff was successful on the basis that the
1defendant bank was ‘unable to meet its current obligations as they mature.’ 
Another way of describing the test was:
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co v Citizens’ National Bank 2 F Supp 29 (District Court 
Pennsylvania, 1932), 32.
155 95 F 728 (Circuit Court Pennsylvania, 1899). This case was cited and quoted with approval in 
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co v Citizens ’ National Bank 2 F Supp 29 (District Court Pennsylvania, 
1932), 32.
156 Ibid 732.
157 Hirsch, above n 79, 12 fn 5.
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891(Court o f Appeals Georgia, 1914); Commonwealth v Tradesmen’s Trust Co 85 A 363 (SC 
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insolvency in its legal sense, which exists whenever such an 
institution as this, from any cause, is unable to pay its debts in the 
ordinary or usual course of its business. 159
In many cases, the circumstances of the case would fulfil both the tests enunciated in 
Quin v Earle and the legal definition of insolvency. The question is whether there 
was any significant difference between the two approaches. A qualitative difference 
may exist in relation to the actual amount of money which the debtor owes and 
whether there was a prospect (however negligible) that the business may be rescued. 
And it can be argued that the financial embarrassment was not the same as legal 
insolvency because the former was a temporary aberration in the liquidity of the 
bank (and a manifestation of a practical incapacity to pay) rather than the lack of 
sufficient assets to discharge the debt. But, that is a fine line and should not be 
overstressed to the detriment of a plaintiff. What the two different approaches 
showed was that the access to proprietary relief was limited to situations where the 
defendant was actually insolvent at the time the payment is made.
Secondly, the relevant officers had to know that the bank was insolvent. This 
principle had been articulated in Quin v Earle160 and was applied in other cases as 
well. 161 The problem with this criterion is whether it was necessary that the officer 
knew that the bank was insolvent or whether it was adequate that the officer had 
sufficient knowledge to indicate that he ought to have been aware of the insolvency. 
It is arguable that the complexity of showing these factors could justify the 
conclusion that, although the criteria leading to the application of the swollen assets 
theory was limited, there was still great uncertainty. However, the appropriate reply 
is that these matters raised evidential problems more than they raise problems of the 
clarity of the general principle. Unfortunately, the cases are not decisive. Generally, 
it was unnecessary to consider the proof of knowledge because the officers were 
found to have known of the insolvency anyway. Even where the question of
159 Commonwealth v Tradesmen’s Trust Co o f Philadelphia 85 A 363 (SC Pennsylvania, 1915), 364. 
See also Section 40 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) for the kinds of situations where an act of insolvency 
will occur. For a general discussion see Dennis Rose in Lewis: Australian Bankruptcy Law (10th ed, 
1994) Chapters 5 and 6.
160 95 F 728 (1899), 732.
161 Scharnberg v Citizens ’ National Bank o f Spencer, Iowa 33 F (2d) 673 (8th Cir, 1929); Cameron v 
Carnegie Trust Co 140 A 768 (SC Pennsylvania, 1928); Corn Exchange National Bank v Solicitors’ 
Loan & Trust Co 41 A 536 (SC Pennsylvania, 1898).
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knowledge was raised, the defendant did not present sufficient evidence to show 
that he did not have knowledge of the insolvency. He simply denied the allegation 
whilst there was ample evidence which indicated knowledge on his part. 163 It may 
well be that the fact that the institution continued trading when management was 
aware of the appalling financial situation would be sufficient to meet such a 
knowledge requirement. After all, the continued trading in cases of insolvency would 
constitute a misrepresentation of financial worthiness. Whether the bank clerk who 
handled the mundane aspects of the transaction actually knew of the insolvency 
would probably be irrelevant if the institution continued trading and the controlling 
office bearers were aware of the insolvency.
Thirdly, the depositor or forwarder of the cheques for collection was not be 
aware of the insolvency of the defendant bank. This is not specifically articulated in 
the case law. But, it is understood that a party cannot be accused of fraud in these 
circumstances when a depositor does know (or has good reason to know) that the 
bank is insolvent. Another way of stating this is that the plaintiff did not know of the 
insolvency and presumed that the bank was solvent and operating in the ordinary 
course of business. As the condition of the defendant was otherwise, the plaintiff had 
not assumed the risk of the defendant’s pre-existing insolvency. The appropriate 
course of action for the bank was either to refuse to accept the deposit or cheque, or, 
on acceptance, to segregate the funds from the bank’s other cash assets. 164
(b) Failure to Honour a Depositor ys Cheque on Presentation
Courts granted proprietary relief on the basis that there has been a failure of 
a bank to honour the depositor’s cheque on presentation, whilst the bank was still 
solvent. 165 Courts held that it was the duty of the bank to make payment on the
162
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163 Ibid 770.
164 Lipchutz v Philadelphia Saving Fund Society 164 A 74 (SC Pennsylvania 1933), 76.
165 Koehler v Joplin State Bank 68 SW (2d) 728 (Springfield Court of Appeals, Missouri, 1934); 
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cheque from the account.166 In Johnson v Farmers’ Bank o f Clarksdale67 the Court 
considered this situation stating:
If it be conceded that the deposit was general, thus creating the 
relation of debtor and creditor, such relation was changed when the 
$3200 check was drawn by plaintiff against such deposit and 
presented to defendant bank for payment. At that time plaintiff had on 
deposit, and the bank had on hand and on deposit in the First National 
Bank of St Joseph, sufficient money with which to pay the check. It 
was the defendant’s duty to pay the check....It being defendant’s duty 
to pay the check, after its refusal so to do it held the amount of the 
check as trustee... It would be unjust to permit plaintiff to suffer loss, 
or permit the other creditors of the bank to profit by the wrongful act
i c o
of the bank in refusing to pay plaintiffs check when presented.
The result was that, although the money had not been segregated and was not 
traceable under orthodox principles, the depositor could obtain a preferential interest 
in the assets of the bank for the amount of the cheque.
In Bryan v Coconut Grove Bank & Trust Co169 the Supreme Court of Florida 
held that the plaintiffs interest was elevated to that of a special deposit170 and the 
plaintiffs preferential interest extended to all of the assets of the defendant:
That the funds thus held upon special or specific deposit improperly 
remained commingled with the general funds belonging to the bank 
by reason of the failure of the bank’s officers to segregate the funds as 
it was their duty to do, does not defeat appellant’s title to such funds 
merely because there is no way to identify the specific money. The 
mingling of such specific funds under those circumstances extends the 
trust to all the funds of the bank.171
166 Claxton v Cantley 297 SW 975 (Springfield Court of Appeals, Missouri, 1927); O ’Grady v Stotts 
City Bank 80 SW 696 (St Louis Court of Appeals, 1904); Allen Grocery Co v Bank o f Buchanan 
County 182 SW 777 (Kansas City of Court of Appeals. 1916)
167 11 SW (2d) 1090 (Kansas City Court of Appeals, 1928).
168 Ibid 1091.
169 132 So 481 (SC Florida, 1931).
170 See below, 173-174.
171 132 So 481 (SC Florida, 1931), 487.
171
In the light of commercial risk assumption, it could be said that upon the 
presentation of the cheque to the defendant banks, the risk which the plaintiff had 
willingly accepted as a depositor in the bank came to an end. The failure of the bank, 
whilst still in a solvent state, to accede to the request did not affect the legal and 
practical consequences of the depositor’s legal act. The debtor-creditor relationship 
had come to an end. The bank was no longer entitled to use the money as its own. 
The relationship had irrevocably changed from one based on debt and common law
172to one regulated by equity.
(c) Safekeeping
Hirsch argued that, where a bank has securities deposited with it for safe 
keeping and converted those securities and used the proceeds for its own use, then 
the bank was a trustee ex maleficio. The problem with Hirsch’s account was that 
some of the authorities to which he referred supported his general conclusion but 
they did not apply the swollen assets theory. Instead, orthodox tracing rules were 
applied174 Other cases concerned parties, other than depositors and banks, in the 
context of other actions such as theft. ' However, the authorities were helpful in the 
sense that they make it clear that persons who stole property or received stolen 
property with knowledge or stole property from their employer and invested it in 
property were held liable as trustees. They could not swell their assets from their 
own wrongdoing. In the context of the underlying theme of the thesis, a party from 
whom money is stolen, did not assume the risk of the insolvency of the thief. So 
too, depositors of securities with banks for safekeeping did not bear the risk of 
wrongdoing or the risk of insolvency.
172 Ibid 484-485.
173 Hirsch, above n 79, 13.
174 Re Royersford Trust Co 178 A 288 (SC Pennsylvania, 1935), 289-290.
1 7S Fur & Wool Trading Co Ltd v George I Fox 156 NE 670 (Court of Appeals New York, 1927).
1/6 Ibid 671.
177 Preston v Moore 180 SW 320 (SC Tennessee, 1915); Nebraska National Bank v Johnson 71 NW 
294 (SC Nebraska, 1897).
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Chapter 6, 225-227.
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(d) Special Deposits and General Deposits for a Special Purpose
In addition to the specific example raised by Hirsch, there were also those 
cases which were categorised (and are still categorised) by courts in the United 
States as giving rise to special deposits and deposits for purposes. The former case 
was where the depositor entrusted chattels, securities or money with a bank which 
were to be held separately from the bank’s assets and not to be used by the bank as 
part of its own assets. The depositor, like the safekeeping category above, was not 
simply a general creditor of the bank and was entitled to trace the property into the 
assets of the bank.
General deposits for purposes were those situations where the bank undertook 
to apply money deposited with it in a way which the depositor specifically directed. 
Therefore, it can be said that the depositor did not take on the risk of the bank’s 
financial position, but rather used the bank as a conduit or agent to perform a task on 
the depositor’s behalf. Both prior to and during Depression years, courts held that the 
deposit made for a general purpose entitled the depositor to priority over the general 
creditors of the bank in the event of the bank’s insolvency. There were many 
purposes which the courts accepted as giving rise to a trust under which tracing 
rules could be used to ascertain property, including security for the performance of a 
contract, deposits for the payment of personal or real property, ~ deposits for 
investment in particular investment schemes104 and deposits for payment of 
indemnities to guarantors. 185 However, there were a large number of cases186 which
179 Scott and Fratcher, above n 100, vol VA, §530.
180 Ibid. See also Bloomheart v Foster 221 P 279 (SC Kansas, 1923); State v Bunton 285 SW 98 (SC 
Missouri, 1926) and Gwynn v Spurway 28 F (2d) 37 (District Court Iowa, 1928).
181 Scott and Fratcher, above n 100, vol VA, §530.
1 82
City o f Miami v Shutts 51 So 929 (SC Florida, 1910); Woodhouse v Crandall 64 NE 292 (SC 
Ilinois, 1902).
183 Interstate Trust & Banking Co v Jones County, Miss. 77 F(2d) 806 (5th Cir. 1935); Peoples- 
Ticonic Bank v Stewart 86 F (2d) 359 (1st Cir, 1936); Rossman v Blunt 104 F (2d) 877 (6th Cir, 1939); 
Shopert v Indiana National Bank 83 NE 515 (Appellate Court Indiana, 1907).
184 Harrison v Smith 53 Am Rep 571 (SC Missouri, 1884).
185 Marshall v Farmers & Merchants Bank of Steele 253 SW 15 (Springfield Court of Appeals 
Missouri, 1923).
186 For a full description see Scott and Fratcher, above n 100, vol VA, §530.
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were described as general deposits for purposes in which the courts held that the 
depositor did not acquire a priority over the general creditors of the bank. It is 
evident that not all courts were willing to impose trust obligations in what were 
otherwise general deposits. Moreover, despite the description of the purpose, the 
evidence was not sufficiently clear to show that the depositor did not intend that the 
bank should use the money as its own. ' Cases have suggested that what was at 
issue was whether or not there was a mutual understanding or agreement on the part 
of the bank and the depositor that the money could only be allocated for the specific 
purpose. If the deposit had been made on terms that the bank could not use the 
money as its own, then the depositor had not taken on the risk of the bank’s 
insolvency.
3 Evaluation o f  the Swollen Assets Theory
An analysis of the swollen assets theory indicates that it neither created 
uncertainty nor did it expand the proprietary net unduly. The underlying theme of the 
swollen assets theory was wrongdoing. If there had been a breach of fiduciary 
relationship and the funds could not be traced under orthodox tracing principles, then 
swollen assets theory provided a means by which the plaintiff could access 
proprietary relief. The swollen assets theory did not overturn equitable tracing. 
Rather it was the logical culmination of tracing rules which were overtaken by 
technological developments and economic chaos. 190
Where there was no fiduciary obligation imposed on the parties, intervention 
was on a limited and principled basis. The question here again was whether the 
conduct of the defendant bank was tantamount to wrongdoing. And, indeed, it could 
not be said that the situations where proprietary relief was awarded were 
controversial or unreasonable. The courts were careful not to haphazardly extend 
proprietary relief beyond what was considered absolutely necessary. It has been
187 Northern Sugar Corporation v Thompson 13 F (2d) 829 (8th Cir. 1926) and the authorities cited 
therein at 831-832.
188 Scott and Fratcher, above n 100, vol VA, §530, 8.
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Minnesota, 1926). For a discussion of special purpose in the context of mutual intention to create a 
trust see Chapter 3, 112-114.
190 Note in this context Taft, above n 73, 176-178.
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demonstrated that in each of the situations discussed, it could be shown that the 
plaintiff did not bear the risk of an unsecured status in the event of the defendant’s 
insolvency.
V Conclusion
The assumption that there must be a proprietary base before proprietary relief 
will be awarded is seriously under challenge. The manipulation and extension of 
following and tracing rules to accommodate the dynamics of commercial 
transactions must eventually lead to the conclusion that the pre-condition of a 
proprietary base is unnecessary and unworkable. The swollen assets theory presaged 
the increasing unworkability of the proprietary base theory.
It is feared that the swollen assets theory would lead to uncertainty. But, the 
historical material has shown that outside the traditional realm of fiduciary 
obligations, swollen assets theory was applicable only in a few circumstances where 
equity deemed a bank to be a ex maleficio. It did not open the proprietary net widely.
What the swollen assets theory did accomplish was a re-orientation of the 
analysis away from technical questions of whether or not the funds were still 
traceable into the hands of the defendant, to an evaluation of the nature and extent of 
the obligations between those parties. Whilst courts were freed from the mechanical 
constraints, they revisited (albeit intuitively) the values inherent in equitable tracing - 
risk assumption and unconscionable conduct.
Today, the swollen assets theory is the bridge between the orthodox 
proprietary view and a new approach to proprietary relief discussed in Part Two.
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PART TWO
A THEORY OF OBJECTIVE NON-ASSUMPTION OF RISK
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Chapter 5
EQUITY’S DOMAIN: UNCONSCIONABLE CONDUCT AND 
PROPRIETARY RELIEF
177
I Introduction
In Part One, the traditional gateways by which equity recognised and 
imposed proprietary interests and relief were considered. The traditional 
relationships which were discussed in Chapter 2 were cases where courts exercising 
equitable jurisdiction had found equitable proprietary interests or imposed equitable 
proprietary relief on the basis of the equitable notion of conscience.1 In Chapter 3, 
various means by which the traditional gateways have been manipulated by courts 
and commentators alike were discussed. It was argued in that chapter that some 
extensions have been utilised without appreciation of the underlying concepts of 
conscience and risk assumption which inform them. The result has been unnecessary 
ambiguity and uncertainty.
The function of Part Two is to delineate the basis upon which equitable 
proprietary intervention should take place. In this chapter, it will be contended that 
equity sustains the appropriate principles upon which proprietary relief ought to be 
granted. It will be argued that the determination of when equitable proprietary relief 
is available (outside well established categories) is inextricably bound up with an 
understanding of unconscionable conduct (or unconscionability). Unfortunately, this 
fundamental proposition has been lost amidst the confusion created by different 
labels and recent theories posited by English restitution lawyers. This chapter will 
commence with an analysis of the limitations of the mutual intention approach. 
Thereafter, unconscionable conduct will be identified and described in order to show 
the breadth and flexibility of the principle. However, it will be argued that equity’s 
inherent flexibility does not create unnecessary uncertainty or provide an avenue for 
the application of subjective notions of fairness and justice. Unconscionability has 
real and concrete meaning in equitable jurisprudence. The relationship of 
unconscionable conduct and unjust enrichment is also considered. Finally, the 
chapter is devoted to a theoretical analysis of how unconscionable conduct may 
contribute to a creditor’s non-assumption of the risk of the status of an unsecured 
creditor. It is argued that proprietary intervention is warranted when it can be shown 
that the unconscionable conduct had a causal connection to the creditor’s unsecured 
status; and, the creditor could not be expected to minimise the risk of the commercial 
transaction. This is referred to as the theory of objective non-assumption of risk.
For a discussion of the notion of conscience in equity see Patrick Parkinson, ‘The Conscience of 
Equity’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The Principles of Equity (1996) 28.
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Chapter 6 constitutes a practical and non-exhaustive application of the theory 
of objective non-assumption of risk. It describes the kinds of situations where equity 
does, and ought to, intervene and provide proprietary relief on the basis of non­
assumption of risk. In order to do so, it sets out certain market contexts which may 
indicate inherently that the creditor was, or was not, expected to minimise the risk of 
the commercial transaction. Thereafter, various kinds of unconscionable conduct are 
considered with a view to determining when equitable proprietary relief would be 
appropriate.
Chapter 7 delineates the kind of device equity ought to use when providing 
proprietary relief and the possible defences open to an insolvent and insolvency 
administrators. Equity has been highly creative in its remedial response to 
unconscionable conduct. It will be argued that where monetary transactions are 
involved in the insolvency context, a general equitable lien is preferable, even to the 
constructive trust. The history and traditional function of the equitable lien is 
considered in order to sustain the argument in its favour. However, a general 
equitable lien is still a theoretical construct in our law. Accordingly, a portion of the 
chapter is devoted to defining the general equitable lien, the potential operation of a 
general equitable lien and the policy issues which it foreshadows. Thereafter, 
possible defences to an action based on an objective non-assumption of risk are 
outlined.
II The Limitations of the Mutual Intention Approach
The mutual intention cases are a starting point for a determination of when 
and how equity ought to intervene in commercial transactions. It will be recalled that 
the mutual intention cases are those situations where two parties have mutual 
intention that funds should not form part of the assets of the recipient.
Where there is a requirement and/or actual segregation of the assets, then 
courts have been willing to find that there has been a mutual intention to create a 
trust. However, where there has been no segregation of assets, the question is 
whether a party has another basis upon which to argue entitlement to proprietary 
relief.
2 Chapter 3, Part III.
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The need for a shift from an intention based orientation of trust creation to an 
evaluation and application of unconscionable conduct, began to arise in the common 
intention cases dealing with de facto relationships and trusts. For example, in Allen v 
Snyder3 Glass JA held that courts could find that a trust regulated the ownership of a 
house where a couple lived and where the title was registered in the name of one 
party. Glass JA held that a court would find that the parties had created a trust in 
favour of the unregistered party, where the parties had expressed a common intention 
orally or where the conduct of the parties was such that it could be inferred from 
their conduct.4 His Honour drew a distinction between inferring an intention from the 
conduct of the parties and imputing intention. The former method was appropriate 
because, from the conduct of the parties, it was possible to infer their subjective 
intention as the basis of the express trust.5 However, Glass JA rejected the view that 
imputation of intention to create a trust was possible, that is, attributing intention 
without tangible evidence of such intention.6 7It was held that the woman in the de 
facto relationship failed to provide evidence from which a subjective mutual 
intention to create a trust could be drawn. The outcome of the case was criticised,
7inter alia, because it did not ‘do equity in such cases.’
In the absence of the segregation of funds or assets, the common intention 
cases drew attention to the difficulty of inferring intention from the acts and 
statements of parties and the fine line between inferring intention and imputing 
intention. How could it be said with certainty that certain kinds of financial 
arrangements or activities indicated an intention to create a trust to the exclusion of 
others? Surely, in identifying certain financial arrangements as indicative of 
intention, the court was making its own judgement as to what parties in a de facto
3 [1977] 2 NSWLR 685. See also Pettit v Pettit [1970] AC 777; Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886; 
Kardynal v Dodek [1980] FLC 190-823; Hohol v Hohol [1981] VR 221; Kelly v Price-Williams 
(1982) 8 Fam LR 665; Butler v Caine [1986] VR 274; Cooke v Cooke [1987] VR 625; Higgins v 
Wingfield [1987] VR 689; Green v Green (1989) 17 NSWLR 343; Grant v Edwards [1986] 638; 
Lloyd's Bank pic v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107; Hammond v Mitchell [1992] 2 All ER 109.
4 [1977] 2 NSWLR 685, 690-691.
5 Ibid 690.
6 Ibid. See also Cook v Fountain (1673) 3 Swans 585, 592; 36 ER 984, 987 (Lord Nottingham).
7
Patrick Parkinson, ‘Doing Equity between De Facto Spouses: From Calverley v Green to 
Baumgartner\ 1988) 11 Adelaide Law Review 370; Marcia Neave, ‘Living Together - The Legal 
Effects of the Sexual Division of Labour in Four Common Law Countries’ (1991) 17 Monash Law 
Review 14, 30.
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relationship should do in order to evince an intention to create a trust. The attempt to 
characterise the trust which arose, showed that the orthodox method of 
differentiating trusts on the basis of intention was becoming increasingly unhelpful. 
Indeed, some judges treated common intention trusts as express trusts. Some opined 
that the trust was in reality a constructive trust based on detrimental reliance on the 
common intention,9 whilst others viewed the arguments based on detrimental 
reliance as incorrect. 10 Some commentators have noted that there may be a 
progressive connection between common intention trusts and resulting trusts. * 11
The common intention trust was not the province of de facto relationships 
solely. In the absence of the segregation of assets, commercial parties sought to 
argue that a mutual intention to create a trust re-adjusted proprietary interests. The 
problems associated with arguing mutual intention in the de facto cases were 
apparent in them also. In Canadian Commercial Bank and Paristyle Novelty Co Ltd 
and Sheen ’s for Shoes Ltd v RT Holman Ltd an insolvent company, Holmans, was 
the head tenant in a building complex to which rental payments were forwarded by 
other sub-tenants, such as Paristyle. The rental payments were deposited and 
intermingled in an operating account. Holmans was required to remit the payments to 
the landlord. During the insolvency proceedings, the question was whether a trust 
operated in favour of the sub-tenants for the rental payments. McQuaid J held that a 
trust did not operate in favour of the sub-tenants. In the absence of the segregation 
requirement, did the common intention of the parties create a resulting trust? His 
Honour said:
While the express trust is a creature of the parties, the implied trust,
be it resulting or constructive, is a creature of the law. The resulting
trust is founded in the concept of common intent, that is to say, it
g
Barbara McDonald, ‘Constructive Trusts’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed) The Principles o f Equity (1996) 
[2139]-[2142],
9 Ibid [2143]; Jill E Martin, Hanbury & Martin: Modern Equity (15th ed, 1997) 267-268; Cooke v 
Cooke [1987] VR 625; Hohol v Hohol [1981] VR 221; Higgins v Wingfield [1987] VR 689; Grant v 
Edwards [1986] Ch 638; Austin v Keele (1987) 10 NSWLR 283; cf Thwaites v Ryan [1984] VR 65 
(particularly the judgement of Fullagar J).
10 GE Dal Pont and DRC Chalmers, Equity and Trusts in Australia and New Zealand (1996) 705- 
706.
11 See the discussion in HAJ Ford and WA Lee, Principles o f the Law o f Trusts (3rd ed, 1996) 
[22340]; DWM Waters, Law o f Trusts in Canada (2nd ed, 1984) 357-361.
12 (1986) 59 CBR(NS) 79.
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arises in cases where the court is satisfied by the words or conduct of 
the parties that it was their common intention that the beneficial 
interest in the property in question was not to reside in the party in 
possession, but rather was to be shared between them in some 
determined or determinable proportion. 13
In rejecting a trust based on common intention, His Honour said:
That depends upon the existence of a perceived common intention to 
create a trust. While it may (or may not) have been in the mind of 
Paristyle from the execution of the lease that there did exist such 
mutuality of understanding necessary for the creation of a resulting 
trust, I interpret the document, in its operational clauses, to spell out a 
simple, straightforward business transaction. Paristyle is to make 
daily deposits with Holman’s, to be credited to the Paristyle account.
Over the course of the month various and varying debits are to be 
charged against the account. If at the end of the monthly accounting 
period there remains a credit balance showing on the ledger sheet, 
Holman’s are to forward to Paristyle its cheque representing that 
credit balance. This exemplifies a common intention as to how the 
account is to be operated, which is not the same thing, in my view, as 
the comon (sic) intention to create a trust. Accordingly, I find no 
resulting trust in the lease document. 14
The case highlighted that a plaintiff seeking to prove that there was a trust was 
required to present convincing evidence of a common intention to have a trust 
regulate the relationship. The outcome was correct because the sub-tenants did take 
on the risk of the insolvency of the head tenant.
In Ausintel Investments Australia Pty Ltd v Lam, 15 a shareholder of a 
company called Ausintel Investments (Aust) Pty Ltd (‘Austinel’) Mrs Lam, had paid 
a deposit into a bank. This bank had provided charges to two other banks as security 
for liabilities of a company related to Austinel, Deutsche Anlangen Leasing Pty Ltd 
(‘Deutsche’). The managing director of Ausintel had obtained agreement from Lam 
to convert the deposit from a security into equity capital by way of injection of 
deposit funds into Ausintel, in exchange for an allotment of shares. Thus, the 
company acquired funds to pay out the two security holding banks. The shares were
13 Ibid 84.
14 Ibid 87-88.
15 (1990) 19 NSWLR 637; See also Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London 
Borough Council [1996] AC 669.
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never issued and Lam sought the winding up of Ausintel. The company 
acknowledged its indebtedness and repaid an amount equivalent to the amount 
invested. However, the company refused to pay interest on those moneys. The New 
South Wales Court of Appeal held that the company did not owe interest to Lam. 
Meagher JA (with whom Gleeson CJ agreed) held that, in the absence of any express 
or implied agreement as to how the money was to be used, the investment funds 
became part of the assets of the company. The funds were not held on trust and there 
were no fiduciary obligations owed to Lam. 16 Mahoney JA said:
But, there are, in my opinion, a number of difficulties involved in this 
submission. First, the basis of the decision in Barclays Bank Ltd v 
Quistclose Investments Ltd itself appears to have been that the 
moneys paid to the company there in question was the subject of 
equitable obligations because it was the common intention of the 
parties that the beneficial ownership of the money should not pass 
from the payer to the company...In so far as that principle is relied on 
in this case, it is inapplicable because, if the legal transactions to be 
constructed were as I have stated them, then the ownership of the 
money was to pass to Ausintel because it in turn had to pass the 
ownership of the money to Deutsche which in turn was to pass it to 
the two banks. And the transactions were carried into effect as 
agreed. 17
Even if the transactions had been subject to some kind of equitable obligation, that 
obligation had been discharged when Ausintel paid the money to Deutsche. Again, 
the outcome was correct because there was no indication of any factors which would 
tend to undercut the normal function of money as a negotiable entity.
However, the case raises some interesting questions about how the Court 
would have approached the matter if Ausintel had refused to issue the shares and had 
become insolvent. Would Mrs Lam have been able to argue that she had acquired 
some proprietary interest by virtue of the agreement to issue the shares in the 
company and Ausintel’s failure to disclose its imminent collapse? As there was no 
discernible common intention, it is strongly arguable that the answer would lie in an 
evaluation of the insolvent’s conduct and the creditor’s capacity to evaluate 
commercial risk in a fully informed way.
16 (1990) 19 NSWLR 637, 646-648.
17 Ibid 641.
1 8
Ibid 641-642.
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I l l  T he Meaning  of Unconscionable Conduct
Having highlighted the limitations of mutual intention, it is necessary to 
review the broad context in which equity may intervene without proof of intention or 
the existence of traditional equitable relationships.
It has been a basic contention of the thesis that equitable principle is the most 
appropriate basis for awarding proprietary relief. So, in order to ascertain whether 
equitable proprietary relief is available to an aggrieved party in an insolvency 
context, it is necessary to ascertain the appropriate equitable principles and apply 
them. It will be specifically contended that equity ought to intervene and provide 
proprietary relief when there is a causal connection between the insolvent’s 
unconscionable conduct and the creditor’s unsecured status. Therefore, it is 
necessary to understand the nature and scope of unconscionable conduct and the 
commercial environment in which the transaction takes place.
In Chapter 1, it was pointed out that there has been a reaction against equity 
intervening in commercial cases.19 The concern has been that a judge will intervene 
on a subjective basis rather than on the basis of principle. This concern is a 
legitimate one, in the light of the fact that some judges have suggested (perhaps 
unwittingly) that the concept of unconscionability or fairness is a broad one 
untrammelled by objective principle.21
So too, it is a legitimate contention that the law which governs commercial 
transactions and insolvency administration should be as certain and accessible as 
possible. For example, Lord Browne-Wilkinson said in Westdeutsche Landesbank 
Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council ( ‘Westdeutsche )  that:
19 Chapter 1, 30.
20 Peter Birks, ‘Equity in the Modem Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’ [1996] 26 The University of 
Western Australia Law Review 1, 22-25.
21 See for example Sir Robin Cooke, ‘Fairness’ [1989] 19 Victoria University o f Wellington Law 
Review 421 and Hussey v Palmer [1972] 1 WLR 1286, 1289-1290 (Lord Denning); cf Parkinson, 
above n 1, [204],
22 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669.
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a businessman who has entered into transactions relating to or 
dependent upon property rights could find that assets which
23apparently belong to one person in fact belong to another“
This remains a compelling reason why courts should limit the availability of 
proprietary relief. This approach would explain why Pincus J in Re Miles; Ex parte 
National Australia Bank Ltd v The Official Receiver in Bankruptcy24 advocated a 
limitation of the device of mutual intention trusts to loan situations found in 
Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Ltd26 and His Honour’s statement in another case 
that:
One of the reasons why the process of liquidation or bankruptcy often 
produces such disappointing results is that the trustee or liquidator 
finds that litigation is necessary to recover property or resolve legal 
problems. Creditors tend to be reluctant to fund this. It appears to me 
that where the law is not quite settled, courts should lean in favour of
27results which conduce to certainty in bankruptcy administration.
Indeed, another factor which must be noted in the quest for certainty, will be the 
need for trustees and liquidators to keep litigation costs to a minimum. It would be a 
complete travesty of justice if the assets which were the subject of dispute were 
devoured in the costs of litigation.
However, the need for certainty is tempered by the requirement that an 
insolvent should not unduly benefit from his unconscionable conduct. As insolvency
regimes do not generally furnish clear rules in relation to unconscionable conduct,
28equitable principles remain relevant in insolvency administration.
The concept of unconscionability (or unconscionable conduct) is at the core 
of the operation and intervention of equity throughout its history. Equity embraced a 
broad notion of fraud, which not only included actual fraud, but also the
23 Ibid 705.
24 (19 8 8) 20 FCR 194.
25 Ibid 199.
26 [1970] AC 567.
“7 Re Osborn; Ex parte Trustee o f Property of Osborn v Osborn (1989) 91 ALR 135, 141. 
28 See Ex parte James: Re Condon (1874) LR 9 Ch App 609.
185
unscrupulous advantageous taking of the innate weakness of another person. The 
concept of equitable fraud was an evolving one which would adapt to the exigencies 
of an era. Therefore, Lord Hardwicke said:
But as to relief against frauds, no invariable rules can be established.
Fraud is infinite, and were a Court of Equity once to lay down rules, 
how far they would go, and no farther, in extending their relief against 
it, or to define strictly the species or evidence of it, the jurisdiction 
would be cramped, and perpetually eluded by new schemes, which the
30fertility of man’s invention would contrive.
And other judges have also called for the need to allow equity a degree of flexibility 
in dealing with fraud. However, this flexibility has been reined in to prevent 
unconscionability being used as a blanket justification for an intuitive and subjective
32sense of justice.
There have been recent and useful attempts to define the underlying rationale 
of equitable wrongdoing or unconscionable conduct; and by this means predict with 
some certainty the kinds of cases which will arise under this rubric.33 What is stated 
below, is an attempt to refine these explanations and to connect the concept of 
unconscionable conduct with the way equity is operating in modem commercial 
transactions.
There are, broadly speaking, five kinds of conduct which fall within the 
general notion of unconscionable conduct. However, this is not a complete account 
because
90
29
Earl of Chesterfield v Janssen (1751) 2 Ves Sen 125, 155-156; 28 ER 82, 100.
30 Letter to Lord Kames cited in LA Sheridan, Fraud in Equity: A Study in English and Irish Law 
(1957) 2.
31 The Right Honourable Sir Raymond Evershed ‘Influence of Remedies on Rights’ (1953) 6 Current 
Legal Problems 1, 20 also cited in Sheridan, above n 30.
32 See Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583, 615 (Deane J).
33 See for example, Paul Finn, ‘Unconscionable Conduct’ (1994) 8 Journal of Contract Law, 37; 
Parkinson, above n 1; David M Wright, The Remedial Constructive Trust (1998) [3.30],
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it is impossible to describe definitively all the situations in which 
relief will be granted on the ground of unconscionable conduct.34
A Common Law and Equitable Wrongdoing
First, there are situations which both common law and equity will
35characterise as wrongdoing. In Earl o f Chesterfield v Janssen, Lord Hardwicke
36referred to actual fraud. An important situation in insolvency contexts is theft of 
property. Here, not only may common law civil and criminal remedies be available, 
but equity may also provide relief as well. This situation is discussed further in 
Chapter 6.37
B Breach o f Equitable Obligations
The second kind of conduct is breach of a pre-existing equitable obligation, 
such as a breach of trust, breach of fiduciary obligations or breach of 
confidence.40 When there is a breach of these equitable duties, there is a fundamental 
violation of such trust and confidence. It is also possible that the notion of presumed 
undue influence may fall under this category. In some cases, it is assumed that a 
party reposes trust and confidence in another and that the transaction in issue has
41been effected by improper means.
Commercial Bank o f Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447, 461 (Mason J) quoted with 
approval in Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 155 ALR 614 [29] (Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ).
35 (1751) 2 Ves Sen 125; 28 ER 82.
36 Ibid 155; 100.
37 Chapter 6, 225-226.
38 Parkinson, above n 1, [208].
39 Ibid. See also Chapter 2, 63-64.
40 Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203; [1963] 3 All ER 
413n. Megan Richardson and Jennifer Stuckey-Clarke, ‘Breach of Confidence’ in Patrick Parkinson 
(ed), The Principles o f Equity (1996) 420, [1202].
41 Parkinson, above n 1, [208]. See also Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 155 ALR 614 
[33] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
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C Exploitation o f Vulnerability
The third kind of equitable wrongdoing is where there is no pre-existing 
equitable obligation in the context of the commercial relationship, but a party can 
point to the exploitation of vulnerability or weakness, at the time that the transaction 
was entered into or when representations were made 42
One example of unconscionable dealing is where a party, aware of the 
vulnerability of the other, sets out to exploit i t 43 Such exploitation may also take the 
form of taking advantage of an apparent lack of business experience.44 Another 
example is where there is conduct in which one party overbears the will of the other. 
This is the traditional rationale for undue influence.45
Unconscionable conduct may also be passive, but equally effective at the 
time of the transaction. It may well be that some forms of unconscionable dealing 
and undue influence are less actively unconscionable. This will be a matter of 
degree. However, equity will intervene when the conscience of the insolvent is 
tainted with the knowledge at the time of the transaction (or soon after), that the 
creditor has, for example, made a mistake or entered into an ultra vires transaction. 
Again, the foundation of the action in equity is the debtor’s knowledge of his 
wrongdoing and the exploitation of the creditor’s lack of information 46
In such cases, the exploitation of vulnerability (whether that vulnerability is 
conventional disadvantage, lack of business experience or simply a lack of 
information) is remedied by disclosure. The kind of disclosure which is required will 
depend on the case. However, such disclosure will inform the creditor of the 
prospective commercial risk and transforms it into an acceptable transaction from an 
equitable point of view.
42
Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd vAmadio (1983) 151 CLR 447, 461 (Mason J).
43 See for example Wilton v Farnworth (1948) 76 CLR 646; Blomley v Ryan (1954-56) 99 CLR 362.
44 A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay [1974] 1 WLR 1308; Clifford Davis 
Management Ltd v WEA Records Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 61; Morlend Finance Corp (Vic) Pty Ltd v Luke 
(1991) ASC156-095.
45 Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113, 134-135 (Dixon J); cf Garcia v National Australia Bank 
Ltd (1998) 155 ALR614.
46 See the discussion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v 
Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669, 711-716.
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D Unconscionable Insistence on Rights
A fourth kind of unconscionable conduct is where there is an unconscionable 
insistence on legal rights. For example, the law of equitable estoppel47 and the law in 
relation to penalties and forfeiture are based on this principle. In the recent decision 
of Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd,49 a majority of the High Court50 drew on 
the existence of this recognised form of unconscionable conduct to explain in what 
situations equity would set aside a wife’s guarantee of the husband’s liabilities. They 
held that the lender was taken to understand that the wife may not fully understand 
the effect of the guarantee because she reposes trust and confidence in the advice of 
the husband. As a matter of principle, where the guarantee was voluntary (that is, the 
guarantor obtained no benefit from the transaction), the lender will be required to 
explain the transaction or be aware that the wife received competent, independent 
and disinterested advice.51 Otherwise, the bank’s enforcement of the guarantee and
52insistence on legal rights will constitute unconscionable conduct.
E Unconscionable Retention o f Property
Unconscionable conduct also encompasses situations in which, at the time of 
the transaction, an insolvent could not be accused of acting unconscionably. It is for 
this reason that Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s judgment in Westdeutsche, 53 is 
unsatisfactory. It is possible for a party to act unconscionably after the initial 
transaction has been concluded and his conscience be sufficiently tainted to require 
equitable intervention. Herq Muschinski v Dodds ( ‘Muschinski’) is relevant.54
Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130; Commonwealth v 
Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394.
48 Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406; Stern v McArthur {1988) 165 CLR 489.
49 Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 155 ALR 614.
50 Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ.
51 Ibid [31].
52 Ibid [32],
53 [1996] AC 669.
54 Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583.
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A de facto couple bought a cottage as tenants in common in equal share in a 
domestic and commercial venture. A large portion of the purchase price was paid by 
the woman. It was agreed that the man would contribute his share of the purchase 
price by working in the commercial venture. The domestic relationship and 
commercial venture came to a premature end. The woman claimed that the man held 
the property on trust for her. The question was whether he did, and if so, on what 
basis?
Some important initial points need to be made. The woman could not argue 
that the parties had a common intention to create an express trust. The evidence 
indicated the opposite. The property was registered in the name of the two parties 
and it was the mutual intention of the parties that this would be the case. Therefore, it 
is not surprising, in the light of the woman’s intention that the man benefit from the 
transaction, that arguments based on some kind of resulting trust were 
unsuccessful.55 In this respect, the situation in Muschinski was similar to the transfer 
of funds where the intention of the transferor was that the transferee acquire the title 
of the money.
There was no suggestion that the man acted unconscionably prior to the 
transaction taking place. The case arose because the personal and commercial 
relationship came to an end. The understanding between the parties was that the man 
would acquire a registered legal interest in the property on the basis that in the future 
he would develop the property and build a kit house as the couple’s residence. The 
man never performed these tasks. Therefore, equity was called upon to intervene in 
a case where there was a breakdown of a joint commercial and personal endeavour 
with no attributable blame.
Deane J, who handed down the leading judgement on unconscionable 
conduct in the case, made it clear that he did not want to expand equitable 
intervention to the extent that the concept of unconscionability would become a 
hollow justification for judicial intervention.56 He carefully examined partnership 
cases from the last century where courts had to deal with the distribution of property, 
where there had been a dissolution of the partnership57 and the parties had not set out
55 Ibid 590-593 (Gibbs CJ); 611-612 (Deane J).
56 Ibid 615.
57 Ibid 620; Note for example Atwood v Maud (1868) LR 3 Ch App 369.
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how the property should be apportioned. For example, in Lyon v Tweddell Jessell 
MR said that:
it is the duty of the Court when dissolving a partnership on equitable 
grounds to decide upon what fair terms the dissolution should be 
made. This has been treated in the argument as a simple question of 
return of part of the premiums. But that is only one element of the 
question. It is the duty of the Court to look at all the facts, and do 
what is equitable between the parties.59
In the light of these cases, Deane J opined that as a commercial relationship (and no 
more), the man's attempt to keep his interest in the property without compensating 
the woman, would have been unconscionable. The personal arrangements in this case 
did not alter this conclusion.60 He stated in a crucial account of the principle of 
unconscionable conduct:
The prima facie rules respectively entitling a fixed term partner to a 
proportionate refund of his or her premium and a contractual joint 
venturer to a proportionate repayment of his or her capital 
contribution on the premature dissolution of the partnership or 
collapse of the joint venture are properly to be seem as instances of a 
more general principle of equity. That more general principle of 
equity can also be readily related to the general equitable notions 
which find expression in the common law count for money had and 
received...Like most of the traditional doctrines of equity, it operates 
upon legal entitlement to prevent a person from asserting or 
exercising a legal right in circumstances where the particular assertion 
or exercise of it would constitute unconscionable conduct...Those 
circumstances can be more precisely defined by saying that the 
principle operates in a case where the substratum of a joint 
relationship or endeavour is removed without attributable blame and 
where the benefit of money or other property contributed by one party 
on the basis and for the purposes of the relationship or endeavour 
would otherwise be enjoyed by the other party in circumstances in 
which it was not specifically intended or specially provided that that 
other party should so enjoy it. The content of the principle is that, in 
such a case, equity will not permit that other party to assert or retain
58
58
(1881) 17 Ch D 529.
59 Ibid 531.
60 (19 8 5) 160 CLR 583, 621-622.
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the benefit of the relevant property to the extent that it would be
unconscionable for him to do.61
In this statement, Deane J made it very clear that equity’s concept of unconscionable 
conduct encompassed far more than the kind of guilty conscience envisaged by 
Birks " or Lord Browne-Wilkinson. The concept of unconscionability included 
situations where a party has acted initially with propriety, but the subsequent events 
turned out quite differently from original circumstances in which the property was 
transferred. Unconscionable conduct addressed the problem of the unconscionable 
retention of benefits on the breakdown of a joint endeavour. In Muschinski itself, 
Deane J held that a constructive trust in favour of the woman was appropriate. There 
was a joint or common endeavour which failed, due to the irreconcilable differences 
between the parties - but no one party could be blamed for the failure of the joint 
venture. However, if the man had retained the interest in the property, then he would 
have gained a benefit without performing the negotiated task. The man would have 
unconscionably retained the property.
It has been suggested that this broadened doctrine of unconscionability does 
not operate to restrain unconscionable conduct, but rather operates to avoid unjust 
outcomes.64 However, it could be said that even this broadened notion of 
unconscionability is ultimately concerned with a party’s unconscionable conduct. In 
Muschinski, the unconscionable conduct was the man’s refusal to return his share of 
the property, notwithstanding the fact that he had not performed the agreed tasks.
It is significant that another illustration of unconscionable retention of 
property are the common money counts. Deane J showed that equity would be 
available to redress proprietary concerns in relation to quasi-contractual money had 
and received which makes up a substantial portion of the law of restitution.65 
Therefore, instead of contorting equitable mechanisms as recent restitution lawyers 
have done, the answer would be found in equity itself. The principle of
61 Ibid 619-620.
6" Birks, above n 20, 71-72, 96.
63 Westdeutsche Girozentrale Landesbank v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669, 711- 
716.
64 Parkinson, above n 1, [212].
65 (1985) 160 CLR583, 619.
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unconscionable conduct would apply in the case of mistaken payment in Chase 
Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd,66 The ultimate recipient 
acquired a benefit in a situation where it would be unconscionable for the payee to 
retain the funds. The payer would be entitled to equitable proprietary relief without 
the need to contort the notions of fiduciary obligations.
Another example of unjust retention of property occurred in Lord Napier and 
Ettrick v Hunter. Lord Templeman pointed out that it was unconscionable for an 
insured to retain payment under an insurance policy and damages from a 
wrongdoer. The validity and integrity of the insurance contracts were not open to 
question. The problem was that the subsequent conduct of the insured was 
unconscionable because of the refusal to pay the settlement to the insurer which had 
honoured its obligations under the contract.
The broadened notion of unconscionable conduct also encompasses 
inequitable denial of obligations These cases are not situations of common 
endeavour, like partnerships or commercial joint ventures. However, there is a 
transmission of property from one party to another on the basis that certain events 
will transpire. The kind of situations which may arise here is where property is 
conveyed to one party subject to an oral trust. A party who obtains the benefit of the 
property cannot then deny the existence of the trust, even though legal formalities 
have not been complied with.69
F Commercial and Personal Relationships
Muschinski concerned the dissolution of a personal relationship upon which 
commercial arrangements were engrafted. Paciocco suggests that courts ought to be 
more willing to provide proprietary relief in personal relationships rather than purely 
commercial ones. As persons enter into marital and de facto relationships on the 
basis of affection and trust, they generally do not take action to protect their property
66 [1981] Ch 105.
67 [1993] AC 713.
68 Ibid 738.
69 Parkinson, above n 1, [210].
70 David M Paciocco, ‘The Remedial Constructive Trust: A Principled Basis for Priorities Over 
Creditors’ (1989) 68 The Canadian Bar Review 315, 325-328.
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and legal relations in the same way as commercial parties. In comparison, 
commercial parties are aware that they should take steps to protect their interests. If 
they do not do so, they should not expect the assistance of the courts.
It is submitted that such a vastly different treatment of commercial parties on 
the one hand and domestic parties on the other is neither helpful or realistic. 
Equitable intervention and proprietary interests in assets should not depend simply 
on whether a relationship between two parties is characterised as commercial or 
domestic. A more subtle approach is needed, in the light of the fact that as the 
discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 has shown, equity has intervened in commercial 
relationships previously.
However, in the light of the legitimate concerns that equitable intervention 
should not renegotiate or re-write commercial transactions,71 or create unnecessary 
uncertainty and be heavy handed, “ such care is warranted. Therefore, the question is 
not whether proprietary relief will be available, but rather on what basis? This central 
issue will be the subject of further consideration.73
G Unconscionable Conduct and Unjust Enrichment
Another issue is whether the concept of unconscionable conduct considered 
in the broader context of Muschinski, is comparable to and interchangeable with the 
influential concept of unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment has dominated United 
States, Canadian and New Zealand jurisprudence. In the United States, the remedial 
nature of the ‘constructive’ trust was recognised early. In the Restatement o f 
Restitution74 a constructive trust was said to arise ‘[wjhere a person holding title to 
property is subjected to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that 
he would he unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it.’75 In Restatement o f
See for example the views of Kirby P of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Austotel Pty 
Ltd v Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 582, 585-586.
7“ Woodson (Sales) Pty Ltd v Woodson (Aust) Pty Ltd (1996) 7 BPR 14, 685, 14, 709 (Santow J).
73 Below, Part IV and generally Chapter 6.
74 American Law Institute, Restatement o f the Law o f Restitution, Quasi Contract and Constructive 
Trusts (1937).
75 Ibid §160.
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the Law Second, Restitution, Tentative Draft No 2 76 the constructive trust is 
described as ‘a means of redressing unjust enrichment.’77
In Canada, unjust enrichment was developed as the criterion upon which the 
‘remedial’ constructive trust was based. The monumental decision, Pettkus v Becker 
( ‘Pettkus ) entrenched the concept of unjust enrichment in Canadian law. Pettkus 
was, like Allen v Snyder, a dispute between a de facto couple about a property 
settlement. Instead of searching for the ‘fugitive common intention’79 a majority of 
the Canadian Supreme Court held that the concept of unjust enrichment applied. 
They said that:
there are three requirements to be satisfied before an unjust 
enrichment can be said to exist: an enrichment, a corresponding 
deprivation and absence of any juristic reason for the enrichment.
The criteria has been applied in other Canadian cases.81 In New Zealand,82 a similar 
approach appears to be developing.
The concept of unjust enrichment used in the United States, Canada and New 
Zealand appears to have much in common with the concept of unconscionability 
identified in Muschinski, although this remains subject to considerable debate. It is 
arguable that the reason why some jurisdictions refer to unjust enrichment rather than 
unconscionability, is because of the early revival of quasi-contract and restitution in 
those jurisdictions. In the United States, the law of restitution was already part of the 
legal landscape in the first half of the 20th century. In 1954, restitution re-emerged in 
Canada as a significant underlying rationale for judicial intervention and the
76 American Law Institute, Restatement o f the Law Second, Restitution, Tentative Draft No 2 (1984).
77 Ibid § 30b. Note also the discussion in Wright, above n 33, [2.18]-[2.22].
78
[1980] 2 SCR 834; (1980) 117 DLR (3rd) 257. See also Regional Municipality o f Peel v Her 
Majesty the Queen in right o f Canada (1992) 98 DLR (4th) 140, 151-164 (McLachlin J).
79Ibid 842; 269 (Dickson J with whom Laskin CJC, Estey, McIntyre, Chouinard and Lamer JJ 
concurred).
80
Ibid 848; 237-274 (Dickson J).
81 See for example Sorachan v Sorachan [1986] 2 SCR 38; (1986) 29 DLR (4th) 1; Peter v Beblow 
[1993] 1 SCR 980; (1993) 101 DLR (4th) 621. Note in the context, Wright, above n 33, [2.23]-[2.30].
87
“ See for example Gillies v Keogh [1989] 2 NZLR 327; Lankow v Rose [1995] NZLR 277. Note in 
this context Wright, above n 33, [2.32]-[2.40].
195
development of legal doctrine. There are a number of proponents of the view that 
the concept of unjust enrichment is closely aligned to the equitable notions of 
unconscionable conduct. Toohey J of the High Court of Australia stated:
The notion of unjust enrichment...is as much at ease with the 
authorities and is capable of ready and certain application as is the
84notion of unconscionable conduct.
85In Gillies v Keogh, Cooke P of the New Zealand Court of Appeal went so far as to 
subsume the notion of unjust enrichment and unconscionability under the rubric of 
reasonable expectations, when he said:
Whatever legal label or rubric cases in this field are placed under, 
reasonable expectations in the light of the conduct of the parties are at 
the heart of the matter. It can be said that a party is unjustly enriched 
if he or she retains the entire fruits of contributions made by the other, 
notwithstanding that the other has suffered detriment or made a 
sacrifice and has reasonably expected from the conduct of the first 
party and all the circumstances that the contributions will carry rights. 
Similarly, to retain the sole benefit can be labelled unconscionable or 
contrary to equity or manifestly unfair. Or the conduct of the first 
party may be said to give rise to an estoppel, proprietary or 
otherwise. . . 86
However, this interpretation fails to address the fact that unjust enrichment and
87unconscionable conduct arguably respond to two very different events. 
Unconscionability responds to equitable wrongdoing on the part of one party. In 
comparison, unjust enrichment responds to and remedies unjust outcomes in the light 
of the reasonable expectations of the parties. Nonetheless, it has been suggested that
83
83 Deglman v Guaranty Trust Co o f Canada and Constantineau [1954] 3 DLR 785.
84 Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 CLR 137, 153. See also Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v 
Paul (1987) 162 CLR 221, 256-257 (Deane J) and The Honourable Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Place 
of Equity and Equitable Doctrines in the Contemporary Common Law World: An Australian 
Perspective’ in Donovan WM Waters (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts 1993 (1993) 3, 14-18.
[1989] 2NZLR327.
86 Ibid 331. See also Lankow v Rose [1995] 1 NZLR 211, 293 (Tipping J); Stratulatos v Stratulatos 
[1988] 2 NZLR 424, 436-438 (McGeechen J); Pasi v Kamana [1986] 1 NZLR 603, 607 (Tompkins 
J).
87
See for example Bryson v Bryant (1992) 29 NSWLR 188, 222-223 (Sheller JA).
196
neither unconscionable conduct nor unjust enrichment can be totally defined as 
simply responses to wrongdoing or unjust outcomes. As Waters has stated:
The two approaches have been compared. It has been said that unjust 
enrichment looks to the expectations of the parties, and enquires into 
the circumstances of one party’s enrichment, while unconscionability 
directs attention to the conduct of that party, a person who has taken 
advantage. ‘But that’, comments the Chief Justice of Australia, ‘is not 
to say that the expectations of the parties are irrelevant to the concept 
of unconscionable conduct.’ Nor, of course, as one should add, is the 
defendant’s conduct irrelevant to the decision of whether there has 
been an unjust enrichment. In Pettkus v Becker the Supreme Court of 
Canada spoke of the expectations of which during the time of the 
contributions the consequently enriched party, was, or ought to have 
been, aware. However, let it be said that the embrace of a conduct 
assessment may indeed be wider than that of an enrichment (or 
outcome) assessment.88
Certainly, two factors would support Waters’ contention that there is, at the very 
least, a considerable overlap of the concept of unconscionability and unjust 
enrichment. First, unconscionable conduct of the Muschinski variety could be 
considered as being outcome driven, as well as directed to unconscionable retention 
of property. After all, Deane J did stress that the concept of unconscionable 
conduct in equity could be directed to an evaluation of a situation where neither of 
the parties was blameworthy - the breakdown of the commercial venture was one of 
those events which occurs in human relationships. Secondly, the important word in 
the phrase ‘unjust enrichment’ is the word ‘unjust.’ Not all enrichments are unjust in 
commercial transactions. Therefore, if an enrichment is unjust in accordance with the 
definition in Pettkus referred to above, it is likely that the conduct of the insolvent 
(whether of an active or passive kind) may be relevant to the situation. The conduct 
of the insolvent at the time the transaction was entered into may not have offended 
commercial sensibilities, but the attitude of the insolvent is subsequently 
unconscionable. At any rate, the debate remains an arid one without the realisation 
that whether unconscionable conduct or unjust enrichment is argued as the basis of 
the proprietary interest or relief, a party is seeking equitable proprietary relief. Thus, 
generally, an examination of the insolvent’s conduct will be relevant from an
88 Donovan WM Waters, ‘The Nature of the Remedial Constructive Trust’ in Peter Birks (ed), The 
Frontiers of Liability (1994) vol 2, 163, 170; cf JW Carter, ‘Restitution and Contract Risk’ in 
Mitchell Mclnnes (ed), Restitution: Developments in Unjust Enrichment (1996) 137, 161.
89 Parkinson, above n 1, [204] and [212].
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equitable point of view, even if it is not the only relevant factor underpinning a 
determination of whether equitable proprietary relief ought to be available. In 
Muschinski, the man’s conduct was unconscionable because he sought to retain a 
benefit to which he was not entitled. It is likely that if the case had arisen in Canada 
rather than Australia, the Canadian courts would have labelled his acquisition of the 
benefit as an unjust enrichment. Ultimately, it is contended, the concept of 
unconscionable conduct is so broadly drawn in Muschinski to comprise most (if not 
all) cases which would be amenable to an analysis based on unjust enrichment.
The concept of unjust enrichment has been utilised in not only personal 
relationships, but also in commercial cases as well. In the United States, it appears 
that unjust enrichment in the context of constructive trusts has been utilised in a wide 
array of commercial cases.90 In contrast, in Canada, the concept of unjust enrichment 
as the source of equitable proprietary relief has been particularly important in 
personal or family contexts.91 Thus, the question has been to what extent the learning 
in the family cases is applicable to commercial cases. There is a body of case law 
which shows that the concept of unjust enrichment will be available to sustain 
equitable proprietary relief in commercial situations which lie outside areas where
93traditional proprietary relief has been available.
In recent times, the concept of unjust enrichment has also re-emerged in
94England. However, it is unclear what future proprietary course proprietary relief for 
unjust enrichment will take.
90
See the various cases described in American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Restitution, 
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91 For a critique o f such cases see Patrick Parkinson, ‘Beyond Pettkus v Becker. Quantifying Relief 
for Unjust Enrichment’ (1993) 43 University of Toronto Law Journal 217.
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Here, it is appropriate to distinguish between the concept of unjust 
enrichment discussed above and the concept of unjust enrichment described by 
Birks. For Birks, the concept of unjust enrichment is essentially a common law 
concept, which is quite apart from unconscionable conduct. Birks criticises the 
concept of unconscionability as being too narrow and vague to determine whether a 
proprietary remedy should be imposed.95 Criticising Westdeutsche, Birks has stated:
The law of trusts, working in different language and organising its 
thought in categories of response rather than categories of event, has 
failed to understand that strategy and, even when in fact responding to 
unjust enrichment, has stuck to the old habit of restricting the cause of 
the cause of action, using, as its chosen restrictor, the guilty 
conscience. Only the guilty will answer. We cannot accommodate two 
strategies.96
The kinds of ‘events’ which Birks had in mind are mistaken payments and ultra vires 
transactions (which occurred in Westdeutsche itself). However, the statement 
contained certain flawed assumptions.
Birks has assumed that the availability of equitable proprietary remedies is 
limited to cases where a court exercising equitable jurisdiction can be convinced that 
the actions of an insolvent are the result of the insolvent’s wrongdoing or ‘guilty 
conscience’ prior to, or at the time of, the receipt of funds.9' Whilst Birks has been 
critical of the reasoning and outcome of the Westdeutsche case, the attitude of both 
Birks and Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche is similar in one fundamental 
aspect. Both confine equity to a peculiarly narrow function - an arbiter of the 
conscience of the insolvent upon receipt of the funds. However, the difference 
between their two positions should also be highlighted. Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
correctly held that equitable jurisdiction will be called into play in deciding whether 
a plaintiff is entitled to a proprietary remedy. In contrast, Birks does not see a role for
Birks, above n 20, 16-25, 67-69; c f Joshua Getzler, ‘Unconscionable Conduct and Unjust 
Enrichment as Grounds for Judicial Intervention’ (1990) 16 Monash University Law Review 283; 
Steve Hedley, ‘Unjust Enrichment as the Basis o f Restitution - An Overworked Concept’ (1985) 5 
Legal Studies 56; Steve Hedley, ‘Restitution’ (1995) Cambridge Law Journal 578; John Glover, 
‘Equity and Restitution’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed) The Principles o f Equity (1996) 92.
96 Ibid 96.
97
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equity. However, as discussed, there is ample case law which suggests that equitable 
unconscionability encompasses a wide array of conduct. As the concept of 
unconscionability in equity covers much of the law of restitution, it can be said that 
Birks’ notion of unjust enrichment is consistent with equity’s concept of 
unconscionable conduct (although he would no doubt, argue otherwise).
Birks has also identified a role for the common law’s proprietary potential." 
Apparently, the common law should be able to provide relief without the 
intervention of equity and the occasions where unjust enrichment will accord such 
relief will be small. He has stated in relation to ownership and security of receipts:
The interest in obtaining restitution of unjust enrichment comes into 
conflict with the interest in the security of receipts. Honest and 
reasonable people ought to be able to dispose as they please such 
wealth as appears to be at their disposition. If claims in unjust 
enrichment proliferated uncontrolled everyone would have to set a 
contingency fund or take out special insurance against the possibility 
of unsuspected restitutionary liability. One way of giving effect to the 
interest in security of receipts is to make claims in unjust enrichment 
very difficult to bring - for example, by cutting down the kinds of 
mistake which will trigger restitution (no restitution for mistakes of 
law, and none for mistakes of fact unless the mistake gives the 
impression of legal liability to pay) or by insisting that a failure of 
consideration counts for nothing unless the failure be total. Another 
version of the same strategy is to insist that the defendant cannot be 
liable unless he has been at fault...equity appears to have settled 
intuitively on that approach but, partly no doubt because the process
has been merely intuitive, it has not been wholly consistent in doing
100so.
And, in a discussion entitled ‘Unjust enrichment trusts’ he has stated:
We noticed earlier that the law of unjust enrichment has adopted a 
particular strategy for reconciling the interest in restitution with the 
interest in the security of receipts. That strategy, primarily mediated 
by the defence of change of position, can be summed up by saying 
that inessential restrictions which formerly protected the interest in 
security of receipts, albeit insensitively, have been removed from the 
cause of action in unjust enrichment but that claims arising from that 
cause of action have been made more fragile, to ensure that honest
See the discussion of following and tracing in Birks, above n 20, 85-89.
100 Ibid 68.
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and reasonable recipients can safely rely on the security of their
• . 101 receipts.
Therefore, if there is a claim based on unjust enrichment, the claimant should be 
entitled to both personal and proprietary remedies. There will be greater certainty in 
the award of the proprietary relief because unlike equity, unjust enrichment is event 
based. There were several means by which he suggested that remedies for unjust 
enrichment may not be available. First, if the defendant can claim a defence of 
change of position. Secondly, he suggested that perhaps the scope for action for 
unjust enrichment may be able to be narrowed by streamlining the events to which it 
will apply. Thirdly, he suggested that only honest and reasonable people should be 
able to retain the security of receipts. If a claimant is not honest and/or is 
unreasonable, he or she will not have security in the receipt.
The problem here is that he quarantined the law of restitution from equity 
(other than in the use of an equitable remedy of the trust), relied on the uncertain 
defence of change of position and potentially straightjacketed the kinds of situations 
where a claimant will be able to claim proprietary relief. The defence of change of 
position is noted below and it is sufficient to point out that the form which this 
defence will take remains to be fully sketched by judges. 104 Moreover, the setting of 
pre-determined events which will give rise to proprietary relief is unhelpful, because 
it is impossible to predict with any confidence a complete set of circumstances in 
which the need for proprietary relief may arise.
If honesty and reasonableness are important in the context of claims in 
restitution, then it should be pointed out that equity also has placed great store on 
these characteristics, as well as in the development of the concept of unconscionable 
conduct. And, whilst equity may not be event based in quite the same way as Birks 
posits restitution is event based, there are discernible trends in the way equity has 
applied the concept of unconscionability to factual situations.
101 Ibid 96.
102 Ibid 66-69.
103 Chapter 6, 340-342.
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H Review
So far, it has been argued that the concept of equitable wrongdoing extends 
well beyond breach of trust or fiduciary obligations or the unscrupulous taking 
advantage of the vulnerability of commercial parties. Obtaining a benefit without 
undertaking the negotiated task, as in Muschinski, will also give rise to equitable 
intervention. Whether this situation is labelled as unconscionable conduct or unjust 
enrichment is ultimately unhelpful where a party seeks to argue another party has 
acquired an equitable proprietary interest by virtue of this unconscionable conduct or 
unjust enrichment. Such a characterisation does not answer the question whether the 
aggrieved party will be entitled, in a particular case, to an equitable proprietary 
interest by virtue of the conduct or the enrichment. As one author has perceptively 
noted, in relation to the concepts of unconscionable conduct and unjust enrichment:
Confusion only arises, however, if either of them are elevated into 
self-standing legal principles which may be applied without more 
precise doctrinal analysis. As explanations for the rationale which 
underlies a variety of specific doctrines, both are useful. However, 
they are stated at too great a level of abstraction to be helpful as 
doctrinal formulae in their own right.105
Therefore, having identified the breadth of equity’s jurisdiction, it is necessary to 
consider the modem underpinnings of this jurisdiction and in so doing, move 
towards the creation of an inherently coherent and logical scheme for equitable 
proprietary relief.
IV A Theory of Objective Non-Assumption of Risk
A Introduction
Judges, insolvency administrators and commercial parties should be mindful 
of important assumptions and significant requirements of the world of commerce. 
These matters were considered in Chapter 1. The overwhelming assumption is that 
risk taking is part of a commercial world which is characterised by ‘self-interest and 
profit-making.’106 In addition, where the transfer and receipt of money is concerned,
105 Parkinson, above n 1, [212].
106 Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 582, 586 (Kirby P).
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money is negotiable and title to that money resides with the recipient. Quite
legitimately, commercial parties require a degree of legal certainty so that they may
play the commercial game in accordance with established and well recognised
parameters. Without such fundamental operative principles, the world of
commerce would simply grind to a halt. People would not invest in commercially
attractive ventures. Money would not function as an essentially negotiable
commodity. Commercial traders would be averse to entering transactions where
there was little certainty as to what was the legal characterisation of the relationship
108and the rights and duties associated with that relationship.
One of the fundamental norms in relation to risk taking has been that a party 
will be an unsecured creditor, unless he avails himself of a security device to protect 
his position in the event that the other commercial party becomes insolvent. This 
important norm was fortified, in a series of real estate agency cases, in which courts 
in Canada have made it clear that, prima facie, real estate agents were mere 
unsecured creditors for their commission. 109 So too, in Walker v Corboy110 the Court 
decided that there was nothing on the facts of the case which indicated that the way 
that the particular principal and agency relationship operated deviated from the 
characterisation of the relationship as essentially an unsecured debtor and creditor 
relationship.
B A Theory o f Objective Non-Assumption o f Risk
However, notwithstanding the prima facie assumption that commercial 
parties bear all risks associated with a transaction, courts have intervened and 
provided proprietary relief. Therefore, courts have overturned commercial norms in
107 See Lanks hear v ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd [1991] 1 NZLR 481, 495-496 (Wallace 
J); Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244, 251 (Lord Selbome); Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co 
AB v Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana [1983] 2 AC 694, 703-704 (Lord Diplock); Westdeutsche 
Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669, 704-705 (Lord 
Bro wne-W ilkinson).
108 As to the need for commercial certainty see Chapter 1, 17-20.
109 Re Allan Realty o f Guelph Ltd (1980) 97 DLR (3d) 95;(1979) 24 OR (2d) 21; Re Ridout Real 
Estate Ltd (1958) 36 CBR 111; Price Waterhouse v Vic MacLeod Real Estate Ltd (1983) 48 CBR 
(NS) 191; Re century 21 Brenmore Real Estate Ltd (1979) 24 OR (2d) 783; (1979) 30 CBR (NS) 71.
110 (1990) 19 NSWLR 382.
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some situations. Unfortunately, in so doing, courts have not articulated what they 
were doing.
It is submitted that central to any determination about the award of 
proprietary relief in commercial transaction is the issue of risk assumption. More 
specifically, in the case of proprietary relief, did the unsecured creditor assume the 
risks associated with being unsecured in the event of the other party’s insolvency? If 
the circumstances indicated that he did so, proprietary relief would not be available. 
However, if the relationship of the parties and the factual circumstances indicated 
that he could not have taken protective action, then proprietary relief may be 
appropriate. Here, the focus of equity, which is concerned with redressing 
unconscionable conduct, must be directed not only to the conduct of the creditor but 
also the conduct of the insolvent as well. The issue is whether the insolvent acted 
unconscionably. As equity has broadly defined unconscionable conduct, there could 
be a number of aspects of the insolvent’s conduct which could become a subject for 
scrutiny. If the insolvent had not acted unconscionably towards the creditor, then it is 
unlikely that the creditor would obtain proprietary relief. However, if the insolvent 
acted unconscionably, then the issue which will arise is whether the unconscionable 
conduct caused or led to the unsecured status of the creditor. The court will need to 
consider whether there was a causal connection between the creditor’s unsecured 
status and the insolvent’s unconscionable conduct.
Therefore, when addressing modem concerns about whether a court should 
provide proprietary relief, it must be appreciated that equity’s concern about 
remedying unconscionable conduct is inextricably linked to risk assumption. An 
evaluation of many areas of traditional proprietary relief discussed in Chapter 2 
indicated that proprietary relief was awarded because the unconscionable conduct of 
the insolvent caused the unsecured status of the creditor. For example, a party who is 
owed fiduciary obligations does not generally take steps to minimise the risks 
associated with its relationship with the fiduciary and is not expected to do so. If the 
fiduciary acts unconscionably and then becomes insolvent, equity will intervene and 
provide proprietary relief.111 This is what occurred in the development of the 
institutional constmctive trust, equitable tracing and the rule in Barnes v Addy. In 
some cases, the nature of the fiduciary relationship, such as in the case of agents and 
brokers, does not predispose courts to provide automatic proprietary relief. However,
111 Chapter 2, 45-46, 63-66, 72-74.
112 (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244.
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they will do so where the wrongdoing of the broker or the agent is causally linked to 
the unsecured status of the party to whom fiduciary obligations are owed. For 
example, in Australian Securities Commission v Melbourne Asset Management 
Nominees Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed), the failure of MAM to 
invest the funds as prescribed was unconscionable conduct which led to the 
unsecured status of the investors. Another situation where equitable proprietary relief 
arose in response to unconscionable conduct was in the seminal case Lord Napier 
and Ettrick v Hunter, 114 where insurers acquired an equitable proprietary interest in 
the proceeds of damages paid to the insured (because the insured refused to pay these 
moneys to them). A similar approach is applicable to situations which stand outside 
traditional equitable relationships. The issue is whether, from an objective 
standpoint, the creditor did not, and could not be expected to, assume the risk 
associated with an unsecured status. A theory of objective non-assumption of risk 
could be articulated in the following way:
(i) the insolvent in fact acquired a benefit (in this case, money) at the 
commencement or during the course of the commercial relationship between the 
parties;
(ii) the creditor did not in fact take steps (or adequate steps) to minimise risk 
in the commercial transaction (and in particular the potential risk of the insolvency 
and the creditor’s unsecured status);
(iii) objectively speaking, the creditor could not be expected to minimise the 
risks associated with the commercial transaction in the light of the commercial 
milieu in which the commercial transaction took place; and
(iv) objectively speaking, the creditor could not be expected to minimise the 
risk of the commercial transaction because the unconscionable conduct (broadly 
defined) of the insolvent directly contributed to the unsecured status of the creditor. 
Another way of stating this is that the insolvent obtained or retained the benefit via 
some form of unconscionable conduct.
Items (i) and (ii) highlight that the insolvent acquired funds by way of 
transfer or collection. The money operated as a negotiable entity and so title has
113 (1994) 49 FCR334.
114 [1993] AC 713.
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passed to the insolvent. The creditor is a mere unsecured creditor who has not taken 
adequate action to elevate himself above the status of an unsecured creditor.
Items (iii) and (iv) locate the two factors which determine whether a creditor 
has, objectively speaking, assumed or not assumed the commercial risk of a 
transaction (including, of course, the potential insolvency of the other party and the 
unsecured status). Item (iii) requires that there was not an assumption of the risks 
associated with an unsecured creditor. Item (iii) makes it clear that an objective 
evaluation of the commercial environment and normal business practices will be 
required. For example, in Muschinski,u 5 the woman was entitled to equitable 
intervention in the personal and commercial relationship. The woman had not taken 
steps to deal with the premature breakdown of the joint venture. However, the 
woman could not be expected to have taken steps to alleviate the risk of the 
transaction. Partners in close personal relationships do not usually act to minimise 
the impact of the breakdown of the relationship, do not clearly define their rights in 
advance or may be unable to do so.116 Such conduct operates against the personal 
commitment, trust and confidence between the parties. In comparison, in Walker v 
Corboy, the farmers had not taken any action in addition to the statutory regulation 
to protect themselves against the risks associated with an agency relationship and 
their unsecured status. If the farmers had wished to protect themselves against risk, 
they ought to have done so in the light of the prevailing commercial norms. There 
was nothing in the relationships between the farmers and the agent which indicated 
that the farmers had not assumed the risk. This contrasts with a subjective approach, 
where a creditor argues that subjectively speaking, he did not assume the risks of an 
unsecured creditor. From the point of view of determining, whether proprietary relief 
ought to be available, this would not be a satisfactory standard. Any unsecured 
creditor would try and argue that he had not assumed the risks of being an unsecured 
creditor in the hope of achieving, effectively, a secured status. The net effect of such 
an approach would be that all unsecured creditors would claim non assumption of 
risk with the effect that interests of secured creditors would be undermined.
115 [1985] 160CLR 583.
116 Fender v St John Mildway [1938] AC 1. Note also Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 79 and In the 
Marriage o f JD and AMHannema (1981) 7 Fam LR 542.
117 (1990) 19 NSWLR 382.
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Item (iv) draws on the pre-existing case law concerning the nexus between
unconscionable conduct and proprietary relief. In Muschinski, the man’s refusal to
recognise that his interest in the property was predicated on the completion of certain
tasks, and the failure act on that basis amounted to unconscionable conduct. The
proprietary relief awarded was directly linked to the fact that the man had acted
unconscionably. In comparison, in Walker v Corboy,119 there was no suggestion that
the agent had acted unconscionably. Therefore, the farmers’ unsecured status was not
attributable to the agent’s unconscionable conduct. There was nothing which
120‘brought a non-express trust...or equitable obligation into existence.’
The material in items (iii) and (iv) have been drafted separately to highlight 
the importance of the commercial context and unconscionable conduct. However, 
those items are not mutually exclusive. The unconscionable conduct of the insolvent 
may explain why the creditor was unable to minimise the risk of the commercial 
transaction, notwithstanding market practice. The insolvent’s unconscionable 
conduct was so overwhelming that it prevented the creditor from following 
commercial risk minimisation strategies. Therefore, in relation to some cases, the 
unconscionable conduct identified in item (iv) would have a direct effect on a 
determination in item (iii).
It could be argued that an equitable emphasis on an objective examination of 
the commercial milieu, unconscionable conduct and the assumption of risk, sets the 
concept of unconscionable conduct apart from unjust enrichment. In Banque 
Financiere de la Cite v Parc (Battersea) Ltd, the House of Lords held that the
application of subrogation as a response to unjust enrichment was not barred because 
the creditor had not sought securities or identified fault on the part of the 
insolvent. However, it will be argued in Chapter 6 that the House of Lords was in 
error in its characterisation of the commercial relationship and the appropriate cause 
of action. The facts in the case indicated that the creditor had sought and obtained a
1 1 R
[1985] 160 CLR 583.
119 (1990) 19 NSWLR 382.
120 Ibid 385 (Priestley J).
121 [1998] 2 WLR 475.
122 Ibid 481, 486-488 (Lord Hoffman).
123 Ibid 479 (Lord Steyn); 494 (Lord Hutton).
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form of security. Objective non-assumption of risk could have informed the outcome 
of the case.
There are sound reasons why proprietary relief ought to be available to 
redress unconscionable conduct causally linked to a creditor’s unsecured status. 
Without the availability of the equitable proprietary relief in such cases, equity will 
become a blunt tool where an equitable wrongdoer is insolvent. The solvency or 
insolvency of the equitable wrongdoer would determine whether a creditor was 
effectively successful, rather than the fact of wrongdoing. In the long term, the 
wrongdoer and its creditors would benefit from the unconscionable conduct.
Moreover, a recognition that proprietary relief would be available in the 
circumstances described will create a degree of certainty. Therefore, instead of 
investigating whether the insolvent’s conduct was unconscionable and then diverging 
into a speculation whether proprietary relief was appropriate, the focus of the 
determination would be whether the insolvent’s conduct was unconscionable and 
whether that conduct caused the creditor’s unsecured status.
There are only three ‘exceptions’ to the provision of equitable proprietary 
relief to redress such unconscionable conduct. The first exception has already been 
highlighted above, namely where (notwithstanding the unconscionable conduct of 
the insolvent) the creditor was expected to take steps to minimise commercial risks. 
This exception is part of the theory of objective non-assumption of risk. This issue is 
discussed further in Chapter 6. This requirement will limit the situations where 
equitable proprietary relief is available in commercial transactions to those where the 
insolvent’s unconscionable conduct was causally linked to the creditor’s unsecured 
status. Therefore, it will operate to differentiate those cases where only a personal 
remedy should be available as a response to unconscionable conduct. For example, a 
large corporate lender may be able to obtain a personal remedy when it has lent 
money under an unsecured ultra vires contract. However, in the light of its failure to 
take action to minimise risk, a proprietary remedy should not be available.
The second and third exceptions are true exceptions to objective non­
assumption of risk. The second is where objective non-assumption of risk is 
established, but there are no available assets from which the creditor can secure 
proprietary relief. There may be no asset base, or alternatively, all assets are subject 
to pre-existing securities. This issue is further discussed in Chapter 7.
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The third exception is where objective non-assumption of risk is established, 
but the insolvent raises a successful defence against the intervention of equity. This 
is discussed in Chapter 7.
V Conclusion
In this Chapter, it was argued that the award of equitable proprietary relief, 
particularly in the context of insolvency, is governed by equitable notions of 
unconscionable conduct. Attempts to sever equitable relief from the doctrinal basis 
of equitable intervention, unconscionable conduct, produces unnecessary confusion 
and uncertainty.
It was then argued that equitable proprietary intervention could be broadly 
explained on the basis of the linking of unconscionable conduct and the non­
assumption of risk. Proprietary relief ought to be available where the unconscionable 
conduct is causally connected to the unsecured status of the creditor. This was 
described as the theory of objective non-assumption of risk. The objective non­
assumption of risk explains traditional as well as newer categories of equitable 
proprietary intervention. Once an objective non-assumption of risk is established, a 
creditor would be entitled to proprietary relief, subject to the exceptions noted.
In the following chapter, a non-exhaustive application of the objective non­
assumption of risk is undertaken.
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Chapter 6
EQUITY’S DOMAIN: THE APPLICATION OF THE THEORY OF 
OBJECTIVE NON-ASSUMPTION OF RISK
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I Introduction
This chapter is concerned with the practical application of the objective non­
assumption of risk theory. For the purposes of the discussion, two assumptions are 
made. First, it will be assumed that one party in the commercial transaction has in 
fact acquired a benefit, namely money, by virtue of a commercial relationship. The 
only situation discussed below which falls outside such cases is theft of property. 
The second assumption is that the aggrieved party did not take adequate steps to 
minimise the risks inherent in the commercial transaction (including the potential 
insolvency of the recipient).
The criteria which is subject to scrutiny in this chapter are items (iii) and (iv) 
as outlined in Chapter 5. Item (iii) refers to the commercial expectations of parties 
and the central importance of the commercial milieu and market practice in which 
the transaction took place. Item (iv) encapsulates the view that the conduct of the 
defendant should be subject to scrutiny. Such conduct must be unconscionable, albeit 
broadly defined.1 Items (iii) and (iv) are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, the 
unconscionable conduct of the insolvent may affect the creditor’s capacity to 
minimise risk notwithstanding market practice.
The following discussion will consider a number of situations where there 
has been unconscionable conduct on the part of the defendant; and where equity has 
or ought to provide equitable proprietary relief. However, in the light of the 
constantly changing ways in which commercial relationships are carried out, the 
discussion is not and cannot pretend to be an exhaustive illustration of the theory. 
However, it is hoped to show that equity is not overly interventionist and that such 
intervention can be undertaken on a rational and coherent basis.
II M arket  Context and the  C r e d it o r ’s Conduct
The first step towards determining whether proprietary relief is warranted is a 
careful examination of ‘the commercial milieu in which the particular dispute has 
arisen.’2 A helpful aspect of the 19th century’s emphasis on laissez-faire
1 Earl o f Chesterfield v Janssen (1751) 2 Ves Sen 125, 155-157; 28 ER 82, 100-101 (Lord 
Hardwicke); Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583, 616-623 (Deane J).
2 (1990) 19 NSWLR 382, 386 (Priestley J).
211
individualism was that it located the necessity for commercial self reliance. 
Commercial parties cannot expect courts to intervene in every transaction which 
goes awry. Therefore, the question will be whether the creditor could be expected, in 
the light of the particular market, to exercise commercial self reliance.
In order to decide whether the creditor could, or could not, be expected to 
take on the risk of an unsecured creditor, it will be necessary for the creditor to 
establish the market practice. It will form a practical background to explain why a 
creditor was not expected to minimise commercial risk. The market context will also 
be important to establish how a creditor would be expected to minimise such risk, 
but was prevented from doing so by the insolvent’s unconscionable conduct. There 
are many different kinds of commercial transactions which have been the subject of 
consideration and discussion in previous chapters including banking transfers,3 
deposits,4 loans,5 broking transactions,6 agency transactions7 * and swap 
arrangements. Each kind of transaction has its own internal dynamics and various 
burdens on the creditor to protect their commercial position. A contrast of very 
different commercial transactions will make this proposition clearer.
Different commercial standards regulate the lending by and the deposit of 
money in a financial institution. When considering the lending of money to potential 
customers, banks generally take a reasonably cautious approach.9 Thus, financial 
institutions wifi generally undertake a series of investigations about the potential
3
Chase Manhattan BankNA v Israel-British (London) Ltd [1981] Ch 105.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co v Citizens’ National Bank 2 F Supp 29 (District Court 
Pennsylvania, 1932).
5 Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] AC 567; General Communications Ltd v 
Development Finance Corporation o f New Zealand Ltd [1990] 3 NZLR 406; Daly v Sydney Stock 
Exchange Ltd (1986) 160 CLR371.
6 Re Goode; Ex parte Mount (1974) 4 ALR 579; 24 FLR 61; Meth v Commercial Banking Company 
of Sydney Ltd (1977) ACLC 140-302.
7 Walker v Corboy (1990) 19 NSWLR 382; Stephens Travel Service International Pty Ltd (Receivers 
and Managers Appointed) v Qantas Airways Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 331; Air Canada v M & L Travel 
Ltd[  1993] 3 SCR 787.
g
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 699.
9 PJM Fidler, Sheldon and Fidler’s Practice and Law of Banking (11th ed, 1982) 269.
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borrower including the borrower’s legal capacity to borrow,10 the creditworthiness of 
11 12the borrower, the purpose of the loan, the source of repayment the duration of the 
risk and whether security is available.13
In contrast, simple depositors of funds in financial institutions are not 
required to undertake an investigation of the capacity of the institution to attract 
funds, the creditworthiness of the financial institution and the source of the 
repayment of the deposited fund, which is essentially a debt. The case law discussed 
in Chapter 4 indicated that during the Depression, depositors were entitled to assume 
creditworthiness when the institution was still operating and there had been no 
disclosure of any financial crisis. Where the institution is insolvent (or has severe 
financial problems) and there is a failure to disclose this, then the making of the 
deposit should not be interpreted as an acceptance of the risk of the institution’s 
imminent collapse and the depositor’s unsecured status. This is discussed below.14
The comparison of these transactions indicates that a claim for proprietary 
relief, based on an objective standard, necessitates an evaluation of market practice. 
Such an evaluation will vividly contextualise the actions or inactions of both parties. 
It will draw the court’s attention to any practical difficulties (aside from the 
unconscionable conduct of the insolvent) which the creditor may face in trying to 
alleviate or pass on risk. In Chapter 3 it was noted that commingling of the funds did 
not, for some judges, necessarily defeat the proposition that a trust was intended, 
particularly where segregation was simply not possible.15 In the seminal case of In 
the Matter o f Penn Central Transportation Company16 the United States Court of
10 Dianne Everett and Sheelagh McCracken, Banking and Financial Institutions Law (4th ed, 1997) 
Chapter 11; Fidler, above n 9, 270-271.
11 Fidler, above n 9, 270-271.
12 For a case where investigation of the purposes of the loan are noted see Prosperity v Lloyds Bank 
Ltd (1923) 39 TLR 372; Fidler, above n 9, 271-272.
13 Fidler, above n 9, 272-273.
14 Below, 243-254.
15 Stephens Travel Service International Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Qantas 
Airways Ltd {1988) 13 NSWLR331, 341-344 (Hope JA).
16 486 F (2d) 519 (3rd Cir, 1973).
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Appeal considered the commingling of moneys issue in the complex context of 
interline railroad transactions. Penn Central collected moneys as agent for other 
carriers and deposited them in general, rather than separate, accounts pending 
distribution to the carriers. The Court held the numerous and varied daily collections 
precluded the practical segregation of the money. Therefore, Penn Central held the 
funds collected on trust.
Unfortunately, courts have tended to neglect an evaluation of standard 
market practice in relation to the individual market transactions. Rather, having 
established that there is some vitiating factor, such as mistake, which justifies the 
court holding that the creditor is entitled to proprietary relief, the courts have 
proceeded to award that relief. This criticism has been made in relation to the 
decision in Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd 
( ‘Chase’). Whilst Goulding J carefully considered equitable principles and 
remedies, he did not discuss what were then common commercial practices between 
international banks where money has been transferred electronically by mistake. It 
was surprising that actions which banks would generally undertake between 
themselves to remedy mistaken overpayment (which no doubt is a common problem 
in electronic transfers), was not presented to the Court. Moreover, the machinery of 
the clearing system was not even considered. 19
The following discussion addresses particular issues which may be relevant 
whether the creditor assumed the risk of the commercial transaction. The list is not 
exhaustive. Rather, the following discussion highlights some major contextual 
considerations when addressing commercial assumption of risk and insolvency from 
a practical perspective.
A Ascertaining the Financial Viability o f  the Insolvent
Theoretically speaking, it is always open to any kind of creditor (whether 
secured or unsecured) to undertake some form of investigation in relation to the 
financial status of the debtor. The extent to which this investigation can be
17 Ibid 524-525.
1 ft
[1981] 1 Ch 105.
19 Philip R. Wood, ‘How Effective is your Security - The Impact of Recent Cases: Linter Case’ 
Banking Law and Practice, 10th Annual Conference, 13 and 14 May, 1993 (1993), 262, 266.
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undertaken via legitimate channels will depend on the jurisdiction which is involved. 
There are two issues which will, by necessity, arise. First, the nature and extent of 
the material which is publicly and legitimately available. Secondly, to what extent 
market practice dictates that the investigation of financial viability of the debtor is 
necessary. Sometimes, the potential creditor will have the commercial leverage to 
demand that they have open access to the books of the debtor. If this is the case, then 
creditors should utilise this capacity to investigate the debtor.
In Australia, material concerning the debtor’s financial status which is 
distinct from the debtor’s own records is available at cost to commercial parties. For
example, under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), a National Personal Insolvency
20Index has been set up which may be searched (at cost to the searcher) for details of 
bankrupt individuals and businesses. The Index details such matters as the 
acceptance of debtor’s petitions, creditor’s petitions, sequestration orders, the 
annulment of bankruptcy by special resolution of creditors24 and automatic discharge
25from bankruptcy.
One apparent omission is the bankruptcy notice issued by the Official
26Receiver, which is not public information. Bankruptcy notices are not matters for 
public record until the creditor’s petition is issued.“ Thus, where there is an 
allegation that there has been an act of bankruptcy, it is unlikely that the party will be 
deemed to have notice of the act of bankruptcy, unless the party is the creditor who
20
Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) Regulation 13.03.
21 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 55.
22 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 43 and 47.
“3 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 43 and 52.
24 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 74.
25 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 149. For full details o f what the National Personal Insolvency Index 
covers see PP McQuade and MGR Gronow, McDonald, Henry and Meek: Australian Bankruptcy 
Law and Practice (5th ed, 1996) vol 2, [RF 450.0].
26 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) Regulation 4.01; McQuade and Gronow, above n 25, vol 1, [40.1.156]- 
[40.1.365]; [RE4.01.0].
27 McQuade and Gronow, above n 25, vol 2, [RF 450.0]
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has sought and obtained the issue of the notice," the party has notice of other acts of 
bankruptcy or has material from which a reasonable inference of an act of 
bankruptcy may be drawn." In the light of events leading up to the bankruptcy, the 
creditor will be at the mercy of the defendant’s integrity. As the case law shows, it 
cannot be assumed that defendants will act appropriately.30
Where details of the process of bankruptcy are available, the question is 
whether parties who deal with the defendant should be imputed with notice of those 
documents. If evidence is adduced which shows that the creditor did have actual 
notice of this information, then equity should not be called to intervene and the 
legislative scheme should simply apply. In Re M and J  de Wit; Ex parte Custom 
Credit Corporation Ltd, Paine J held that the creditor was not entitled to relief 
because the creditor was aware that a bankruptcy petition was due for hearing and 
from that information, it could be inferred that the creditor knew that the bankrupt 
had committed an act of bankruptcy. The creditor was aware of the risks involved in
32dealing with a person so close to formal bankruptcy.
However, under the bankruptcy regime, it appears that the assumption has 
been and continues to be that, where documents and events are publicly notified, 
then parties are assumed to have notice of those events and documents even if they 
do not have actual notice. The problem will be that parties may not take the time to 
investigate the creditworthiness of a commercial party with which they are dealing. 
They will not consider that it is necessary to make an investigation of a party which 
is open for business.
Bankrupts suffer serious consequences if they obtain credit, goods or services 
without disclosing their bankruptcy to the other party to the transaction.33 It is likely
28
28
Note Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 41.
29
In relation to earlier English legislation, Bankruptcy Act 1914 (UK) s 46 see Muir Hunter, 
Williams ’ Law and Practice in Bankruptcy (17th ed, 1958) 376-377.
30 Note such cases as Daly v Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 371; Westpac Banking 
Corporation v Savin [1985] 2 NZLR 41; Lankshear v ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd 
[1993] 1 NZLR 481; Neste Oy v Lloyd's Bank pic [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 658.
31 (1961) 19 ABC 63.
32 Ibid 71.
33 See Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 265 (5) and 269.
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that, in most cases, a bankrupt would not attempt to act in ways which contravene the 
legislative regime. If a bankrupt does so act, then it is strongly arguable that the 
bankrupt has acted unconscionably.
However, the fact that the information of the bankruptcy is publicly available 
may be a factor which will ultimately go against a creditor. In Re Ayoub; Ex parte 
Silvia34 a bankrupt commenced operating as a liquor merchant and purchased stock 
after the issue of a sequestration order of which the creditors were unaware. When 
the Official Receiver in bankruptcy became aware of the business, he took over the 
business on a cash on delivery basis. The Official Receiver subsequently sold the 
business. One of the issues was whether the subsequent unsecured suppliers took 
priority over the other earlier unsecured creditors. Morling J held, inter alia, that the 
business had not been undertaken originally on the basis that the subsequent 
suppliers would be paid for the goods. The suppliers were unsuccessful because they 
assumed the risk of the insolvency when they could have easily investigated the 
bankrupt’s creditworthiness and decided not to do so.35
Where the information concerning creditworthiness is available, it is likely 
that courts will invariably distinguish two different scenarios (between which there 
are wide ranging permutations). The first scenario is where the creditor is involved in 
business on a regular basis and at least part of the undertaking of that business is the 
transfer (or loan) of funds or the supply of goods to customers. Another situation is 
where financial institutions and large department stores provide credit for the 
purchase of goods. It would be part of normal commercial practice to make a 
thorough investigation of the creditworthiness of an applicant (whether corporate or 
individual). This would include undertaking searches of the relevant insolvency 
register or paying search agencies to do so on their behalf. Whilst the comments here 
are generally limited to the investigations of the data available in relation to 
insolvencies, if there were other legitimate forms of investigation, courts may well 
decide, in the light of the nature of the business operations, that search of these data 
bases may become necessary. Therefore, the creditor bears an onus to undertake 
investigations of creditworthiness. The cost of these measures can be built into the 
overall cost of the transaction, so that the debtor would effectively pay for the costs
34 (1983) 67 FLR 144.
35 Ibid 149. See also Downs Distributing Company Pty Ltd v Associated Blue Star Stores Pty Ltd 
[1948] 76 CLR 463, 484 (Williams J) and Re Gozzett; Ex parte Messenger & Co Ltd v The Trustee 
(1936) 1 All ER 79.
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of the search. If a creditor ascertains that the applicant lacked creditworthiness, then 
the creditor has notice of the financial problems and if that creditor proceeds with the 
transaction (which it would probably be well advised not to), the creditor bears the 
risk as an unsecured creditor. The creditor should not be able to obtain equitable 
proprietary intervention. Where the searches indicate that there are no financial 
problems, if these problems surface at a later stage then the creditor may be entitled 
to seek the assistance of equity.
The second scenario is where the party does not carry on business or is 
carrying on business which does not require these kinds of investigations on a 
regular basis. Consumers cannot be expected to add to their transaction costs by 
undertaking insolvency searches. For example, the vendors in Westpac Banking 
Corporation v Saving who had hired an agent to sell their boats, were not 
admonished by the New Zealand Court of Appeal for failing to undertake searches 
about the creditworthiness and financial status of the agent. They were not required 
to make such investigations. Their claims for relief were not impaired by the fact that 
they had not made them.
B Whether the Creditor was able to Protect Itself from Risk by Requiring 
Security or Imposing Conditions on How the Money was to be Kept and/or
Used
Another issue is whether the unsecured creditor was in a position to require 
security and/or impose conditions on how the money should be kept and/or used. 
Theoretically speaking, it is possible for any lender, wholesaler and consumer to seek 
security from a borrower, retailer or supplier. But, in the end result, theoretical 
possibilities take second place to the practical realities of the market. Depositors, 
principals, mistaken payers, insurers and guarantors are not in the habit of taking 
security to protect themselves. Indeed, to do so may render the transaction farcical, 
unnecessarily expensive and lead to an impediment in the flow of funds. However,
37insurers have the opportunity to offset the insurance risk via reinsurance.
36 [1985] 2N ZLR 41.
37 For a comprehensive discussion of reinsurance see RL Carter, Reinsurance (1979) and Ross Phifer, 
Reinsurance Fundamentals: Treaty and Facultative (1996). For a discussion of the Australian context 
see Kenneth Sutton, Insurance Law in Australia (2nd ed, 1991) Chapter 17.
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Lenders are generally in a good position to require borrowers to provide 
security in one form or another. The type of security will depend on a borrower’s 
asset base and the extent of the borrower’s liability. Obviously, each case will need 
to be determined on its own merits. But, a lender should bear an onus to protect its 
interests (and indirectly the interests of its customers). A lender would need to 
adduce evidence that there had been a good reason why it had not taken security 
because a strong presumption must be that the lender assumed the risk of having the 
low priority of an unsecured creditor. If the nature of the loan was one which was not 
secured, such as short term credit with high interest, the lender ought to be deemed to 
have assumed the risk of an unsecured creditor. Where the lender had originally 
stipulated that security was necessary, but had later withdrawn from that position, 
then the lender had assumed the risk of being an unsecured creditor.
In contrast, depositors in financial institutions (despite their characterisation 
as creditors) do not have the practical leverage to require the financial institution to 
provide security for the deposit. Even relatively large corporate depositors or 
depositors who have deposited a considerable amount of money in a financial 
institution, are not likely to succeed. Both market practice and the general 
characterisation of the relationship between depositors and banks as unsecured 
creditors set the parameters of the relationships. If the situation were otherwise, then 
the nature and function of financial transactions would be unnecessarily bogged 
down, transaction costs would rise and the financial institutions may be in an 
uncompetitive position.
Another situation arises in relation to the electronic transfers of money. In 
Chase the fact that the transferring bank had not acquired security from the 
transferee in the event that moneys could be paid over by mistake, did not 
detrimentally affect its action based on mistake of fact. The fact that security had not 
been demanded, let alone actually acquired, was not even raised. It was simply 
assumed that the relationship of the parties was such that it was not part of market 
practice between banks to acquire security from one another. It is not in the best 
interests of a finance provider to provide security over their business or the assets of 
their business to a potential competitor.
38 Foley v Hill (1848) 2 HL Cas 28; 9 ER 1002; N  Joachims on (A Firm Name) v Swiss Bank 
Corporation [1921] 3 KB 110; EP Ellinger and Eva Lomnicka, Modern Banking Law (2nd ed, 1994) 
107-111.
39 [1981] 1 Ch 105.
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Where customers (or principals) are concerned, it is equally unlikely that 
security would be available over the vendor’s (or agent’s) assets.40 In Walker v 
Corboy41 farmers forwarded produce to agents for sale on a regular basis. These 
transactions were regulated by legislation which, in accordance with market practice, 
did not provide for security over the agent’s assets.42 The only way that the farmers 
could have obtained a security status was proof of a trust over their own assets and 
the proceeds of sale of their assets. However, they were unsuccessful 43
The converse situation (in terms of the trust successfully used as a security) 
was the decision in Re Kay ford (in liq) . 44 It was evident that mail order customers 
were not in the habit of asking for security over the pre-payments which were made. 
From the judgment there appears no suggestion that mail order customers should or 
could insist on security. The interesting development in Re Kayford (in liq) was that 
the Court acknowledged and accepted the attempts of the company to provide a 
quasi-security when it began to suffer financial difficulties.
C Credit Insurance
The concept of credit insurance (also referred to as guarantee or financial 
insurance) is allied to the taking of security. In order to secure protection against the 
inability of the debtor to fulfil its financial obligations, the creditor effects insurance 
under which the insurer agrees to insure the creditor, in the event that the debtor fails 
to honour its debts. The creditor will not need to stand alongside other unsecured 
creditors and seek payment from the debtor’s scarce assets in the event of the 
debtor’s insolvency. Unlike security, credit insurance is a means by which the credit 
insured transfers the risk of insolvency to a third party on the payment of a price. If 
the insurer becomes liable under the contract, then the insurer will honour that 
liability. As an unsecured creditor (standing in the shoes of the original creditor), the
See for example Westpac Banking Corporation v Savin [1985] 2 NZLR 41; Neste Oy v Lloyds 
Bank pic [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 658.
41 (1990) 19 NSWLR 382.
42 Farm Produce Act 1983 (NSW).
43 (1990) 19 NSWLR 382, 397-398 (Meagher JA).
44 [1975] 1 WLR279.
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insurer will bring an action against the debtor pursuant to the doctrine of 
subrogation 45
The insurance may relate to a particular debt such as a loan,46 debts in 
general47 or any debts which the debtor may owe the creditor after the insurance is in 
operation. It will depend on the terms of the policy when the insurer becomes liable 
to the insured. Liability may arise on the basis of non-payment of the debt when it 
falls due49 or on the insolvency of the debtor.50 Such insurance usually contains a 
provision in which, the creditor agrees not to modify its rights and remedies against 
the debtor.51
Whilst it is theoretically possible for a creditor to take out credit insurance, 
each case will be determined by market practice. There are several potential 
problems. One difficulty may be that credit insurance may not be available to the 
creditor on acceptable terms. Credit insurance is not as common as life, fire or 
accident insurance and there may be less choice as to the kind of insurance product 
available.
Even if there are credit insurance packages available, the question will be 
whether credit insurance is acceptable in market practice. It is likely that large and/or 
permanent market players would benefit most from taking out credit insurance over 
potentially risky debtors. However, taking out credit insurance may not be
Michael Parkington (ed), MacGillivray & Parkington on Insurance Law (7th ed, 1981), [2135]- 
[2146]. As to the operation of credit insurance in Australia and its relationship to credit legislation see 
CCH Australian & New Zealand Insurance Reporter (1979-) Vol 1, 1^ 1-660; Swann Insurance (Aust) 
Pty Ltd v Fraillon [1992] 1 VR 401 and the comment on the case in (1991) 6 Australian Insurance 
Law Bulletin 82.
46 Parr’s Bank v Albert Mines Syndicate Ltd (1900) 5 Com Cas 116.
47 Solvency Mutual Guarantee Co v York (1858) 3 H & N 588; 157 ER 603; Solvency Mutual 
Guarantee Co v Froane (1861) 7 H & N 5; 158 ER 369; Solvency Mutual Guarantee Co v Freeman 
(1861) 7 H & N 17; 158 ER 374.
48 Seaton v Burnand [1900] AC 135; Anglo-Californian Bank Ltd v London and Provincial Marine 
and General Insurance Co Ltd (1904) 10 Com Cas 1.
49 Shaw v Royce Ltd [1911] 1 Ch 138.
50 Hambro v Burnand [1904] 2 KB 10; Waterkeyn v Eagle Star Insurance Co (1920) 5 LI LR42.
51 Finlay v The Mexican Investment Corporation [1897] 1 QB 517.
221
financially viable. The credit insurance may add to the creditor’s, and accordingly, 
the debtor’s transaction costs to the extent that the transaction becomes unattractive 
from the debtor’s point of view. Credit insurance may take time to effect and the 
debtor may be unwilling to wait for an insurer to undertake the necessary financial 
investigations prior to issuing insurance. The debtor may resent having a third party, 
such as an insurance company, inspect its records of assets and financial transactions 
(particularly when the insurance is for the benefit of the creditor not the debtor).
Finally, the insurance company may not wish to assume the commercial risk 
associated with some debtors. This may signify to a creditor that it should re­
evaluate its original intention to deal with the potential debtor. If the creditor 
proceeded with the transaction, this may in itself constitute evidence that the creditor 
took on the commercial risk of the debtor’s potential insolvency.
Generally speaking, if there is sufficient evidence to suggest that credit 
insurance is available and part of market practice, then the failure of the creditor to 
effect such insurance should become a potent factor against equitable relief.
D Deposit Insurance
Linked to the passing of risk via credit insurance, there is also the possibility 
that deposit insurance will be available for customers of financial institutions. The 
rationale for deposit insurance is not simply the passing of risk and the protection of 
small depositors. By enabling small depositors to pass on risk by obtaining deposit 
insurance, a degree of economic stability may be sustained in the event of the
52collapse of the financial institution.
Despite the various reasons which underlie deposit insurance as an 
institution, the basic question in insolvency situations will be whether it was 
available to creditors. Where deposit insurance is available in common law countries 
such as the United States and Canada,53 it is arguable that the failure to take 
protective steps, leads to a strong inference that the creditor assumed the risk of 
insolvency. This inference would be partly offset where the deposit insurance is 
limited in some way. For example, the deposit insurance may be available to insure
Herbert G Grubel, A Proposal for the Establishment o f an International Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (1979) 10-11.
53 Ibid.
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small accounts only. It may be available for certain kinds of customers only - large 
depositors may be left to negotiate complex arrangements which stand outside the 
deposit insurance norm.
Where there is no regime for deposit insurance, then the creditor does not 
have the opportunity to offset the potential insolvency of the financial institution. 
This is the case in Australia where recently, the Wallis Committee stated that on 
balance that there was no need for a deposit insurance scheme in the light of other 
banking arrangements.54 Such arrangements include the provisions which deal with 
banking failure under the Banking Act 1959 (Cth). Under Division 2 ‘Protection of 
Depositors’, where a bank is unable to meet its obligations or suspending payment, 
the assets of the bank are required to be used to meet deposit liabilities prior to all 
other liabilities of the bank.55 Section 16 (2) of the Banking Act requires that unless 
authorised by the Reserve Bank of Australia, a bank shall hold assets (other than 
goodwill) in Australia of a value not less than the total amount of its deposit 
liabilities in Australia. These provisions have not been tested in court, so it is unclear 
how well they would operate to protect depositors.56 However, in comparison, 
depositors in building societies or credit unions are not accorded such priority under 
the relevant legislation which controls them.57
E Transaction Costs
Transaction costs are those necessary costs which are associated with minor 
and subordinate actions which lead to the successful completion of a commercial 
transaction. Such costs may occur at the commencement of or during the transaction, 
such as various searches in relation to the borrower. Other costs may occur at the end 
of the transaction, such as the registration of the interests of a purchaser in land or a 
new security holder’s interest under a company charge.
54 Financial System Inquiry Final Report (1997) 355.
55 Banking Act 1959 (Cth) s 16 (1).
56 Financial System Inquiry Final Report (1997) 354.
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There are some transaction costs which are necessary for satisfactory 
completion. For example, registration of a chargee’s interest may be necessary in
58order to ensure that the chargee’s interest is fully protected and/or realisable.
However, there are other actions which are not absolutely necessary to carry 
out the transaction, but they are highly prudential. The extent to which non­
mandatory transaction costs become important determinants of the assumption of 
risk of commercial transactions will depend on the time taken to undertake the non­
mandatory prudential transaction, the cost of the prudential action and its cost in 
relation to the overall transaction. Time and cost sustain vastly different market 
practices. So for example, in loan transactions, banks generally have the opportunity 
to demand time to complete various searches and enquiries about the borrower and 
search costs are ultimately borne by the borrower. These costs are generally in 
proportion to the value of the transaction and the risk assumed by the bank. In 
comparison, depositors of funds in financial institutions, do not have the time or the 
resources to investigate the financial status of such institutions each time a deposit is 
made. The cost of undertaking searches in relation to the financial stability of the 
institution may be completely disproportionate to the search costs.
F Review
The above discussion has emphasised the need for an understanding of the 
market context and practical market expectations of creditor conduct. In some 
commercial transactions, practical market expectations will, objectively speaking, 
dictate that an aggrieved creditor should have taken steps to protect his or her own 
interests. Where this is determined, then prima facie, that creditor should not be 
entitled to proprietary relief. It should not obtain priority over other unsecured 
creditors - particularly those unsecured creditors who, unlike that creditor, did not 
have an array of protective measures at their disposal. Objectively speaking, the 
creditor was expected to minimise the risk of the commercial transaction in the light 
of the milieu in which the commercial transaction took place. However, the creditor 
may still be able to secure proprietary relief, if the creditor can show that the 
insolvent’s unconscionable conduct effectively prevented the creditor from taking 
standard risk minimisation measures. Thus, the creditor could not be expected to 
minimise the commercial risk.
58 Note for example, Corporations Law Part 3.5, ss 262 and 266.
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Where a creditor could not be expected to minimise the transaction risk, that 
creditor would have to address item (iv), namely, whether the insolvent’s conduct 
was unconscionable.
I l l  T he Defendant’s Unconscionable Conduct
For the purposes of the discussion, unconscionable conduct will be evaluated 
under three broad divisions, unconscionable conduct outside a commercial 
transaction, unconscionable conduct prior to or at the time the commercial 
transaction commences and unconscionable conduct after the commercial transaction 
commences.
A Unconscionable Conduct Outside a Commercial Transaction
For the sake of completeness, it is necessary to consider a situation where a 
party acts unconscionably outside a consensual commercial transaction. Equity has 
provided relief in cases of actual wrongdoing (such as fraudulent
misrepresentation) . 59 However, outside commercial transactions, there are cases 
where there has been deliberate wrongdoing which may expose another to the 
insolvency of the wrongdoer. In such cases, proprietary relief ought to be available.
A common example would be where one party stole money from another. In 
Black v S Freedman & Co, 60 the appellant employee stole money form the 
respondent employer. The appellant gave the stolen money to his wife, the second 
appellant. The respondent was successful in the claim against the wife. It was held 
that the employee owed fiduciary obligations to his employer.61 Therefore, the 
respondent’s proprietary interest in the money was linked to the fiduciary 
relationship. However, O’Connor J said that equity would intervene where there was 
a simple theft.62
59 Earl o f Chesterfield v Janssen (1751) 2 Ves Sen 125, 155; 28 ER 82, 100 (Lord Hardwicke); LA 
Sheridan, Fraud in Equity (1957) 10-51.
60 [1910] 12CLR 105.
61 Note Patrick Parkinson, ‘Fiduciary Obligations’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The Principles o f 
Equity, (1996) 325, [1003],
62 [1910] 12 CLR 105, 110; See also Spedding v Spedding (1913) 30 WN (NSW) 81; Rasmanis v 
Jurewitsch (1970) 70 SR (NSW) 407; Zobory v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1995) 129 ALR
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The interposition of equity has also been supported by academic writers 
although the mechanisms identified have been different.64 Theft is a criminal offence 
and is subject to moral opprobrium and rigorous legislative sanctions.65 On this basis 
alone, it would be surprising (if not ludicrous) if the creditor was not entitled to 
proprietary relief in the situation where a thief had become insolvent.
However, applying the approach to proprietary relief which has been posited, 
a creditor would not be expected to minimise risk of theft as against the thief who 
perpetrated the crime. Therefore, the creditor would be entitled to proprietary relief 
against the thief in priority to the thief s other unsecured creditors (who had taken on 
the normal commercial risk of the thief s potential insolvency). Even if the party had 
availed the opportunity presented of insuring the property and successfully claimed 
under the insurance, it is strongly arguable that the thief would be required to 
disgorge the property acquired by his wrongdoing to an insurer on the basis of 
subrogation.66 In addition, the theft cases show clearly the absurdity of insisting on
the traceability of the proceeds of the crime. Instead, the proof of theft beyond
68reasonable doubt, should be sufficient to entitle a creditor to proprietary relief.
63
484, 487 (Burchett J); Australian Postal Corporation v Lutak (1991) 21 NSWLR 584, 589 (Bryson 
J); Lennox Industries (Canada) Ltd v The Queen (1937) 34 DLR (4th) 297, 304 (Reed J); Goodbody 
v Bank o f Montreal (1974) 47 DLR (3d) 335; Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington 
Borough Council [1996] AC 669, 715-716 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
63 Austin Wakeman Scott and William Franklin Fratcher, The Law of Trusts (4th ed, 1989), vol V, § 
508.1; Malcolm Cope, Proprietary Claims and Remedies (1997) 90; AJ Oakley, Constructive Trusts 
(3rd ed, 1997) 46-53; and Helen Norman, ‘Tracing the Proceeds of Crime: an Inequitable Solution?’ in 
Peter Birks (ed), Laundering and Tracing (1997) 95, 102.
64 RP Meagher and WMC Gummow, Jacobs’ Law of Trusts (6th ed, 1997) [1310]. In relation to 
conversion see Scott and Fratcher, above n 63, vol V, § 508.1; The Hon Mr Justice Peter J Millett, 
‘Tracing the Proceeds o f Fraud’ in Stephen Goldstein (ed), Equity and Contemporary Legal 
Developments (1992) 407, 413-414; Norman, above n 63, 102.
65 See for example the Theft Act 1968 (UK) (supplemented by the Theft Act 1978); Peter Gillies, 
Criminal Law (4th ed, 1997) Chapter 19 (New South Wales and South Australia) and Chapter 22 
(Victoria and ACT).
66 For a discussion of subrogation see Chapter 2, 77-80.
67
See for example, Norman, above n 63, 95.
68 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) sl40  (1).
226
B Unconscionable Conduct Prior to or at the Time o f  the Commercial
Transaction
A major area of scrutiny will be the conduct of the insolvent prior to or at the 
time of the transaction which in some way induced the creditor to enter the 
transaction. Such conduct may severely curtail the capacity of a creditor to take 
appropriate action to minimise risk. The conduct is divisible into two segments. 
There are situations where the insolvent’s conduct is unconscionable in an active 
sense. Alternatively, there is conduct where the insolvent has passively (but 
purposively) induced the creditor to enter into the transaction.
1 Active Unconscionable Conduct
The three major situations are fraudulent misrepresentation, proprietary 
estoppel and the active exploitation of vulnerability by the application of pressure on 
the creditor.
(a) Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Fraudulent misrepresentation (which is distinct from the form of 
misrepresentation known as innocent misrepresentation) is essentially an action 
which was available at common law. The major requirement is that the 
representation was made with knowledge of its falsity09 and with actual dishonesty.70 
The fraudulent representation must induce the contract and have a causal connection 
with the contract.71 If the creditor can show that there is a fraudulent 
misrepresentation, then he may affirm the contract and bring a tortious action of
69 Note in this regard Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337, 374 (Lord Herschell); cf Sheridan, above 
n 59, 12-13, 17-24; RP Meagher, WMC Gummow and JRF Lehane, Equity Doctrines and Remedies 
(3rd ed, 1992) [1301]; Tony Duggan, ‘Misrepresentation’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The Principles o f 
Equity (1996) 158, [602],
70 Duggan, above n 69, [602].
71 Ibid; Gipps v Gipps [1978] 1 NSWLR 454, 460 (Hutley JA).
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deceit, sue for breach of warranty, where the fraudulent misrepresentation has been 
incorporated into the contract73 or rescind the contract.74
The general rationale for an action based on fraudulent misrepresentation is 
that a party should not be entitled to benefit from the creation of a false impression 
or the making of a false statement. However, where proprietary relief is sought, the 
basis for proprietary relief ought to be that, due to the fraudulent misrepresentation 
the creditor was not fully informed of the risks associated with the transaction.
The proprietary potential of fraudulent misrepresentation was evident in the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal decision in Liggett v Kensington although this was 
not fully appreciated or apparently argued. Investors paid funds to a bullion dealer 
for the purchase of bullion on the basis, inter alia, that the bullion which they 
purchased would be segregated from the large mass and, they would have title in the 
bullion. The bullion dealer became insolvent. Cooke P held that a fiduciary 
relationship arose as the bullion dealer had obtained funds via the misrepresentation. 
Therefore, the investors were entitled to proprietary relief in priority to not only 
unsecured creditors but a floating chargee. On appeal to the Privy Council, Lord 
Mustill held that the investors had intended to transfer the money, so that they could 
not argue that they retained title to the money. Whilst they may have been entitled to 
have the contract set aside and obtain personal relief, they were not entitled to
78proprietary relief.
72
72
Munchies Management Pty Ltd v Belperio (1988) 84 ALR 700, 706 (Fisher, Gummow and Lee JJ).
73 Alati v Kruger (1955) 94 CLR 216, 222 (Dixon, Webb, Kitto and Taylor JJ).
74 Kennedy v The Panama, New Zealand & Australian Royal Mail Co Ltd (1867) LR 2 QB 580.
75 DW Greig and JLR Davis, The Law of Contract (1987) 827-828.
76 [1993] 1 NZLR257.
77 Ibid 270-271; See also Australian Securities Commission v Melbourne Asset Management 
Nominees Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 334 and note in the Canadian context Hunter Engineering Inc 
(Hunter Machinery Canada Ltd), Integrated Metal Systems Canada Ltd and Allis-Chalmers Canada 
Ltd v Syncrude Canada Ltd [1989] 1 SCR 426; (1989) 35 BCLR (2d) 145.
78
Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (In Receivership) [1995] 1 AC 74, 100-105.
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It is submitted that the customers were entitled to proprietary relief. There 
was a fraudulent misrepresentation by the bullion dealer which induced the investors 
to pay over funds, because the company took no action to segregate the bullion as 
represented. It is likely that the investors would have been less inclined to do so if 
they had been informed that the gold dealer had no intention of undertaking its 
apparent contractual obligations in relation to segregation of the assets (with the 
effect that the investors would not have had title to the bullion). Therefore, there was 
a direct nexus between the unconscionable conduct and the investor’s unsecured 
state.
(b) Proprietary Estoppel
As discussed below, claims based on equitable estoppel for incomplete or 
anticipated contracts may entitle a creditor to personal relief. It is unlikely
79proprietary relief will be available.
However, a party may be successful where he proves that the other party
80represented to him a present or future intention as to his proprietary status and the 
party acted to his detriment on the basis of that representation. The other party then 
attempts to resile from the representation. This amounts to unconscionable conduct. 
If the party shows that nothing less than compliance with the representation will 
remedy the defendant’s unconscionable conduct, then the party may obtain 
proprietary relief. This was the result of proprietary estoppel cases which
83concerned representations made in relation to land.
79 Below, 263-264; 266.
80 In relation to representations see for example Waltons Stores (Interstate) Pty Ltd v Maher (1988) 
164 CLR 387; Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394; Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 
406; Marine Steel Ltd v The Ship ‘Steel Navigator’ [1992] 1 NZLR 77.
" In relation to the criteria applied see for example Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 
394; Commonwealth v Clark [1994] 2 VR 333.
Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] Ch 179; Morris v Morris [1982] 1 NSWLR 61; Riches v 
Hogben (1986) 1 Qd R 315; Patrick Parkinson, ‘Estoppel’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The Principles of 
Equity (1996) 201, [712],
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In the light of the theory of objective non-assumption of risk, it is arguable 
that a representation about a party’s security status could be treated in a similar 
fashion where detrimental reliance upon the representation is shown. This is the 
analysis which could have been undertaken in Banque Financiere de la Cite v Parc 
(Battersea) LtcfA the facts of which are considered in Chapter 3.85 Instead of 
distorting the law of subrogation, an argument based on equitable proprietary 
estoppel would have been more effective. The manager of the corporate group made 
a written representation that in the future the creditor would be treated as a secured 
creditor in priority to the other members of the corporate group. The creditor made 
the loan accommodation available relying on the written representation. In the light 
of the unusual financial arrangements and the representations of the manager, the 
creditor did not take steps to protect its interests in conformity with market 
practice. Thus, it did not assume the risk of insolvency of the defendant. The 
subsequent unconscientious failure of the defendant to comply with the 
representation would have directly contributed to the unsecured status. It was 
necessary for equity to intervene and compel the defendant to treat the creditor as if 
the creditor had security which entitled it to priority over other corporate members of 
the group. Although it can be argued that the ultimate unconscionability would have 
been the failure to comply with the representation, it was the representation which 
induced the creditor to act to its detriment. Therefore, both the representation and the 
failure to adhere to it constituted unconscionable conduct.
2 Active Exploitation of Vulnerability
There are occasions where it can be said that despite the fact that parties are 
required to protect themselves, they are unable to do so, due to their innate
84 [1998] 2 WLR 475.
Chapter 3, 131-132.
86 [1998] 2 WLR 475, 477 (Lord Steyn); 480-483 (Lord Hoffman).
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vulnerability and/or the inordinate pressure placed upon them. Common law duress
88and actual undue influence are examples of such pressure.
(a) Duress
The common law has identified that actual pressure or threats may require 
remedial relief. The parties involved may be at arm’s-length, but the actual or 
threatened coercion is of such a serious nature that courts intervene. In order to 
secure relief, a creditor is required to establish that there has been an improper or
89illegitimate pressure from which the defendant has received a benefit.
Where there has been actual or threatened violence to the person,90 the 
transaction is voidable.91 Presumably, there is a right to recover money paid pursuant 
to actual physical coercion or threats of coercion, although it has not been directly 
decided. Where there has been a threat to seize or detain a person’s goods, money 
paid in response to the threat will also be recoverable.93 A contract which is induced 
by duress to goods is voidable.94
The controversial issue is whether courts should set aside benefits obtained in 
the course of exercising commercial pressure. In Australia, two leading judges have
87
87 Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113; Bank of New South Wales v Rogers (1941) 65 CLR 42; 
Wilton v Farnworth (1948) 76 CLR 646; Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362; Bester v Perpetual 
Trustee Co Ltd [1970] 3 NSWR 30; Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 
447.
88 In relation to proprietary relief in such cases see Scott and Fratcher above, n 63, vol V, § 468.
89 Universe Tanks hips Inc o f Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation [1983] 1 AC 
366; Dimskal Shipping Co SA v International Transport Workers Federation. [1992] 2 AC 152.
90
Lord Goff of Chieveley and Gareth Jones, The Law of Restitution, (4th ed, 1993) 234.
91 Scott v Sebright (1886) 12 PD 21; Barton v Armstrong [1976] AC 104.
92 Goff and Jones, above n 90, 234.
93 Astley v Reynolds (1731) 2 Strange. 915; 93 ER 939; Snowdon v Davis (1808) 1 Taunt 359; 127 
ER 872; Masked v Horner [1915] 3 KB 106; Valpy v Manley (1845) 1 CB 594; 135 ER 673.
94 Dimskal Shipping Co SA v International Transport Workers Federation [1992] 2 AC 152; North 
Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Hyundai Construction Co Ltd [1979] QB 705; Pao On v Lau Yiu Long 
[1980] AC 614; cf the earlier authority Skeate v Beale (1841) 11 Ad & E 983; 113 ER 688.
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taken very different views. McHugh JA (as he then was) in Crescendo Management 
Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation95 held, obiter dicta, that the common law 
would intervene to redress economic duress.96 In contrast, Kirby P (as he then was) 
in Equiticorp Finance Ltd (in liq) v Bank o f New Zealanct1 held that the concept of 
economic duress, an ‘open-ended formulae,’ led to the dangerous situation of courts 
substituting their views about commercial transactions and created uncertainty in 
commercial transactions. He pointed out that the doctrine of economic duress may 
simply be part of the law of undue influence or unconscionable dealings. The 
extent to which economic duress is part of equitable doctrine, rather than common 
law doctrine, remains to be seen.
Whilst the kinds of situations which will constitute economic duress are not 
closed, 100 some commentators have drawn attention to the fact that the determination 
whether a threat is illegitimate pressure may, on occasions, be difficult and will be 
divided on the facts. 101 Nonetheless, it appears that at this stage, economic duress has 
become part of the common law, alongside duress to person and goods.
The question in the context of this thesis is whether a person subject to 
illegitimate commercial pressure should be able to not only seek personal remedies, 
but whether in the case of the insolvency of the wrongdoer, proprietary relief should 
be available as well. Goff and Jones have opined (with which this author agrees):
There is no authority on the question whether a person who pays 
money or confers some other benefit under duress has, in addition to a 
personal claim, a restitutionary proprietary claim. In our view the
95 (1988) 19 NSWLR 40. See also Keith Mason and JW Carter, Restitution Law in Australia, (1995) 
[540] and Peter Birks, ’The Travails of Duress’ [1990] Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law 
Quarterly 342, 343-344.
96 Ibid 45-47.
97 (1993) 32 NSWLR 50.
no
Ibid 107.
99 Ibid.
100 For a list of factors see Mason and Carter, above n 95 [542].
101 See generally MP Sidone, ‘The Doctrine of Economic Duress,’ [1996] 14 Australian Bar Review 
Part 2, 114; Goff and Jones, above n 90, 266-268.
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courts should grant the coerced person such a claim and should not be 
inhibited from doing so by the absence of any fiduciary relationship... 
it would not normally be just to allow, on an insolvency, the general 
creditors of the person exercising duress to share in the fund, obtained
by their debtor, as a result of the debtor’s illegitimate pressure
102exercised on the claimant.
A party who acts under illegitimate pressure exerted by an insolvent does not assume 
the risks associated with the commercial transaction, including the potential 
insolvency of that insolvent. He has not acted independently - even though he may 
be aware of the risks involved and has been unable to take protective measures.
(b) Actual Undue Influence
In addition to common law duress, equity has settled a general concept of 
undue influence under which contracts and gifts are set aside. Generally, it will be 
shown that a party did not exercise independent judgement due to the actual undue 
influence and that the party was not afforded the opportunity to acquire independent 
advice. 104 Unable to act independently, the party is often unaware of the risks 
associated with the transaction. It would be incongruous if an insolvent exercising 
undue influence was able to retain funds which he had acquired by the exercise of 
influence.
The doctrine of actual undue influence is particularly effective. In Bank o f 
Credit & Commerce International SA v Aboody,]05 the defendants were a married 
couple who were directors of a family company. The company had borrowed money 
which was secured by the wife’s interest in the matrimonial home. The company 
collapsed and the creditor bank sought to exercise its contractual rights under the 
securities. The wife challenged the validity of the securities on the basis that they had 
been procured by the actual undue influence of the husband of which the bank had 
notice. The wife was ultimately unsuccessful, but the case did shed light on the kind
102 Goff and Jones, above n 90, 275. But note here Scott and Fratcher, above n 63 vol V, § 468.
103 Tony Duggan, ‘Undue Influence’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The Principles of Equity (1996) 379, 
[ 1101 ]-1107]; Sheridan, above n 59, Chapter 5.
104 Duggan, above n 103, [1108].
105 Bank of Credit & Commerce International SA vAboody [1990] 1 QB 923.
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of conduct which constitutes actual undue influence. The English Court of Appeal 
did find that the husband had acted in a way which had prevented the wife from 
deliberating upon the commercial risks in an impartial fashion. The husband entered 
the solicitor’s room and insisted in an aggressive fashion that the wife sign the 
documents. 106 The wife compliantly signed the documents without a full and 
informed discussion with the solicitor of the risks involved. 107 There was also
evidence that the husband deliberately concealed information from the wife about the
• !  108 risks.
Another (but less common) example of actual undue influence is the threat to 
prosecute a party or a close relative of the party, unless they entered into a contract or 
pay over money. 109 Such an example of undue influence is closely aligned to the 
common law concept of duress.
It could be argued that there is a growing merger and overlap of duress and 
actual undue influence. In both common law duress and actual undue influence the 
person upon whom the pressure is exerted is unable to exercise independent 
judgment and commercial freedom. The aggrieved party is pushed into a transaction. 
In actual undue influence, this is exacerbated because the aggrieved party has acted 
without an understanding of the commercial risks inherent in the transaction. 
Therefore, in both duress and actual undue influence cases, it can be said that the 
aggrieved party did not willingly assume the risk of the commercial transaction. 
Thus, objectively speaking, a creditor could not be expected to minimise the risk of 
the commercial transaction in the light of the duress or actual undue influence 
exerted by the insolvent. 110
106 Ibid 951-952.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
Williams v Bayley (1866) LR 1 HL 200; Davies v London & Provincial Marine Insurance Co 
(1878) 8 Ch D 469; Public Service Employees Credit Union Co-operative Ltd v Campion (1984) 75 
FLR 131.
110 For a discussion of undue influence and proprietary relief in the form of a constructive trusts see 
Oakley, above n 63, 35-46.
234
(c) Legal Compulsion
Finally, for completeness, it is necessary to note those occasions where there 
is legal compulsion as distinct from duress or actual undue influence described 
above. In the legal compulsion cases the facts of the situation may compel one party 
to pay for the liabilities of the other party. 111 Therefore, a debtor-creditor relationship 
arises. It may be impossible for the creditor to access his goods without making 
payment, although it is the other party’s liability which is in issue. Alternatively,
119both parties may be liable, but the creditor is only secondarily liable.
Several distinct scenarios may arise. Where all that has occurred is legal 
compulsion, then it is most likely that the creditor will have a personal remedy. 
Where personal relief is sought, a creditor who is secondarily liable has the 
opportunity to reclaim funds from the defendant who is primarily liable.
Alternatively, if the defendant is insolvent and it is simply a question of legal 
compulsion, then it is strongly arguable that the creditor should be able to obtain a 
proprietary remedy against the insolvent. It cannot be said that the creditor has 
assumed the risk of the defendant’s insolvency. Instead, the creditor has been placed 
in an invidious position in which he can only access his own goods through payment 
of the insolvent’s liabilities. In contrast, when the creditor is secondarily liable, it is 
unlikely he is able to seek proprietary relief. The creditor was liable and in agreeing 
to such liability, he assumed the risk that at some stage the insolvent would be 
unable to pay. 114
Finally, there are situations where the legal compulsion is combined with 
another vitiating factor such as overpayment. 115 In this case, the payee will be
Brook’s Wharf and Bull Wharf Ltd v Goodman Brothers [1937] 1 KB 534; cf the facts in Esso 
Petroleum Ltd v Hall Russell & Co Ltd [1989] 1 AC 643.
112 Brook’s Wharf and Bull Wharf v Goodman Brothers [1937] 1 KB 534; Exall v Partridge (1799) 8 
TR 308; 101 ER 1405; Johnson v Royal Mail Steam Packet Company (1867) LR 3 CP 38.
113 Moule v Garrett (1872) LR 7 Ex 101; Brooks Wharf and Bull Wharf Ltd v Goodman Brothers 
[1937] 1 KB 534; Gebhardt v Saunders [1892] 2 QB 452; Harris v Carnegie [1933] OR 844.
114 Note also the cases in relation to contribution Lowe & Sons v Dixon & Sons (1885) 16 QBD 455; 
Ellesmere Brewery Co v Cooper [1896] 1 QB 75; Mahoney v McManus (1981) 55 ALJR 673; 
Newberry v Harrop [1986] 1 Qd R 187.
115 As to mistaken overpayments see below 262-263; 267-271.
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required to repay an amount equivalent to the funds which have been overpaid. If the 
payee is insolvent, there is case law which suggests that an overpayment can give 
rise to proprietary relief.116
3 Passive Exploitation of Vulnerability
The passive exploitation of vulnerability is a more subtle method of 
advantage taking. It involves situations where a court ought to impose a duty of 
disclosure on the defendant, notwithstanding the fact that the transaction is a 
commercial one. The discussion commences with a consideration of unilateral 
mistake. Thereafter, undue influence and unconscionable transactions (particularly in 
the light of the duty of disclosure) and the problem of commercial information 
asymmetry are considered.
(a) Unilateral Mistake
Unilateral mistake occurs where one party is aware of the mistake which 
another has made when entering the transaction, particularly a contract, and this 
party does nothing to inform the other of the error. Instead, the party hopes to gain 
from the mistake by relying on the terms of the contract. In Taylor v Johnson 17 the 
purchaser of land was aware that the vendor of the land had made a fundamental 
error in relation to the sale price and did not alert the vendor to the error. The Court 
held that the vendor was entitled to rescission of the contract. It is not necessary 
for a party to demonstrate that the other deliberately set out to ensure that the other 
remains mistaken.119 However, it has been held that the doctrine of unilateral mistake
Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd [1981] Ch 105; Phoenix 
Assurance Co o f  Canada v City o f Toronto (1981) 129 DLR (3d) 351; (1982) 35 OR (2d) 16 
(Montgomery J); 142 DLR (3d) 767, 39 OR (2d) 680 (CA); Zaidan Group Ltd v City o f London 
(1987) 36 DLR (4th) 443; 58 OR (2d) 667 (Barr J); affd 49 DLR (4th) 681; 64 OR (2d) 438 (CA).
117 (1983) 151 CLR422.
118 Ibid 432-433 (Mason ACJ, Murphy and Deane JJ). Other cases applying or considering the 
doctrine include Deputy Commissioner o f Taxation v Chamberlain (1990) 26 FCR 221, on appeal 
(1991) 28 FCR 21; Cielo v MG Kailis Gulf Fisheries Pty Ltd (1991) 104 FLR 189, 192 (Gray J); 
Roach v B & W Steel Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 110; Lewis v Combell Constructions Pty Ltd (1989) 
18 NSWLR 528; Tuttv Doyle (1997) 42 NSWLR 10.
119 See for example Roach v B & W Steel Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 110, 114 (CA); Lowe v 
Harrington (1997) 138 FLR 1; (1996-1997) 21 Farn LR 583; Tutt v Doyle (1997) 42 NSWLR 10, 14 
(CA).
236
will apply where a party was not actually aware of the mistake, but it ‘was of such
character and accompanied by such circumstances that he had reason to know of
120 121 it’ or that he ought to have known of it.
The traditional remedial response to unilateral mistake is rescission, a 
personal remedy. However, courts will award other remedies when the circumstances 
so require. Therefore, where unilateral mistake is proven, proprietary relief should 
be available because the mistaken party has not assumed the risk of the commercial 
transaction.
(b) Presumed Undue Influence
Equity has also developed an effective doctrine to deal with those situations 
where there has been a relationship of trust and confidence giving courts cause to 
presume undue influence. There are certain relationships of trust and confidence to 
which equity will raise an automatic presumption of influence such as parent and 
child, guardian and ward, religious leader and adherent, solicitor and client and 
doctor and patient. 124 The other form of presumed undue influence is where there is 
a relationship of trust and confidence. However, undue influence has also been 
effectively extended to cases where an agent of a third party unduly influences
120 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts: A Comprehensive Treatise on the Rules o f Contract 
Law (1960) vol 3, § 610 cited with apparent approval by Mason ACJ, Murphy and Deane JJ in Taylor 
v Johnson (1983) 151 CLR422,432.
121 Roach v B & W Steel Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 110, 114 (CA); Lewis v Combell Constructions 
Pty Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 528, 536 (Finlay J); Tuttv Doyle [1997] 43 NSWLR 10, 14-15 (CA).
122 Tuttv Doyle [1997] 42 NSWLR 10.
123 Duggan, above n 103, [111 l]-[ 1115] and the cases considered therein; Sheridan, above n 59, 88- 
96; Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, above n 69, [1511]-[1519].
124 Duggan, above n 103, [1112]; Sheridan, above n 59, 90-96; Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, 
above n 69, [1511]-[1519].
125 Barclays Bank pic v O ’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, 189-190 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
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another ~ or the third party has actual or constructive notice that there has been
127undue influence.
Undue influence has been allied to fiduciary obligations. Whilst it has been 
argued that the doctrines are distinct, ~ (so that for example, the parent-child 
relationship attracts an automatic presumption of undue influence, but it is not a 
fiduciary one), there have been strong arguments that they have much in common.129 
Both are concerned with relationships of trust and confidence the abuse of which are 
remedied by disgorgement. 130 Thus, undue influence could have been appropriately 
discussed in Chapter 2.
However, a discussion of undue influence is equally appropriate in this 
chapter as well and possibly more so. They are still separate doctrines in which the 
different aspects of relationships of trust and confidence are protected. They also 
have different historical origins. The law of fiduciary obligations is driven by 
prophylactic rules ensuring that a fiduciary does not undertake transactions which 
conflict with that duty or enable him or her to obtain unauthorised profits from that 
duty. The doctrine of undue influence is not elevated to the status of a duty. Rather, it 
is used to set aside transactions which are acquired by the exercise of influence or 
pressure.
126
126 Avon Finance Co Ltd v Bridger [1985] 2 All ER 281; Coldunell v Gallon [1986] 1 QB 1184; 
Bank of Credit & Commerce International SA v Aboody [1990] 1 QB 923; Challenge Bank Ltd v 
Pandya (1993) 60 SASR 330.
127 Barclays Bank pic v O ’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180; Challenge Bank Ltd v Pandya (1993) 60 SASR 
300, 343 (King CJ); cf recent developments in Australia in relation to married women in Garcia v 
National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 155 ALR 614.
128 Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, above n 69, [1520]; cf Goff and Jones, above n 90, 286.
129 Johnson v Buttresss (1936) 56 CLR 113, 135 (Dixon J).
‘30 Duggan, above n 103, [1130].
131 In relation to undue influence see Earl of Chesterfield v Janssen (1751) 2 Ves Sen 124, 156 28 ER 
82, 100 (Lord Hardwicke) and Earl of Aylesford v Morris (1873) 8 Ch App 484, 489-490 (Lord 
Selbome). In relation to fiduciary obligations see LS Sealy in ‘Fiduciary Relationships’ [1962] The 
Cambridge Law Journal, 69, 69-72 and PD Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (1977) [2].
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The exercise of influence has an obvious connection with the common law 
doctrine of duress. But presumed undue influence is concerned with the prevention 
of
taking surreptitious advantage of the weakness or necessity of 
another: which knowingly to do is equally against conscience as to
132take advantage of his ignorance.
The court may require evidence of such matters as the intelligence, education, 
character, age, state of health and business experience of the aggrieved party. 133 Such 
factors will be important in setting up the relationship of the parties and the potential 
for abuse. The other factor is whether the party received independent advice -  a 
common defence to all forms of undue influence. 134 Such advice must be given in a 
free and relaxed manner away from any potential pressure. Otherwise, as recent 
case law has confirmed, the absence of such independent advice will tend to the 
conclusion that the aggrieved party did not exercise an independent and fully 
informed intention to enter into the transaction. Therefore, proprietary relief ought to 
be available. 137
Generally, rescission is the appropriate remedy. However, it is strongly 
arguable that a creditor seeking proprietary relief on the basis of undue influence did 
not assume the risk of the transaction. Undue influence implies an abuse of a 
relationship of trust and confidence by the insolvent. Following from this, the abuse 
is manifested in the lack of any credible independent advise to explain the 
ramifications of the transaction. Moreover, proprietary remedies are available
132 Earl of Chesterfield v Janssen (1751) 2 Ves Sen 124; 156; 28 ER 82, 100 (Lord Hardwicke).
133 See generally Union Fidelity Trustee Co of Australia Ltd v Gibson [1971] VR 573, 577-578 
(Gillard J).
134 Duggan, above n 103, [1119], [1121]; Brusewitz v Brown [1923] NZLR 1106, 1115-1117 
(Salmond J).
135 cf Bank of Credit & Commerce International SA v Aboody [1990] 1 QB 923.
136 Barclays Bank pic v O ’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, 195-199 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
137 Goff and Jones, above n 90, 286.
138 For a discussion of undue influence and proprietary relief in the form of a constructive trust see 
Oakley, above n 63, 35-46.
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where there has been a breach of fiduciary obligations. The only major exception 
is that the proprietary scope of fiduciary obligations is wider (in the sense that the 
fiduciary proprietary net will catch gains obtained via breach of duty which the 
fiduciary himself could not have gained) . 140
(c) Unconscionable Dealing
Equity will intervene where the insolvent has taken unconscientious 
advantage or exploitation of the vulnerability of the creditor (even though there is no 
pre-existing relationship of trust or confidence) . 141 A successful creditor is required 
to prove that there was a special disadvantage like poverty, illness, age, infirmity, 
lack of education or lack of explanation of the transaction. 142 In addition, the 
defendant must have knowledge of the special disadvantage143 and unconscientiously 
exploited that disadvantage. 144 An important expansion has been that a lack of 
business experience will also constitute a special disadvantage, 145 particularly in the 
context of standard form contracts. 146 Unconscionable dealing has taken two forms.
139
139 Chapter 2, 63-71.
140 Attorney-General (Hong Kong) v Reid [1994] 1 AC 324.
141 For an authoritative discussion of unconscientious dealings see the seminal case, Commercial 
Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447.
142 Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362; Wilton v Farnworth (1948) 76 CLR 646; Louth v Diprose 
(1992) 175 CLR 621; Vital Finance Corporation Pty Ltd v Taylor (1991) ASC 56-099; Morlend 
Finance Corp (Vic) Pty Ltd v Luke (1991) ASC 56-095.
143 Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; Hart v O ’Connor [1985] AC 
1000; Morlend Finance Corp (Vic) Pty Ltd v Luke (1991) ASC 56-095; cf Melverton v 
Commonwealth Development Bank o f Australia (1989) ASC 55-921.
145 Morlend Finance Corp (Vic) Pty Ltd v Luke (1991) ASC  ^56-095.
146 A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay [1974] 1 WLR 1308,. 1314-1315, [(Lord 
Reid); 1315-1314 (Lord Diplock); Clifford Davis Management Ltd v WEA Records Ltd [1975] 1 
WLR 61, 64-65 (Lord Denning MR); Commercial Bank o f Australia v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR447.
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(i) Special Disadvantage - Innate Disadvantage
There is the possibility of intervention where the insolvent acquiring a benefit 
has knowledge of the special innate disadvantage of the creditor. In Re Walsh; Ex 
parte Waters147 an undischarged bankrupt described by the court as a ‘confidence 
man’ 148 placed advertisements in newspapers in which he solicited investments in 
businesses holding out that there would be high returns. The applicant, a retired 
engine driver, replied to the advertisements and agreed to invest in a mining 
company. A few days later the applicant was informed by the police that he had 
been defrauded. He claimed in bankruptcy proceedings that the funds paid only for 
the purpose of acquiring mining shares and that the Official Receiver in Bankruptcy 
held those funds on trust for the applicant. Stable J agreed with this argument. 149 
However, it is clear that Stable J was also influenced by the relative abilities of the 
parties as well. He described the applicant as:
a trusting, foolish elderly man [who] was taken in by a newspaper 
advertisement which would not have drawn more than a raised 
eyebrow from a more worldly reader. 150
The facts also fell within the criteria for unconscionable transactions. The simple and 
trusting elderly engine driver had a special disadvantage of age and limited education 
which the trickster exploited. In the light of the special disadvantage, it could be said 
that the applicant did not, objectively speaking, assume the risk of the transaction.
(ii) Non-Disclosure of Important Information Concerning the Financial 
State of the Defendant
Courts have held that an insolvent was not entitled to retain funds which had 
been obtained in the context of a parlous financial situation which was known to the
147 [1978] QdR 134.
148 Ibid 135.
149 But note the analysis in Chapter 3, 112-114.
150 [1978] QdR 134, 135.
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insolvent or in the case of a company, the officers of the company. In other areas of 
law, legislatures have frowned on trading after insolvency. 151
Such situations fit within the equitable doctrine of unconscientious dealing 
because the creditor suffers from a special disadvantage which is a form of 
information asymmetry. The insolvent takes advantage of this information 
asymmetry and receives a benefit, knowing that it is insolvent or that the financial 
situation is very dire.
The proposition that in certain situations an information asymmetry must be 
remedied, may appear somewhat inconsistent and antithetical to the law on 
fraudulent153 and innocent misrepresentations. 154 A fundamental tenet of the law is 
that simple silence is not actionable and a positive representation is required to 
activate the law relating to misrepresentations. 155 The definition of positive 
statements is wide. 156 In contrast, equity intervenes on the basis that there was a duty 
to disclose information. It appears that a failure to disclose will invite equitable 
intervention.' ' So that, whilst the silence of the insolvent about its parlous financial 
status is not actionable on the basis of the misrepresentation, equity does require 
disclosure of information where there is an evident information asymmetry. Without 
a readjustment of the information asymmetry, a party could act against his interest 
without being fully informed of the commercial consequences of the transaction. 
Such a party could rightly state that the reason for his non-assumption of the risk was 
the insolvent’s failure to disclose vital information which led him not to take any or 
sufficient action to minimise risk. Therefore, the appropriate redress for information
151 See for example the Corporations Law (Cth) Part 5.7B, Divisions 3 and 4.
152 For a brief discussion of the different definitions of information asymmetry in the context of 
market regulation see Financial System Inquiry Final Report (1997) 190.
153 See above, 234-235
154 See below, 264-266.
155 Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597; W Scott, Fell & Co Ltd v FH Lloyd (1906) 4 CLR 572. In 
relation to exceptions to the rule: see Duggan, above n 69, [611].
156 Walters v Morgan (1861) 3 De GF & J 718, 723-724; 45 ER 1056, 1059 (Lord Campbell LC).
157 See for example the recent decision of the High Court of Australia in Garcia v National Australia 
Bank Ltd (1998) 155 ALR614.
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asymmetry is disclosure of the relevant commercial information where that 
information is not publicly available. This general countermeasure to information 
asymmetry has been operational in our legal system as the concept of uberrima fides
1 158shows.
An analysis of the Commercial Bank o f Australia Ltd v Amadio,]59 indicates 
that disclosure lies at the heart of the equitable doctrine of unconscionable dealing. In 
that case, elderly parents executed a mortgage over the home in order to secure an 
overdraft facility made available to a company controlled by the son. The parents 
were immigrants whose understanding of the English language was limited. The 
parents were unaware of both the company’s and the son’s precarious financial 
situation. Moreover, the son misled the parents about the nature and extent of the 
mortgage. The parents believed that the mortgage secured $50,000 for 6 months. In 
fact, the mortgage was an unlimited security. It is most likely that the parents would 
not have signed the documentation if the company’s financial situation and nature of 
the mortgage had been disclosed by an independent third party. However, caution is 
needed where independent advice is involved. Where the defendant is insolvent (or 
close to insolvency) independent advice may not be an adequate defence. The 
independent advice may be naively predicated on solvency or a buoyant financial 
condition. Both the independent adviser and the creditor may be entitled to assume 
that the defendant is solvent and the transaction, in the light of that assumption, may 
appear prudent.
The cases can be conveniently divided into two strands. There are those 
situations where an insolvent receives funds when it is already insolvent and fails to 
disclose the insolvency. An alternative situation is where the insolvent receives funds 
when it is in a parlous financial situation, fails to disclose this and becomes 
insolvent.
Insolvency
The intervention of equity and the imposition of proprietary relief in cases of 
receiving funds whilst insolvent was presaged by courts utilising the swollen assets
1 SR
Chapter 1, 24-26.
159 (1983) 151 CLR447.
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theory in the United States particularly during the Depression 160 and they will not be 
further discussed here.
Neste Oy v Lloyd's Bank pic161 illustrates information asymmetry. Although 
the failure to disclose took place in the context of an ongoing relationship, the 
analysis will be the same for pre-transactional situations and ongoing relationships. 
The plaintiffs were ship owners. From time to time they employed Peckton Shipping 
Ltd (‘PSL’) as their agent in the United Kingdom. The plaintiffs paid moneys into 
PSL's account with Lloyds Bank pic for the payment of any cost incurred by the 
plaintiffs vessels during visits to the United Kingdom. Due to financial difficulties, 
the Peckton Group (including PSL) stopped trading. Lloyds sought to set off group 
debts against moneys paid by the plaintiffs into the PSL account. The plaintiffs 
brought an action claiming that Lloyd's was not entitled to a set-off and that PDL 
held the funds on trust.
Bingham J held that PSL could not retain the moneys received from the 
plaintiff after it had ceased trading. 1  ^The defendant’s conduct was unconscionable 
because it had not disclosed its insolvency and inability to perform the contract. The 
insolvent and its unsecured creditors would obtain a windfall because more funds 
would be distributable. 163 Indeed, it could be said that to determine otherwise would 
permit an insolvent to retain funds in circumstances where the plaintiff could not be 
objectively expected to assume commercial risk, because the non-disclosure 
contributed to the plaintiffs unsecured status.
Parlous Financial Situations
Where a person or a firm is not insolvent, but is in a parlous financial 
situation, it may be more difficult to determine whether or not the court should 
intervene and provide proprietary relief. When they applied the swollen assets 
theory, some courts suggested that unless there was actual insolvency, courts should
160 For a discussion of these cases see Chapter 4, Part IV.
161 [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 658.
162 Ibid 666.
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not provide proprietary relief. 164 On the other hand, there were cases which 
illustrated that courts would be able to intervene if the person or firm were in such a 
parlous financial position that it was most unlikely that they would recover. 165 This 
approach appears to have currency today. 166 The question in each case amounts to 
whether the financial circumstances were so grim that they ought to have been 
disclosed to the creditor.
One factor which may dissuade a party from disclosing the parlous financial 
situation is that such disclosure may be construed as an act of bankruptcy. If a debtor 
notifies creditors that it has suspended or is about to suspend payment of debts, the 
debtor commits an act of bankruptcy. Another factor would be that the release of 
such commercially sensitive information could cause a panic amongst creditors and 
worsen the prospects of the debtor (particularly if the creditors refuse to deal with the 
debtor or call in loans early).
On the other hand, failure to inform a potential creditor means that it is more 
likely that a creditor will be satisfied with its unsecured status without taking steps to 
protect itself against the potential insolvency, particularly where any investigation of 
public records fails to disclose the problem. Thus, where information concerning the 
parlous financial status of the defendant is not available and/or searching for such 
information is not market practice, the unsecured creditor should be elevated to the 
status of a secured creditor where there is a failure to disclose it. However, one 
essential qualification is that the insolvency should be imminent. The following 
material deals with various commercial transactions in which the failure to disclose 
an imminent collapse was a crucial aspect in the unsecured creditor’s application for 
proprietary relief.
164 Chapter 4, 167-170.
166 Re Bengal Trading Corporation 12 Bankr 695 (Bankr SD Fla, 1981) and Re Vermont Real Estate 
Investment Trust 25 Bankr 813 (Bankr D Vt, 1982). See generally Jeffrey Davis, ‘Equitable Liens and 
Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy: Judicial Values and the Limits of Bankruptcy Distribution Policy’ 
(1989) 41 Florida Law Review 1,44-46.
167 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 40 (1) (h); Re Hewson; Ex parte Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd (1967) 
10FLR 479.
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Transfer of Funds for Investment
In Daly v Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd ( ‘Daly’), a customer of a 
stockbroking firm wished to invest in shares. An employee of the firm advised the 
customer that the investment in shares at the time was not wise. He suggested that 
the customer deposit funds with the firm in the form of a loan until it was 
commercially sound to purchase shares. The customer lent the money on loan on 
interest and subsequently added a further sum to the initial amount. Unknown to the 
employee of the firm, the firm was in a parlous financial situation. The partners were 
aware of the situation, but continued to operate commercially. The customer 
assigned the deposits to his wife. Three months after the customer had made the first 
deposit and one month after the customer had made the subsequent deposit, the firm 
ceased trading and became insolvent. The firm was unable to repay the deposit. 169 
The plaintiff brought an action claiming that she was entitled to recover 
compensation. She was unsuccessful before the Court of Appeal where it was held 
that compensation was available where there had been a defalcation within the 
meaning of the relevant legislation; and that a breach of fiduciary duty did not
171constitute such a defalcation.
On appeal, the High Court held that the firm had breached its fiduciary duties 
to the customer because the firm had failed to disclose its own interest in the 
transaction, particularly its parlous financial position. However, the Court held 
that the money which had been deposited with the firm was not the subject of a
173constructive trust. Relying on Lister v Stubbs, characterising the dealing with the
168
168 (1986) 160 CLR371.
169 Ibid 375 (Gibbs CJ).
170 Securities Industry Act 1975 (NSW) s 97.
171 [1982] 2 NSWLR 421, 427 (Reynolds JA).
17?
(1986) 160 CLR 371, 377 (Gibbs CJ with whom Wilson and Dawson JJ agreed); 385-386 
(Brennan J).
173 (1890)45 ChD 1.
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money as a loan174 and taking into account the interests of other unsecured 
creditors, 175 the Court held proprietary relief was not appropriate. 176
It is submitted that, when appropriate, the High Court should reconsider its 
decision in Daly. First, Lister v Stubbs177 has been recently overruled in Attorney- 
General (Hong Kong) v Reid. The latter case has established that the imposition of 
proprietary relief in the form of a constructive trust was appropriate when a corrupt 
fiduciary obtained benefits from third parties during the course of the fiduciary 
relationship.
Secondly, although the firm was not corrupt like the defendant in Attorney- 
General (Hong Kong) v Reid, the firm had breached its fiduciary duty to its 
customer. In Attorney-General (Hong Kong) v Reid, the Privy Council examined the 
relationship between the breach of fiduciary duty and the acquisition of funds and 
property acquired. In Daly, the Court failed to follow through the fact that the breach 
of fiduciary duty was directly linked to the acquisition of the loan funds and for that 
reason the plaintiff was entitled to proprietary relief. 179 Recourse to a personal 
remedy afforded by the existence of a claim based on common law debt did nothing 
to ensure that the firm was not enriched by the firm’s convenient failure to disclose. 
Instead, the firm benefited from that failure because there were additional funds 
available for the payment of liabilities which would certainly not have been available 
if there had been a disclosure. Whilst the majority of the Court was concerned that 
the money would have been withdrawn from the general body of unsecured 
creditors, it did not perceive that an obvious fault on the part of the firm had swelled 
the assets to which the general creditors were entitled. The reasoning and outcome of
174 (1986) 160 CLR 371, 377 (Gibbs CJ with whom Wilson and Dawson JJ agreed).
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid 379.
177 (1890) 45 ChD 1.
1 78
[1994] 1 AC 324.
179 See the comments in Stephenson Nominees Pty Ltd v Official Receiver (1987) 76 ALR 485, 506 
(Gummow J); Barbara McDonald, ‘Constructive Trusts’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed) Principles of 
Equity (1996) [2120]; Malcolm Cope, ‘Ownership, Obligation, Bribes and the Constructive Trust’ in 
Malcolm Cope (ed), Equity Issues and Trends (1995) 91, 114.
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the case did not adequately address the fact the plaintiffs unsecured status was 
directly linked to the failure to disclose.
Thirdly, even if the stockbroker had not owed a fiduciary duty to the 
customer, it would have been fitting for the Court to have granted the plaintiff 
proprietary relief. The firm had unconscionably failed to disclose its poor financial 
position. Thus, the customer had not assumed the risk of the imminent collapse of 
the firm.
180Instead, the decisions in Hill v Rose ( ‘Hill ’) and Lanks hear v ANZ Banking 
181Group (New Zealand) Ltd display a greater sensitivity to the issue of disclosure 
than the High Court in Daly.
In Hill, one of the defendants, a director of a company, invited the plaintiff to
182invest in a company. This defendant was described as ‘the guiding spirit.’ He did 
not disclose to the plaintiff that the company had liabilities which were in excess of 
$1.4 million and accumulated losses of over $950,000 or that the company carried 
on the business as trustee of the family trust. Tadgell J held that the defendants 
owed the plaintiff fiduciary obligations and non-disclosure amounted to breach of 
those obligations. Accordingly, the plaintiff was entitled to judgement against the 
company and judgement against the individual defendants for an indemnity for the 
amount not recovered from the company.
It is arguable that if the theory of objective non-assumption of risk was 
applied in the form articulated above, the plaintiff may not have succeeded. After all, 
the judge commented that the plaintiff was:
1 80
[1990] VR 129.
1 81
[1993] 1 NZLR481.
1 8?
[1990] VR 129, 130.
1 8 ^
Ibid 135-136.
184 Ibid 135.
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amazingly naive...and provided the money without receiving proper 
advice about, or carefully considering for himself...the consequences 
of his doing so.185
However, the case is distinguishable from the kinds of situations which have been 
discussed. The plaintiff sought and obtained a personal remedy in the form of 
equitable compensation. As the company was insolvent, the plaintiff was awarded an 
indemnity against the other defendants for those amounts which the company still 
owed. Therefore, Tadgell J did not have to focus on whether the unconscionable 
conduct led to the unsecured status of the plaintiff in determining whether to provide 
proprietary relief.
Investment in a Partnership
In Lankshear v ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd, the plaintiff 
formed a partnership and paid her co-partner, Broadley, $80,000 for the partnership 
project. She obtained a third mortgage over Broadley’s home for the amount 
contributed. The plaintiff had acquired the $80,000 for investment by way of an 
overdraft from the National Bank which was secured over her family home. 
Broadley was adjudicated bankrupt and the plaintiff obtained judgment against him 
for the amount secured under the mortgage but was never repaid the contribution. 
The plaintiff was required to sell her own home in order to repay her own overdraft. 
The plaintiff sought personal relief against the bank..
There appears to have been two factors which persuaded the Court that the 
plaintiff was entitled to proprietary relief against Broadley. There was a fiduciary 
relationship between the parties as partners in the business venture. Failure to 
disclose that the funds would be used to pay a pre-partnership overdraft amounted to 
a breach of duty. In addition, it appears that whether or not there was a breach of 
fiduciary' obligations, the relationship was one which demanded that Broadley 
disclose how the funds were going to be used. On this basis, the plaintiff was also 
entitled to proprietary relief. Therefore, she was entitled to a constructive trust
185 Ibid 132.
186 [1993] 1 NZLR481.
187 Ibid 490.
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against Broadley. A large portion of the funds had been deposited in Broadley’s bank
188account and the plaintiff was able to access it via the rule in Barnes v Addy.
Analysing the case from the perspective of the assumption of risk, it is clear 
from the judgment that the plaintiff did not assume the risk of an unsecured creditor. 
As Wallace J stated, the plaintiff would not have provided the funds if she had 
realised that her partner was in financial difficulties. Therefore, not only should 
Broadley have immediately disclosed how he intended to use the money, but also the 
general financial problems which beset him. These financial problems were extant 
between Broadley and a financial institution. It would have been impossible for the 
plaintiff to have obtained information of such a difficult commercial relationship 
because the bank would have been in breach of its duty to customers not to divulge 
such confidential information to third parties. 190
Leaving aside arguments based on the rule in Barnes v Addy, without the 
availability of proprietary relief in the form of a constructive trust against Broadley, 
the plaintiff could have suffered severely from the improvident transaction. Even if 
the relationship had been characterised as fiduciary, the current equitable tracing 
rules would probably have been of little assistance as the funds were immediately 
dissipated in the black hole of a large overdraft. 191 In this case, it was necessary for 
the Court to impose proprietary relief in order to ensure that the defendant did not 
retain an advantage from the information asymmetry.
1 RR
Ibid 494-496.
189 Ibid, 490.
190
In relation to confidential information see Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering 
Co Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203;[ 1963] 3 All ER 413n; Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) 
[1990] 1 AC 109; Attorney-General (UK) v Heinenmann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 10 
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Principles o f Banking Law (1997) Chapter 6; Ellinger and Lomnicka, above n 38, 133-143; GA 
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Receipt o f  Property for Sale as Agent
In Westpac Banking Corporation v Savin, ~ Aqua Marine was appointed as 
agent to sell the two respondent’s boats in September and October 1978 and failed to 
disclose its parlous financial situation. Both vessels were sold respectively in 
September and October. In both cases, Aqua Marine deposited the sale proceeds into 
an overdrawn general account. Neither vendor was paid any of the sale proceeds. 
Aqua Marine went into liquidation in November 1978 and there were no funds to 
meet its liabilities to unsecured creditors.
At first instance, Holland J viewed the actions of Aqua Marine dimly. He 
held that the Aqua Marine was in breach of its fiduciary obligations to the vendors. 
He said that the nature of the transactions indicated that the vendors impliedly 
authorised the deposit of the sale proceeds into the Aqua Marine’s general account. 
However, the principals had not authorised the company to use the sale proceeds for 
the company’s own purposes. Therefore, the owners retained a proprietary interest in 
the sale proceeds.194
In the light of the discussion concerning the fungibility and negotiability of 
money195 and the way that proceeds of sale are generally treated in the hands of 
agents,196 it was probably incorrect to automatically characterise the sale proceeds as 
the property of the vendors. There was no requirement to segregate the money. 
Indeed, there was an implied authorisation to deposit sale proceeds into the general 
account. Such an authorisation carries with it the implication that the agent may use 
the money as its own. Even though an agency relationship is fiduciary, it cannot 
be assumed that the principal has an automatic proprietary interest in the sale 
proceeds. There is old authority which suggests that where there is a single, one-off 
transaction, the principal is entitled to assume that the agent holds the proceeds of
192 [1985] 2NZLR41.
193 Savin & Boyle v De Vere (1983) 1 BCR 545.
194 Ibid 549.
195 Chapter 1, 11-13.
196 Chapter 2, 62-63.
197 See for example, Walker v Corboy (1990) 19 NSWLR 382.
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sale as a trustee198 and is able to use equitable tracing in order to access the funds. 199 
Thus, here it is arguable that the fiduciary aspect of the agency relationship invested 
the vendors with a proprietary interest in the sale proceeds. However, even if this had 
been the case, the exercise of proprietary rights pursuant to the fiduciary relationship, 
would not assist because the funds had been dissipated into the black hole of the 
overdrawn account. Traditional equitable tracing rules would not assist in the 
recovery of dissipated funds.200
A majority of the New Zealand Court of Appeal accepted that there had been 
a breach of fiduciary duty and that the vendors had implicitly authorised the deposit 
of the funds into an account. They recognised that the vendors would not have 
permitted the agent to dissipate their funds in the overdrawn account if there had 
been full financial disclosure. It is likely that the vendors would have taken steps to 
protect their proprietary interest in the funds or obtained the services of another 
agent. McMullen J held that there was no authorisation for the deposit of the funds 
in the company’s account. However, for the reasons already stated, this is not a 
helpful method of analysis.
Another way of dealing with the matter would have been to consider whether 
the vendors assumed the risk of the agent’s imminent insolvency. The problem did 
not lie in the fact that the sale proceeds did not belong to the company and that the 
company was using the proceeds for its own purposes. An evaluation of the facts 
showed that, an implied authorisation to deposit in a general account was already an 
authorisation to an agent to use the funds as its own (with the proviso that an 
equivalent amount to the sale proceeds would, in due course, be forwarded to the
198
Foley v Hill (1848) 2 HL Cas 28, 35-36; 9 ER 1002, 1005; Palette Shoes Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Krohn 
(1937) 58 CLR 1, 30 (Dixon J). See also Walker v Corboy (1990) 19 NSWLR 382, 383-384 
(Priestley JA).
199 Lupton v White (1808) 15 Ves 432; 2 Ves Jun Supp 416; 33 ER 817; 34 ER 1158 and Re Hallen’s 
Estate, Knatchbull v Hallett (1880) Ch D 696, 719 (Jessel MR).
~°° See the discussion of traditional tracing rules in equity in Chapter 2 above, 67-71 and Bishopsgate 
Investment Management Ltd (in liq)v Homan [1995] Ch 211.
~01 [1985] 2 NZLR 41, 45 (Richardson J with whom Sir Clifford Richmond agreed).
203 Ibid 55 (McMullen J).
252
vendors). Indeed, as some evidence indicated, there was nothing unusual in agents 
depositing sale proceeds into general accounts.204 Rather, the problem was that the 
vendors had not been alerted to the general parlous state of the agent’s affairs and the 
account was overdrawn. This was the basis upon which the vendors could have 
argued that they were entitled to proprietary relief. As it turned out, the vendors were 
able to obtain personal relief against the agent’s bank under the rule of Barnes v 
Addy. But here it appears that the wrongdoing was not sheeted home to the major
wrongdoer, but to a bank which was deemed to have constructive notice of the nature
206of the funds deposited in the account.
Mail Order Purchases
In the light of the concerns of the courts that the transferors and principals 
should not be vulnerable to information asymmetry, the English decision in Re 
Kay ford Ltd (in liq) becomes clear. Kayford Ltd was a mail order company. 
Customers paid either the full purchase price or a deposit for the goods. The 
company found it increasingly difficult to obtain supplies for the goods and was 
concerned that these difficulties would affect its financial viability. The company 
consulted its accountants who advised it to deposit the mail order funds into a 
separate account to ensure that if the company went into liquidation, the funds could 
be refunded to prepaying customers. The company placed the funds into a separate 
account. Megarry J held that the unilateral intention on the part of Kayford Ltd was 
sufficient to create an express trust. The nature of the customers and the potential 
liquidation of the company demanded that the company act honourably and protect 
customers by utilising the trust as a security device.209 What Megarry J located was 
the need for transferees or agents to act openly and honestly with those parties with
204 Ibid 45-46 (Richardson J with whom Sir Clifford Richmond agreed).
205 (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244.
206 Ibid 50-54 (Richardson J); 61-71 (Sir Clifford Richmond).
207 [1975] 1 WLR279.
Ibid, 281-282.
209 Ibid 202. Compare the judicial attitude to trade debtors in Re Ayoub; ex parte Silvia (1983) 67 
FLR 144, 149 (Morling J).
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whom they do business. Therefore, they had to either disclose business difficulties or 
to take effective steps to ensure that the customers (and presumably principals) 
obtained security over the funds pending the finalisation of the transaction. 
Otherwise, the transferee (or agent) and its other unsecured creditors will have the 
benefit of the information asymmetry. It is not surprising that at the end of his 
judgment," Megarry J spoke so approvingly of the actions which had been taken by 
officers of Kayford Ltd. In the light of the theory of objective non-assumption of 
risk, if the company had not acted as it had, the customers could have sought the 
imposition of proprietary relief.
The preceding discussion indicates that the concept of information 
asymmetry will broaden in the light of the practical constraints which are associated 
with information gathering and the assumption of risk. The courts did not suggest 
that the parties were under a conventional special disadvantage or that these plaintiffs 
were naive about the nature of commercial transactions. Rather, these plaintiffs 
were at an evident disadvantage because of information asymmetry. If the plaintiffs 
had been made aware of the parlous financial situation, it is unlikely that they would 
have entered the transactions in the first place.
C Unconscionable Conduct After the Commercial Transaction Commenced 
1 Introduction
The preceding discussion addressed unconscionable conduct which occurred 
prior to the commencement of the transaction. However, insolvents may also act 
unconscionably during the course of a commercial transaction where the insolvent 
has received money (or goods for sale) from the plaintiff. The plaintiff intended the 
transfer of the funds (or goods for sale). Therefore, the plaintiffs capacity to act 
independently and/or in an informed way was not impaired prior to the transaction. 
The assumption under which the plaintiff operated was not induced by the insolvent 
(with the exception of innocent misrepresentation). However, the insolvent 
subsequently acts unconscionably when it refuses to restore the plaintiff to the
210 Ibid.
For an example of a situation of parties who evidently had little or no business experience see: 
Morlend Finance Corp (Vic) Pty Ltd v Luke (1991) ASC ^56-095.
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Situation prior to the acquisition of the benefit. Equity will not permit the party to 
retain that benefit. There are two major permutations of this theme.
First, there are those situations discussed below under the heading, 
‘Subsequent Unconscionable Conduct.’ These are cases where the transaction has 
‘commenced, but the transaction is not completed due to an intervening discovery or 
vitiating factor. Such a discovery or vitiating factor totally changes the legal and the 
commercial matrix to the extent that it is no longer effective. Thereafter, the recipient 
of the money becomes insolvent. The breakdown of the commercial venture leads to 
the retention of a benefit which was not contemplated without its successful 
completion. In some circumstances, the commercially honourable course would be 
for each party to restore the other to the situation before the transaction commenced 
(subject to a plaintiffs right to affirm voidable contracts), taking into account costs 
and liabilities incurred by each of the parties - a kind of practical justice approach as 
adopted by equity in rescission cases. However, the insolvent may refuse to 
disgorge the money or the monetary equivalent. The insolvent’s reaction to the 
vitiating factor and the retention of the funds is the unconscionable conduct which 
triggers equitable intervention. So, plaintiffs have had to bring an action to have 
the money (or its equivalent) disgorged from the assets of the insolvent.
The topic of ineffective contracts is a large one. The general rubric can cover 
contracts which are void ab initio 214 voidable contracts,21S contracts which are
• • 2 1 6  217anticipated and contracts which are discharged by breach. Some authors also 
include illegal contracts as comprising part of the notion of void and ineffective
Louis Proksch, ‘Rescission’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The Principles o f Equity (1996) 856 
[2510]-[2511].
213 See the discussion of Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583 in Chapter 5, 195-199.
214 Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd [1936] 2 KB 403; Guinness pic v Saunders [1990] 2 AC 663, Rover 
International Ltd v Cannon Film Sales Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 912. In relation to a company or a local 
authority acting ultra vires see Sinclair v Brougham [1914] AC 398; Westdeutsche Landesbank 
Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 699.
2' 5 Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1.
~16 Way v Latilla [1937] 3 All ER 759; William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd v Davis [1957] 1 WLR 932; 
British Steel Corporation v Cleveland Bridge and Engineering Co Ltd [1984] 1 All ER 504.
217 See for example, Rowland v Divall [1923] 2 KB 500. Note Goff and Jones, above n 90, 412-447; 
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contracts. However, for the purpose of this discussion supervening illegality is 
considered in the context of defences in Chapter 7.219 Some authors have suggested 
that, in principle, a party faced with an ineffective contract should not have access to 
proprietary relief. Others have suggested that proprietary relief is available (even 
to a limited extent).“" In the light of the different factual situations which may arise 
in relation to ineffective contracts, it is unlikely that it can be said unequivocally that 
proprietary relief is always an appropriate response. Ultimately, the question will be 
whether the plaintiff, in the context of the ineffective contract, has assumed the risk 
of an unsecured creditor.
Secondly, there are those situations discussed under the heading ‘Mutual 
Omissions.’ Here, it has not been the unconscionable conduct of the insolvent which 
induced the plaintiff to enter the transaction. These are cases where an event triggers 
the need for equitable intervention even though the event may not bring the ongoing 
relationship to an end. Sometimes it is the insolvency of the transferee or the agent 
which does so. The plaintiff may have initially assumed the risk of an unsecured 
creditor, but the problem is that the parties have not negotiated what should happen 
to the funds or the proceeds of sale on the occurrence of the triggering event.
2 Subsequent Unconscionable Conduct
(a) Innocent Misrepresentation
An innocent misrepresentation renders contracts voidable. Although the 
original innocent misrepresentation may be an act of the insolvent, it is not the 
product of unconscientious motivations. Therefore, it would be the insolvent’s 
response to the discovery of the innocent misrepresentation and the refusal to repay
218
218
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219 Chapter 7, 325-329.
220 Goff and Jones, above n 90, 94.
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the benefit accrued (rather than the innocent misrepresentation) which would 
constitute unconscionable conduct. Traditionally, the remedies for innocent 
misrepresentation at common law were very narrow. Equity created a jurisdiction 
which went beyond common law because equity provided relief for a 
misrepresentation without the need for the proof of fraud in the strict sense.224 Equity 
may refuse to grant specific performance to the representor or may grant the remedy 
of rescission of the contract to the representee.225
The leading case is the 19th century decision, Redgrave v Hurd which did not 
deal with insolvency. A vendor selling a house and legal practice, innocently 
misrepresented the amount of income which was derived from operating the 
business. The vendor sought specific performance and the purchaser sought 
rescission of the contract. At first instance, Fry J held that the vendor was entitled to 
specific performance on the basis that the purchaser should have taken care to 
investigate the representations. This view is generally consistent with the doctrine 
of caveat emptor,228 in the sense that purchasers should take care to investigate for 
themselves the substance of representations made by a vendor. On appeal, Sir 
George Jessel highlighted equity’s broad jurisdiction and said:
It was put in two ways, either of which was sufficient. One way of 
putting the case was, ‘A man is not to be allowed to get a benefit from 
a statement which he now admits to be false. He is not to be allowed 
to say, for the purpose of civil jurisdiction, that when he made it he 
did not know it to be false; he ought to have found that out before he 
made it.’ The other way of putting it was this: Even assuming that 
moral fraud must be shewn in order to set aside a contract, you have it 
where a man, having obtained a beneficial contract by a statement 
which he now knows to be false, insists upon keeping that contract.
To do so is a moral delinquency: no man ought to seek to take 
advantage of his own false statements.’ The rule in equity was settled,
223 Duggan, above n 69, [602]-[603].
224 Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1.
225 Duggan, above n 69, [603].
226 (1881) 20 Ch D 1.
227 Ibid 8.
228 Chapter 1, 17.
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and it does not matter on which of the two grounds it was rested....If a 
man is induced to enter into a contract by a false representation it is 
not a sufficient answer to him to say, ‘If you had used due diligence 
you would have found out that the statement was untrue. You had the 
means afforded you of discovering its falsity, and did not choose to 
avail yourself of them.’
The vendor’s response to the discovery of the innocent misrepresentation was 
unconscionable.
In one major respect the approach of Jessel MR differs from the concept of 
objective non-assumption of risk. He created an essentially strict liability regime. 
The representor was not entitled to specific performance and the representee was 
almost automatically entitled to rescission. Today, courts should take a more 
balanced approach, particularly where the representor was insolvent. Courts should 
not simply absolve the representee from any responsibility to investigate the truth of 
the representation. Factors such as the public availability of the information (which 
formed the substance of the representation), the costs of investigating the truth of 
such financial information in the light of the full market value of the transaction230 
and market practice would also be highly relevant. In Redgrave v Hurd the vendor 
did not keep good records of account and this may have ultimately been in the 
purchaser’s favour. However, today a purchaser would be entitled to insist upon a 
thorough investigation of detailed and audited books of account before entering into 
the contract of sale. Certainly, the purchaser would be well advised to do so.231
(b) Common Mistake
The situation which is contemplated here is where the parties enter into a 
commercial transaction under a mistake of fact or law. During the course of the 
transaction, the plaintiff paid over money or entrusted goods to the insolvent. The 
discovery of common mistake showed that the mutual intention of the parties is
229 (1881) 20 ChD 1, 12-13.
230 Duggan, above n 69, [606].
231 See Andrew Lang, ‘Practical Problems in the Sale of a Business 1’ in Andrew Lang (ed), 
Practical Problems in the Sale o f Business (1998) 2-18.
232 As to the Australian approach, see David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank (1992) 175 
CLR 353; Mason and Carter, above n 95, [413]-[414].
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vitiated and the transaction was no longer commercially viable. In such a situation 
equity will intervene. Greig and Davis have stated:
If the parties have entered into a contract on the basis of a common 
mistake, the contract is generally valid at law...But for one party to 
insist on continued performance of the contract after the mistake has 
been discovered is the same sort of (sic) ‘moral fraud’ or ‘moral 
delinquency’ as permits the rescission of a contract induced by a non- 
fraudulent misrepresentation. To insist on maintaining the benefits of 
the contract when the error is revealed may well amount to
233unconscionable conduct.
It is established that equity will intervene where it can be seen that the common 
mistake was a serious one (such as a total failure of consideration) 234 which went to 
the heart of the transaction and it would be unconscionable for the one party to
236retain ‘the windfall’. The traditional personal remedy for common mistake is
• • 237rescission.
238In this situation, the creditor should be entitled to proprietary relief, in the 
event of the other party’s insolvency. The creditor could assert that he did not 
assume the status of an unsecured creditor. The unconscionable conduct of the 
insolvent placed him in that position. An insolvent would be unable to argue that the 
creditor failed to preserve his interests because the insolvent has also failed to do so.
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(c) Void Contracts
Two situations require comment. One situation is where there is the lack of 
capacity of one of the parties involved in the transaction. Such incapacity may arise 
by virtue of specific legislation which confirms the legal incapacity of certain 
persons to enter certain contracts and renders the contract void.239 This will not be 
further pursued. However, the incapacity may be enshrined in the nature of the legal 
entity entering into the transaction. For some time, the capacity of the modem 
corporation was constrained by the mandatory objects clause in the memorandum of 
association.240 However, the capacity of corporations, registered in Australia, to act 
as a natural person was set down in legislation in 1983.241 Therefore, in recent years, 
the ultra vires issue has not been so critical in relation to corporations.242 But, as 
recent English cases show, it can still create difficulties where unincorporated 
bodies, such as municipal councils are unaffected by legislative amendments to the 
ultra vires doctrine.243
The other situation is where there are transactions which both parties 
mistakenly enter into and are rendered void by statute.
These situations are sometimes determined in the light of the law of 
restitution.244 However, as the argument of the thesis makes clear, when seeking 
equitable proprietary relief, the considerations encapsulated in the theory of objective 
non-assumption of risk should be applied notwithstanding that it is arguable that a 
claim in restitution is involved.
239
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(i) Ultra Vires Contracts
The concept of ultra vires encapsulates those situations where a director of a 
company has entered a contract outside his authority,245 where a company has 
entered into a contract prior to incorporation (and therefore has acted beyond the 
power of a non-incorporated entity),246 or where a company has acted outside its
247powers.
The extent to which proprietary relief should be available in such cases is still 
largely undetermined, although the House of Lords in Westdeutsche Landesbank 
Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council248 broached it recently.
The facts of Westdeutsche are set out in Chapter 3.249 What is relevant in this 
discussion is that the bank was entitled to a personal remedy. However, the bank was 
not entitled to compound interest because a majority of the court held that award of 
compound interest was only within equitable jurisdiction. The fact that the local 
authority had received the money, unaware of the vitiating effect of the ultra vires, 
indicated that the jurisdiction of the equity jurisdiction based on conscience was not 
activated.
However, when setting out the basis for equitable intervention, the House of 
Lords took the opportunity to overrule Sinclair v Brougham ( ‘Sinclair’). The facts 
of Sinclair are set out in Chapter 3. In a modem light, it can be said that the non­
members had assumed the risks of the transaction, but they had not been aware that 
the actions of the building society were ultra vires. This vitiated the original 
intentions of the depositors. The majority judgments in Westdeutsche failed to
245 Craven-Ellis v Canons Ltd [1936] 2 KB 403; Guinness pic v Sanders [1990] 2 AC 663.
246 Rover International Ltd v Cannon Film Sales Ltd [1989] 1 WLR 912.
247 Sinclair v Brougham [1914] AC 398; Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London 
Borough Council [1996] AC 669.
248 [1996] AC 669.
249 Chapter 3, 124-125.
250 [1996] AC 669, 717-718 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
251 [1914] AC 398.
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consider the broadening notion of unconscionable conduct. Therefore, it is contended 
that the House of Lords was incorrect when it overruled Sinclair or (in the light of 
the wide variety of judgments in the case) the result in Sinclair. The non-members 
were entitled to proprietary relief. They were entitled to assume that the building 
society was acting within its powers. There was no market practice which required 
investigation of the legal status and capacity of the building society. It would have 
been unconscionable for the building society to have retained money under a void 
contract. There was no legitimate basis upon which the society could receive and 
retain funds. This did not change because the society became insolvent. Such an 
approach would be consistent with equity’s approach to common mistake.
However, such reasoning does not automatically imply that proprietary relief 
should be available in all cases. For example, a large corporate lender which failed to 
discover that a company director entered into a loan contract outside his authority or 
a borrowing company had acted ultra vires, may not be entitled to such relief. It may 
be established that it had not taken sufficient care to preserve its own interests and 
investigate the status of the director and the company. It may not have followed 
prudent market practice.
(it) Mistaken Transactions made Void by Statute
Allied to the concepts of common mistake and illegality (which are 
considered below), parties may mistakenly enter into a contract which is rendered 
void by statute. This was the situation which occurred in David Securities Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth o f Australia (David Securities’) where a borrower entered a 
contract in which it was required to pay tax to the lender under the mortgage. The
253High Court of Australia held that the loan was caught by taxation legislation 
which rendered such obligations void.254 The Court held that the borrower was 
entitled to recover those moneys which had been mistakenly paid over on the basis 
that there was a legal obligation to pay them. Once the mistake was proved, further
252 [1992] 175 CLR353.
253 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 261.
254
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proof of the unjust retention of the funds was unnecessary/ It was sufficient that
257the mistake was causative but not fundamental.
As the lender was solvent, it was unnecessary to consider the situation where 
proprietary relief was sought. However, where a contract is rendered void by virtue 
of its breach of a legislative provision, such a borrower should be entitled to 
proprietary relief. As in the cases of common mistake and ultra vires contracts, there 
is no conscionable basis upon which the lender should be able to retain funds. The 
borrower’s unsecured status would be directly connected to the ineffective contract 
and the lender’s unconscionable retention of the funds. When applying the theory of 
objective non-assumption of risk, market practice will be an important criterion. In 
David Securities, the plaintiff was not expected to minimise the risks associated with 
the terms of the transaction. As a borrower, the plaintiff was obliged to comply with 
the lender’s requirements. Generally, borrowers are not required to investigate the 
legality of the lender’s borrowing requirements. Moreover, borrowers in this 
situation rely on the expertise of the lender to ensure that the transaction is legally 
valid.
(d) Ineffective Contracts - Failure to Comply with Formalities
A contract which is ineffective due to a failure to comply with formalities is
258unenforceable but it is not void. Both equity, via the doctrine of part 
performance, and modem restitution have responded to provide personal relief. 
Otherwise, the insolvent and his creditors would obtain a windfall due to the 
unenforceable nature of the contract. In recent times, the failure to comply with 
formalities has arisen most clearly in quantum meruit cases where a party has 
provided services ignorant of the fact that the contract does not comply with
256 Ibid 379.
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legislative requirements. Notwithstanding the non-compliance, the service 
provider has been able to claim an amount in payment for services rendered.
However, in such cases the party to whom the service was provided was not 
insolvent. If there had been an intervening insolvency, then the question ought to 
have been whether, objectively speaking, the service provider assumed the risk of an 
unsecured creditor. It is by no means clear that a creditor could establish objective 
non-assumption of risk of the transaction in all cases. An objective evaluation of 
market practice would be necessary.
(e) Contracts Discharged for Frustration or Breach
Contracts discharged for frustration or breach are neither void or voidable. 
They are valid contracts. Up to the time of discharge, the contract is fully enforceable 
and thereafter the terms and conditions of the contract remain operative. It can be 
assumed in these cases that each of the parties have taken on the risk of the potential 
insolvency of the other, that they have thoroughly investigated the financial status of 
the other party (if they considered it necessary) and they have regulated their 
relationships on the basis that the contract sets out the terms and conditions of the 
relationship (including what is precisely to occur where there is a breach of contract). 
They have accepted that the primary remedy for breach of contract will be damages. 
By entering into the contract, they have generally accepted the prevailing norms of 
commercial operation and they may not have taken security from one another in 
anticipation of breach of contract. In the case of discharge by breach, it is likely that 
in many cases a plaintiff will only be allowed to rely on contract rather than a claim 
in restitution. This issue is interrelated with the complex matter of the nature and 
extent of the failure of consideration required. The limited scope of the availability 
of restitution has been criticised.264 But, whether the claim is made on the basis of 
damages for breach or the limited head under restitution based on total failure of
261
261 Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1986) 162 CLR 221.
“62 McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd (1933) 48 CLR 457, 476-477 (Dixon J); Johnson v Agnew 
[1980] AC 347, 367, 392-398 (Lord Wilberforce).
"63 As Goff and Jones, above n 90, 412-413; Rowland v Divall [1923] 2 KB 500; Rover International 
Ltd v Cannon Film Sales Ltd [1989] 1 WLR 912; Goss v Chilcott [1996] AC 788, 797 (Lord Goff).
264 Burrows, above n 217, 259-261; E McKendrick, ‘Total Failure of Consideration and Counter- 
Restitution: Two Issues or One’ in P Birks (ed), Laundering and Tracing (1995) Chapter 8.
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consideration, only a personal remedy should be available. Generally, a proprietary 
remedy should not be awarded/ The only exception which would arise is where 
contract is subject to specific performance on the basis that the subject matter of a 
sale contract was rare or unique. Equity would provide a specific remedy with 
proprietary consequences.266
Contracts which are discharged through frustration are governed by 
legislation which sets out the rights of the parties and the allocation of risk. The 
legislation was in response to the defects in the common law such as the need for 
total failure of consideration, the general denial of an action based on quantum 
meruit" and the denial of the defence of change of position. However, a perusal 
of the various forms of legislation" shows that there is no allocation of risk which is 
influenced by the insolvency of the parties. The remedies under the various forms of 
legislation are based on the premise that the remedy which will be awarded will be a 
personal remedy.
The only possible exception to the position stated above is where the 
frustrating event has direct bearing on the insolvency of the defendant such as in Re 
Kayford Ltd (in liq).212
"65 See Worthington, above n 221, 168-171.
266 Ibid 171-172; Fells v Read (1796) 3 Ves Jun 71; 1 Ves Jun Supp 334; 30 ER 899; 34 ER 814; 
Dougan v Ley (1946) 71 CLR 142. In relation to the breadth of equitable jurisdiction to restore 
chattels in specie see Burr v Bloomsburg 138 A 876 (Court o f Chancery New Jersey, 1927).
267 Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 (UK); Frustrated Contracts Act 1959 (Vic); The 
Frustrated Contracts Act 1978 (NSW).
268 Whincup v Hughes (1871) LR 6 CP 78.
269 Cutter v Powell (1796) 6 TR 320; 101 ER 573.
270 For a discussion o f change of position see below 340-342.
271
For a discussion of the various forms of legislation such as the Frustrated Contracts Act 1959 
(Vic) or Frustrated Contracts Act 1978 (NSW) see Greig and Davis, above n 75, 1336-1350; Carter 
and Harland, above n 222, [2068]-[2098].
272 [1975] 1 WLR279.
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(j) Incomplete or Anticipated Contracts
Generally, the situations which arise under this heading pertain to a 
disgruntled party providing services pursuant to an incomplete contract or an 
anticipated contract. Therefore, it falls outside the scope of this thesis. However, 
such situations stand in contrast to the proprietary estoppel situation identified 
previously. The problem for providers of services in the circumstances presently 
under consideration is whether they will be able to obtain personal relief based on the 
services rendered. Such plaintiffs have been successful either on the basis of 
equitable estoppel273 or quantum meruit.274 Such plaintiffs will effectively argue that 
the relationship was such that it was tantamount to a valid contract operating, 
because there was detrimental reliance on the representations of the other party that a 
contract would come into operation in the future, that there was a request made to 
the plaintiff to undertake the wori<f or free acceptance. What is clear is that 
where the party has rendered services pursuant to an incomplete contract or in 
anticipation of a contract, that party has taken on the risk of the other party’s 
potential insolvency whether or not there is a contract in existence. It is probable that 
the party has not even undertaken normal market practice because the party had 
simply provided services without taking protective measures, including having the 
terms of the relationship set out in a complete contract. Where money is transferred, 
rather than services rendered, the same analysis will apply. Therefore, as personal 
relief is available, proprietary relief should not be available to a party who has 
performed services or paid money pursuant to an incomplete contract or in 
anticipation of a contract.
273 Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387.
274 William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd v Davis [1957] 1 WLR 932; Sabemo Ltd v North Sydney 
Municipal Council (1977) 2 NSWLR 880.; British Steel Corporation v Cleveland Bridge and 
Engineering Co Ltd [1984] 1 All ER 504; Marston Construction Co Ltd v Kigass Ltd (1989) 46 BLR 
109; Brenner v First Artists’ Management Pty Ltd [1993] 2 VR 221; Angelopoulous v Sabatino 
(1995) 65 SASR 1.
275 Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, 403-406 (Mason CJ and Wilson J), 
417-430 (Brennan J).
“76 Brenner v First Artists ’ Management Pty Ltd [ 1993] 2 VR 221.
277 Angelopoulous v Sabatino (1995) 65 SASR 1, 6-13 following Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul 
(1986) 162 CLR 221.
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3 Mutual Omissions
(a) Introduction
The situations considered here occur when the parties have failed to set out or 
make clear their full intentions. In the past, courts have presumed or inferred the 
intention of the parties to a contract in the form of implied terms.278 Therefore, it is 
arguable that what is occurring is that courts have effectively inferred the mutual 
intention of the parties in much the same fashion as courts dealing with the de facto 
relationships cases. However, this is not the correct approach and it ought not be 
pursued. Rather, it is better to evaluate the transaction in the light of the theory of 
objective non-assumption of risk. In the mutual omission cases, the broad nature of 
the context will be that the insolvent received funds in circumstances which were not 
envisaged by the parties. In this sense, the cases are similar to the subsequent 
unconscionable conduct cases. However, the ‘triggering event’ does not necessarily 
bring the contract or relationship to an end. It may simply affect one transaction 
within an ongoing relationship. Then the recipient becomes insolvent. The creditor 
could not be expected to have foreseen the situation or to have taken precautionary 
steps in the light of market practice. The creditor requests the insolvent or its 
administrator to disgorge the money (or the monetary equivalent). The insolvent, 
knowing the circumstances of the payment, unconscionably refuses to repay the 
same to the creditor.
(b) Mistaken Payments
Courts have considered situations where there is an ongoing relationship in 
which an insolvent received mistaken payments and/or overpayments. It appears that 
there are a variety of jurisdictions where a genuine error on the part of a creditor does 
entitle the creditor to proprietary relief.
The Moorcock 14 PD 64, 68 (Bowen LJ); Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239; Tai 
Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Lui Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1986] AC 80.
279 In relation to the latter see Allen v Snyder [1977] 2 NSWLR 685.
280 For England see Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd [1981] Ch 105. 
In relation to Australia, see Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Westpac Banking 
Corporation (1988) 164 CLR 662. In relation to Canada, note Harper and Royal Bank of Canada; 
Re/Max Renown Realty, Third Party 114 DLR (4th) 749 and the comments of Peter D Maddaugh and
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Mere negligence in making a payment will not disentitle the creditor to 
personal relief281 and it appears that such negligence should not, in principle, impair 
prospects for proprietary relief. However, the fact that there has been some lack of 
care on the part of the creditor should be a consideration when deliberating whether 
or not the court should award proprietary relief, particularly where the other 
unsecured creditors of the insolvent have not acted negligently.
One scenario is where the plaintiff makes an overpayment or pays the 
insolvent twice (which is in itself an overpayment). The overpayment is made on the 
basis of the innocent mistake of the creditor. In Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel- 
British Bank (London) Ltd the creditor mistakenly transferred $2 million twice to 
another bank. Goulding J held that the plaintiff had acquired a proprietary interest by 
virtue of the mistake which entitled it to recoup the money which had been paid over 
twice. However, this method of finding a proprietary interest has been criticised 
in Chapter 3.286
Another scenario is where the plaintiff pays funds to the insolvent under the 
mistake that he is indebted to the defendant and/or the defendant makes an erroneous
John D McCamus, The Law o f Restitution (1990) 239-240. For the United States see Re Berry 147 F 
208 (2nd Cir, 1906); American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Restitution (1937) §163; 
Davis, above n 166, 56-57; Emily L Sherwin, ’Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy’ [1989] University 
of Illinois Law Review 297, 357-361.
281
Kelly v Solari (1841) 9 M & W 54; 152 ER 24; White v Copeland (1894) 15 LR (NSW) 281; 
Imperial Bank of Canada v Hamilton [1903] AC 49; RE Jones Ltd v Waring Gillow, Ltd [1926] AC 
670; Commercial Bank of Australia v Younis [1979] 1 NSWLR 444; National Westminster Bank Ltd v 
Barclays Bank International Ltd [1975] 1 QB 654; Westpac Banking Corporation v ATL Pty Ltd 
[1985] 2 Qd R 577.
282
" See the result in Chase Manhattan NA v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd [1981] Ch 105.
283
Note in this regard, Lane Bryant Inc v Vichele Tops Inc (In re Vichele Tops Inc) 62 Bankr 788 
(BankrEDNY, 1986).
284[1981] Ch 105.
285
Ibid. Note also Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation 
[1988] 164 CLR 662. In relation to mistaken gifts and overpayment see generally Lady Hood of 
Avalon v Mackinnon [1909] 1 Ch 476; Barclays Bank Ltd v WJ Simms Son & Cooke (Southern) Ltd 
[1980] 1 QB 677, 686-699 (Goff J).
286 Chapter 3, 119-121.
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demand on the plaintiff which the plaintiff believes is a valid demand of payment.287 
Here, personal relief has been available. A developing area is where a bank honours 
a cheque under mistake and therefore advances its own money to the payee. Courts 
are increasingly willing to permit banks to bring a personal action to recover such 
payments. Money which is paid due to a mistake is prima facie, recoverable by a 
bardT subject to various defences including change of position. Therefore, when 
a bank pays funds mistakenly in ignorance of the customer stopping the cheque,290 
the death or incapacity of the customer or forgery,291 the bank will have a personal 
claim against the payee (rather than the customer who did not provide a genuine 
mandate for the bank to follow). If the bank is unable to bring an action against the 
payee it will have no remedy. This situation has been criticised on the basis that it is 
inappropriate to take action against the payee where the customer has stopped the 
cheque. " However, there is no reason to suggest that the position should be any 
different where proprietary relief is sought. Whilst the bank did intend to make the 
payments, that intention was vitiated by circumstances which were unknown to the 
bank. It could be argued that banks, when honouring cheques, should be required to 
make careful investigations prior to honouring them. However, the careful cross­
checking of every transaction would slow down the banking process inordinately. It
287 Ex parte Simmonds; Re Carnac (1885) 16 QBD 308; Re Brown; Dixon v Brown (1886) 32 Ch D 
597, 602 (Kay J); Re Opera Ltd [1891] 2 Ch 154; Re Rhoades; Ex parte Rhoades [1899] 2 QB 347, 
355 (Lindley MR); Re Berry 147 F 208 (2nd Cir, 1906); Re Paddington Town Hall Centre Ltd (1979) 
41 FLR 239; Re Kelly (1980) 108 DLR (3d) 149; Hartogen Energy Ltd v The Australian Gas Light 
Company (1992) 36 FCR 557, 572-573 (Gummow J).
288 Barclays Bank Ltd v WJ Simms Son & Cooke (Southern) Ltd [1980] 1 QB 677; Cranston, above n 
190,265-270.
289
Alan Tyree, Banking Law in Australia (3rd ed 1998) [6.25]-[6.27].
290 Tyree, above n 289, [6.37]-[6.38].
291 Ibid, [6.42]-[6.46]; Imperial Bank o f Canada v Bank o f Hamilton [1903] AC 49; National 
Westminster Bank Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd [1975] QB 654.
292 See the judgment of Goff J in Barclays Bank Ltd v WJ Simms Son & Cooke (Southern) Ltd {1980] 
1 QB 677, 699-700.
293 Tyree, above, n 289, [6.40]; RM Goode, ‘The Bank’s Right to Recover Money Paid on a Stopped 
Cheque’ (1981) 97 The Law Quarterly Law Review 254, 262-264; KG Nicholson, ‘Recovery of 
Money Paid Under a Mistake of Fact’ (1986) 60 The Australian Law Journal 459. Note also the 
possible use of subrogation: Liggett B (Liverpool) Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1928] 1 KB 48.
269
bank had investigated the customer’s financial prospects, it would not have provided 
the loan accommodation, the problem for the bank is that the erroneous payment has 
been made due to its failure to investigate the financial status of the customer rather 
than the negligence of the payee or the customer.
Finally, there is the situation where a plaintiff pays the funds to the wrong 
person under a clear mistake of fact. For example in Lane Bryant Inc v Vichele Tops 
Inc (In re Vichele Tops Inc), the plaintiff had written and forwarded a cheque 
mistakenly to the defendant which deposited the cheque in its bank account. There 
was no doubt that the plaintiff could bring an action on this ground. The problem for 
the court, which ultimately negatived the claim for proprietary relief, was the 
negligence of the claimant.299 The view was that the plaintiff ought to have taken 
more care.
(c) Double Receipts or Interests
Another situation where parties fail to delineate what should happen when the 
insolvent receives twice its entitlement under the transaction. There is some analogy 
between this situation and the traditional authority in which the interests of vendors 
and purchasers under contracts for sale of land were protected by the imposition of 
liens300 or purchasers of future property were protected by equitable assignments for 
consideration.301 Equity intervened where one party had completely fulfilled his part 
of the bargain and the other party had not fulfilled the terms of the contract. In each 
case, equity imposed either a lien or a constructive trust to secure the completion of 
the contract.
In relation to monetary transfers and receipts, the sorts of situations which 
may arise are those where the insolvent actually receives twice the entitlement under 
the contract. In a sense, there has been an overpayment, but the overpayment has
298
62 Banker 788 (Banker EDNY, 1986).
299 For a consideration of this issue see Chapter 7, 332-335.
300 Chapter 2, 74-76; Chapter 7, 295-296. For a comprehensive discussion of the relationship 
between vendors and purchaser in land sale contracts see DWM Waters, The Constructive Trust: The 
Case for a New Approach on English Law (1964) Chapter II; M Cope, Constructive Trusts (1992) 
Chapter 25.
301 Chapter 2, 75-77; Note in this context Palette Shoes Pty Ltd v Krohn (1937) 58 CLR 1.
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a trust, the Court went on to water down the obligatory nature of segregation. In an 
informative (but a conceptually disordered) judgment, de Jersey J sidestepped the 
requirement for segregation as a manifestation of intention. He said that a 
requirement to segregate funds could be discerned and imputed from the transaction 
itself.308 Thereafter, when the purpose for which the money was deposited came to an 
end, a resulting trust arose in favour of the depositor. He based his decision on a 
form of inferred or imputed intention. However, the case also signified that other 
analyses were emerging as well. He pointed out that he doubted that the existence of 
a trust was dependent on intention and referred (almost intuitively) to an emerging 
jurisprudence based on objective non-assumption of risk when he said:
Had one asked the plaintiff, it would have said of course, that it 
expected the moneys to be paid, as a fund, to the extent to which they 
were not expended following default by the lessees. The plaintiff 
apparently had no intention of associating with EAL as a mere 
investor. Likewise EAL, having regard to the peculiar circumstances 
of this deposit, would, if asked, have conceded an obligation to keep 
the moneys in a discreet identifiable fund, whether with EAL or 
invested by it, so that they would be readily available for payment to 
Financial Services [the lessor] if necessary, and ultimately, repayment 
for the plaintiff.309
De Jersey J could have resolved the simple but practically critical issue by recourse 
to an objective test of assumption of risk. A common-sense commercial approach 
would indicate that the guarantor had accepted the risk that it could lose the funds 
(due to the default of the lessee) or when the entity in which it deposited funds may 
become insolvent in the future. However, the period of risk taking on the part of the 
guarantor came to an end; and, objectively speaking, there was no longer any 
commercial reason why the bank was entitled to retain the funds. For this reason, the 
bank was required to disgorge them or (as in this case) a monetary equivalent.
307
307
308
309
Ibid 84.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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IV Conclusion
A major contention of this thesis is that the intervention of modem equity is 
explicable on the basis of whether an aggrieved party could be expected to assume 
the risk of the commercial transaction. From the identification of this criterion, a 
theory of objective non-assumption of risk has been posited.
In this chapter, the theory of objective non-assumption of risk has been given 
practical application. This chapter complements chapter 5. It provides a context to 
and a practical delineation of the kinds of situations where the principles enunciated 
in that chapter are likely and unlikely to apply. The situations which have been 
discussed are not exhaustive. This is because commercial persons and their lawyers 
are constantly creating new and varied commercial vehicles. Moreover, the 
protective methods for the minimisation of risk are constantly changing in response 
to such commercial vehicles.
However, the occasions where the theory ought to apply in favour of an 
unsecured creditor are limited and do not undermine the need for certainty in 
commercial transactions. The theory of objective non-assumption of risk draws on 
the modem foundation of traditional equitable relief and extends the scope for such 
relief. Its operation shows that equity is capable of intervening in commercial 
relationships on a principled basis targeting unconscionable conduct. Thus this 
chapter also complements Chapter 2.
Having established a principle upon which equitable intervention in 
commercial relationships may be explained and provided an illustration of how it 
may operate, the next issues are - what form will the proprietary remedy take and can 
the insolvent raise any defences against proprietary relief ?
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Chapter 7
EQUITY’S DOMAIN: REMEDIES AND DEFENCES
I Introduction
The last two chapters were devoted to the elucidation and practical 
application of the theory of objective non-assumption of risk. They were predicated 
on the basis that equity should be able to provide proprietary relief as a response to 
unconscionable conduct (subject to any defences which the insolvent may raise). 
This chapter considers the two remaining and necessary components of the objective 
non-assumption of risk theory, namely, the appropriate proprietary remedy and 
defences.
Equity has utilised a wide array of mechanisms in response to unconscionable 
conduct. In the following discussion, these measures are detailed. However, in the 
light of the complexity of monetary transactions and the negotiability and fungibility 
of money, it will be argued that one remedial response, a general equitable lien, is 
preferable to the rest. This discussion covers material which is separate from that 
contained in Chapter 4. It will be recalled that it was argued in that chapter that the 
necessity for a proprietary base as a precondition to proprietary relief is no longer 
tenable. The technological complexity of money makes it impossible to reify, 
segregate and trace money into a proprietary base. Instead, what was essential to 
identify was whether the creditor objectively assumed the commercial consequences 
of the transaction.
II Remedies for Unconscionable Conduct
Traditionally, the common law has provided personal rather than proprietary 
remedies in the form of damages.1 Even where the common law has provided
proprietary relief in the form of finding that title has not passed or common law
2
tracing, such relief has been beset by limitations.
Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Ex 850; 154 ER 363. Modem examples can be found in Johnson v 
Agnew [1980] AC 367, 392, 400 (Lord Wilberforce); Pennant Hills Restaurants Pty Ltd v Barrell 
Insurances Pty Ltd (1981) 145 CLR 625, 637 (Gibbs J); Mahoney v J  Kruse hie h (Demolitions) Pty 
Ltd [1985] 156 CLR 522, 527. For a comprehensive discussion of common law damages and contract 
see: DR Harris, ‘Damages’ in AG Guest (ed), Chitty on Contracts (27th ed, 1994) vol 1, Chapter 26 
and DW Greig and JLR Davis, The Law of Contract (1987) Chapter 23. For a discussion of common 
law damages and tort see RP Balkin and JLR Davis, Law o f Torts (2nd ed, 1996) Chapters 11 and 27.
2
In relation to common law tracing see Chapter 2, 65-66.
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Instead, it can be argued that it was the Chancery and then the modem 
jurisdiction of equity which has developed proprietary relief (or relief which has 
proprietary consequences such as specific performance) * 3 in a sophisticated way.
A Common Law and Equitable Proprietary Responses to Unconscionable
Conduct
There have been a wide variety of responses to unconscionable conduct 
which have, or could have, a significant proprietary effect in insolvency situations, 
where the transfer or receipt of money is concerned. The following discussion will 
inevitably draw on remedies which have been used in response to the kinds of 
unconscionable conduct which have been considered in the preceding chapter. 
However, the discussion in the main, will focus on equitable responses which have a 
proprietary effect in insolvency situations. Each of the methods are described and 
evaluated in the light of the practical and legal complexity of monetary transactions.
1 Title Has Not Passed
The theory that title has not passed to goods or money is a recurrent theme 
for determining proprietary rights to goods under legislation and ‘Romalpa’ clauses.4 
However, the theory also arises where certain kinds of vitiating events occur such as 
mistake.5 Referring to contracts which are vitiated by various kinds of mistake, Greig 
and Davis have stated:
Sarah Worthington, Proprietary Interests in Commercial Transactions (1996) 198-206. Note also
John Glover, ‘Equity, Restitution and the Proprietary Recovery of Value’ (1991) 14 The University of
New South Wales Law Journal, 247, 254-262.
4
See Aluminium Industrie Vaassen BV v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Reports 443 
(Mocatta J); affirmed [1976] 1 WLR 676 (CA). Other cases where the Romalpa clause has been 
considered include Borden (UK) Ltd v Scottish Timber Products Ltd [1981] Ch 25; Clough Mill Ltd v 
Martin [1985] 1 WLR 111; Hendy Lennox (Industrial Engines) Ltd v Grahame Puttick Ltd [1984] 1 
WLR 485; Armour v Thyssen Edalstehlwerke AG [1991] 2 AC 339; Re Weldtech Equipment Ltd 
[1991] BCC 16; Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd [1991] BCC 484. For helpful 
discussions o f Romalpa clauses see John Parris, Effective Retention o f Title Clauses (1986); JR 
Bradgate, ‘Reservation of Title Ten Years On’ (1987) 51 Conveyancer 434; Sally Wheeler, 
Reservation o f Title Clauses: Impact and Implications (1992); MG Bridge, ‘Form, Substance and 
Innovation in Personal Property Security Law’ [1992] Journal o f Business Law 1; Gerard 
McCormack, Reservation o f Title, (2nd ed, 1995); Worthington, above n 3, Chapter 2.
5 Worthington, above n 3, 124-125.
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In each of these situations, although it is possible to speak of a ‘void 
contract’, the reality is that, because of the lack of assent by one party 
to the terms proposed by the other, the necessary mutuality of a 
contractual obligation has failed to materialise. Neither party can be 
under any obligation to the other, and anything done in purported 
performance of the ‘contract’ has no effect. In particular, the delivery 
of goods by one to the other in pursuance of such an arrangement 
does not result in any change of ownership.6 78
This interpretation is logically valid because if the contract is void, then there is no 
relationship between the parties and anything undertaken pursuant to the contract is 
rendered nugatory by the very void nature of the ‘contract.’
However, where void contracts are involved, the practice of legislatures and 
courts is more complex. For example, in relation to statutory schemes contracts with 
minors and gaming contracts, contracts are treated as void whilst executory. 
However, such contracts appear otherwise to have full effect and operation. The 
problem is that whilst the contract is technically void, the parties have treated the 
relationship created by the contract as fully operational and binding. They could no 
longer argue that they have not benefited from the contract and both parties were 
willing to perform the contract. Where the contract is void, due to mistake or ultra 
vires, courts have been faced with the same dilemma. The parties have often acted 
for some time on the basis that the contract between them was valid.
Whilst it may be possible to argue that title to identifiable personal property
has not passed, the analysis breaks down where money is concerned. The problem in
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council 
8( ‘Westdeutsche’) was that the contract between the parties was void because the 
swap arrangement was ultra vires. Nonetheless, the parties had acted on the basis that 
the contract was valid for some time. The crucial fact was that although the bank’s 
claim was legitimate in the light of the void contract, the bank was unable to claim 
proprietary relief simply on the basis of the fact that the contract was void. Money is 
essentially a negotiable commodity.9 Where money is paid pursuant to a void
6 Grieg and Davis, above n 1, 1086; Note also SJ Whittaker, ‘Chapter 1 - Introductory’ in AG Guest 
(ed), Chitty on Contracts (27th ed, 1994) vol 1,1, [1-023],
7 Greig and Davis, above n 1, 1090-1093.
8 [1996] AC 669.
9 Chapter 1, 12-13.
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contract, there are two fundamental legal principles essentially at odds with one 
another. Theoretically, title (legal or equitable) does not pass pursuant to a void 
contract. On the other hand, money, in whatever guise it may take, functions quite 
easily as a negotiable commodity. Indeed, in Westdeutsche, it is likely that the 
money transferred throughout the transaction would have generally been paperless 
and ephemeral. 10 The implication of the decision was that the normative and 
practical function of money militates against the concept of reservation of title - even 
in circumstances where there is a serious vitiating factor which subverts the legal 
efficacy of the transaction to the extent that it is theoretically void. Therefore, 
retention of title is a limited remedial response to unconscionable conduct.
2 Following and Tracing
It is submitted that the traditional rules of common law following and 
equitable tracing are embellishments of the concept of retention of title. The 
significance of both traditional common law following and equitable tracing rules is 
that they operate on the basis that the creditor who seeks to follow or trace must 
locate the asset in its original, mixed or substituted form. After locating the asset in 
its original, mixed or substituted form, the creditor can argue that he has retained title 
to that asset. However, the mechanical following and tracing processes which 
currently operate in our legal system are limited. Whilst they are sometimes helpful 
responses to wrongful conduct, they are not entirely effective. Therefore, in the light 
of the complexity of monetary dealings and transactional ephemerality, it may be 
impossible for a party to locate the money to which he alleges he retains title. * 11 
Accordingly, the common law following and equitable tracing rules are limited 
remedial responses to unconscionable conduct.
3 Rescission
Rescission is an important remedial response to many forms of 
unconscionable conduct12 such as mistake, 13 misrepresentation, 14 duress, 15 undue
10 Ibid, 9-11.
11 Chapter 2, 65-66; 68-70.
12~ See generally RP Meagher, WMC Gummow and JRF Lehane, Equity Doctrines and Remedies (3rd 
ed, 1992) [2403]-[2404]; Louis Proksch, ‘Rescission’, in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The Principles o f 
Equity, 1996) 856, [2502] and Keith Mason and JW Carter, Restitution Law in Australia, (1995) 
[1310],
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• 16 17influence and unconscionable dealing. Rescission was available both at common
18law and in equity. The common law version was notoriously difficult to satisfy 
because an exact restoration of the parties to their former position was required. 19 
However, where money was involved, this was not a problem because money is 
fungible and so precise and complete restoration was effectively possible. Courts of 
equity operating in their concurrent jurisdiction" ordered rescission upon an even 
more flexible basis to achieve the near or practical restoration of parties to their 
previous position. Ultimately, equity developed a more expansive and useful
23remedy of rescission than the common law.
Rescission is an effective remedy for unconscionable conduct. Where a party 
has acted unconscionably in relation to transactions,24 rescission operates to set them 
aside. The ultimate effect of rescission in common law and equity is the restoration 
of the parties to the position which they stood in prior to the transaction which, 
generally speaking, was the product of the unconscionable conduct. There may be an
13 Lord Goff of Chieveley and Gareth Jones, The Law o f Restitution (4th ed, 1993), 212-220; Mason 
and Carter, above n 12, [1311].
14 Alati v Kruger (1955) 94 CLR 216; Abram Steamship Co Ltd v Westville Shipping Co Ltd [1923] 
AC 773; Goff and Jones, above n 12, 183-212; Mason and Carter, above n 12, [1311].
15 Mason and Carter, above n 12, [1312].
16 Tony Duggan, ‘Undue Influence’, in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The Principles o f Equity (1996) 379, 
[1128]; Mason and Carter, above n 12, [1313].
17 Mason and Carter, above n 12, [1314] and [1316].
1 Q
Proksch, above n 12, [2503].
19 Erlanger v The New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1878) 3 App Cas 1218, 1278-1279 (Lord 
Blackburn); Sibley v Grosvenor (1916) 21 CLR 469, 474-475 (Griffith CJ).
20 Proksch, above n 12, [2503] fn 16.
21 For a modem example see Vadasz v Pioneer Concrete (SA) Pty Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 102.
Erlanger v The New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1878) 3 App Cas 1218, 1278-1279 (Lord 
Blackburn).
"3 Ibid; Proksch, above n 12, [2503]-[2504],
24 Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, above n 12, [2403]-[2404].
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act of rescission by the innocent party which revests property. Court action may be 
required in order to effect complete restoration of legal title, although it may not be 
necessary where equitable title is concerned.26
However, the effectiveness of rescission in insolvency contexts awaits 
testing. Rescission is characterised as a personal remedy (rather than a proprietary 
remedy) by which parties are restored to the position that they would have been in if 
the transaction had never taken place." The remedy is supposed to operate 
retrospectively and the transaction (together with any obligations under it) is 
avoided. The question is, how do these principles of rescission operate in relation 
to money in an insolvency context? Although equity is able to make orders which 
achieves equivalent restoration," it is by no means completely clear that in all 
jurisdictions rescission is effective in insolvency situations. Both Worthington30 and 
Hayton argue that under the doctrine of rescission, the original title of the asset 
does revest after an effective election. So too, in the United States, there is material 
to suggest that proprietary relief is available in relation to a number of areas where 
rescission would be a traditional remedy. The recipient holds the subject property as 
a constructive trustee. However, there have been some powerful statements that 
whilst rescission may be available, the creditor only acquires personal remedies in an 
insolvency situation/ In addition, there appears to be a need for identifiable
25
Clough v The London & North Western Railway Co (1871) LR 7 Ex 26, 34-35; Hunter BNZ 
Finance Ltd v CG Maloney Pty Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 420, 432-433 (Giles J).
26 Alati v Kruger (1955) 94 CLR 216, 224 (Dixon CJ, Webb, Kitto and Taylor JJ).
"7 Erlanger v The New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1878) 3 App Cas 1218, 1278 (Lord Blackburn); cf 
David M Wright, The Remedial Constructive Trust (1998) [3.67]-[3.79],
9ft
Proksch, above n 12, [2501].
9Q
Erlanger v The New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1878) 3 App Cas 1218, 1278-1279 (Lord 
Blackburn).
30 Worthington, above n 3, 164.
31 David Hayton, ‘Ascertainability in Transfer and Tracing of Title’ (1994) Lloyds Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly, 449, 452.
32 In relation to the United States see Austin Wakeman Scott and William Franklin Fratcher, The Law 
o f Trusts (4th ed, 1989) vol V §465-473.
33 Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (In Receivership) [1995] 1 AC 74, 101-103 (Lord Mustill).
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property in order for an effective rescission to take place.34 However, in Eldan 
Services Ltd v Chandag Motors Ltd*5 Millett J said that even if the property is 
identifiable, that would not be sufficient to ground proprietary relief.
Proksch has noted:
Where the transaction consists only of the payment of money, for 
instance under duress, rescission of the transaction is implicit in 
pursuit of an action for return of the money. In all these instances, 
rescission both dates from, and takes effect at, the time of the act of
37the party in electing to rescind.
The statement assists in constructing one possible interpretation of how rescission 
operates in insolvency situations. In the light of the fact that money is fungible and 
negotiable, title to the money passes to the wrongdoer. Apprised of the wrongdoing, 
the innocent party rescinds the transaction and brings an action for a return of the 
money or, more accurately, a monetary equivalent. It is the act of rescission which 
brings the transaction to an end. On this analysis, it is arguable that rescission can 
only operate as a personal remedy, where the aggrieved is unable to trace the money 
and establish a proprietary base. Certainly, if the wrongdoer becomes insolvent prior 
to the act of rescission, then the operation of the remedy of rescission would entitle 
the party to personal relief in the form of a monetary equivalent of the amount 
originally transferred or collected. The consequence is that the party who has 
lawfully rescinded the contract stands as an unsecured creditor of the wrongdoing 
insolvent. A difficulty is that whilst a consistent and coherent application of 
rescission should result in the party’s claim having a proprietary effect, rescission 
has no associated device which articulates the proprietary status of the successful 
creditor. This would suggest that it is solely a personal remedy or a remedy which 
has no proprietary effect.
The preceding interpretation undercuts the basic rationale of rescission. A 
common view is that the function of rescission is to restore the parties to the position
34 Worthington, above n 3, 165 and Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (In Receivership) [1995] 1 AC 101- 
103.
35 [1990] 3 All ER 459.
36 Ibid, 462.
37 Proksch, above n 12, [2506].
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which they would have been in if the transaction had never taken place.38 If 
rescission simply operates as a personal remedy, then this would not be the case 
where the wrongdoer was insolvent. The practical restoration would be determined 
by the defendant’s financial state of affairs, rather than the nature of the conduct 
which gave rise to the right of rescission.
An alternative interpretation emphasises that whilst rescission is primarily a 
personal remedy, it will have a proprietary effect where the wrongdoer is insolvent. 
The potential for rescission to have a proprietary effect has been recognised. The 
problem with such earlier explanations is that the remedy of rescission is tied to and 
functions in a way akin to the resulting trust40 and the need for identifiable 
property.41 It has already been demonstrated that such reasoning is unhelpful and 
impractical.42 The proprietary articulation of rescission needs to be established on a 
different basis.
The potential proprietary effect of the remedy of rescission lies in its 
restorative function. Where a contract or a transaction is vitiated by the 
unconscionable conduct, it is not sufficient that the aggrieved party is theoretically 
restored to his former position. The aggrieved party must be restored to that position 
in practical terms.43 Indeed, if this cannot be achieved, then the remedy of rescission 
is not available.44 But courts have taken a pragmatic and flexible attitude towards 
this requirement particularly when there is some form of unconscionable conduct.45
38 Erlanger v The New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1878) 3 App Cas 1218, 1278 (Lord Blackburn); A H  
McDonald & Co Pty Ltd v Wells (1931) 45 CLR 506, 512 (Rich, Starke and Dixon JJ); Meagher, 
Gummow and Lehane, above n 12 [2403]; Proksch, above n 12, [2501].
39 Worthington, above n 3, 163-165. Note also Wright, above n 27, [3.67]-[3.79].
40 Ibid 164-165.
41 Ibid 165-167.
4~ Chapter 3, 122-127; Chapter 4, Part III.
43 See for example, Cooper v Phibbs (1867) LR 2 HL 149; Stepney v Biddulph (1865) 12 LT 176; 
Brown v Smitt (1924) 34 CLR 160; Solle v Butcher [1950] 1 KB 671; Evans v Benson & Co [1961] 
WAR 12; Mihaljevic v Eiffel Tower Motors Pty Ltd and General Credits Ltd [1973] VR 545; 
O ’Sullivan v Management Agency & Music Ltd [1985] QB 428.
44 Gans v Riley (1913)15 CLR 731; AH McDonald & Co Pty Ltd v Wells (1931) 45 CLR 506; Drozd 
v Vaskas [1960] SASR 88; Holder v Holder [1968] Ch 353; Sargent v Campbell [1972-73] ALR 708.
45 Proksch, above n 12, [2511]; Erlanger v The New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1878) 3 App Cas 
1218, 1278-1279 (Lord Blackburn).
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This has ensured wrongdoers are not able to rely on practical impediments in order to 
avoid the rescission of a transaction. This same approach should be adopted in 
relation to insolvents who have acted unconscionably, as defined in Chapter 6. The 
fact that the wrongdoer is insolvent should not bar the creditor from effective 
proprietary relief.
In addition to the uncertainty whether rescission has proprietary effects, the 
remedy has other associated difficulties. Rescission does not operate automatically. 
A party must perform an act of rescission46 and in some cases, a court order is 
required to revest title back to the innocent party.47 Apparently, without such acts or 
court orders, the innocent party has no effective interest in the assets of the 
wrongdoing insolvent. No doubt, such a process is predicated on the basis that the 
contract is voidable. From the perspective of insolvency, the process is cumbersome.
4 The Trust
Although there are dangers in referring to a unitary concept of the trust in 
legal discussion, what is considered here is the operation of the trust as a remedial 
response to unconscionable conduct. Both the constructive trust 49 and the resulting 
trust50 have been put forward as appropriate proprietary devices to remedy 
unconscionable conduct (or unjust enrichment in actions in restitution). However, 
despite their different origins, after they come into existence, they operate in 
accordance with the fundamental characteristics of the standard trust model.51 There 
is a division between legal title and equitable title of the subject property which is
46 Abram Steamship Co Ltd v Westville Shipping Co Ltd [1923] AC 773, 781 (Lord Atkinson); Alati v 
Kruger (1955) 94 CLR 216, 224 (Dixon CJ, Webb, Kitto and Taylor JJ).
47 Proksch, above n 12, [2507], [2509],
48
See generally RP Meagher and WMC Gummow, Jacobs ’ Law of Trusts in Australia (6th ed, 1997), 
Chapter 3; HAJ Ford and WA Lee, Principles o f the Law of Trusts (3rd ed, 1996) [1110]-[1140]; 
DWM Waters, Law o f Trusts in Canada, (2nd ed, 1984), Chapter 2.
49 See Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583; Pettkus v Becker [1980] 2 SCR 834; (1980) 117 
DLR (3d) 257.
50 See generally Robert Chambers, Resulting Trusts (1997) 220-230.
51 Meagher and Gummow, above n 48, [ 105]-[ 110]; JD Heydon and PL Loughlan, Cases and 
Materials on Equity and Trusts (5th ed, 1997) [22.3.1]-[22.3.2].
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vested in parties designated respectively as a trustee and a beneficiary. Moreover, 
the trust operates over certain property which is defined or, in practical terms, is 
capable of being ascertained.53 Thirdly, the trustee owes fiduciary obligations and 
these fiduciary obligations are annexed to the trust property.54
The trust is an effective mechanism. Despite the fact that a trustee holds the 
legal title to property, the division of the ownership of trust property results in the 
withdrawal of the trust property from the asset base of the trustee.55 The operation of 
the trust is specifically recognised in insolvency legislation.56 When interpreting such 
provisions, courts have not only included express trusts but also trust-like 
relationships. Therefore, it is not surprising that courts have characterised 
relationships as being trust like and imposed the ‘constructive’ trust. In so doing, a 
court simultaneously vests equitable title in the aggrieved party and removed the 
property from distribution amongst unsecured creditors.
However, despite its effectiveness, the trust model is not the most appropriate 
proprietary response to unconscionable conduct where money is the subject of 
dispute.
First, certainty of subject matter is still a practical problem where money is 
concerned - although courts have taken a flexible and practical attitude towards 
certainty of subject matter where a trust has been mutually intended by the parties or 
where the money is capable of being traced. Even where a flexible approach is 
taken in response to unconscionable conduct, the issue is what property should 
constitute trust property. There are three possible solutions. It is arguable that a trust
52
52 See for example Meagher and Gummow, above n 48, [105] and [107]; Waters, above n 48, 10-12.
53 Knight v Knight (1840) 3 Beav 148; 49 ER 58; Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington 
London Borough Council [1996] AC 669, 705 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); Meagher and Gummow, 
above n 48, [106].
54 Meagher and Gummow, above n 48, [110]; Heydon and Loughlan, above n 51, [22.3.2].
55 Waters, above n 48, 13-14.
56 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) si 16 (2) (a).
57 Dennis Rose, Lewis: Australian Bankruptcy Law (10th ed, 1994), 139; PP McQuade & MGR 
Gronow, Australian Bankruptcy Law & Practice (5th ed, 1996) vol 1, [116.2.05]-[116.2.63].
Chapter 4, 137, 141-142.
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arises in respect of property which the insolvent holds and which is of a similar 
nature to the former trust property. In the case of money, there would be no difficulty 
because a trust could arise over an equivalent amount. However, it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, to provide reasoned criteria as to which portion of money 
constitutes trust property. Another approach would be to argue that as the money in 
its original, mixed or substituted form no longer exists in accordance with traditional 
following and tracing rules, a trust arises over part of the insolvent’s assets for the 
amount in dispute. Again, it would be difficult to provide reasoned criteria for the 
imposition of a trust over certain assets in preference to others - particularly where a 
monetary claim is involved. Finally, it is arguable that a trust could arise over the 
whole of the assets of the insolvent. In this case, the trust would vest the aggrieved 
creditor with an equitable interest in the entire assets of the insolvent until the 
creditor is paid out. This would effectively mean that the creditor would rank in 
priority over all unsecured (and, possibly all or some other secured creditors). 
Although the remedy would be highly effective from the creditor’s point of view, it 
is likely that it would be extremely draconian from the perspective of the insolvent 
and the insolvent’s secured creditors. Such a remedy may be completely 
disproportionate to the amount in dispute and the unconscionable conduct involved.
Secondly, if the trust is linked to specific property (as distinct from the 
general assets of the insolvent) then the value of the creditor’s interest is directly 
linked to the underlying value of that property. Traditionally, where property is held 
on trust, the monetary or market value of the trust assets is determined by the actual 
property held on trust. It is submitted that it is possible to provide proprietary relief 
without any of this inherent danger.
Thirdly, equity imposes stringent duties and obligations upon the person who 
is designated as the trustee.59 Trustees owe fiduciary obligations60 and are debarred 
from dealing with property for their own benefit.61 They are required to act with 
reasonable care62 and loyalty.63 Trustees are also regulated by legislation.64 In the
59 See Meagher and Gummow, above n 48, [ 1602]-[ 1606] and Chapter 17; Ford and Lee, above n 48, 
Chapter 9; Waters, above n 48, Chapters 18-19.
60 Chapter 2, 61-62.
61 Meagher and Gummow, above n 48, [1742]; [1749]; Ford and Lee, above n 48, [9110]-[9120]
62 Meagher and Gummow, above n 48, [1718]. Ford and Lee, above n 48, [9050]-[9060].
63 Ford and Lee, above n 48, [9080].
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light of these onerous duties which accompany trusteeship, the trust is not an 
appropriate response to unconscionable conduct in many instances where what is 
required is a device which elevates a party to the status of a secured creditor.
Fourthly, some commentators have argued that although the remedial 
response to unconscionable conduct is characterised as a constructive trust, it is not 
a trust. Referring to the operation of the constructive trust as a response to unjust 
enrichment, Waters has stated that:
an unjustly enriched person does not ‘become a trustee,’ as we 
understand that term in the law of express trusts. He will be required 
to hold the property in question for another, as an express trustee, too, 
must do. But chalk and cheese are not the same substance, even 
though they may happen to have the same colour. The similarities are 
truly accidental. To follow this further, an express trustee must 
recognise the claims of others, as indeed he must discharge a number 
of duties in his role of managing property on behalf of others. The 
unjustly enriched party is required to make specific restitution of that 
which he ought to restore to another. We may call this the duty to 
admit another’s claim, if we will, provided we understand we are 
merely describing the effect of imposing upon him the obligation to 
restore what he should not have, and enforcing that obligation through 
the availability of a restitutionary remedy.65
Generally, courts do not wish to impose trust obligations upon the insolvent other 
than that the insolvent holds the property for another party.
Notwithstanding the onerous duties which accompany trusteeship, there are 
two cases where the imposition of a trust is warranted. The first situation is where a 
constructive trust is imposed in response to breach of pre-existing trust and/or 
fiduciary obligation. Traditionally, this has been called the institutional constructive 
trust.66 Even where a constructive trust is imposed on third parties by virtue of the 
rules contained in Barnes v Addy, it is imposed in order to support the efficacy of 
the pre-existing fiduciary obligation.
64 For example Trustee Act 1925 (UK); Trustee Act 1925 (NSW); Trustee Act 1958 (Vic); Trustee Act 
1973 (Qld); Trustee Act 1962 (WA); Trustee Act 1936 (SA); Trustee Act 1898 (Tas).
65 Waters, above n 48, 388.
66 Chapter 2, 65.
67 (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244; See also Chapter 2, 64.
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The other situation where a constructive trust is appropriate is where an 
aggrieved creditor establishes that an insolvent has acted unconscionably in the 
acquisition of an asset in which the creditor has a legitimate interest. In Muschinski v 
Dodds,68 the facts of which are considered elsewhere,69 it was clear that the woman 
wished to re-acquire the beneficial interest in specific property. Mason and Deane JJ 
held that it was unconscionable for the man to retain his legal entitlement to the 
property. They held that the man held his half share of the property on trust to repay 
the woman for the contribution she made to the acquisition of the property on his 
behalf.70
However, where there was no pre-existing trust operating and the underlying 
property which is subject to dispute is money (operating as a negotiable and 
functional commodity), then the trust is an unnecessary and inappropriate response 
to unconscionable conduct. Instead, the equitable lien, modified to take into account 
modem conditions, is more suited to the task.
Ill The Equitable Lien - A Remedy for the 21st century ?
A Introduction
In Chapter 4, it was suggested that we are evolving from a legal regime based 
on the need for a proprietary base, to a regime based on proprietary responses to 
unconscionable conduct. It is contended that, in the light of the negotiability and 
transactional ephemerality of money, the equitable lien will become an increasingly 
important remedial device where commercial risk is not assumed by an unsecured 
creditor.
Both common law and equity have developed a jurisdiction in which the lien 
was utilised. In common law, under a possessory lien, a creditor was entitled to 
retain the debtor's goods until the debt owing to the creditor was paid. The common 
law lien expanded into two kinds of possessory lien - a particular possessory lien and
68 (19 8 5) 160 CLR583.
69 Chapter 5, 190.
70 (1985) 160 CLR 583, 599 (Mason J); 620-624 (Deane J).
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a general possessory lien. Under the former, the creditor has the right to retain 
goods until the debt directly associated with those goods is paid. Under the latter, 
the creditor has the right to retain goods until payment of all debts which are owed to 
him.73 Common law liens are created by virtue of a common law right,74 express 
agreement or by statute.
Common law liens appear to have been the dominant definitional form of lien 
in our legal system. The concept of lien is defined in The Shorter Oxford English
77Dictionary from material from 1531 as
A right to retain possession of property until a debt due to the person
78detaining it is satisfied.
71
See generally, JHG Sunnucks, ‘Lien’ in Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone (ed), Halsbury's Laws o f 
England (4th ed, 1979) vol 28, [516]-[541].
72 Jones v Tarleton (1842) 9 M&W 675; 152 ER 285.
73 In relation to general liens in favour of solicitors see Cowell v, Simpson (1809) 16 Ves 275, 280; 2 
Ves Jun Supp 441; 33 ER 989, 991 (Lord Eldon); 34 ER 1170; Hughes v Hughes [1958] 3 All ER 
179; bankers; Brandao v Barnett (1846) 12 CL and Fin 787; 8 ER 1622; London Chartered Bank of 
Australia v White (1879) 4 App Cas 413; stockbrokers; Jones v Peppercorne (1858) John 430; 70 ER 
490; Re London and Globe Finance Corporation [1902] 2 Ch 416; John D Hope and Co v 
Glendinning [1911] AC 419.
74 In relation to bankers and solicitors, ibid.
75 Green v Farmer (1768) 4 Burr 2214, 2221; 98 ER 154, 158 (Lord Mansfield); Hougton v 
Matthews (1803) 3 Bos &Pul 485, 494; 127 ER 263, 268 (Heath J); Kirchner, Sharp and Waterston v 
Venus (1859) 12 Moo 261; 14 ER 948; Bock v Gorrissen (1860) 2 De G F & J 434, 443;45 ER 689, 
693 (Lord Campbell); Jowitt & Sons v Union Cold Storage Co [1913] 3 KB 1; United States Steel 
Products Co v Great Western Railway Co [1916] 1 AC 189, 196 (Lord Buckmaster).
76 For a discussion of workers liens in various jurisdictions see Ronald Donovan Elliot, The Artificers 
Lien (1967); John Nigel Wilson, Contractors Liens and Charges (1976); Douglas N Macklem and 
David I Bristow, Construction and Mechanics Liens in Canada (5th ed, 1985); Kevin Patrick 
McGuinness, Constructive Lien Remedies in Ontario (1983).
77 William Little, HW Fowler and Jessie Coulson, The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd ed, 
1973) vol 1.
78 Ibid 1208; For similar trends see also JA Simpson and ESC Weiner, The Oxford English 
Dictionary (1989) vol VIII, 907; J M Sinclair (General Consultant), Collins English Dictionary (3rd 
ed, 1992) 899 and Virginia S Thatcher (ed), The New Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary o f the English 
Language (1971)491.
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However, the common law lien is not an appropriate remedial response to 
unconscionable conduct because the party claiming the lien has the property subject 
to the lien in his possession. In the factual scenarios and cases which have been 
raised throughout the thesis show that this has not been the case.
B The Equitable Lien
A modem definition of the equitable lien is:
‘Equitable lien’ means an equitable right, conferred by law upon one 
person, to a charge upon the real or personal property of another until 
certain specific claims have been satisfied...An equitable lien differs 
from a common law lien in that a common law lien is founded on 
possession and, except as modified by statute, merely confers a right 
to detain the property until payment, whereas an equitable lien, which 
exists quite irrespective of possession confers on the holder the right 
to a judicial sale.79
It is not a possessory lien. It arises irrespective of whether the party claiming the lien 
has possession of the disputed goods or money. It also operates without the necessity 
that the parties have an intention to create it. A lien which does arise by virtue of 
intention of the parties is called a charge, in order to distinguish it from a lien, which 
arises irrespective of intention. The equitable lien is an equitable mechanism which 
has the potential for great flexibility because it can arise in response to 
unconscionable conduct and provide security over assets in the hands of the 
insolvent.
C The Equitable Lien and the Trust
The equitable lien differs from the express trust in that it may arise without
the necessity of the parties having an intention to create it. In this respect, an
81equitable lien appears similar to a constructive trust and a resulting trust.
79 Sunnucks, above n 71, [551].
80
Edward I Sykes and Sally Walker, The Law o f Securities (5th ed, 1993) 193-199.
81
See Fulp v Fulp 140 SE (2d) 708 (SC North Carolina, 1965); Minton v Stewart 359 SW (2d) 925 
(Court of Civil Appeal Texas, 1962); Holder v Williams 334 P (2d) 291 (District Court of Appeal, 
California, 1959) 292-293; CJS Liens § 1, 832.
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However, a lienee acquires different rights than a beneficiary under a trust. 
Generally, a beneficiary acquires a vested equitable interest and rights in respect of 
the administration of the trust as well. “ Without a separation of the legal and 
equitable interests, there is no trust. However, under a lien, the lienee does not 
acquire an equitable interest in property. Pomeroy states:
In an equitable lien there is a legal estate with possession in one 
person, and a special right over the thing held by another; but here the 
resemblance, which at most is external, ends. This special right is not 
an estate of any kind; it does not entitle the holder to a conveyance of 
the thing nor to its use; it is merely a right to secure the performance 
of some outstanding obligation, by means of a proceeding directed 
against the thing which is subject to the lien. To call this a trust, and 
the owner of the thing a trustee for the lien-holder, is a misapplication 
of terms which have a very distinct and certain meaning.84
The security interest acquired by a lienee has a number of significant consequences 
for the operation of the lien.
First, because the equitable lien does not provide the lienee with an equitable 
interest, the value of the lien is not tied to the underlying value of the property upon 
which the lien is fixed. In contrast, a beneficiary has an equitable interest in property 
which will be fixed to the value of the property of the trust. Therefore, where the 
underlying property appreciates, it has been opportune to argue that a trust regulates 
the relationship. On the other hand, where the underlying property has depreciated,
85parties have argued that a lien has arisen.
Meagher and Gummow, above n 48, [2303]-[2306]; cf discretionary trusts: Gartside v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners [1968] AC 553; IJ Hardingham and R Baxt, Discretionary Trusts (2nd ed, 
1984) [605]-[609].
Re Cook; Beck v Grant [1948] Ch 212; Re Haberley, dec'd [1971] NZLR 325; DKLR Holding Co 
(No 2) Pty Ltd v CSD (NSW) (1982) 40 ALR 1; Re Transphere Pty Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 726; 
Waters, above n 48, 10-13.
84 Spencer W Symons, John Norton Pomeroy: A Treatise o f Equity Jurisprudence, (5th ed, 1941) Vol 
IV, § 1234 (fn 5); American Law Institute, Restatement o f the Law Second, Restitution, Tentative 
Draft No 2 (1984) § 30a.
85 DWM Waters, The Constructive Trust: The Case for a New Approach in English Law (1964) 27 
and Frank R Lacy, ‘Constructive Trusts and Equitable Liens in Iowa’ (1954-1955) 40 Iowa Law 
Review 107, 145-155 and the cases discussed therein and Malcolm Cope, Proprietary Claims and 
Remedies (1997) 112.
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Secondly, a beneficiary is entitled to the income of the underlying property.86 
Conversely, a lienee is not entitled to the product or income produced by the
87underlying property.
Thirdly, it has been suggested that the equitable lien cannot be sustained 
outside the limitations period set by statute.88
Fourthly, a trustee has far more onerous duties in relation to the underlying 
property than does the lienor. This highlights the very different historical origins 
and functions of the trust and the lien. The equitable lien is discussed by authors as 
part of the modem law of securities,90 whilst the trust is not generally considered as a 
security device.91 The lien operates as a bare security. In comparison, the trust 
operates as a security interest coupled with burdensome obligations. There is a place 
and need for both in our legal systems. The problem has been that the trust and the 
equitable lien have been confused and misunderstood.
Finally, a difference between the constmctive trust and the lien is that the lien 
has been available in discrete circumstances only,92 whilst the constmctive tmst has, 
at least recently, been the subject of some judicial creativity. The constmctive tmst 
has been a remedial response to unconscionable conduct (and unjust enrichment) 
although the situations where the constmctive tmst would be available, remains to be 
developed 93 Whilst the equitable lien is still highly relevant to the kinds of situations
86 Lacy, above n 85, 145-152.
87 Ibid.
88 Sunnucks, above n 71, [551] noting the Limitation Act 1939 (UK) s 18(1).
89 Lord Napier and Ettrick v Hunter [1993] AC 713, 738 (Lord Templeman).
90 Sykes and Walker, above n 80, 199-206.
91 Ibid 12.
92
" PV Baker and P St J Langan, Snell's Equity (29th ed, 1990) Chapter 10.
93 See for example Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583; Pettkus v Becker [1980] 2 SCR 834; 
(1980) 117 DLR (3d) 257; Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough 
Council [1996] AC 669, 716 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); M Cope Constructive Trusts (1992) 
Chapters 1 and 2.
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where it has traditionally operated, it is beginning to be disentangled from the limited 
traditional applications in the past.94
In order to understand the lien and the reasons why it has not been utilised 
freely as a security device in response to unconscionable conduct, it is necessary to 
consider its origins and function in our legal system.
D The Origins of the Equitable Lien
Despite suggestions that the lien stems from the decision of the Courts of 
Chancery in the 1800s,95 the origins of the equitable lien appear to lie in Roman law 
which was well known to English lawyers. Roman law developed a number of 
securities over property, including the hypotheca, which were adopted in 19th 
century England.96
The Roman hypotheca originated as a response to the inconsistencies which 
arose from the use of other forms of available security. The hypotheca arose by 
pledging the item without the need for its physical transfer to the creditor.98 Sykes 
and Walker have stated:
In the third general class of security (hypotheca), the arrangement of 
rights is more subtle that in the case of the other two. The property is 
appropriated to the creditor so that on default he or she is entitled to 
pursue certain remedies against it and not merely against the debtor.
The creditor has certain rights of a proprietary character, but they can 
be realised only in the event of default. To this general type of 
security the term ‘charge’ is frequently applied, but that phrase is 
itself of ambiguous import and is better used to denote one particular 
type of hypothecation.99
Barbara E Cotton, ‘The Equitable Lien: New Life in an Old Remedy?’ [1994] 16 Advocate's 
Quarterly 385.
95 Ibid 385.
96 Note the consideration and discussion of Roman law in Ryall v Rowles (1750) 1 Ves Sen 349, 358; 
27 ER 1074, 1081 and generally WB Buckland, Equity in Roman Law (1911).
97 HF Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study o f Roman Law {1952) 319.
98
RW Lee, The Elements o f Roman Law (4th ed, 1956) [261 ]-[265]; Jolowicz, above n 97, 319.
99 Sykes and Walker, above n 80, 14.
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Whilst legal historians have disputed the origins of the hypotheca,m  it presaged the 
development of modem securities which did not require possession - most notably 
the mortgage101 and the equitable lien.10" The hypotheca was capable of being 
created by the agreement of the parties. 103 However, there was also the legal or tacit 
hypotheca (or hypotheca tacita or legitima). These hypotheca were created by law. 104 
In turn, the tacit hypotheca was divided into two kinds. The special hypotheca was 
potentially, a security imposed by law over specific property. 105 The general 
hypotheca was a charge over the whole of the debtor's property to secure liability. 106 
Modem comparisons have been noted. Thomas has stated:
Though generally used for land, hypothec (sic) could be utilised to 
create a security over any form of res, including debts; indeed, there 
was possible the equivalent of the ‘floating charge’ of English law, ie, 
a lien on the debtor's stock-in-trade for the time being; anything that 
could be the object of a sale could be pledged or hypothecated. 107
Early predecessors of the common law lien were in operation during the medieval 
and tudor periods. However, in contrast it appears that the hypotheca was lost, or 
nearly lost, even though the notion of a non-possessory security was clearly evident 
in medieval times. 109 The logical answer may be that what had been labelled an
Compare and contrast Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (1962) 152; Rudolph 
Sohm, The Institutes: A Textbook o f the History and System of Roman Private Law (3rd ed, 1907), 
354-355; Jolowicz, above n 97, 319-320; JAC Thomas, Textbook o f Roman Law (1976), 332; Lee, 
above n 98, [261],
101 Charles Phineas Sherman, Roman Law in the Modern World (1917) vol 2, § 616.
103 Lee, above n 98, [261]; Jolowicz, above n 97, 319.
104
Lee, above n 98, [263]; DH Van Zyl, History and Principles o f Roman Private Law { 1983) 199.
105 Lee, above n 98, [263].
106 For an example o f the general hypotheca see Lee, above n 98, [263]; Van Zyl, above n 104, 199; 
Nicholas, above n 100, 152-153.
107
Thomas, above n 100, 332. See also Buckland, above n 96, 63-71; Jairus W Perry (ed), Joseph 
Story: Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence as Administered in England and America (13th ed, 
1877) vol II, §1221-1224.
108
William Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd, ed, 1937) vol 7, 511-513.
109
Sir Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The History o f English Law Before the Time 
o f Edward I (2nd ed, 1968) vol II, 117-118.
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hypotheca in Roman law was then called something quite different in medieval 
English law. After all, no explanation has been found as to why the offspring of the 
Roman hypotheca became known as a lien. Perhaps, after the Norman Invasion non- 
possessory securities were known according to a French nomenclature and the Law 
French.110 In The Oxford English Dictionary the word lien is given both a French and 
a Latin derivation.111
It is probable that the modem equitable lien grew out of the common law 
notion of lien in response to mercantile needs during the 18th and 19th Centuries. 
The development of the equitable lien was apparent but slow. For example, 
Blackstone113 did not discuss the equitable lien but was aware of the existence of the 
pignus and hypotheca as Roman law security devices which he briefly mentioned in 
the context of mortgages.114 Prior to and during the 18th century there was some case 
law which confirmed the legitimacy of the vendor's equitable lien over the land for 
the purchase price115 and the trustee's lien.116 Later, well into the 18th century, it 
seems that the purchaser's lien ' and the partnership lien appeared. In the 19th 
century, the equitable lien had a sustained application. There are numerous cases 
which deal with, in one way or another, the vendor's equitable lien,119 the purchaser's
110 Bryan A Gamer, A Dictionary of Modern Usage (2nd ed, 1995) 504-505.
Simpson and Weiner, above n 78, vol VIII, 90.
112 Note Ryall v Rowles 1 Ves Sen 348; 27 ER 1074 and Charles Viner, A General Abridgment of 
Law and Equity (1743) vol 15, 96-99 (lien on lands) and vol 4, 449-476 (charge).
113 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1764).
114 Ibid Vol II, 159. Note also Viner, above n 112, vol 14 329-331 (hypothecations in relation to 
maritime vessels); the definition of ‘hypotheca’ and ‘to hypothecate’ in Owen Ruffhead and J 
Morgan, A New Law Dictionary, (1772). For examples of texts which did not deal with the concept 
of hypothecation, charge or lien see Precedents in Chancery, being a Collection of Cases Argued and 
Adjudged in the High Court of Chancery; From the Year 1689 to 1722 (1733); Henry Ballow, A 
Treatise of Equity (1737).
Hearle v Botelers (1604) Cary 25; 21 ER 14; Chapman v Tanner (1684) 1 Vem 267; 23 ER 461; 
Harrison v Southcote and Moreland (1751) 2 Ves Sen 389; 28 ER 249.
116 How v Godfrey (1678) Rep Temp Finch 361; 23 ER 198.
117 Burgess v Wheate, AG v Wheate (1759) 1 Eden 177, 211; 28 ER 652, 665 (Lord Mansfield).
1 1 R
West v Skip (1749) 1 Ves Sen 239; 27 ER 1006.
119 Mackreth v Symmons (1808) 15 Ves Jun 328; 2 Ves Jun Supp 410; 33 ER 778; 34 ER 1155; 
Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 Ch D 499; Kettlewell v Watson (1884) 26 Ch D 501.
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120 121 122equitable lien, partnership liens and a trustee's right to be indemnified In
addition, Story identified the equitable lien as a remedy for mistaken improvements 
to land.123
The reason why the equitable lien remained a significant equitable 
mechanism during the 19th century in the atmosphere of laissez-faire capitalism124 
has not been authoritatively considered by legal historians. But some suggestions 
may be proffered. The equitable lien was the subject of indisputable 18th century 
precedent. The lien was applied in a circumscribed and uncreative way. In those 19th 
century texts which do deal with the equitable lien, the treatment is generally 
formalistic and cursory. Moreover, where the law concerning trusts and 
partnerships was concerned, the equitable lien was being used in areas which were 
incontestably the province of equitable jurisdiction anyway. Finally, the 
imposition of a lien in the seminal vendor and purchaser cases did not detract from 
the enforcement of the contract. It assisted in the performance of the contract and
120
Wythes v Lee (1855) 2 Drewry 396; 61 ER 954; Westmacott v Robins (1864) 4 De GF &J 390; 45 
ER 1234; Rose v Watson (1864) 10 HL Cas 672; 11 ER 1187; Aberaman Ironworks v Wickens (1868) 
4 Ch App 101; Rodger v Harrison [1893] 1 QB 161.
121 Ex parte Williams (1805) 11 Ves Jun 3; 32 ER 988; Ex parte King (1810) 17 Ves 115; 34 ER 45; 
Kelly v Hutton (1868) 3 Ch App 703; Harvey v Crickett (1816) 5 M & S 336; 105 ER 1074; Hague v 
Dandeson (1848) 2 Exch 741; 154 ER 689.
122 Dawson v Clarke (1811) 18 Ves 247; 34 ER 311; Batten, Proffitt and Scott v Dartmouth Harbour 
Commissioners (1890) 45 Ch D 612; Budgett v Budgett [1895] 1 Ch 202.
123 See Perry, above n 107, vol II, §1237. Note also 53 CJS Liens § 8b; 51 Am Jur 2d Liens §34; R J 
Sutton, ‘What Should be Done for Mistaken Improvers’ in PD Finn (ed), Essays on Restitution, 
(1990) 241.
124 Chapter 1, 17-20; PS Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, (1979) 393-397.
125 See for example John Fonblanque, A Treatise of Equity (5th ed, 1820) vol 1, 232, 155, footnote 
(e), and 381, footnote (k); Thomas Lewin, Practical Treatise on the Law of Trusts (5th ed, 1867) 453, 
454 and 508. The Right Honourable the Earl of Halsbury, The Laws o f England (1911), Vol XIX, 
[20]-[39]; cf Perry, above n 107, vol I, § 506.
126 For the role that equity developed the legal framework of partnership in the 18th and 19th 
Centuries see Keith L Fletcher, Higgins and Fletcher: The Law of Partnership in Australia and New 
Zealand, (7th ed, 1996) 6-7; Holdsworth, above n 108, vol 8, 217-218.
127 See for example Hearle v Botchers (1604) Cary 35; 21 ER 14; Chapman v Tanner (1684) 1 Vem 
267; 23 ER 461; Harrison v Southcote and Moreland (1751) 2 Ves Sen 389; 28 ER 249; Burgess v 
Wheate, AG v Wheate (1759) 1 Eden 177; 28 ER 652.
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provided an additional equitable remedy where common law on its own was 
deficient.
E Characteristics of the Application of the Equitable Lien in the 19th and
20th Centuries
There were three features of the application of the equitable lien in the 19th 
century which have determined how it has operated in recent times.
1 Redressing Unconscionable Conduct
Despite the 19th century abhorrence of the discussion of policy issues,128 in 
some cases courts still ventured to posit reasons for the imposition of the equitable 
lien. In Todd v Moorhouse Jessel MR held that a tenant for life under a settlement 
comprising shares who had made an advance to a trustee had an equitable lien over 
the shares for repayment with interest. He said in relation to argument by counsel:
The proposition he [counsel] affirms is this, that if one of the cestuis 
que trust advances money for the purpose of paying a sum properly 
payable out of the corpus of the trust funds, then, unless it can be 
shown that the trustees could not raise the money in any other way, 
the person advancing his money is to lose it. That is, the cestuis que 
trust are to be enriched by the amount advanced merely because the 
trustees by some possible means or other could otherwise have raised 
that amount, and the cestuis que trust can, therefore, keep both the 
money advanced and the property which ought to have been sold to 
raise money. Common sense, common honesty, and sound law are 
altogether against any such extravagant notion.130
In 1902, Vaughan Williams LJ said that a purchaser’s lien was ‘a right which may
1^1have been invented for the purpose of doing justice.’
1 28
PS Atiyah, above n 124, 388.
129 [1874-75] XIX Equity Cas LR 69.
130 Ibid 71. See also Re Johnson; Shearman v Robinson (1880) 15 LR Ch D 548, 555-556 (Jessel 
MR).
131 Whitbread & Co Ltd v Watt [1902] 1 Ch 835, 838. See also Rose v Watson [1864] 10 HLC 672; 
11 ER 1187. Note also in this context David M Wright, above n 27, [3.63]. For a discussion o f the 
United States case law and unjust enrichment see American Law Institute, Restatement o f the Law
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In the United States, the equitable lien has been utilised with great 
effectiveness to redress many forms of unconscionable conduct where remedies at 
law would be inadequate and incomplete. The kinds of situations where the 
equitable lien may arise are not closed. But it would be a misrepresentation to say 
that the equitable lien is available simply on the basis of subjective discretion. 134
Recent Anglo-Australian cases indicate that courts may increasingly use the 
equitable lien to redress unconscionable conduct outside traditional contexts.
(a) Hewett v Court135
A builder of prefabricated houses agreed to pre-construct a house for a 
purchase and then transport the home to the purchaser for practical completion. The 
purchase price was payable in instalments. The first two payments were made by the 
purchasers. The builder became insolvent. The contract provided that the house 
remained the property of the builder until completion. The parties agreed that the 
purchasers would pay for the work undertaken and take the house in its incomplete 
state. A revised balance of what was outstanding was calculated and paid by the 
purchasers. After the variation of the agreement liquidators were appointed who 
argued that the purchasers had obtained a preference. The purchasers argued that 
they had an equitable lien over the house. 136
The High Court decided by a majority of three (Gibbs CJ, Murphy and Deane 
JJ) to two (Wilson and Dawson JJ) that the purchasers had an equitable lien over the
Second, Restitution, Tentative Draft No 2 (1984), §30, comment b, 6; Caldwell v Armstrong 342 F 
(2d) 485 (10th Cir, 1965); United States v Adamanti Co 197 F (2d) 1 (9th Cir, 1952); 53 CJS Liens § 8; 
51 Am Jur 2d Liens § 22-§ 35.
132 Cotton, above n 94, 393 citing Hill v Hill 345 P (2d) 1015 (SC Kansas, 1959).
133 Gables Racing Association Inc v Persky 6 So (2d) 257 (SC Florida, 1942), 262. (Justice Adams); 
53 CJS Liens § 5.
134 53 CJS Liens § 5; 51 Am Jur 2d Liens § 24.
135
(1983) 149 CLR 639; For a discussion of the case see Sykes and Walker, above n 80, 202, 205- 
206; IJ Hardingham, ‘Equitable Liens for the Recovery o f Purchase Money’ (1985) 15 Melbourne 
University Law Review 65; Michael Christie, ‘The Equitable Lien in a Commercial Context: Some 
Recent Australian Developments’ (1986) 14 Australian Business Law Review 435.
136 Note also the earlier decisions in Court and Evans v Hewett [1981] WAR 237 (Wickham J); Court 
and Evans v Hewett [1982] WAR 151 (CA).
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house for the amount of the purchase money paid. The dissenting judges, Wilson and 
Dawson JJ, held that there was insufficient authority to warrant an equitable lien 
arising. When the first instalment was paid there was nothing to which the lien could 
attach.137
Hewett v Court was significant because a majority of the High Court were 
willing to accept that an equitable lien, a proprietary remedy, could arise outside 
established categories on the basis of redressing unconscionable conduct. Moreover, 
it would arise even though there was no direct nexus between the payments and the 
house. The majority of the High Court did not insist that the instalments were to be 
used for the construction of the house. Rather, they simply required that the house 
in question was appropriated to the contract. In this context, the builder appropriated 
the house to the contract when the builder identified the house as the property built in 
satisfaction of the contractual obligation. The decision has been criticised.139 But 
more farsighted authors praised the outcome of the majority judgments as a 
significant step towards the principled liberalisation of proprietary remedies.140
(b) Lord Napier and Ettrick v Hunter141
The basic facts are set out in Chapter 4.142 The insured was insolvent. The 
House of Lords found that the doctrine of subrogation applied because it would be 
unconscionable for the insured to refuse to recoup the insurer.143 Thereafter, the 
question was what was the appropriate remedy. Lord Templeman said:
137 (1983) 149 CLR 639, 656-658.
138
Ibid, 648 (Gibbs CJ); 669-670 (Dean J) and 650 (Murphy J).
139 Sykes and Walker, above n 80, 206; JC Starke, ‘Current Topics’ (1983) 57 The Australian Law 
Journal 433, 434-436.
140 Donovan W M Waters, ‘Where is Equity Going? Remedying Unconscionable Conduct’ (1988) 18 
The University o f Western Australia Law Review 3, 32-41; Paul R Coughlan. ‘Equitable Liens for the 
Recovery of Book Deposits’ (1987) 9 Dublin University Law Journal 90, 95-98; IJ Hardingham, 
‘Equitable Liens for the Recovery of Purchase Money’ (1985) 15 Melbourne University Law Review 
65.
141 [1993] AC 713.
142 Chapter 2, 87-88; Chapter 4, 144-145.
143 [1993] AC 713.
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It is next necessary to consider how equity copes with such 
unconscionable conduct. Saville J and the Court of Appeal appear to 
have thought that equity can only interfere by creating a trust fund 
held in trust by trustees for different beneficiaries in different shares, 
the trustees being burdened with administrative and investment 
duties, the trustees being liable for all the duties imposed on trustees 
but being free from liability if the trust fund is lost without 
negligence. I agree that if this were the only method of protecting the 
rights of an insurer the practical disadvantages would be fearsome. 
Fortunately, equity is not so inflexible or powerless. In order to 
protect the rights of the insurer under the doctrine of subrogation 
equity considers that the damages payable by a wrongdoer to the 
insured person are subject to an equitable lien or charge in favour of 
the insurer. The charge is imposed by equity because the insurer, once 
he has paid under the policy, has an interest in the right of action 
against the wrongdoer and an interest in the establishment, 
quantification, recovery and distribution of the damages awarded 
against the wrongdoer. It would be unconscionable for the insured 
person, who has received £100,000 from the insurer, to put damages 
of £130,000 into his own pocket without providing for the 
recoupment of the insurer who only contracted to indemnify the 
insured person.144
Lord Goff agreed with Lord Templeman in this regard.145 In making such a decision, 
the House of Lords effectively helped to make sense of those cases in which a trust 
was impressed on any compensation that an insured received from the wrongdoer.146 
The lien awarded in Lord Napier and Ettrick v Hunter has been praised as a viable 
security alternative to the trust.147
144 Ibid 738.
145 Ibid 744-745.
146 See SR Derham, Subrogation in Insurance Law (1985) 25 and the cases cited therein including 
Randal v Cockran (1748) 1 Ves Sen 98; 27 ER 916; Blaauwpot v Da Costa (1758) 1 Eden 130; 28 
ER 633; Commercial Union Assurance Co v Lister (1874) LR 9 Ch App 483; King v Victoria 
Insurance Co Ltd (1896) AC 250; Morely v Moore [1936] 2 KB 359.
147 WMC Gummow, ‘Names and Equitable Liens’ (1993) 109 The Law Quarterly Review 159, 163; 
cf Charles Mitchell, The Law of Subrogation (1994) 83.
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2 Confusion o f the Trust and the Equitable Lien
The equitable lien and the trust are still confused with each other. This 
phenomenon has gone largely unnoticed. Waters has argued that in the consideration 
of vendor and purchaser liens over land, judges in the 19th century often confused 
the concepts of equitable lien and trust. The confusion of the trust and the lien was 
evident in a leading text of the time. In Joseph Story: Commentaries on Equity 
Jurisprudence149 the equitable lien was discussed in the context of implied trusts,150 
even though it was clear that the author understood the difference between the 
equitable lien and the trust in proprietary terms.151 Thus, the lien was portrayed as a 
minor part of the law of trusts and, as Waters has shown, when the lien was the
152appropriate device, judges often preferred to read the lien as a trust instead. 
Certainly, in the seminal judgment of Jessel MR in Re Hallett ’s Estate; Knatchbull v 
Hallett,153 the trust and the equitable lien (referred to incorrectly as a charge) were 
proffered as alternative remedies for breach of trust and fiduciary obligations.154
In the 20th century, the confusion of the lien and the trust is still evident. For 
example, in some works the equitable lien has been treated as synonymous with the 
constructive trust.155 The constructive trust (rather than the equitable lien) has been 
seen as the proprietary remedy of a vendor under a contract for sale of land.
Nonetheless, in both the 19th and 20th Centuries, the lien as a security device 
has been utilised without the attendant obligations associated with the trust. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the lien arises in legislative contexts in Canada and
148 Waters, above n 85, 85-86, 96-100, 131-136.
149 Perry, above n 107, vol II.
150 Ibid § 1216-1244; cf Symons, above n 84, vol IV, §1234.
151 Ibid §1217.
15" Waters, above n 85, 85-86; 96-100; 131-136.
153 (1880) 13 Ch D 696.
154 Ibid 709.
155 See for example Cope, above n 93, Chapter 25; AJ Oakley, Constructive Trusts (3rd, ed, 1997) 
Chapter 6 and Jill E. Martin, Hanbury and Maudsley: Modern Equity {15th ed, 1997) 640-641.
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Australia.156 In Anglo-Australian law there are also special non-statutory and
157statutory maritime liens. ' In American statutes, the lien, both in equity and
1 SRcommon law, has been used with great effectiveness.
3 Liens over Specific Property
In the 19th and 20th Centuries the lien has operated as a charge over specific 
property. The nature of the lien (rather than the events which triggered it) is akin to 
the Roman law tacit special hypotheca where a charge over specific property was 
imposed by law. In Hewett v Court,159 Deane J said that a lien arose only where 
property could be specifically identified as subject to the lien.160 This requirement is 
also evident in the United States.161 This was justifiable where land was 
concerned, but it is unworkable where money and fungibles are involved.
Yet, in hindsight, it is arguable that the 19th century judges and lawyers also 
had the opportunity to adopt a lien akin to the general tacit hypotheca. Such a lien 
would not require the identification of specific property or the segregation and 
reification of money. Although 19th century judges explicitly refused to countenance
For a discussion of Canadian statutory liens see Douglas N Macklem and David I Bristow, 
Construction and Mechanics' Liens in Canada, (1985) Chapters 2 and 3. For a general discussion of 
statutory hypothecations in Australia see Sykes and Walker, above n 80, 750-752. In relation to liens 
in colonial times see Alex C Castles, An Australian Legal History (1982) 172-175.
157
For a discussion of the Australian position see Sykes and Walker, above n 80, 753-758; DA Butler 
and WD Duncan, Maritime Law in Australia (1992) particularly [3.3.2]. For a discussion o f the 
English position see DR Thomas, Maritime Liens (1980).
1 SR
See 53 CJS Liens § 9 and 51 Am Jur 2d Liens § 36-§39.
159 [1983] 149 CLR639.
160 Ibid 668.
161 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Second, Restitution, Tentative Draft No 2 (1984) 
§30g.
162 See Hearle v Botelers (1604) Cary 25; 21 ER 14; Chapman v Tanner (1694) 1 Vem 267; 23 ER 
461; Mackreth v Symmons (1808) 15 Ves Jun 329; 2 Ves Supp 410; 33 ER 778; 34 ER 461; Lysaght v 
Edwards (1876) 2 Ch D 499; Kettlewell v Watson (1884) 26 Ch D 501; Burgess v Wheate; Attorney- 
General v Wheate (1759) 1 Eden 177; 28 ER 652; Westmacott v Robins (1864) 4 De GF & J 390; 45 
ER 1234; Rose v Watson (1864) 10 HL Cas 672; 11 ER 1197; Aberaman Ironworks v Wickens (1868) 
4C h App 101.
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the fully fledged development of the lien as a hypothecation in common law,163 
equity provided impetus in one area for the general lien - the floating charge.
(a) The Floating Equitable Charge
The modem corporation was a product of 19th century mercantile 
developments.164 It was quickly discovered that the corporate asset base was neither 
stable not specific. 165 The problem was how could security be provided over 
fluctuating assets. Gough166 has pointed out that by the mid-19th century there was a 
specific equitable charge available over specific corporate property. The 
development of the specific company charge was, no doubt, inspired by 
developments in the law of real property. During this period Torrens advocated the 
Torrens title mortgage which operates as a security without the need for the 
transfer of ownership.169
According to Gough's analysis, the floating equitable charge was bom in the
1 7 0 .
1870s. Prior to that time, the Court of Chancery was unable to countenance the
171existence of a floating security. But, spurred on by developments in equity
163 Howes v Ball (1827) 7 B & C 481, 484; 108 ER 802, 804 (Lord Tenterden CJ). Donald v Suckling 
(1866) LR 1 QB 585, 613 (Blackburn J); Sewell v Burdick (1884) 10 App Cas 74, 95-96 (Lord 
Blackburn).
164 For a historical discussion sees Paul L Davies, Gower’s Principles o f Modern Company Law (6th 
ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) Chapters 2 and 3.
165 HAJ Ford, RP Austin and IM Ramsay Principles o f Corporations Law (8th ed, 1997) [1.320].
166 William James Gough, Company Charges (2nd ed, 1996).
167 Gough, above n 166, 27-28; Brown v Bateman (1867) LR 2 CP 272.
168 Douglas J Whalan, The Torrens System in Australia, (1982), 167-168; Robert TJ Stein and 
Margaret A Stone, Torrens Title (1991) 165-166.
169 CL Forrest Trust: Trustees Executors and Agency Co Ltd v Anson [1953] VLR 246. 256 (Herring 
CJ). See also The English Scottish and Australian Bank Ltd v Phillips (1937) 57 CLR 302, 321-322 
(Dixon, Evatt and McTieman JJ).
170 Gough, above n 166, 102-108.
171 King v Marshall (1864) 33 Beav 565; 55 ER 488; New Clydach Street and Bar Iron Co (1868) 
LR 6 Eq 514.
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allowing a party to assign future property, “ the floating charge developed in a series 
of important cases starting with Re Panama; New Zealand and Australian Royal 
Mail Co. The floating charge was justified on the basis that it avoided the paralysis 
of the company's business operations. Otherwise, the consent of the creditor would 
be necessary each time the company wished to dispose of an asset.174 The floating 
charge was (and is) created by the contractual and mutual intention of the parties to
175charge the company's asset as a going concern.
The floating charge was not only a security over the whole of the assets of the 
chargor. It also secured assets which became part of the corporate asset base after the 
execution of the charge documentation. Hence the charge was both general and
176floating. It was only upon default that the charge crystallised.
The existence of the floating charge bears out the view expressed previously 
that 19th century lawyers could have developed a general lien. In some early cases in 
the 1870s in which the floating charge was given judicial blessing Jessel MR 
presided. Yet, in Re Hallett's Estate, whilst he endorsed the necessity for the
tracing of money (albeit in a mixed form) before recovery could take place, he still 
retained the specific lien (referred to in the judgment as a charge) as a proprietary 
remedy. Therefore, he said in relation to tracing:
[T]he beneficial owner has a right to elect either to take the property 
purchased, or to hold it as a security for the amount of the trust money
172
172 Holroyd v Marshall (1862) 10 HL Cas 191; 11ER 999 Reeve v Whitmore (1863) 33 LJ Ch 63 and 
the later case of Tailby v Official Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523; Gough, above 166, 106-108.
173 (1870) 5 Ch App 318. See also Evans v Rival Granite Quarries Ltd [1910] 2 KB 979; Re General 
South American Co (1876) 2 Ch D 337; Re Florence Land and Public Works Co; ex parte Moor 
(1878) 10 Ch D 530; Re Colonial Trusts Corporation; Ex parte Bradshaw {1880) 15 Ch D 465.
174 Re Yorkshire Woolcombers Association Ltd [1903] 2 Ch 284; Biggerstaff v Rowatt's Wharf Ltd 
[1986] 2 Ch 93; Gough, above n 166, 90.
175 Re Panama; New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Co (1870) 5 Ch App 318; Gough, above n 
167, 120.
176 Gough, above n 166, 102; Chapters 8 and 11; Stein v Saywell (1969) 121 CLR 529, 556. (Kitto
J).
177 See Re Florence Land and Public Works Co; Ex parte Moor (1878) 10 Ch D 530, 543; Re 
Colonial Trusts Corporation; ex parte Bradshaw (1879) 15 Ch D 465, 472.
1 7R
(1880) 13 Ch D 696.
304
laid out in the purchase; or, as we generally express it, he is entitled at 
his election either to take the property, or to have a charge on the
1 7Q
property for the amount of the trust property.
Today, the specific lien remains an alternative proprietary remedy to a constructive
Ultimately, in relation to the floating charge, the need for mercantile 
flexibility won the day. Our legal system was forced to provide a legal mechanism 
which would cope with commercial needs. It is the contention of this thesis that we 
are facing a similar juncture in our history in relation to proprietary rights over 
money. The general hypotheca model, reworked and refined to deal with our own 
commercial needs is the appropriate legal mechanism to redress unconscionable 
conduct.
IV Towards the Development of a General Lien
The equitable lien, as a special hypothecation, is closely allied to equitable 
tracing which was discussed in Chapter 4. As will be recalled, before equitable 
tracing can be utilised, the specific res must be capable of being traced in its 
original, substituted or mixed form. Still, the possibility that the equitable lien 
could operate in a even more flexible way was indicated in Hewett v Court. Gibbs CJ 
stated:
it is immaterial whether the moneys paid were in fact used by the 
company in the construction of the building. A purchaser's lien does 
not depend on the ability to trace the purchase moneys into the
183property over which the lien is created.
179 Ibid, 709.
180 Swiss Bank Corporation v Lloyds Bank Ltd (1979) 2 All ER 853, 867-869 (Browne-Wilkinson J); 
Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583, 598 (Gibbs CJ); Morris v Morris [1982] 1 NSWLR 61.
1 O 1
Chapter 1, 14-15.
1 0 7
Chapter 2, 65-70.
1 8 ^
(1983) 149 CLR 639, 648.
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It was sufficient to show that the vendor has been the recipient of the money.184
Besides loosening the nexus between the original asset and the lien, there 
have been signs that the general equitable lien may become utilised in our legal 
system. In Space Investments Ltd v Canadian Imperial Bank o f Commerce Trust Co 
(Bahamas) Ltd ( ‘Space’), the facts of which are set out in Chapter 4, Lord 
Templeman stated obiter:
It is therefore equitable that where the trustee bank has unlawfully 
misappropriated trust money by treating the trust money as though it 
belonged to the bank beneficially, merely acknowledging and 
recording the amount in a trust deposit account with the bank, then the 
claims of the beneficiaries should be paid in full out of the assets of 
the trustee bank in priority to the claims of the customers and other
187unsecured creditors of the bank.
Lord Templeman justified this proposition on the basis that it followed Re Hallett’s 
Estate. In Liggett v Kensington, the majority of the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal followed the obiter dicta in Space and held that the bullion company owed 
fiduciary obligations to the investors.190 The company breached its fiduciary 
obligations because it failed to appropriate bullion to each of the accounts. Therefore, 
the investors (who should otherwise have been unsecured creditors) were entitled to 
take priority over the holder of a floating charge. However, on appeal, the Privy 
Council held that the company did not owe the investors fiduciary obligations and 
the investors were merely unsecured creditors.191 Goff and Jones have suggested that 
a general lien may be an appropriate remedy for unjust enrichment and have 
identified the equitable lien as a response to mistaken payments, breach of trust,
184 In relation to the flexible application of the lien to assets see Graham Douthwaite, Attorney’s 
Guide to Restitution (1977) [8.3].
1 8S
[1986] 1 WLR 1072.
186 Chapter 4, 146.
1 87
[1986] 1 WLR 1072, 1074. See also SJ Stoljar, The Law of Quasi-Contract (2nd ed, 1989), 143.
188 Ibid.
189 [1993] 1 NZLR 257 (Cooke P and Gault J, McKay J dissenting).
190 Ibid 272-275 (Cooke P); 280-281 (Gault J).
191 Re Goldcorp Ltd (In Receivership) [1995] 1 AC 74.
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fraudulent misrepresentation194 and undue influence195 without the need for the 
application of tracing rules. Ultimately, it is the nature of the creditor’s claim which 
is significant. 196
What Lord Templeman was advocating and what the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal applied, was a general lien similar to the Roman tacit general hypotheca in its 
fullest form. There are considerable advantages in the development of a general 
equitable lien.
A general lien over the insolvent’s property would enable a creditor to obtain 
a security interest in that property, without the need to point to the original funds or 
the funds in a substituted or mixed form. The general equitable lien would 
meaningfully address a central proposition which has recurred in this thesis - it is no 
longer feasible to require a specific proprietary base before providing proprietary 
remedies.
Also, it would end the straightjacket approach to the equitable lien which has 
so dominated our legal perceptions of it. Indeed, the author has never found a 
sufficiently cogent answer why the specific equitable lien applies in some cases and 
not in others. For example, why should the remedial relief available to vendors or 
purchasers of personal property be different from the remedial relief available to 
vendors or purchasers of real property? Why should purchasers such as the investors 
in Liggett v Kensington 97 acquire less rights in the fungible property they purport to 
purchase than a purchaser of land? And if they do, should proprietary relief be 
determined on factors other than whether the fungible property is specifically 
identifiable?
Finally, the evolution of a general lien would extricate the equitable lien from 
the trust (whether express or constructive). Moreover, as the equitable lien is not
192 Lord Goff of Chieveley and Gareth Jones, The Law of Restitution (3rd ed, 1986) 78-80.
193 Goff and Jones, above n 13, 98-102.
194 Ibid.
195 Ibid 286.
196 Ibid 101-102.
197 [1993] 1 NZLR257.
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created by the intention of the parties, the concept of intention would not be 
contorted and manipulated out of all recognition. Rather, the courts have to consider 
what overall principle would govern the imposition of a general equitable lien in the 
light of the relationship of the parties.
A Application of the General Equitable Lien
Despite the theoretical attractions of the general equitable lien, it is necessary 
to consider its practical implications. As the general equitable lien is a theoretical 
construct at this stage, it has not been applied in an insolvency context before. There 
are a few cases such as Spacem  and Liggett v Kensington 99 which have presaged its 
operation.
Assuming that a creditor has established that he did not objectively assume 
the risk of a transaction, the question is - how should the general equitable lien 
operate? Courts exercising equitable jurisdiction have emphasised that equitable 
remedies are to be used with sensitivity and discretion.200 So too, a general equitable 
lien would have to be applied sensitively consistent with the theory of objective non­
assumption of risk.
Where the asset or assets which are in dispute are traceable in accordance 
with equity’s tracing rules, then it would be appropriate for a creditor to seek to trace 
those identifiable assets. Where the creditor is able to trace the funds, the traditional 
lien operates in response to a breach of a fiduciary duty.
However, where equity’s tracing rules were inapplicable because there was 
no breach of fiduciary obligations or the funds were wholly or in part untraceable, a 
party ought to be able to acquire a general equitable lien over assets of the insolvent 
to secure the original amount in dispute. Again, in this way, the lien would redress 
the unconscionable conduct of the insolvent and secure the creditor against the 
claims of all other unsecured creditors. Further, s 30 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 
(Cth) enables the Court to make orders including declaratory orders, orders granting
198 [1986] 1 WLR 1072.
199 [1993] 1 NZLR257.
200 Coleman v Myers [1977] 2 NZLR 225; Cheese v Thomas [1994] 1 WLR 129; Waltons Stores 
(Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387; Commonwealth o f Australia v Verwayen (1990) 170 
CLR 394.
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injunctions or other equitable remedies. It is likely that a general equitable lien 
would fall within this provision.
B How Would the General Equitable Lien Operate in an Insolvency
Context?
The specific lien does not operate in the same way as the trust. This has an 
important consequence in insolvency contexts. The trust splits ownership and 
operates to remove the specific asset from the insolvent’s asset base.201 The lien does 
not operate to remove the asset or fund from the asset base of the insolvent. A 
specific lien operates as a security or charge over the assets of the insolvent. Section 
5 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) includes the lien in the definition of secured 
creditor. Such charges or liens may be created by the parties or they may operate by 
law (such as the liens which operate in response to breach of fiduciary duty) or 
statute. Indeed, a creditor may be secured even though there has not been complete 
compliance with registration requirements.204As the asset remains part of the 
underlying asset base of the insolvent, a creditor would have a number of practical
205courses open to it where a specific asset is involved.“
However, it would be entirely impractical for the general lienee to prove the 
general lien in proceedings quite separate from the main bankruptcy proceedings. It 
would be inappropriate for a general lienee to realise or surrender the general lien. 
Instead, the general lienee would need to prove the amount due to him during the 
proceedings.
C When Would the General Equitable Lien Commence Operation?
Where a debtor is solvent, the operation of a general equitable lien will not be 
necessary. However, where the debtor is insolvent and the creditor can demonstrate
201
Note also Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 116 (2) (a).
202 Re Hallett ’s Estate; Knatchbull v Hallett (1880) 13 Ch D 696.
203 See for example McQuade and Gronow, above n 57, [5.1.115]. In relation to Torrens title 
mortgages see Barry v Heider (1914) 19 CLR 197; Re Shoreline Homes Ltd [1982] 1 NZLR 663.
204 ibid.
“°5 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 90
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that he has not objectively assumed the risks of an unsecured creditor, then a general 
equitable lien ought to operate. Noyes has stated that the equitable lien
is that peculiar right to bring an action which is in form in personam 
and in effect in rem.206
It is submitted that a general equitable lien would arise over the assets of the 
insolvent on the occurrence of the later two events, namely,
(a) the unconscionable conduct of the insolvent (which forms part of the general 
theory of objective non-assumption of risk); and
(b) the insolvency itself - that point in time when the insolvency commences and a 
personal remedy would no longer satisfactorily redress the unconscionable 
conduct.207
It would not be appropriate for a general lien to operate at a time prior to the 
insolvency. The reason is that the operation of the general equitable lien would, 
technically speaking, preclude the insolvent from using and disposing of assets in a 
manner commensurate with ownership. However, upon insolvency, the general lien 
would operate, as Noyes has indicated, as a personal right in action with proprietary 
consequences.
D How Would the General Equitable Lien Commence Operation?
This issue has also arisen in relation to the imposition of the constructive 
trust and it is worth addressing various possible answers to the question.
First, it has been argued that how a constructive trust arises is dependent 
upon whether it is characterised as being an institutional constructive trust or a 
remedial constructive trust. The former would arise without the need for a court
C Reinold Noyes, The Institution of Property: A Study o f the Development, Substance and 
Arrangement of the System of Property in Modern Anglo-American Law (1936) 370.
207 For a description of the circumstances when bankruptcy commences see Bankruptcy Act 1966 
(Cth) ss 5, 115 (1) and 115 (2) (a).
208
For a consideration of and description of the institutional and remedial constructive trusts see Ford 
and Lee, above n 48, [22060]; Wright, above n 27, Chapter 2.
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order. The latter would arise where there was an order of the court.209 This 
bifurcation may create unnecessary disputation about the characterisation and 
consequences of the kind of constructive trust being in issue. Moreover, in 
Muschinski v Dodds ( ‘Muschinski’)2w Deane J presaged the blurring of the line
between these two kinds of constructive trust - at least in the way that they operate as
j .  211 remedies.
Secondly, it has been suggested that whether or not the constructive trust 
operates in its institutional or remedial mode, it operates pursuant to an order of a 
court. In this way, the constructive trust is differentiated from the express trust and 
the presumed resulting trust which are respectively based on actual and inferred 
intention. In contrast, the constructive trust operates as a vehicle to give effect to a 
pre-existing obligation which the constructive trustee has breached.214 Thus, the 
court not only recognises and enforces the trust, but also creates the trust. The merit 
of this approach is that it provides a uniform approach to the operation of the 
constructive trust. However, the attendant problem is that it appears that a court order 
is required for all forms of constructive trust - even where there has been a clear 
breach of traditional equitable obligation, such as breach of fiduciary duty.
A third approach has recognised that a constructive trust may arise and
215operate independently of a court order. In such a case, a declaration of the 
aggrieved creditor’s rights would simply recognise and enforce the constructive trust 
- it would not create the trust. This approach appears to have been endorsed in the
Barbara McDonald, ‘Constructive Trusts’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed) The Principles o f Equity, 
(1996) 709, [2106]; Martin, above n 155, 291-292.
210 (1985) 160 CLR583.
211 Ibid 614-615. For a discussion of this issue and some of the tensions which arise see Pamela 
O’Connor, ‘Happy Partners or Strange Bedfellows: The Blending of Remedial and Institutional 
Features in the Evolving Constructive Trust’ (1996) 20 Melbourne University Law Review 735; Ford 
and Lee, above n 48, [22060] and [22080].
212 GE Dal Pont, ‘Equity’s Chameleon - Unmasking the Constructive Trust’ (1997) 16 Australian 
Bar Review 46.
213 Ibid 48-50.
214 Ibid 51-65, 78.
215 For a discussion of the kind of circumstances see Ford and Lee, above n 48, [22080]; Oakley, 
above n 155, 5-7.
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United States. In Australia and Canada, the position is more complex because the 
remedial constructive trust is rightly perceived as an inherently flexible remedy. In 
Australia, there is authority which indicates that a constructive trust may arise 
independently of a court order.217 In Muschinski, 218 Deane J stated:
notwithstanding that the constructive trust is remedial in both origin 
and nature, there does not need to have been a curial declaration or 
order before equity will recognise the prior existence of a constructive 
trust...Where an equity court would retrospectively impose a 
constructive trust by way of equitable remedy, its availability as such 
a remedy provides the basis for, and governs the content of, its 
existence inter parties independently of any formal order declaring it 
or enforcing it.219
However, Deane J suggested that a constructive trust may be imposed and operate 
from the date of an order of the court where competing common law or equivalent 
claims are in issue. In making these comments, he highlighted that where remedial 
concerns were in issue, the dichotomy between the institutional constructive trust or 
the remedial constructive trust begins to disappear." Moreover, where claimants 
have rights to equitable relief due to unconscionable conduct, such rights do not 
automatically translate into a proprietary remedy. Indeed in Muschinski, Deane J 
pointed out that:
in this country at least, the constructive trust has not outgrown its 
formative stages as an equitable remedy and should still be seen as an 
in personam remedy attaching to property which may be moulded and
216
216 Scott and Fratcher, above n 32, vol V §462.4. For a consideration of this approach see Wright, 
above n 27, [8.1]-[8.10].
217 See for example Queenland Mines Ltd v Hudson [1975-1976] ACLC 40-266, 28,708-709 
(reversed on appeal on other matters (1978) 18 ALR 1); Re Osborn; Ex parte Trustee o f Property o f 
Osborn v Osborn (1989) 25 FCR 517; (1989) 91 ALR 135; Re Jonton Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 105; 
Zobory v Federal Commissioner o f Taxation (1995) 64 FCR 86; Greater Pacific Investments Pty Ltd 
(in liq) v Australian National Industries Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 143; Re Sabri; Ex parte Brien v Sabri 
and the ANZ Banking Group [1996-1997] 21 Fam LR 213. For a discussion of the position see 
Meagher and Gummow, above n 48, [1311].
9 1 8
(1985) 160 CLR583.
219 Ibid 614.
220 Ibid 615.
221 Ibid 614-616.
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adjusted to give effect to the application and interplay of equitable 
principle in the circumstances of the particular case.222
Instead, the court may provide personal relief or no relief at all, where it considers 
that the claimant would obtain a double benefit. In Canada also, the Supreme 
Court has indicated that proprietary relief is not an automatic consequence of unjust 
enrichment.224 Courts ought to consider whether there are other appropriate remedies
225which will not interfere with the rights of third parties.
Turning to the possible operation of the general equitable lien, it is strongly 
arguable that whilst the rights for relief in the form of an equitable lien, exist prior to 
a court order, it will be necessary for a creditor to obtain a court order declaring an 
equitable lien. There are several reasons for this. A claim for proprietary relief does 
not preclude the vesting of property in insolvency administration. Instead, 
property vests in the administrator subject to such claims for equitable relief. It is 
not a function of an insolvency administrator to determine whether a creditor is 
entitled to proprietary relief. Indeed, to do so would leave the administrator open to 
criticism that he had not acted appropriately. Under s 178 of the Bankruptcy Act 
1966 (Cth) a creditor who is affected by an act, omission or decision of a trustee, 
may apply to the court for an order dealing with these matters. And, the
230 231administrator may be personally liable “ if he is found guilty of breach of duty.
222 Ibid 615.
223 Australian National Industries Ltd v Greater Pacific Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) (1992) 7 ACSR 
176.
224 Sorachan v Sorachan [1986] 2 SCR 38, 47; (1986) 29 DLR (4th) 1, 7-8 (Dickson CP); Rawluk v 
Rawluk [1990] 1 SCR 70; (1990) 65 DLR (4th) 161.
See Rawluk v Rawluk [1990] 1 SCR 70, 103-104; (1990) 65 DLR (4th) 161, 185-186 (McLachlin 
J).
226 See for example, Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 59.
Til See for example, Re Clark; Ex parte Beardmore [1894] 2 QB 393; Corke v Corke (1994) 121 
ALR 320, 326-327 (Lockhart J).
228 McQuade and Gronow, above n 57, [154A.0.10].
229 Ibid [178.0.10],
230 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 176.
231 For a definition of ‘breach of duty’ see Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 5.
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Moreover, the rights and interests of third parties, as identified by Deane J in 
Muschinski, remain important considerations as well. The problems associated 
with a general equitable lien and third parties will be discussed further. Finally, in 
the light of the fact that the importance of a general equitable lien would be a new 
development in the law, a court order imposing one would be necessary.
E What Value Would be Secured by the General Equitable Lien?
A general equitable lien over assets would secure an amount equivalent to the 
sums transferred to the insolvent or collected by the insolvent as an agent.
However, in the light of the decision in Westdeutsche, the issue of interest
payable on a disputed amount may need to be addressed. In this case, the disputed 
amount was repaid to the bank. The council had effective use of the money for a 
substantial period of time and had derived income from it. At the same time, the 
bank lost revenue. Therefore, the bank claimed compound interest on the basis that 
the bank had retained an equitable interest in the money under a resulting trust. A 
majority of the House of Lords held that the bank was only entitled to simple interest 
under the common law.234 Lord Goff and Lord Woolf, in dissenting judgments, held 
that the jurisdiction to award compound interest was not limited to traditional 
proprietary claims. Equity was capable of awarding compound interest when justice 
demanded it.235
The problem is, how should courts deal with interest claims in insolvency
236 misituations. The House of Lords in Westdeutsche was not presented with this 
difficulty. It is submitted that there are four possible approaches to such a claim.
232 (1985) 160 CLR 583, 615.
233 [1996] AC 669. See also Ausintel Investments Australia Pty Ltd v Lam (1990) 19 NSWLR 637.
Ibid, 700-702 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); 718-719 (Lord Slynn of Hadley) and 737-741 (Lord 
Lloyd of Berwick).
235 684, 690-698, (Lord Goff of Chieveley); 724-730, 735-737 (Lord Woolf). Note also Mason and 
Carter, above n 12, [2813]-[2817]; Martin, above n 155, 638-639.
236 For a discussion of the present law in relation to interest see Mason and Carter, above n 12, 
Chapter 28.
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First, it could be argued that the creditor is not entitled to any interest 
whatsoever. The problem here is that this approach does not take into account the 
fact that if the insolvent has retained the funds for some time (even if the funds are 
no longer in existence or traceable) the insolvent is likely to have earned 
considerable income or offset losses with it. Equally, the creditor may have suffered 
a loss as well.
Secondly, as the general lien arises in response to personal action, it could be 
contended that simple interest is sufficient. The award of interest would acknowledge 
that the creditor has suffered a hypothetical loss and the insolvent made a gain. Yet, 
despite its attractive simplicity, this method does not deal with the fact that the 
insolvent my have used the money in such an entrepreneurial fashion so as to obtain 
an income well in excess of simple interest.
Thirdly, as an equitable lien is a form of equitable proprietary remedy, 
compound interest ought to be available. Traditionally, compound interest is 
awarded where there is evidence of unconscionable conduct, such as a breach of 
fiduciary obligations. Therefore, as the theory of objective non-assumption of risk 
incorporates an evaluation of unconscionable conduct, compound interest is an 
appropriate response. Again, this method does not take into account how the 
insolvent has used the money to gain additional income.
A fourth (and in the author’s view, a preferable) approach, is to place the 
issue of interest in a broader framework. The essential question is to what extent (if 
at all) did the insolvent earn income on the disputed amount and whether there was 
an augmentation of the insolvent’s assets via income received or expenditure saved? 
Therefore, an evaluation of whether an amount, in addition to the original amount, is 
payable emphasises the insolvent’s actual or likely gains rather than simply the 
creditor’s hypothetical losses. This approach does accord with the way that equity 
deals with unconscionable conduct, such as breach of fiduciary obligations. Where a 
trustee or fiduciary breaches his fiduciary obligations, he is required to repatriate not 
only the assets of the trust to the trust, but also any income or profits derived from 
the assets as well. Therefore, the actual accretions to the insolvent and 
hypothetical losses to the creditor could be dealt with as follows:
237 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942] 1 All ER 378; [1967] 2 AC 134n; Boardman v Phipps 
[1967] 2 AC 46; Warman International Ltd v Dwyer (1995) 182 CLR 544.
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(i) where it is possible to ascertain precisely the income derived by the 
insolvent (whether or not equitable tracing rules apply), the creditor should be 
entitled to the income earned; or
(ii) where it is impossible to ascertain the precise income but it is possible to 
ascertain the likely accretions (or there has been an effectual accretion in the light of 
how the insolvent treated the original funds), the creditor should be entitled to those 
accretions; or
(iii) where it is impossible to ascertain actual or likely accretions or the 
insolvent has made a loss in relation to the use or investment of the funds, the 
creditor should be entitled to compound interest at a rate generally prescribed by the
238court in equity cases for such a period.
Such a scheme emphasises that creditors are primarily entitled to gains made by the 
insolvent. In this way, the insolvent’s assets are not unnecessarily diminished by 
claims based on ludicrous hypothetical losses. Therefore, the legitimate interests of 
other unsecured creditors are respected. On the other hand, the insolvent is not 
entitled to retain gains made pursuant to unconscionable conduct. However, where it 
is not possible to determine the actual or likely income or gains made by the 
insolvent, the creditor is still entitled to claim a hypothetical loss. The rationale for 
such a claim is that a creditor should be placed in the position he would have been if 
the unconscionable conduct had not taken place. One foreseeable argument against 
the suggested scheme is that market interest may exceed the actual income or likely 
gains made by the insolvent. Therefore, the creditor should be entitled to the higher 
of the two amounts. However, such an argument re-shifts the analysis towards 
seeking the best possible result from actual income or likely gains on the one hand or 
hypothetical losses on the other. Rather, the major operative principle should be the 
disgorgement of gain. The calculation of interest for hypothetical losses is a fall-back 
position. Where the fall-back position is utilised, the interest ought to be calculated 
from the date of receipt by the insolvent rather than the date of insolvency or date of
238 See Mason and Carter, above n 12, [2814].
239 For cases which applied this approach in relation to equitable compensation see Re Dawson 
[1966] 2 NSWR 211; Hill v Rose [1990] VR 129.
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the court order in order to reflect the extent of the benefit acquired.240 The suggested 
scheme is consistent with the swollen assets theory considered in Chapter 4.
A few examples will illustrate the application of the scheme.
If an insolvent deposits funds in an account and the account accrues interest, 
then a creditor should be entitled to the fund and interest earned. The situation falls 
within item (i) above.
If an insolvent (whether or not the insolvent owes fiduciary obligations) uses 
the funds to pay off a commercial overdraft, then the insolvent is not holding an 
actual gain. However, there has been a positive accretion to the estate because the 
insolvent has effectively saved paying interest on the overdraft. In such a case, the 
creditor should be entitled to an amount equivalent to the interest saved - taking into 
account a reasonable estimation of how long it would have taken the insolvent to 
otherwise pay the overdraft. This situation falls within item (ii) above.
If an insolvent’s records and accounts were lost or incomprehensible, this 
ought not be a bar to the creditor securing payment of compound interest under item 
(iii).
F Over What Property Belonging to the Insolvent Would a General
Equitable Lien Operate?
As the assets remain in the hands of the insolvent, questions about priorities 
will arise; or, to put it another way, the issue will be over what assets of the insolvent 
will the lienee obtain security? There are four possible kinds of property over which 
a general equitable lien could operate.
1 Unencumbered Assets
Lord Templeman in Space241 and Goff and Jones242 have suggested that a 
general lien could only operate over unencumbered assets. This proposition is a
240 Mason and Carter, above n 12, [2808].
241 [1986] 1 WLR 1072, 1074.
242 Goff and Jones, above n 192, 80; Goff and Jones, above n 13, 98-99; 286; Gareth Jones, ‘Tracing 
Claims in the Modem World’ [1988-1989] King’s Counsel 15, 19.
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helpful one because it shows that where there are unencumbered assets, these assets 
should be utilised first to pay out a creditor secured under the general lien. Therefore, 
even though a creditor is unable to access equity’s traditional tracing rules (for any 
variety of reasons), such a party should be treated in priority to other unsecured 
creditors via a general equitable lien over unencumbered assets.
The problem with this suggestion is that the bulk of the assets of the insolvent 
may secure the indebtedness of the insolvent. Therefore, the value of the assets 
which may be unencumbered is minimal. Moreover, such assets, where an individual 
is involved, may be personal effects such as clothes and household property which
243are exempted from the property available for distribution.
One situation which may arise is where the whole or part of the assets are 
encumbered and the secured assets have been realised and the secured creditor has 
been paid out. There may be funds available from the realisation of the security for 
payment to the unsecured creditors. Here, the general lienee ought to have a security 
interest. In such a case, both the secured creditor and the general lien holder would 
have priority over the unsecured creditors. The secured creditor took measures to 
alleviate risk. The general lienee did not objectively assume the risks associated with 
being an unsecured creditor.
2 Assets Subject to a Floating Charge
It is arguable that there should be no bar to a general lienee’s claim where 
there are no unencumbered assets because the assets of an insolvent company are 
subject to a floating charge. In Liggett v Kensington,244 the facts of which are 
considered in Chapter 6,245 a dispute arose between a debenture holder which 
appointed receivers of Goldcorp Exchange Ltd and the unsecured creditors. A 
majority of the New Zealand Court of Appeal held that the customers were entitled 
to priority over the debenture holder in the form of a constructive trust on the basis
241
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 116(2)(b).
244 [1993] 1 NZLR257.
245 Chapter 6, 228.
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that the unsecured creditors had not taken on the risk of insolvency whilst the 
debenture holder had.246
The debenture holder was aware that despite the fact that the floating charge 
is a flexible mechanism, it does have one major drawback. A floating charge must 
crystallise before it attaches to specific property and the chargor’s right to dispose of 
the property, which is subject to the charge, comes to an end.247 Therefore Cooke P 
was able to rationalise the imposition and priority of the constructive trust, not only 
on the unconscionable conduct of the insolvent (in this case characterised as a breach 
of fiduciary obligations), but also on the inherent limitation of the floating charge in 
relation to the trust. Therefore, a party who had not objectively assumed risk, could 
acquire priority over not only other unsecured creditors, but also secured creditors 
who had not sought a sufficiently adequate or effective security.
However, on appeal in Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (In Receivership) 248 the 
Privy Council rejected the views of the majority of the Court of Appeal. Lord Mustill 
(who delivered the judgement for the Privy Council) stated:
There remains the question whether the court should create after the 
event a remedial restitutionary right superior to the security created by 
the charge. The nature and foundation of this remedy were not clearly 
explained in argument. This is understandable, given that the doctrine 
is still in an early stage and no single juristic account of it has yet 
been generally agreed. In the context of the present case there appear 
to be only two possibilities. The first is to strike directly at the heart 
of the problem and to conclude that there was such an imbalance 
between the positions of the parties that if orthodox methods fail a 
new equity should intervene to put the matter right, without recourse 
to further rationalisation. Their Lordships must firmly reject any such 
approach. The bank relied on the floating charge to protect its assets; 
the customers relied on the company to deliver the bullion and to put 
in place the separate stock. The fact that the claimants are private 
citizens whereas their opponent is a commercial bank could not 
justify the court in simply disapplying the bank’s valid security. No
246 Liggett v Kensington [1993] 1 NZLR 257, 274-275 (Cooke P); 280-283 (Gault J). McKay J 
dissented.
247 Gough, above n 166, 135. For a discussion of what crystallisation entails see Chapters 8 and 11 of 
the same work.
248 [1995] 1 AC 74.
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case cited has gone anywhere near to this, and the Board would do no 
service to the nascent doctrine by stretching it past breaking point.249
The Privy Council’s approach was an affirmation of securities as mechanisms for the 
minimisation of risk. In comparison, Cooke P treated the floating charge as a second 
class security in comparison to other forms of fixed security - even though the 
floating charge may have been the only practical security available. Thus, the Privy 
Council considered that the efficacious realisation of a pre-existing security took 
precedence over redressing unconscionable conduct (in the fuller context of the 
objective non-assumption of risk). This is a significant issue which awaits further 
judicial analysis. But the comments made below in relation to fixed securities also 
apply to floating charges.
3 Assets Subject to Fixed Securities
At this stage, it is unclear what course courts would take where all or a 
substantial part of the assets of the insolvent are subject to fixed securities. There are 
two courses open to them. Courts may choose to assert the traditional priority status 
of secured creditors over any kind of unsecured creditor. The rationale for this 
approach is that secured creditors have not assumed the risk of the insolvency of the 
debtor because they have taken measures to minimise risk. The strength of such an 
argument is augmented by s 90 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) which entitles 
secured creditors to realise securities outside the statutory scheme.
Alternatively, the courts could assert that there is a difference between 
secured creditors who have taken measures to protect themselves and parties who 
have not assumed the risk because they have not had an opportunity to minimise risk. 
In the light of the theory of objective non-assumption of risk, such a party should 
take priority even over secured creditors.
It appears that such cases as Neste Oy v Lloyd’s Bank pic250 and Theiss 
Watkins White Ltd v Equiticorp Australia Ltd251 there was no need to consider this 
issue because there were adequate liquidated and unencumbered funds. Nevertheless,
249 Ibid 104.
250 [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 658.
251 [1991] 1 Qd R 82.
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there are strong arguments against the priority of a general equitable lien over fixed 
securities.
Parties often enter into commercial transactions on the basis that the 
transaction is secured. Therefore, the availability of a legal system under which 
securities are recognised and given full operation, is essential for commercial 
activity. Once the effective operation of a fixed security is impaired by the prioritised 
operation of the general equitable lien, then commercial uncertainty follows. 
Moreover, the substantial statutory development of securities of all kinds would be 
undermined by the intervention of equity and the special status of secured
252transactions under an insolvency regime.
Valid securities have the effect of withdrawing the secured property from the 
asset base available for distribution. For example, s 90 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 
(Cth) permits a secured creditor to simply rely entirely on the security without the 
need to lodge proof of the debt at all or realise the security independently of the 
bankruptcy proceedings and prove for any balance still owing. If a general equitable 
lien were permitted to operate, this would have the effect of undermining the central 
function of securities.
Further, secured parties may have no notice of the insolvent’s unconscionable 
conduct. Actual and constructive notice are important criteria in undue influence 
cases,253 unconscionable dealing254 and the rule under Barnes v Addy 255 Before there 
can be equitable intervention, the third party must have actual or constructive notice 
of the unconscionable conduct. The concept of notice is directly linked to the 
principle that equity does not operate or intervene against a bona fide purchaser for
252 Re Osborn; Ex parte Trustee o f Property o f Osborn v Osborn (1989) 25 FCR 547, 553-554; 91 
ALR 135, 142; Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (In Receivership) [1995] 1 AC 74, 103-105 (Lord 
Mustill).
253 Bank o f New South Wales v Rogers (1941) 65 CLR42; Barclays Bank pic v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 
180.
254 Commercial Bank o f Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; Tony Duggan, 
‘Unconscientious Dealing’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The Principles o f Equity (1996) 121, [513],
255 (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244; McDonald, above n 209, [2130]-[2132]; [2136]-[2137]; cf Royal 
Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] AC 378 and Meagher and Gummow, above n 48, [1335]- 
[1337].
321
value without notice who acquires the legal estate. It would be incongruous and 
contrary to the traditional operation of equity if the interests of a bona fide purchaser 
for value, such as a secured lender, were subordinated to the interests of a general 
lienee.
256
The arguments in favour of a general equitable lienee are also cogent in the 
light of the serious nature of unconscionable conduct. The argument that the 
intervention of equity would create commercial uncertainty should be seen in 
perspective. Equity would intervene on a principled basis in only the most 
exceptional circumstances where a creditor could not be expected to assume risk and 
the insolvent has acted unconscionably in the augmentation of his asset base.
Indeed, a central function of equity is the prevention of and redress for legal 
and equitable wrongdoing. Even in the 19th century, equity retained jurisdiction 
(albeit a limited one) to redress unconscionable conduct. If courts were to limit 
equitable relief to cases where there were adequate unencumbered assets available, 
then the courts would be artificially limiting remedial relief for unconscionable 
conduct. Therefore, instead of the proprietary base requirement becoming an obstacle 
to proprietary relief, the existence or non-existence of fixed securities would create a 
barrier. One of the features of the constructive trust imposed in Liggett v Kensington 
was that it operated to furnish the customers with priority over all other secured 
parties. This was achieved by the trust mechanism withdrawing the assets from 
distribution amongst other secured and unsecured creditors until the claims of the 
customers had been satisfied. It could be argued that, for this reason, the constructive 
trust is a preferable mechanism. However, the same can effect may be achieved by a 
general equitable lien if it were acknowledged that such a lien would take precedence 
over other securities, where the value of the unencumbered assets was less than the 
amount claimed by a creditor.
Notwithstanding the existence of statutory schemes in relation to land and the 
administration of insolvency, equity has remained an important contributor to the 
operation of these schemes.“ In Ex parte James; Re Condon, it was held that
Patrick Parkinson and David Wright, ‘Equity and Property’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The 
Principles o f Equity (1996) 53, [315].
257 Chapter 1,27-29.
Ibid 29, 34-36.
259 (1874) LR 9 Ch App 609; Chapter 1, 34-35.
322
equitable principles still applied in the course of a bankruptcy. Concomitant with the 
concern that there should be fair dealing in the administration of insolvent estates, 
there has been the broad interpretation of the concept of trust under s 116 (2) (a) of 
the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). One author has pointed out that the concept of trust 
under the legislation has gone well beyond situations where specific and traditional 
trusts operate to include relationships which may be considered fiduciary. In this 
way courts have tried to address unconscionable conduct on a piecemeal basis. The 
recognition of a general lien over all of the assets of an insolvent would clearly 
provide an effective form of proprietary relief in response to unconscionable 
conduct.
Finally, the operation of a general equitable lien would not undermine the 
function of specific securities such as the mortgage or the charge. Rather, the 
existence of the general equitable lien would simply mean that priority issues would 
have to be resolved between two different kinds of secured creditors, namely the 
creditors under the fixed securities and the creditor under the general equitable lien. 
The definition of secured creditor under s 5 of the Bankruptcy Act includes the 
operation of equitable securities such as the equitable mortgage, the equitable lien or 
the equitable charge.
4 Statutory Exceptions to the Rateable Distribution Policy
261As previously discussed, in bankruptcy and insolvency legislation certain 
unsecured creditors are accorded priority over all other creditors. For example, s 109 
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) sets out certain specific claims and relationships which 
are accorded special priority, such as petitioner’s costs,262 trustee’s remuneration and 
expenses,263 funeral and testamentary expenses,264 wages and salaries of the 
employees of the insolvent to a limited extent, workers compensation claims
260 Dennis Rose, above n 57, 139.
261 Chapter 1, 33. See generally McQuade and Gronow, above n 57, [109.0]-[109.10.05].
262 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 109 (1) (a)
263 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 109 (1) (b)
"64 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 109 (1) (d)
265 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 109 (1) (e)
266 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 109 (1) (f)
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and child support. These items are subject to internal priority. The question is how 
is the apparent conflict between the interests of the general lienee on the one hand 
and the parties accorded special priority in the legislation on the other reconciled?
The special prioritised exceptions to the rateable distribution principle may 
be explained on two bases. Some of the exceptions such as petitioner’s costs and 
trustee’s expenses relate to the costs incurred in relation to the administration of the 
insolvency. It is not appropriate that the petitioner or the trustee in bankruptcy should 
bear the costs of the insolvency. Otherwise, there would be no incentive for creditors 
to bring petitions or trained parties to act as trustees in bankruptcy.
Another rationale for the prioritised legislative list is that it provides for 
protection of parties who are unable to otherwise take action to obtain security in the 
event of insolvency. Thus, it is arguable that the legislation contains a version of the 
objective non-assumption of risk theory in relation to a level of wages and salaries. 
Employees do not assume the risk of the employer’s insolvency. Instead, what 
occurs is that the employee swells the assets of the employer by the use of his labour. 
If the employee is not accorded even a partial preferential status in relation to the 
assets of the insolvent, it will mean that the employee has swelled the assets of the 
employer to the benefit of other unsecured creditors, some of whom may have been 
able to take action to avoid the risk of insolvency. The employee cannot demand 
security for the value of the labour and it would be unconscionable for the insolvent 
employer to retain the goods or the benefits of the services without payment of some 
salaries and associated costs. Indeed, s 561 of the Corporations Law (Cth) recognises 
the priority of employee’s claims over floating charges. Therefore, for practical and 
policy reasons, the small (but highly significant) legislative exceptions to rateable
distribution should be followed. Thus, these specific exceptions should have first
268priority before any general lien as a response to unconscionable conduct.
Therefore, a general equitable lien would be an appropriate proprietary 
response to most claims based on objective non-assumption of risk. Certainly, it 
would be a fitting proprietary response where funds are untraceable and the insolvent 
has unencumbered assets which are equivalent to or more than the amount in dispute.
267
267 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 109 (1 A) (a)
268 For an adherence to this approach see Lennox Industries (Canada) Ltd v The Queen (1987) 34 
DLR (4th) 297, 307-310 (Reed J) and Re Permanent House (Holdings) Ltd [1988] BCLC 563; cf 
Griffiths v Yorkshire Bank pic [1994] 1 WLR 1427.
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Whether the general equitable lien should extend to assets subject to floating and 
fixed securities is still open to debate.
V Defences
Even if a creditor as plaintiff establishes that, objectively speaking, he could 
not be expected to take on the risk of the transaction, he may not be successful. It is 
likely that an insolvent debtor may be able to raise successfully a defence against the 
plaintiff. The kinds of defences which may be raised in an action for proprietary 
relief remain largely undetermined. However, it is suggested that there are two major 
kinds. First, there are defences which are based on a critical evaluation of the actions 
or inactions of the plaintiff. Secondly, there are those defences in which the conduct 
of the insolvent is central.
A Defences Based on the Conduct of the Creditor as Plaintiff
1 Introduction
The insolvent’s administrators may be able to raise many of the standard 
defences traditionally made against a plaintiff seeking equitable relief. The effect of 
such defences may be that the creditor may secure neither personal nor proprietary 
relief. Another way of stating this is that if the defence is available in cases of 
solvency, it will also operate in cases of insolvency.
2 Illegality
The insolvent’s administrators may be able to argue that the plaintiff has 
entered into an illegal transaction and should not be entitled to any equitable relief 
whatsoever.
269In relation to contracts which are illegal for public policy reasons or are
270contracts prohibited by statute, the traditional position has been that:
269 For a helpful discussion see Greig and Davis, above n 1, 1126-1145.
270 Goff and Jones, above n 13, Chapters 19 and 22; Greig and Davis, above n 1, 1116-1117.
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No Court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action
271upon an immoral or an illegal act.
Illegality has been an effective defence. But, the underlying philosophy of this 
approach has been challenged by the High Court of Australia decision in Nelson v 
Nelson? 12 a case on illegal trusts.
There are two different types of illegal contracts. In the first kind, the plaintiff 
is unaware of the fact that the contract is illegal, namely, the parties are not pari in 
delicto. He may have a range of additional factors available on the basis of 
ignorance, including mistake of some relevant fact,273 fraud,274 pressure or 
oppression/ Where the contract is executory and the plaintiff discovers that the 
contract is illegal, he may withdraw from the contract prior to its fulfilment and 
recover the money which has been paid under the contract. If the contract has been
performed or partly performed, the plaintiff will have no access to personal or
278proprietary relief.
The second kind of case is where the plaintiff enters into the contract 
knowing that the contract is illegal. Where the contract is executory he may
Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341, 343; 98 ER 1120, 1121 (Lord Mansfield). This rule has 
been applied in a large number of modem cases, including Parkinson v College o f Ambulance Ltd 
and Harrison [1925] 2 KB 1; Re National Benefit Assurance Co Ltd [1931] 1 Ch 46; Berg v Sadler 
and Moore [1937] 2 KB 158; JM Allan (Merchandising) Ltd v Cloke and Another [1963] 2 QB 340; 
Shaw v Shaw [1965] 1 WLR 537; Ashmore, Benson, Pease & Co Ltd v A WDawson [1973] 1 WLR 
828; Spector v Ageda [1973] Ch 30; United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank o f 
Canada [1983] 1 AC 168.
272 (1995) 184 CLR538.
273 Oom v Bruce (1810) 12 East 225; 104 ER 87; Clay v Yates (1856) 1 H&N73;  156 ER 1123.
274 Hughes v Liverpool Victoria Friendly Society [1916] 2 KB 482.
275 Smith v Bromley (1760) 2 Doug 696n; 99 ER 441; Smith v Cuff (mi) 6 M & S 160; 105 ER 
1203; Atkinson v Denby (1861) 6 H & N, 158 ER 321; affd 7 H 7 N 934; 158 ER 749; Williams v 
Bayleyi 1866) LR 1 HL 200.
276 For a discussion of the origins of the executory contract see Atiyah, above n 124, 419-434.
277 Taylor v Bowers (1876) 1 QBD 291; South Western Mineral Water Co Ltd v Ashmore [1967] 1 
WLR 1110.
778 Lowry v Bourdieu (1780) 2 Doug 468; 99 ER 299. See Goff and Jones, above n 13, 488-490 and 
the authorities cited therein.
326
withdraw from the contract until it is performed by the other side on the basis that 
such a withdrawal indicates repentance or locus poenitentiae. Where the illegal 
contract has been partly performed, the traditional approach has been to let the loss 
lie where it falls. In this case the plaintiff co-wrongdoer will be unable to recover 
his money. This approach is taken because he did enter into the transaction aware of 
accepting its illegal nature and the risks associated with such illegality. Still, the 
objection to the general rule applicable to both kinds of situations which have been 
highlighted is that:
To nullify bargains because of illegality when the law is unwittingly 
broken may require a contracting party to forfeit a sum ‘vastly in 
excess of any penalty that a criminal court would impose; and the sum 
forfeited will not go into the public purse but into the pockets of
someone who is lucky enough to pick up the windfall or astute
281enough to have contrived to get it.’
An alternative approach to the defence of illegality is analogous to the 
examination which the High Court undertook. In Nelson v Nelson, the Court 
looked further afield and investigated how courts in the United States dealt with 
illegality. Two parties had knowingly participated in setting up a trust for an 
illegal purpose. A mother used her own funds to purchase a property in the name of 
her son and daughter. Subsequently, she obtained substantial funds under the 
Defence Service Homes Act 1918 (Cth). In order to access this finance, she was 
required to declare that she had no other interest in a property. Later, the mother and 
the children disagreed as to who owned the first property. The son conceded his 
mother’s interest but the daughter refused to do so. The mother was clearly in breach 
of the legislation. The daughter retained the property which prima facie, under the 
law relating to resulting trusts, belonged to the mother. The Court balanced the 
interests of the two wrongdoers and did not permit the daughter to retain the
~79 Bigos v Boustead [1951] 1 All ER 92.
Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341; 98 ER 1120.
281 Goff and Jones, above n 13, 519. See also Andrews Burrows, The Law o f Restitution (1993) 334- 
341.
789
(1995) 184 CLR 538.
983
Ibid, 566-567 (Deane and Gummow JJ).
284 Chapter 2, 56-60.
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proprietary benefit. However, the mother was required to repay funds which she had 
received under the legislative scheme. The extent to which personal remedies 
should be available needs to be worked out in the light of the policy considerations 
raised by such cases as Nelson v Nelson. Until then, a discussion of the availability of 
proprietary remedies cannot be made with confidence.
Nonetheless, a few points can be made in relation to proprietary relief. Where 
the plaintiff shows that he or she was induced by fraud, pressure or undue influence 
to enter into the illegal transaction then that person should be entitled to a proprietary
remedy where the other wrongdoer is insolvent. This is consistent with equitable
286intervention where the unconscionable conduct occurs prior to the transaction.
Where the plaintiff shows that it was a case of a genuine mistake on his part, 
or both parties were genuinely ignorant then, prima facie, he should be able to obtain 
proprietary relief subject to the other requirements of the theory of objective non­
assumption of risk.
However, where the plaintiff knew of the illegality and the contract is 
executory, it is more difficult. Although it is arguable that the plaintiff assumed the 
risk and illegality of the transaction, the plaintiff should be able to recover in 
principle, as the illegal purpose has not been fulfilled. The basis of this suggestion is 
that it would be unjust to permit an insolvent or his unsecured creditors to obtain 
some financial relief from what are ill-gotten gains. It is also arguable that the 
insolvent had committed potentially two acts of unconscionable conduct - namely, 
the insolvent entered into a contract which he knew was illegal; and, upon discovery 
of the illegality of the contract, the insolvent refused to disgorge the benefit obtained 
under it.
Finally, when the contract has been partly or fully fulfilled, then the question 
is whether equity may intervene on the basis of unconscionable retention of property. 
Again, it is arguable that the plaintiff has assumed the risk and illegality of the 
transaction. Therefore, proprietary relief should not be available. However, the 
problem is that the insolvent has acted wrongfully in two instances and his creditors 
would obtain a windfall. In this situation, proprietary relief should be seriously
285 Nelson v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538, 571-572 (Deane and Gummow JJ); 616-618 (McHugh J); 
cf 597-598 (Toohey J).
286 Chapter 6, 227.
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considered. It may depend upon whether the parties may be restored, in a practical 
sense, to the pre-illegality situation. It will be recalled that in Nelson287 a majority of 
the High Court held that before the plaintiff was able to access relief, she was 
required to disgorge the funds which she had obtained pursuant to the illegal 
purpose. In so doing, she restored herself to the pre-illegality situation. Thereafter, 
she was entitled to re-acquire the house which she had transferred to her daughter. In 
this case it was easy to re-adjust to a pre-illegality situation. What can be said is that 
if a plaintiff wishes to assert either a personal or proprietary remedy, then he cannot 
expect to retain property which has been acquired through illegality.
3 Clean Hands
It may be argued that the plaintiff has acted with such impropriety that the 
insolvent’s administrators can rely on the equitable maxim that ‘[h]e who comes into 
equity must come with clean hands.’ The maxim will operate where the 
impropriety is directly related to the equity alleged by the plaintiff289 such as 
misrepresentation,290 the plaintiff has misled the court,291 there has been a breach of 
duty or sexual immorality. It is unclear whether the defence of clean hands is 
limited to these broad situations and it has been suggested that a precise statement of 
when the defence of clean hands will be available is necessary.294 However, the 
concept of unclean hands should not be limited, otherwise equitable discretion will 
be unnecessarily fettered. At any rate, it is fairly clear that there are certain situations 
when the defence will not be available, namely, where the action of the plaintiff is
987
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288 Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, above n 12, [322].
289 Kettles and Gas Appliances Ltd v Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 108; 
Harrigan v Brown [1967] 1 NSWR 342.
290 Hewson v Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd [1968] 2 NSWR 224; Kettles & Gas Appliances Ltd v 
Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 108.
291 Armstrong v Shepherd & Short Ltd [1959] 2 QB 384, 397 (Lord Evershed MR).
292 AG (UK) v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109.
293 Glyn v Weston Feature Film Co [ 1916] 1 Ch 261.
294 Michael Spence, ‘Equitable Defences’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The Principles o f Equity (1996) 
939, [2933],
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295 296for the cancellation and delivery of documents, suits for declaratory relief, suits 
to prevent multiplicity of actions and a suit for statutory relief. If the 
circumstances do not involve these matters, then prima facie, the insolvent should be 
in a position to successfully raise the defence.
4 Laches
The insolvent may be in a position to argue that the plaintiff has 
unnecessarily delayed bringing an action against the insolvent. Such an argument 
may not be an easy one to make. A mere delay will not in itself bar a claim.299 
Indeed, generally speaking, equitable proprietary claims are not barred by statutes of 
limitations. This can be a reason why a party may argue that they have an equitable 
proprietary interest rather than merely a personal claim. In Cohen v Cohen 00 the 
plaintiff was unable to bring an action for recovery of debt because the action was 
barred by the relevant Statute of Limitations. Therefore, the plaintiff argued 
successfully that the defendant held sale proceeds on trust for her because he was 
required to specifically account for them.301 Certainly, claims based on undue 
influence, innocent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty are not so 
barred. However, it will be necessary to consult the applicable statute of 
limitations in order to discern whether the action is barred.304 It is also possible to
295 St John V St John (1805) 11 Ves Jun 526; 32 ER 1192; Money v Money (No 2) [1966] 1 NSWR 
348.
296 Lodge v National Union Investment Co Ltd [1907] 1 Ch 300.
297 Angelelides v James Stedman Henderson Sweets Ltd (1927) 40 CLR 43; Dow Securities Pty Ltd v 
Manufacturing Investments Ltd (1981) 5 ACLR 501.
7QQ
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299 See Baburin v Baburin [1990] 2 Qd R 101, 112 (Kelly SPJ); Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, 
above n 12, [3605]-3606]; John Brunyate, Limitation o f Actions in Equity (1932) 260-261.
300 (1929) 42 CLR 91.
301 Ibid 161-162.
302 Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, above n 12, [3414].
303 KM v HM [1992] 3 SCR 6; 76-80; (1993) 96 DLR (4th) 289, 333-336 (La Forest J); Williams v 
Minister, Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (1994) 35 NSWLR 497.
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apply the statute of limitations by analogy,305 although the courts have the discretion
306to refuse to follow such an analogy. Delay may also operate as a form of waiver
307indicating an intention to release an equitable interest or right.
5 Hardship
It may be possible for the defendant to argue that the plaintiffs delay in 
bringing the action will cause hardship on the defendant and accordingly, is 
unconscionable.308 Courts have been traditionally hesitant in delineating definitely 
the scope of the defence or the sorts of situations in which the defence will arise.309 
However, there are some claims where the defence is more successful. Whilst claims 
by beneficiaries under an express trust have not been generally subject to it310 (except 
in a number of discrete cases) other essentially proprietary claims have been 
subject to the defence. The reason for the difference in approach is that it would be 
simply unconscionable for a plaintiff to assert an interest in property when a long 
period of time has passed and the defendant is entitled to assume that he has a 
proprietary interest in the property or its substitute. The defendant should not be 
subject to uncertainty over a lengthy period. Indeed, the operation o f various
304 For legislation which specifically excludes claims for equitable relief on the basis of analogy see: 
for example Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 23; Limitation o f Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 5(8); Limitation 
o f Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 10(6)(b). For a general discussion of the statute of limitations see Spence, 
above n 294, [2910].
305 Knox v Gye (1872) LR 5 HL 656, 674 (Lord Westbury).
306 KM v HM [1992] 3 SCR 6; 75; (1993) 96 DLR (4th) 289, 332 (La Forest J); Williams v Minister, 
Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (1994) 35 NSWLR 497. See also Denis Browne, Ashburner’s 
Principles o f Equity (2nd ed, 1933) 506 and Spence, above n 294, [2912].
307 Orrv Ford (1988-1989) 167 CLR316, 338 (Deane J)\ Avtex Airservices Pty Ltd v Bartsch (1992) 
107 ALR 539, 567-568 (Hill J).
Lindsay Petroleum Co v Hurd (1874) LR 5 PC 221, 239-240 (Sir Barnes Peacock).
309 OrrvFord (1988-1989) 167 CLR316, 340-341 (Deane J).
311 Ibid, 341 (Deane J). Note also Hourigan v Trustees Executors and Agency Co Ltd (1934) 51 CLR 
619 and Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, above n 12, [3606].
312 Bedford v Wade (1805) 17 Ves Jun 87, 97; 34 ER 34, 38 (Sir William Grant MR).
313 Fitzgerald v Masters (1956) 95 CLR 420, 433-434 (Dixon CJ and Fullagar J).
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insolvency regimes is likely to limit the period under which a creditor is able to make 
a claim as a ‘secured’ creditor by virtue of the intervention of equity. After a certain 
period, usually three years, the insolvent is entitled to a discharge from insolvency.314
6 Contributory Negligence
Another possible defence, which relates directly to proprietary relief, is that 
the plaintiff contributed to his unfortunate financial position in relation to the 
insolvent. It has already been demonstrated that a failure to inspect public records or 
take security may seriously undermine a plaintiffs case where such conduct is part 
of a conventional risk minimisation strategy.315 However, these issues have been 
discussed from the perspective of what a plaintiff must prove. However, the context 
here is what defences the insolvent may raise in relation to the plaintiffs pre­
transactional conduct. Although there is an overlap between commercial expectations 
of risk minimisation and a potential defence of contributory negligence, they remain 
different. Commercial expectations of risk minimisation emphasises the need for the 
plaintiff to establish the commercial milieu in which the transaction took place. On 
the other hand, the defence emphasises the plaintiffs neglectful action or omission.
The question is whether a broader notion of negligence may become relevant. 
It is tempting to use the phrase ‘contributory negligence’ in this context. 
Contributory negligence has been defined as:
a plaintiffs failure to meet the standard of care to which he is 
required to conform for his own protection and which is a legally 
contributing cause, together with the defendant’s default, in bringing 
about his injury.316
Contributory negligence arises in tort actions where the defendant owes the plaintiff 
a standard of care to which the defendant does not conform. The plaintiff brings an 
action in negligence against the defendant who, in turn, argues that the plaintiff 
himself, through his own fault, contributed to his own injury. Whilst the concept
For a discussion of discharge from bankruptcy see: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) Part VII 
particularly ss 149 and 149A and McQuade and Gronow, above n 57, [149.0]-[149A.3.05].
315 Chapter 6, 214-218.
316 John G. Fleming, The Law of Torts (9th ed, 1998) 302.
317 Ibid 302, 318-320.
332
of contributory negligence was developed in tort cases, it can be assimilated into 
some commercial cases where proprietary relief is sought. Whilst it could not be said 
that the defendant owed the plaintiff a formal duty of care, it is arguable that equity 
is moving towards formalised duties such as requirements of disclosure in certain 
circumstances.318
Here, two distinct questions arise. First, is it appropriate on a theoretical level 
that courts exercising equitable jurisdiction seriously consider arguments based on 
contributory negligence? Some authors argue that the common law courts (as distinct 
from Chancery) engaged in an exploration of such issues as contributory negligence. 
Customarily, equity has awarded remedies without undertaking an inquiry into 
whether the acts or omissions of the plaintiff were at least in part responsible for the 
loss suffered.319 Other authors have cautiously welcomed the potential for enfusing 
equitable relief with common law criteria so long as the exercise is undertaken on a 
principled basis.320
However, courts exercising equitable jurisdiction did consider whether the 
conduct of the plaintiff itself contributed to the unfortunate position. Indeed, this has 
been an important issue in priority claims between equitable interests. In addition, 
there is also authority which suggests that the notion of contributory negligence may 
be pleaded where equitable relief is sought. For example, in Day v Mead, Cooke P
held that in an action for breach of fiduciary duty, contributory negligence on the
In relation to duties of care and disclosure note the effect o f such cases as Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia v Smith (1991) 102 ALR 453; Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 
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part of a plaintiff would directly affect the assessment of the loss sustained by the 
plaintiff on the basis of the fusion of law and equity. Unfortunately, where 
fiduciary obligations are concerned, the interpolation of the concept of contributory 
negligence appears somewhat antithetical to the concept of fiduciary obligations. But 
perhaps, the answer lies in the fact that in such cases as Day v Mead, the nature of 
the non-assumption of risk was not as extensive as in traditional trust and fiduciary 
cases.
Secondly, is the concept of a contributory negligence an appropriate basis for 
a defence against an action for proprietary relief ? If the plaintiff could show that he 
could not have objectively assumed the risk, the plaintiff should be entitled to 
proprietary relief. In cases concerned with mistake, it has been accepted by courts 
that the negligence of the plaintiff will not preclude recovery.324 However, in relation 
to other vitiating factors such as void and voidable contracts, the position is far from 
clear.
There are good reasons for courts carefully examining the extent to which (if 
at all) the neglectful actions or omissions of the plaintiff have contributed to its 
unsecured status. Such an approach is consistent with the attitude of the courts to 
inspection of public registers. A plaintiff should not be able to obviate his own 
responsibility for protecting his interests. Otherwise, the grant of proprietary relief 
may assist a blatantly neglectful plaintiff. Also, it should not be forgotten that a 
plaintiff who seeks proprietary relief is seeking to establish priority over other 
creditors, principally unsecured creditors. It would be inequitable to elevate one 
unsecured creditor (who had acted neglectfully) to a secured status, whilst another 
unsecured creditor did not have an opportunity to take security. Indeed, in the 
exercise of equity’s substantial discretionary jurisdiction, a court must be entitled to 
weigh up the conduct of the parties. Traditionally, when providing relief, equity has
326examined the conduct of the person seeking that relief.
323 Ibid 451; Note also Canson Enterprises Ltd v Boughton & Co (1992) 85 DLR (4th) 129, 132 (La 
Forest J, Sopinka, Gonthier and Cory JJ concurring), cf Hill v Rose [1990] VR 129; Carl B Potter Ltd 
v Mercantile Bank o f Canada (1980) 112 DLR (3d) 88.
324 Kelly v Solari (1841) 9 M & W 54; 152 ER 24.
325 ReAyoub; ex parte Silvia (1983) 67 FLR 144, 148-149 (Morling J).
326 For example see specific performance cases: King v Poggioli (1923) 32 CLR 222; Gurney v 
Gurney (No 2) [1967] NZLR 922.
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There are two kinds of conduct which may be relevant to a defence of 
contributory negligence. One form of conduct is where the plaintiff made certain 
assumptions about the transactions which were unwarranted. Here, the plaintiff may 
have made assumptions concerning the capacity of the defendant to enter into a 
contract “ or the inherent validity of the contract or obligations contained therein. 
Whether the plaintiff failed to investigate to the degree necessary to protect its own 
interest will ultimately be a matter of fact. Certainly, large commercial enterprises 
with the finances and human resources to undertake factual and legal enquiries may 
not be successful in the light of their own investigatory neglect. Surely, for example, 
large commercial enterprises are able to make appropriate investigations to ensure 
that the transactions which they commonly enter are not rendered void or voidable 
by statute. In comparison, the small consumer has neither the time nor resources to 
undertake such investigations. Nonetheless, there will be occasions where the 
assumption made by even a large commercial enterprise will be so widespread that 
the failure to investigate further should not be interpreted as neglect. In 
Westdeutsche the plaintiff had entered into a swap arrangement with the defendant 
council. Later, it had been held by the House of Lords that such interest rate swaps 
were ultra vires the powers of local councils. At the time, the plaintiff entered into 
the interest rate swap, it was commonly assumed that local councils had the capacity 
to enter into such commercial arrangements. The fact that the plaintiff made such a 
commonly held market assumption was not evidence that the plaintiff had failed to 
protect its financial interests.
The other form of neglect which will inevitably contribute to a plaintiffs 
status as an unsecured creditor is where the plaintiff acquires an ineffective security 
from the insolvent. As the plaintiff has sought security from the defendant (in 
conformity with commercial norms), it is part of the plaintiffs responsibility to 
ensure that the security is valid in all respects.
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669; 
Sinclair v Brougham [1914] AC 398.
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7 Passing on Risk to Customers331
The defence of passing on of risk has arisen in the context of the law of 
restitution. It has been described as arising:
when the plaintiff shifts on to a third party the financial burden that is 
consequent upon the defendant’s unjust gain. Thus, in the most 
common scenario, a business purportedly liable for a tax makes 
payment to the government, but also attempts to recoup its loss by 
raising the prices that it charges to its customers. When the tax is 
determined to be improper or inapplicable, the business seeks 
restitutionary relief. The government resists that claim on the basis 
that its enrichment came not at the plaintiffs expense, but rather at
332the expense of the plaintiffs customers.
There have been a series of recent decisions in which courts have rejected or
333questioned the merits of the defence. It is argued that restitution is concerned with 
restoring what belongs to a plaintiff rather than ascertaining the ultimate loss.334
T O C
Even if the defence of passing on of risk is theoretically acceptable, in practical 
terms it is very difficult to give effect to and to prove. The operation of a defence 
based on passing on of risk means that a plaintiff will be left without any remedy.
For a discussion o f the defence see Burrows, above n 281, 476-477; W Woodward, “ Passing-on’ 
the Right to Restitution’ (1985) 39 University o f Miami Law Review 873; P Mitchell, ‘Restitution, 
‘Passing On’ and the Recovery of Unlawfully Demanded Taxes: Why Air Canada Doesn’t Fly’
(1995) 53 University o f Toronto Faculty Law Review 130; Francis Rose, ‘Passing On’ in Peter Birks 
(ed), Laundering and Tracing (1995) 261; JD Merrells, ‘Restitutionary Recovery of Taxes After the 
Royal Insurance Case’ in Mitchell Mclnnes (ed), Restitution: Developments in Unjust Enrichment
(1996) ; John Glover, ‘Restitutionary Recovery of Taxes After the Royal Insurance Case: 
Commentary’ in Mitchell Mclnnes (ed), Restitution: Developments in Unjust Enrichment (1996) 131.
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It appears that the defence has not been raised in cases where the plaintiff has 
been seeking proprietary relief. This is understandable in the sense that in the past, 
plaintiffs have asserted that they have retained a proprietary interest in the funds 
which were the subject of the dispute. The passing on of risk defence arises in cases 
where it is accepted that the defendant has acquired title to the funds and the 
defendant wishes to deflect the vitiation of the transaction on the basis that the 
plaintiff has a large consumer base upon which to pass on risk.
However, it is one of the main contentions of the thesis that in the future, 
proprietary relief will no longer depend solely upon tracing and reification of money. 
Therefore, a defence based on passing on of risk to customers could be raised where 
a proprietary claim has been made, particularly on the basis that the passing on of 
risk is a form of risk minimisation. The question will be what attitude the courts 
should take.
There are several reasons why courts should take a cautious approach. First, 
such a defence would work in favour of the insolvent and the general unsecured 
creditors to the detriment of a plaintiff. Even if it were proved that the plaintiff had 
paid over funds pursuant to undue influence or a genuine mistaken belief, the 
insolvent and the unsecured creditors would have access to these funds on the basis 
that the plaintiff had an opportunity to pass on the risk to its customers.
Secondly, the defence would not only operate effectively against arguments 
that the plaintiff should receive a proprietary and priority status. Arguably, it would 
also undercut the claims of a plaintiff as an unsecured creditor. The effect of the 
defence in an insolvency context is that the plaintiff loses a right and remedy to 
recover even a rateable proportion of the funds which it claims against the defendant. 
This would enhance the position of the defendant insolvent and the capacity of that 
insolvent to repay its other creditors.
Thirdly, such a defence could be used ruthlessly against plaintiffs which have 
the capacity to pass on business costs to customers. The problem is that it is difficult 
(if not impossible) to prove that such losses have been passed onto customers. 
Moreover, the underlying assumption of the defence is that it is commercially 
feasible for plaintiffs to pass on losses to their customers. In a highly competitive
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market this may be impossible to achieve because of the underlying elasticity and 
efficiency of the market in which the plaintiff operates.
Fourthly, no doubt part of the day to day operation of business is that the 
more profitable transactions will offset less profitable or even loss creating 
transactions. However, it is not clear whether unsuspecting customers should have 
the risk of the insolvency effectively passed onto them. The position of the 
customers is qualitatively very different from the credit insurer who consciously
338undertakes to accept the risk of insolvency of another.
B Defences Based on the Conduct of the Insolvent as Defendant
1 Introduction
The issue here is to what extent should an insolvent (or the insolvent’s 
administrators) argue that courts should take into account the subsequent actions of 
the insolvent when a plaintiff seeks proprietary relief. Two important defences are 
possible.
2 Any Wrongdoing is not Attributable to the Insolvent’s Administrators
Under the rule in Ex parte James; Re Condon the trustee in bankruptcy 
cannot rely on taking full advantage of his legal rights and in the case of property, 
the trustee may be ordered to return the money which he may have collected.340 In 
subsequent cases, judges have indicated a willingness to exercise equitable 
jurisdiction in order to ensure that the party who effects the administration of the
337 See generally the issues raised in SG Corones, Restrictive Trade Practices Law (1994) [1-01]-[1- 
13].
Chapter 6, 220-222.
339 (1874) LR 9 Ch 609. See also Chapter 1, 34-35.
340 Muir Hunter and David Graham, Williams and Muir Hunter: The Law and Practice in Bankruptcy 
(19th ed, 1979) 249-254.
338
insolvent’s estate, acts in such a way as to ensure that there has been honest 
dealing.341
Unfortunately, the rule appears to be both circumscribed and in decline.342 It 
has been circumscribed in the sense that it is only available to a claimant who is 
unable to submit an ordinary proof of debt.343 The explanation of the restriction is 
that:
The rule is not to be used merely to confer a preference on an 
otherwise unsecured creditor, but to provide relief for a person who 
would otherwise be without it.344
Where a party is not able to submit an ordinary proof of debt, such as a wife in 
family court proceedings,345 the party may be successful. But many if not most 
unsecured creditors in the commercial context will not fulfil this requirement. 
Therefore, they will not be able to rely on the rule in Ex parte James.
This can be seen as another manifestation of the principle of rateable 
distribution.346 The problem is that a creditor may be in a position to seek a second 
insolvency, but the assets which the insolvent had acquired from them are used to
For examples of where the principle has been referred to with approval or applied: Re Craig & 
Sons: Ex parte Hinchclijfe [1916] 2 KB 497; Re Thelluson; Ex parte Abdy [1919] 2 KB 735; Re 
Regent Finance & Guarantee Corp [1930] WN (Eng) 84; Re Henderson; Ex parte Tonkin (1934) 7 
ABC 273; Re Docker; Ex parte Official Receiver (1938) 10 ABC 97; Re Roberts; Official Receiver v 
Lincoln Investments Ltd (1976) 26 FLR 330. Re Wyvern Developments Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 1097.
342 For examples where the principle has not been applied see Re Hall: Ex parte Official Receiver 
[1907] 1 KB 875; Tapster v Ward (1909) 101 LT 503; Re Stokes; Ex parte Mellish [1919] 2 KB 256; 
Re Wigzell; Ex parte Hart [1921] 2 KB 835; Official Assignee of Turnbull’s Estate v Goldstein (1921) 
29 CLR 377; Scranton’s Trustee v Pearse [1922] 2 Ch 87; Re Wilson; Ex parte Salaman [1926] Ch 
21; Re Gozzett; Ex parte Messenger & Co Ltd v The Trustee [1936] 1 All ER 79; Re De Wit; Ex parte 
Custom Credit Corporation Ltd; Official Receiver (1961) 19 ABC 63; Re Roberts; Official Receiver v 
Lincoln Investments Ltd (1976) 26 FLR 330; 12 ALR 730; Re Byfield (a bankrupt); Ex parte Hill 
Samuel & Co Ltd v Trustee o f the Property of the Bankrupt [1982] Ch 267.
343 Hunter and Graham, above n 340, 250; Re Clark (A Bankrupt); Ex parte The Trustee v Texaco Ltd 
[1975] 1 WLR 559; Re Ayoub; Ex parte Silvia (1983) 67 FLR 144; Re Sabri; Ex parte Brien v 
Australia and New Zealand Group Ltd [1996-1997] 21 Farn LR 213.
345 Re Ayoub; Ex parte Silvia (1983) 67 FLR 144; Re Sabri; Ex parte Brien v Australian & New 
Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1996-1997] 21 Farn LR 213.
346 Chapter 1, 32-34.
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pay debts under the first insolvency. Under the second insolvency there are no assets 
to start with.347 It is also necessary to show that the assets of the insolvent have been
348enriched. However, what is meant by enriched is not clear.
It has been also held that the rule is only applicable where the acts or 
omissions of the insolvent are attributable to the administrator. Thus, even if the 
property is traceable, the courts have not always been willing to accede to proprietary
1 • 349claims.
This form of defence has the prima facie effect of ensuring that the 
insolvent’s estate remains augmented. It is antithetical to the swollen assets theory350 
and artificially segregates the activities of the insolvent from the actions of the 
administrators. The result is a perverse accretion of additional assets for distribution 
amongst the other unsecured creditors. It may well be that in the future, analysis will 
shift focus on whether the plaintiff took the risk as was considered in Re Ayoub; ex 
parte Silvia. 251 Such an analysis would concentrate on the dual issues of risk 
assumption and the insolvent’s unconscionable conduct rather than the artificial 
segregating of assets.
3 Change of Position
The defence of change of position is allied to the traditional defence of delay 
in the sense that both defences highlight that it would be unconscionable to impose
352liability on the defendant in the light of the defendant’s changed circumstances. 
The defence is also allied to estoppel353 because both defences require evidence that 
the defendant has acted to his own detriment on the faith of the receipt. However, the
347 Re Ayoub; Ex parte Silvia (1983) 67 FLR 144.
348 Hunter and Graham, above n 340, 250.
349 See for example Re Wigzell: Ex parte Hart [1921] 2 KB 835; Downs Distributing Co Pty Ltd v 
Associated Blue Star Stores Pty Ltd (in liq) (1948) 76 CLR 463, 483-484 (Williams J); Westpac v 
Markovic (1985) 82 FLR 7, 11 (Zelling J).
350 Chapter 4, Part IV.
351 (1983) 67 FLR 144, 148-149 (Morling J).
352 Lipkin Gorman (A Firm) v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548, 579-580 (Lord Goff).
353 Mason and Carter, above n 12, [2404], [2406]-[2409],
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defence of estoppel is generally more difficult to prove because a collateral 
representation has generally been required in order to successfully plead estoppel.354 
A representation that a defendant was entitled to money cannot be implied from the 
payment itself. The change of position defence also differs from estoppel in the sense 
that change of position is activated by the fact that the defendant has changed his or 
her position on the faith of the receipt (rather than the active representation of the 
plaintiff) . 355
The defence of change of position is a powerful tool. A defendant who is able 
to avail himself of the defence, would, on the basis of his own actions in good faith, 
preclude the plaintiff of a personal remedy. Presumably, if the plaintiff was 
precluded from obtaining personal relief, then it would be unlikely that a court would 
provide proprietary relief. In an insolvency context, this would mean that the 
plaintiff would not even sustain the status of an unsecured creditor.
The defence of change of position has been recognised in the law of
356restitution. Whilst some of the features of the defence of change of position remain 
unclear and unsettled, certain criteria must be fulfilled. In order to activate the 
defence, a defendant must show that expenditures have been made on the basis that 
the payment was valid. The defendant must have acted in good faith and the defence 
is not open to wrongdoers. Therefore, it is unlikely that the defence would be
3^4
" National Mutual Life Association v Walsh [1987] 8 NSWLR 585, 596-598 (Clarke J).
355 Mason and Carter, above n 12, [2409].
356 David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353; Lipkin 
Gorman (A Firm) Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548; State Bank of New South Wales v Swiss Bank Ltd 
(1995) 39 NSWLR 350.
357
See for example Goff and Jones, above n 13, Chapter 40; Burrows, above n 281, 421-431; Peter 
Birks, ‘Change of Position: The Nature of the Defence and its Relationship to Other Restitutionary 
Defences’ in Mitchell Mclnnes (ed), Restitution: Developments in Unjust Enrichment (1996) 49; 
Michael Bryan, ‘Change of Position: Commentary’ in Mitchell Mclnnes, Restitution: Developments 
in Unjust Enrichment (1996) 75; Damien O’Brien, ‘Change of Position: The Past, the Present and the 
Future’ (1995) 25 Queensland Law Society Journal 511; Paul Key, ‘Change of Position’ (1995) 58 
The Modern Law Review 505; M Mclnnes, ‘The Defence of Change o f Position in the Law of 
Restitution,’ (1996) Australian Business Law Review 313; Tina Cockbum, ‘Restitution: The Defence 
of Change of Position After David Securities’ (1994) 24 Queensland Law Society Journal 95; Robert 
Chambers, ‘Change o f Position on the Faith of the Receipt’ (1996) 4 Restitution Law Review 103; 
Richard Nolan, ’Change of Position’ in Peter Birks (ed) Laundering and Tracing (1995) 6.
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Lipkin Gorman (A Firm) v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548, 579 (Lord Goff); Mason and Carter, 
above n 12, [2419].
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available to defendants who have, prior to the transaction, acted unconscionably.359 
However, it is not surprising that the defence has been pleaded in other situations 
where the defendant could be expected to rely on the validity of the payment, such as
360where the plaintiff mistakenly made a payment to the defendant.
The defence will not be available simply on the basis that the defendant has 
made an expenditure. The defendant will have to show that the defendant spent the 
money solely on the basis of the receipt and that it is unlikely that the expenditure 
would have been made without it.361 The defence is not available where the funds 
have been spent on ordinary living expenses, so that the expenditure must be made 
on extraordinary, as distinct from ordinary, items. It is unclear at this stage whether 
the defendant must precisely identify the expenditure made with the receipts or 
whether the defence will operate so long as the funds have been expended364 
(although the latter is to be preferred). The defence operates pro tanto.365 Therefore, 
it is only an effective defence to the extent that the defendant has expended the funds 
solely on the basis of the receipt on extraordinary items.
Despite the need for further clarification of the precise parameters of the 
defence, courts should take a cautious attitude. Certainly, the defence should only be 
available in situations where the insolvent has arguably acted unconscionably after 
the commercial transaction commenced.
359 See the note written by Peter Butler in [1993] Restitution Law Review 55, § 18 on Mercedes-Benz 
(NSW) Pty Ltd v ANZ and National Mutual Royal Savings Bank (Unreported judgment of 5 May, 
1992, 48-49 Palmer JA).
360 David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank o f Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353.
361 Lipkin Gorman (A Firm) v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548, 580 (Lord Goff).
36" Ibid; David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank o f Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353, 385-386 
(Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
363 See the discussion in Rural Municipality o f Storthoaks v Mobil Oil Canada Ltd (1975) 55 DLR 
(3d) 1, 13 (Martland J).
364 Moritz v Horsman 9 NW (2d) 868 (SC Michigan, 1943).
365 Lipkin Gorman (A Firm) v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548, 580-581 (Lord Goff).
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VI Conclusion
In this chapter, the two remaining parts of the theory of objective non­
assumption of risk were considered, namely, the proprietary remedy and possible 
defences.
It was argued that, generally speaking, the appropriate proprietary remedy for 
objective non-assumption of risk would be a general equitable lien over the assets of 
the insolvent. Such a lien would represent a new development and extension of the 
kinds of equitable charges and liens in our legal system. It would also give effect to 
doctrinal developments inherent in the adoption of the theory of objective non­
assumption of risk.
As a theoretical construct, a general equitable lien has not been tested in the 
courts. And, as the discussion in this chapter indicates, there are a number of 
substantive issues which arise from the practical application of a general equitable 
lien. However, these practical issues must be faced and not simply dismissed. As 
modem commercial transactions become more complex and equitable tracing 
becomes increasingly impractical, new remedial responses to unconscionable 
conduct need to be found. The general equitable lien is not undermined by the fact 
that practical and doctrinal problems still need to be worked through. Rather, these 
problems indicate that traditional remedial responses to unconscionable conduct are 
in urgent need of review. Thus, the application of the general equitable lien 
represents the culmination of the application of the theory of objective non­
assumption of risk and the discussion foreshadows that courts and commentators will 
continue to identify salient issues.
The same can be said about the defences discussed. Equity has countenanced 
defences to actions based on unconscionable conduct and there is no reason why 
such defences should not be available where a plaintiff claims objective non­
assumption of risk. The parameters and workability of some of the defences 
considered are still to be worked out. This will become important as claims for 
proprietary relief continue to be made.
In this and the previous two chapters, the underlying rationale and practical 
application of the theory of objective non-assumption of risk were discussed. The 
conclusion summarises the thesis and considers the potential impact of the theory of 
objective non-assumption of risk.
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CONCLUSION: EQUITY’S DOMAIN
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I Introduction
The focus of this thesis has been the issue of how and when proprietary relief 
should be available where one party has transferred money or goods for sale to a 
party who becomes insolvent. It is contended that this issue can no longer be simply 
answered by recourse to traditional proprietary rules and legal mechanisms.
Modem capitalism is transacted in a more sophisticated way than in 19th 
century England. In particular, technological developments have challenged 
traditional forms of money, the way that money is transferred between parties and 
the characterisation of commercial relationships. Just as Lord Mansfield was 
required to innovatively respond to the legal issues created by the way 18th century 
commerce was transacted, so too, we are challenged to creatively and carefully 
respond to commercial change. Without a careful response at this stage, our legal 
system will be unable to cope with the further and likely changes in the 21 st century.
Fortunately, today legislatures and judges alike are less reticent about 
intervening in commercial transactions than their counterparts in the 19th century. 
Some of the flaws of an untrammelled capitalist system from a legal perspective 
were highlighted in Chapter l .1 Therefore, even though a particular commercial 
situation does not fall within traditional characterisations or certain traditional rules 
cannot be applied, courts should not be precluded from providing relief in otherwise 
arms-length transactions. However, any such proprietary intervention must be 
undertaken on a principled and legally justifiable basis.
II Unsecured Creditors
The basic context is that a creditor transfers money or goods for sale to a 
party who becomes insolvent. The creditor is unsecured. Without the existence of a 
traditional security device, the creditor will stand behind preferred and unsecured 
creditors. From the unsecured creditor’s perspective, the practical effect can be 
catastrophic. At the end of the day, there may be insufficient assets available to 
partly or fully pay out the unsecured creditors. Therefore, a unsecured creditor will 
try and argue that despite his unsecured status, he should be accorded a secured 
status because of the nature and circumstances of the transaction. If such arguments 
were accepted each time an unsecured creditor sought a secured and preferential
* Chapter 1, 20-22.
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Status, the way that transactions were legally effected and the administration of 
insolvencies would be uncertain and chaotic.
One way of dealing with this problem is to assert that notwithstanding the 
nature of and the circumstances surrounding the transaction, an unsecured creditor 
cannot be accorded a higher secured and preferred status. It could be argued that such 
insolvency regimes such as the Banbuptcy Act 1966 (Cth) do not contain a specific 
provision which empowers courts to elevate the unsecured creditor to a secured or 
preferred status. Therefore, the concept of an unsecured creditor should remain a 
unitary concept and administrators and courts alike should not be entitled to 
investigate and consider the reasons why a party was an unsecured creditor. 
However, this approach is not tenable.
As previous discussion has highlighted, there are some specific cases where 
legislatures have singled out unsecured creditors for special and preferred treatment. 
Such unsecured creditors are accorded a preferred status which entitles them to stand 
ahead of all other unsecured creditors. Although the list is a relatively small one, it is 
necessary for the operation of such insolvency regimes. Otherwise, insolvency 
regimes would operate unfairly against administrators and employees.
It has also been noted that insolvency regimes such as the Bankruptcy Act 
1966 (Cth) do not preclude the operation of the general law, particularly equity, 
where appropriate. The legislation recognises equitable mechanisms such as the 
trust2 3 and equitable securities such as the equitable lien.4 Moreover, the legislation 
specifically states that courts may make such orders, including equitable remedies, as 
the court thinks fit.5 Therefore, the legislation does not preclude an order for 
equitable proprietary relief, where the court considers that such an order is necessary. 
Whether such relief is warranted, depends upon the general law rather that the terms 
of the legislation.
Moreover, courts exercising equitable jurisdiction have made it clear that 
where necessary, they will intervene in insolvency situations to ensure administrators
2 Chapter 1, 33; Chapter 7, 323-324.
3 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 116 (2) (a).
4
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 5.
5 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 30 (1) (b).
346
do not unfairly incorporate property into the insolvent’s asset base which does not 
properly belong to the insolvent.6
To treat unsecured creditors as an undifferentiated mass of creditors is to fail 
to acknowledge that there are a variety of reasons why such creditors may be 
unsecured. Therefore, whilst in most cases the unsecured creditor is and can only 
remain unsecured, there will be a relatively small number of cases where the creditor 
has a legitimate argument that he should be elevated to a secured and preferential 
status. The simple division between secured and unsecured creditors which is so 
entrenched in property law and insolvency administration, is an inadequate 
bifurcation of creditor status in these kinds of cases.
Another way of dealing with this problem is to acknowledge that our legal 
system does elevate unsecured creditors to a preferred status in a limited range of 
cases. Indeed, the discussion throughout Chapter 2 illustrated the kinds of 
mechanisms which equity has used to do so. Our 19th century legal heritage has been 
helpful in determining when proprietary interests exist or where proprietary relief 
should be available. However, the underlying substratum of commercial contexts and 
technological innovation has rendered existing methodologies inadequate in a small 
but significant group of cases. The kinds of situations where proprietary relief is 
necessary were illustrated in Chapter 6.
Ill The Role and Rationale of Equity
Having located that a relatively small group of unsecured creditors may argue 
that they should be accorded a secured status as against other unsecured creditors, it 
is necessary to consider how and on what basis that preferential status ought to be 
achieved. In general terms, where a party is initially unsecured, a secured status is 
established by the recognition of, or the award of, proprietary relief in the form of a 
trust or equitable lien - both creations of equitable jurisdiction. Thus, it has been 
contended throughout this thesis that both the rationale for proprietary intervention 
and the mechanisms for intervention will be derived from equity. The principal 
reason for such an assertion is that equity, rather than the common law, has 
developed and sustained proprietary mechanisms which have effectively operated in 
insolvency situations. Although this thesis did not discuss at length the traditional 
equitable securities (such as the equitable mortgage and the equitable charge), it is
6 Ex parte James; Re Condon (1874) LR 9 Ch App 609.
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important to emphasise that these kinds of securities have formed the basis for the
7development of sophisticated and complex commercial security arrangements . In
8addition, the trust in its various forms which is not recognised as a security device, 
has important security implications. It splits ownership between two separate parties, 
so that if the trustee becomes insolvent, the assets subject to the trust are not 
available for distribution amongst the creditors of the trustee.7 *9 Having identified 
important equitable mechanisms, it has been argued that it is necessary to analyse the 
modem rationale for these mechanisms. By doing so, it is possible to determine what 
further kinds of cases equity will avail proprietary relief.
At this time, there appears to be no single justification for the recognition and 
award of proprietary relief in equity. This could be interpreted as indicating that the 
theoretical basis of equity is confused and uncertain. However, this is not an 
interpretation consistent with this thesis. Rather, it was pointed out in Chapter 1 that 
equity is undergoing a period of renewal and transformation. Its profound interaction 
with, and intervention in, commercial relationships has meant that, equity has not 
only progressed from its ecclesiastical origins to a secular jurisdiction, but that the 
operation of the modem secular jurisdiction is becoming commercially orientated 
and clearer.
At this point, there are possibly five approaches for governing the application 
of equitable proprietary mechanisms. All of these interpretations have surfaced for 
discussion throughout the thesis and it is appropriate to identify and juxtapose them 
for the purpose of the conclusion.
A first approach is to argue that equitable proprietary mechanisms and 
intervention should be limited to the narrowly defined and pre-existing traditional 
categories of equitable proprietary relief. The kinds of mechanisms which fall within 
the traditional purview were discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. Therefore, traditional 
equitable securities such as equitable mortgages and charges are the product of 
mutual intention and operate in favour of mortgagees and chargees to secure them 
against the insolvency of the mortgagor or chargor. Equitable proprietary relief
7 See generally, Edward I Sykes and Sally Walker, The Law o f Securities, (5th ed, 1993), Chapter 7; 
William James Gough, Company Charges (2nd ed, 1996).
g
Sykes and Walker, above n 7, 12.
9 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 116 (2) (a); DWM Waters, Law o f Trusts in Canada, (2nd ed, 1984) 13- 
14.
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would be available to remedy breach of fiduciary duty and in accordance with certain 
specific equitable doctrines. But, even here it should be noted that not all fiduciary 
relationships extend proprietary protection.
The advantage of this approach is that the criteria for equitable proprietary 
mechanism and equitable proprietary relief is clear and limited to apparently 
traditional modes of equitable intervention. However, such an approach is flawed. It 
does not take into account the modem context such as changing technological 
underpinnings and the faster pace in which commercial transactions take place. It 
does not posit how equity should respond to commercial change. It suffers from an 
overall sense of incoherence - there is no overarching principle which binds equitable 
intervention together - except perhaps, a reference to the need to prevent 
unconscionable conduct. Therefore, there is no meaningful and systematic principle 
which may be applied to determine the nature and possible further extent of equitable 
intervention in the future. Essentially, it utilises equitable proprietary securities and 
equitable proprietary relief in an entirely mechanical way. The danger of this 
approach is that the dynamics and flexibility of equity in its original and modem 
form are lost.
A second approach is to describe the existence of equitable mechanisms on 
the basis of mutual intention or equitable wrongdoing narrowly defined. This 
approach is similar to the first one - except that it allows a party which stands outside 
traditional categories to access proprietary relief where there has been equitable 
wrongdoing in a narrow sense. Again, traditional equitable securities operate in 
favour of mortgagees and chargees to secure them against the insolvency of the 
mortgagor or chargor. Where there is no mutual intention to create a security, then 
the unsecured creditor has three options open to it. The unsecured creditor may be 
able to show a trust or fiduciary duties regulate the relationship and impact upon the 
distribution of assets in an insolvency. Another option is that he may be able to 
access certain specific traditional equitable doctrines which entitle him to proprietary 
relief such as subrogation or marshalling. The final option open to the creditor is that 
he may be able to establish that the insolvent was guilty of wrongdoing in the sense 
that prior to or at the time of the transaction, the insolvent acted unconscionably. So, 
for example, the unsecured creditor may be able to establish that he is entitled to 
proprietary relief because there were fraudulent misrepresentations before the 
contract was entered into or the gift was the product of the undue influence of the 
insolvent. This approach is consistent with the majority decision in Westdeutsche
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Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council} 0 The advantages 
and disadvantages of this interpretation are similar to those identified in the first 
interpretation, except that the underlying principle of equity is utilised more 
effectively.
A third approach is that equity cannot provide a coherent principle for the use 
of equitable proprietary mechanisms. This interpretation is connected to the first 
interpretation in one fundamental aspect. Both interpretations are more concerned 
with utilising equitable proprietary relief rather than connecting them to a coherent 
modem rationale explaining and determining the extent of equitable relief. However, 
this is a dangerous course to follow, because, at its most extreme, it dislocates 
equitable proprietary relief from equitable doctrine altogether. The work of some 
modem restitution lawyers highlights this trend very clearly. In order to succeed, 
these theorists have subsumed areas of traditional equitable jurisprudence into the 
law of restitution and they have also sought to identify equitable proprietary 
mechanisms which have restitutionary characteristics.* 11 The results of their analyses 
are highly innovative and interesting schemes in which the rationale for equitable 
intervention is carved out of the proprietary shell which is then filled with 
restitutionary rationalisations. Moreover, such analysis may torture and recast 
traditional proprietary modes beyond recognition. Thus, the situation remains 
inherently confused and unsatisfying. One is left wondering whether a simpler and 
more coherent scheme is possible.
A fourth approach is that equitable intervention is available when a judge 
considers that it is necessary to redress the perceived unconscionable conduct (or 
unjust enrichment) of the insolvent or unconscionable outcome. Unconscionability 
operates as an abstract concept upon which both the decision and outcome of the 
case is rationalised. The danger is that insolvency administration is determined on 
the basis of a subjective interpretation of unconscionability. Therefore, equitable 
intervention may be piecemeal and ad hoc. Certainty of principle and predictability 
is impossible where unconscionably is an abstract standard.
The fifth interpretation stresses that it is no longer possible to adhere to 
traditional modes of equitable relief or to torture such traditional modes beyond
10 [1996] AC 669.
11 See for example Peter PH Birks, ‘Equity in the Modem Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’ [1996] 26 
The University o f Western Australia Law Review 1; Robert Chambers, Resulting Trusts (1997).
350
recognition in order to reach a satisfactory outcome. Rather, it is necessary to 
identify the raison d ’ etre of modem equity. Equity no longer operates on the basis 
of an ecclesiastical or canonical notion of subjective conscience (although some 
important modem equitable mechanisms such as the trust were the product of the 
ecclesiastical conscience). Instead, as society became secularised, so did equity. 
Moreover, as commercial certainty was required, so too equity abandoned subjective 
notions of conscience in favour of objective standards. In addition, the operation of 
modem equity in commercial relationships is explicable on the basis of risk 
assumption. As discussed in Chapter 2, commercial risk assumption may explain the 
operation of trusts, some fiduciary relationships and undue influence because there 
has been no assumption of risk of insolvency by a beneficiary or a party upon whom 
undue influence has been exercised. It would be the unconscionable conduct of the 
insolvent which would (without equitable intervention) cause the unsecured status of 
the beneficiary or unduly influenced party. It is for this reason that equity intervenes 
and provides proprietary relief.
The possibility of a coherent scheme for equitable intervention beyond 
traditional bases is enhanced by the adoption of commercial risk assumption as a 
rationale. The underlying assumption of the modem capitalist system is that parties 
bear the risks and consequences of the commercial relationships they enter. 
Therefore, such parties must take their own initiative to minimise any potential risks 
of the transaction including the potential insolvency of the other party. The 
fundamental premise of this essentially laissez-faire thinking is that parties will act 
self-interestedly, but honourably. However, this is a flawed assumption. Self interest 
and high-minded conduct are not always compatible with commercial conduct. 
Therefore, even in the laissez-faire heyday of the 19th century, equity was compelled 
to impose fiduciary obligations and develop equitable doctrines such as subrogation. 
Equity intervened to protect parties who placed trust and confidence in commercial 
advisers and operators. Equity also intervened to prevent unconscionable ‘advantage- 
taking’ of vulnerability and special disadvantage. As modem transactions and 
technology have become more complex, the need for equitable proprietary 
intervention has not abated. Rather, it is increasingly obvious that equitable 
proprietary intervention can no longer be limited to traditional equitable relationships 
or to protect innately vulnerable persons. As the discussion in Chapter 6 has 
indicated, business persons may legitimately call upon equity to intervene in 
commercial transactions. The development of the constructive trust as a remedy in 
various jurisdictions also supports the need for equitable intervention. Such 
situations may be more limited or less frequent than the traditional areas of equitable 
relief - but they are no less real.
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The theory of objective non-assumption of risk represents a co-joining of the 
general rationale for equitable intervention together with the rationale for equitable 
proprietary intervention, non-assumption of risk. In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the theory of 
objective non-assumption of risk was developed and applied as an explanation of 
why and how equity intervenes in certain commercial transactions and not in others. 
It has been contended that the theory may be used as a modern and coherent rationale 
for the continued efficacy of equity’s traditional mechanisms such as the trust or 
fiduciary obligations. However, its operation was considered in essentially 
commercial transactions concerned with the transfer and receipt of money, many of 
which do not fall within equity’s traditional purview. Central to the theory is that it is 
the conduct of the insolvent which has placed the creditor in an unsecured position; 
and, objectively speaking, the creditor could not have been expected to avoid or 
minimise the risks associated with the transaction.
IV The Operation of Equity in the 21st century
Having identified a modem rationale for equitable proprietary relief and 
developed a theory of objective non-assumption of risk, the question is - what does 
the theory show about the future possible direction of equity in the 21st century? It is 
submitted that the theory indicates that there will be substantial shifts in the way that 
equity operates in commercial relationships and insolvency administration. It also 
portends that important further policy issues will need to be addressed.
Indeed, the theory demonstrates a number of possible trends which are likely 
to radically change the way we perceive how equitable proprietary relief ought to 
operate in insolvency administration.
The theory of objective non-assumption of risk indicates that the so-called 
law of restitution may be simply part of a broad concept of equitable unconscionable 
conduct. As was shown, the concept of unconscionable conduct in equity has been 
wider than some commentators and judges have suggested, with the result that the 
modem law of restitution is probably part of the law of equity - or at least is 
explicable on equitable terms and objective non-assumption of risk The advantage of 
such a common rationale for equitable proprietary intervention would be the 
development of a single doctrinal system for equitable proprietary relief.
Thus, if it were accepted that the concept of unconscionable conduct is 
broader than some commentators and judges have envisaged, the unnecessary divide
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within equity between ‘unjust enrichment’ and ‘unconscionability’ would begin to
12disappear. As Tipping J stated in Lankow v Rose:
The various roads which have been identified have different
1 Tsignposts, but...they all lead to Rome.
Instead, the focus would be upon determining whether there had been an objective 
non-assumption of risk.
The theory of objective non-assumption of risk also signals that the supposed 
hard line between proprietary and personal remedies is breaking down. For some 
authors, such a prospect is troublesome. 14 However, more than fifty years ago, Noyes 
recognised that the development of the specific lien had precisely that effect. 15 In 
certain circumstances, equity provided proprietary relief to parties who would have 
otherwise had only recourse to personal relief under the contract. 16 What is occurring 
is that equity is beginning to develop a general approach to proprietary relief in 
contractual and bilateral relationships. However, such a general approach is neither 
unprincipled nor untrammelled.
Another related aspect to the breakdown of the divide between proprietary 
and personal relief is that, at least in relation to money, the pre-condition of a 
proprietary base for proprietary relief is increasingly untenable. Technological 
innovation increasingly precludes a practical fulfilment of the condition. As presaged 
by the swollen assets theory, the nexus between ‘property’ and proprietary claims 
will become less important; and traditional personal actions may ground proprietary 
relief in cases where there has been an objective non-assumption of risk.
As the case law and this thesis already demonstrate, outside traditional 
equitable relationships and remedies, equity does not and cannot operate on a rule
12 [1995] 1 NZLR277.
13 Ibid, 293.
14 David S Cowan, Rod Edmunds and John Lowry, ‘Equitable Tracing and Swollen Assets Theory’ 
(1995) 1 Contemporary Issues in Law 1.
15 C Reinold Noyes, The Institutions o f Property: A Study o f the Development, Substance and 
Arrangement o f the System of Property in Modern Anglo-American Law (1936) 370. Note also Sykes 
and Walker, above n 7, 8.
16 Chapter 2, 73-75.
17 See also Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583, 612-616 (Deane J).
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based scheme. A rule based scheme is, arguably, certain. But, it may lack an inherent 
flexibility to respond to a changing world and may preclude equitable proprietary 
intervention. Thus, traditional rules are beginning to break down. Equity will be 
called upon to intervene in commercial relationships where there is no formal 
fiduciary obligation and the funds in dispute are no longer traceable. It is suggested 
that equitable intervention will be based on two contextual factors. First, there will 
be an evaluation of the conduct of an insolvent in the light of the principle of 
unconscionability. Such a principle is not legally abstract. It has real meaning 
because various kinds of unconscionable conduct have been identified in the case 
law. However, it is not rigid. It is possible that new forms of unconscionable conduct 
may be identified by courts in the future. Secondly, equity will also consider the 
market context of the commercial transaction and the capacity of the creditor to 
avoid or minimise risk. Therefore, equity is moving from a proprietary jurisdiction 
constructed on set relationships and rules towards a proprietary jurisdiction based on 
the appraisal of conduct against general and flexible criteria.
However, when equity does intervene in commercial relationships, it must do 
so more sensitively than previously. It has been argued that in most circumstances, 
the constructive trust is not the appropriate response to unconscionable conduct 
where money is concerned. Rather, it has been posited that equitable proprietary 
relief needs to take the form of security rather than a trust. If this suggestion were 
followed, the equitable lien rather than the constructive trust would become the main 
form of proprietary relief where money was in dispute.
Another related area requiring sensitive judicial analysis is the award of 
interest where proprietary claims are made.
If equitable proprietary intervention expands the way posited, an interesting 
issue will be the extent to which the rule in Barnes v Addy will remain relevant. In 
the past, where assets have not been traceable in the hands of a wrongdoing 
insolvent, if it has been possible to locate the assets in the hands of the third party 
who knowingly received them or knowingly assisted in the breach of fiduciary 
duty. 19 The meaning o f ‘notice’ remains a problematical issue.20
1 R
(1874) LR 9 Ch App 244.
19 Westpac Banking Corporation v Savin [1985] 2 NZLR 41; Lankshear v ANZ Banking Group (New 
Zealand) Ltd [1993] 1 NZLR 481.
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The theory of objective non-assumption of risk may affect the demand for 
third party liability in two ways. First, if a proprietary base is no longer required as a 
pre-condition for proprietary relief, an aggrieved creditor may succeed against the 
insolvent on the basis of objective non-assumption of risk without the need to 
investigate the conduct of third parties. Therefore, the creditor’s action would be 
refocussed on the conduct of the insolvent rather than whether or not a third party 
had notice of wrongdoing. Secondly, where the insolvent has insufficient assets to 
cover the creditor’s claim, the question would be whether the creditor would be able 
to bring an action against a third party, such as a bank. The theory of objective non­
assumption of risk operates beyond the boundaries of traditional equitable 
obligations, such as receipt of property subject to fiduciary obligations or knowingly 
assisting a breach of fiduciary obligations which are pre-conditions to relief under 
Barnes v Addy. If third parties (who did not owe fiduciary obligations) were liable 
because they had notice of the insolvent’s unconscionable conduct when they 
received the assets or assisted the insolvent, then the concept of notice would have to 
be more clearly defined than it is at present.
Finally, previous attempts to adapt pre-existing equitable proprietary 
mechanisms, such as fiduciary obligations or the resulting trust, have tended to 
obscure important policy issues which lie ahead. Here the issue is how far should the 
broad principle of unconscionable conduct traverse insolvency schemes. It was noted 
earlier in this chapter that the bifurcation of creditors, according to whether they are 
secured or unsecured, is helpful but sometimes inadequate. Yet, at the heart of 
insolvency administration is the assumption that unsecured creditors are entitled only 
to a rateable distribution of the assets which are not subject to securities. This thesis 
has demonstrated that the rateable distribution principle is and ought to be 
inapplicable to certain kinds of creditors, namely, those creditors who did not 
objectively assume the risk of being an unsecured creditor. It was argued in Chapter 
7 that such creditors should be granted proprietary relief to enable them to stand 
ahead of other unsecured creditors. However, the extent to which a creditor affected 
by the unconscionable conduct of the insolvent, should stand ahead of unsecured 
creditors is contentious. From a purely equitable perspective, unconscionable 
conduct should be addressed by appropriate remedial relief including, where
20 See for example Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378; Baden v Societe Generale 
pour Favoriser le Developpement du Commerce et de ITndustrie en France SA [1983] BCLC 325; 
[1992] 4 All ER 161.
21 See for example Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 373.
355
necessary, proprietary relief. However, the operation and effect of proprietary relief 
(whether in the form of the remedial constructive trust or a general equitable lien) 
could impede the effective operation of traditional securities. The interest of a 
constructive beneficiary or a general lienee may take priority over established 
security holders. As the Privy Council in Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (In 
Receivership) indicated, it is unclear how courts will proceed. Whilst equity is able 
to intervene and modify the effect of the statutory scheme, the kind of modification 
inherent in the remedial constructive trust and the general equitable lien may 
question the underlying thrust of insolvency schemes such as the Bankruptcy Act 
1966 (Cth). Therefore, not only judges, but also insolvency policy makers, need to 
reconsider the integral status of secured creditors vis-ä-vis unsecured creditors who 
seek relief due to an objective non-assumption of risk.
As stated at the beginning of this thesis, one of the most difficult issues 
facing commercial and insolvency lawyers of the late 20th century is defining the 
circumstances in which proprietary relief is available to unsecured creditors of 
insolvents. The tortured and uncertain path towards resolution of this issue has been 
the result of legacies of the 19th century and the imperfect and incoherent way our 
legal system has regulated the blemishes of an otherwise untrammelled laissez-faire 
capitalist system. However, as this thesis propounds, a resolution of this issue lies in 
an investigation of the nature of equity’s capacity to provide proprietary relief. It is 
predicted that lawyers in the 21 st century will re-affirm that the award of proprietary 
relief (in whatever form it takes) is and will remain part of equity’s domain.
22 [1995] 1 AC 74, 104 (Lord Mustill).
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